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THE IDEA OF GOD

AND

THE MORAL SENSE

IN THE

LIGHT OF LANGUAGE.

BEING A PHILOLOGICAL ENQUIRY INTO THE RISE AND
GROWTH OF SPIRITUAL AND MORAL CONCEPTS.

BY

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Heb Dduw heb Ddim; Duw a digon.

ياهو ياهو يامن لايعلم ماهو الآهو

Es rauschen den eingeborenen Ton
Der Wald, das Meer seit Jahrtausenden schon;
Geschlechter schwanden und sind gekommen,
Sie haben des Urlieds Klang vernommen,
Und konnten aus all dem Wogen und Wehen
Ein einziges Wort nur: „Gott“ verstehen!

Feodor Löwe.

Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ Λόγος.

Zwei Dinge erfüllen das Gemüth mit immer neuer und zunehmender Bewunderung und Ehrfurcht, je öfter und anhaltender sich das Nachdenken damit beschäftigt: der bestirnte Himmel über mir und das moralische Gesetz in mir.

Kant.

Ἀγιασθήτω τὸ ὄνομά σου.

יהוה אֱדַבְּרֵנוּ מִהֶאֱדָר שְׁמֶךָ בְּכִלְהָאָרְצִין:

PREFACE.

When dealing with concepts of languages little known and understood we have thought it well in each case to give an outline of the grammar and ideology, together with the Pater Noster, and in this connexion we gratefully acknowledge our indebtedness to Prof. Friedrich Müller's most excellent *Grundriss der Sprachwissenschaft*.

Nor must we fail to mention our obligation to Prof. Tylor's invaluable work on *Primitive Culture*, and to Curtius' *Grundzüge*.

It is hoped that the various classifications at the end of the work may prove useful not only to the philologist but to every one who delights to trace the mental progress of the race. The psychological classifications are those of Professors Steinthal and Oppert; the genealogical linguistic classification is that of Prof. F. Müller, the theistic is our own.

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
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INTRODUCTION.

HE tendency of modern thought is undoubtedly toward that unification of knowledge which is so essential to all human progress. Alike in science, religion and philosophy there is a call for exact correspondence between external fact and internal thought. Science, on the one hand, is advancing toward transcendentalism, combining with its results the principles of philosophy, whilst philosophy, on the other, is learning to operate only on those abstract symbols which are the rational equivalents of their concrete reals. Such, indeed, are the dangers of the specialist that, unless he occasionally take a glance over the whole field of research his point of view is apt to be too circumscribed for him to be able to obtain or retain a far-reaching generalisation. Particularly is this the case with the theologian and moralist who, ignoring the comparative method, have looked each at his own science for his own special purpose, the result being that neither has often had a vision of total truth.

Now it seems to us that it is the light of Language which must be thrown on these sciences in order to reveal their true nature and significance. In few fields of learning have such epoch-making discoveries been lately made as in semasiology. Students of language have brought many costly gifts to the Adyton of science, and it is some of those

gems, those dealing more especially with man's ethical and spiritual consciousness, which it is here attempted to lay bare.

Accepting the definition of moral philosophy as 'the science which teaches men their duties and the reasons of them' the comparative philologist is able to show not only what this philosopher or that poet thought of Obligation, but what has been conceived of God, of Duty, and of Right and Wrong by the *universal human mind*. Interesting and important as it is to find out the views of Confucius and Aristotle on Virtue, of Kant on conscience, of Spinoza on the nature of the Deity and of Wordsworth on Duty, those of mankind at large are surely not less worthy of attention. We have, then, to place under the microscope of the etymologist the words for what Cicero has so happily termed the *igniculi et semina virtutum, quae sunt earum quasi principia et fundamenta*.

And here we must remember that it must be a polar examination, resulting from the application of the historical method. That such antinomies of thought as many and one, whole and part, subject and object, matter and mind, are necessarily conceived as correlatives is the common dictum of all philosophies, however otherwise opposed. If there is a law of consciousness which may be looked upon as original or final it is surely that which tells us that, absolute unity is a mere verbal abstraction, that, apart from phaenomena 'force' has no meaning, can only be known in manifestation, that the infinite is in the finite, the inner itself the outer; namely, the law of relativity. The question mooted so long ago at the first flush of speculative thought: Πῶς δέ μοι ἔν τι τὰ πάντ' ἔσται καὶ χωρὶς ἑκάστων; may perhaps be best answered by a re-statement of the problem. Every thing is a group of relations, every thought involves relation, likeness, difference; that is to say, thinking is a synthesis of thesis and antithesis in rapid alternation. The

proof is not only psychological but also linguistic. In our own Aryan the same root *tak* has given us different words for the deepest of all correlations, that, namely, of *thoughts* and *things* and for the possibility of expressing either or both.

thing : think : : denken : bedingen.

If in the macrocosm two phaenomena A and B habitually appear together and the phaenomenon A is presented to the senses, upon the state *a* which is produced in the microcosm the state *b* immediately follows representing the phaenomenon A. But the thought-process does not end here. Since in the outer world the phaenomenon B is just as much the antecedent of A as A is of B — since the expressions ‘antecedent’ and ‘consequent’ are only applicable as the order of our experience, it follows that, as often as the state *b* is induced the state *a* necessarily follows. So long as the relation remains the subject of thought, there must be this rapid alternation of thesis and anti-thesis. To use Mr. Spencer’s illustration: If the outer lines and colors of a body are presented there at once follows on the resulting consciousness the consciousness of something resisting; and conversely, if in the dark a body is touched, on the resulting consciousness there follows that of something extended. But in no case is this all. When the idea of extension recedes, that of resistance does not wholly disappear. Both continue to be thought of as it would seem almost simultaneously; and since the two members of the relation cannot be apprehended in absolutely the same state of consciousness, since, further, the lasting consciousness of them cannot be one state of consciousness, which is equivalent to no consciousness, it follows that the seemingly-ceaseless presentation of both is in reality a rapid alternation, an alternation so swift that it produces the effect of persistence, just as the changing impressions to which the retina is subjected by the pictures at the opposite sides of a revolving thaumatrope induce a con-

ciousness of the two pictures as merged into one. From a logical point of view Prof. Bain says the same:

'The essential relativity of all knowledge, thought or consciousness cannot but show itself in language. If everything that we know is looked upon as a transition from something else, every experience must have two sides, and either *every name must have a double meaning*, or for every signification there must be two names. We cannot have the perception 'light' except as motion from the dark, our consciousness is affected in a particular way by the transition from light to dark and from dark to light. The word 'light' has no meaning without that which is contained in the word 'dark'. We distinguish the two opposite transitions, light to dark, and dark to light, and this distinction is the only difference of meaning in the two terms: 'light' is emergence from dark; 'dark' is emergence from light. Now, the doubleness of transition is likely to occasion double names being given all through the universe of things; languages should be made up, not of individual names, but couples of names.'

If, as we have every reason to believe, the residuum of speech, the root, apperception-stuff or perceptual reflex were originally either the emotional or mimetic repetition of a syllable, then we can well understand how, in the synthesis, one syllable would represent the positive and the other the negative. Thus in Egyptian we find *Menmen* to stand ✓ to move; in Joruba *baba* great ✓ small. A differentiation would be *Ruhe-Hurry*, etc., metathesis of sound for inversion of meaning. Of radical polarity we have several instances, notably in the Hamito-Semitic family of speech. E. g. Egyptian: *Ma* to give ✓ to take; *tûa* to honor ✓ to despise; *tûs* to separate ✓ to bind; *ôp* to meet ✓ to part; *suo* to flow ✓ to dry up; *bâh* empty ✓ full; *kef* to take ✓ to let lie; *ken* strong ✓ weak; *tem* to cut to pieces ✓ to unite; *terp* to take ✓ to give, and *ken* to stand ✓ to go; hierog.: *lauu* kept: *le* someone ✓ none.

Hebrew: *birēk* to bless √ to curse.

Arabic: *bānnah* pleasant scent √ a stench; *bāʾa* to buy √ to sell; *āṣāna* he pushed him back √ it pleased him; *bāus* force √ fear; *bālta* to separate √ to complete; *bāsaʿa* *bīhī* to rejoice, make glad √ to despise; *bāka* to weep √ to sing; *tabāllada* to rule √ to be subject; *jātana* to cleave to the ground √ to raise oneself a little above the ground; *hārada* to take refuge in something √ to separate from something; *kālaʾa* to rob √ to endow; *dālaʿa* to hurry √ to go quietly; *dintuhu* or *dajjantuhu* I asked him for a loan √ I received from him a loan; *zāmaʿa* to be quick √ to go with short steps; *sābaḥa* with its double antitheses: to swim √ to dig into the ground, to be busy √ to be at leisure; *sāḡada* to throw oneself down (for prayer) √ to stand upright; *sūmma* to poison √ to set right; *aṣḡāhu* it caused him pain √ it made him happy; *šarība* to have quenched one's thirst √ to be thirsty; *šāzaba* to destroy √ to repair; *tašāzaba* it became united √ it became scattered; *ʿadala* to act justly √ to turn away from the right path; *afraḥa* to cause joy √ to rob of joy; *fāraʿa* he went up √ he came down; *fāza* he made his fortune √ he died; *ḡārazahu* he made him a loan √ he received from him a loan; *ḡāšaba* to spoil √ to adorn. and *ḡāšabe* to refuse to drink √ to drink.

Aryan examples are: —.

Skt: *upa* above √ below

Latin: *sacer* holy √ accursed; *prōpugnāre* to attack √ to defend; *praevenīre* to go before, help √ to come behind, hinder; *cūriōsus* full of care, sad √ inquisitive, glad.

Persona √ personne; Rem √ Rien; Aliquis √ Aucun; hostis √ guest.

French: *prévenir* assister √ empêcher.

German: *Boden* ground √ loft; *bannen* to hold fast √ to exclude; *gegen* towards √ against.

English: *square* to agree ✓ to disagree; *fast* rest
 ✓ motion; *shame* modesty ✓ disgrace; *ravel* to
 entangle ✓ to disentangle.

As regards *let* and *cleave* in which different roots have come to be identical by mere outer change, it is a question whether, to the English linguistic consciousness, they are polar words or not.

The early framers of speech could only realise thought by thesis and antithesis, likeness and difference. If great resemblance had to be expressed it could only be done by negation; the good was only the relatively bad, until, with the progress of thought, arose separation and distinction of positive and negative. Of the three phases of primitive speech, namely, antonymy (each sound expressing opposed meanings), homonymy (every sound having any meaning) and synonymy (every meaning being expressed by any sound) the first would seem to be alike the oldest and most interesting, but in our enquiry we must take note of all. Hitherto students of language have, for the most part, been engaged in seeking and formulating the laws of phonetic changes, but a far more important study is that of the laws of conceptual evolution as manifested in the rise and fall both of word-meanings and grammatical forms. How are concepts generated and concatenated? How are impressions co-ordinated? These are the questions that interest the psychological student of human speech.

By more than one apostle of the mind it has lately been maintained that all future philosophy will be a philosophy of language. Not only do we find the higher order of linguistic students renouncing the purely grammatical and syntactical standpoint for the exploration of the borderland between philology and philosophy, but psychologists themselves are beginning to see that language is not so much the garment as rather the body of reason, and that the problems of reason, or the mythology of philosophy,

can only be solved by a critique of Language. It is possible, no doubt, to think in sight and to see in thought: modes of mind can certainly be represented in architecture, sculpture and painting, but no fine art in its richest forms can tell us such a simple fact as: last summer there was a bad harvest. Again, in nature everything is either necessary or contingent; there is no still small voice to whisper: 'thou canst, for thou must!' In other words, sequence of time and moral obligation can only be expressed in verbal symbols. We are thus led at once to consider the relation of language to thought, to seek the origin of Reason, to see whether the dawn of mind was not also the sunrise of the moral sense, whether conscience and consciousness did not rise together.

VOLUME I.

THE HISTORY OF SPIRIT


AND

THE THOUGHT OF GOD.



CHAPTER I.

THE HISTORY OF SPIRIT.

F the many realms of knowledge upon which progressing philology has thrown a flood of light, there is surely none more fascinating to the student of man than that of ethical and spiritual concepts. Language has made most of our riddles in ethics and religion, and must therefore be made to solve them.

Now, in matters of scientific discovery there is perhaps no safer maxim than the well-known aphorism of Bacon:—

Sola spes est in verâ inductione.

But nowhere has it been on the whole so persistently neglected as in the attempts to explain the rise and fall of moral and religious ideas. And yet it is precisely in an examination of the fundamental facts of man's common religious and ethical consciousness that the inductive method should prove most fruitful. What philology and ethnology have done to strengthen the tie that binds the individual to his fellow-man, we venture to think comparative conceptology will do for the broadening and deepening of his faith. In dissecting the various forms of human speech we are not only laying bare the progress of culture, but are writing the history of the evolution of the moral sense. Thus, if we wish to know what stage in


the development of ethical or religious thought has been reached by the different branches of mankind, we must examine their words for *God*, for *sin* and *righteousness*, *falsehood* and *truth*, *good* and *evil*, *love* and *hatred*, *soul* or *spirit*.

In the following pages we propose to give such a chapter of ethics from an analysis of language; to listen to the voice of conscience in the temple of speech. It is not too much to hold that, in the multiform manifestation of language we have a *contemporary antiquity* and are able, as Goethe would say, to look into great maxims of creation, nay, into the secret workshop of God! The consideration of the cell-element of all religious or ethical thought, namely, the concept of Deity or the idea of right and wrong can thus vie in interest with the astronomer's study of galaxy and nebulae, of systems and of worlds. To trace the history of the name which is above every name, to gauge the supreme concept, to arrive at a truly scientific derivation of the words for the All-Father, which, from the cradle to the grave, express for each his sublimest thought, his best feeling, his loftiest aspiration, must be to every reverent observer, be he ethnographer or psychologist, historian or antiquarian, a very choice delight.

On the hypothesis of man's evolution from some lower organism the question naturally presents itself: is there no life of the soul in some of the higher mammalia, no possibility of a pre-human ethical or religious consciousness? Have not the animals morals and religion? It certainly has been maintained, and more especially by von Hartmann, that the attitude of many domestic animals toward man is undoubtedly of a religious nature. In so doing, however, there can be little doubt that the unconscious philosopher looks at the question too much from an anthropopathical point of view, which leads him to overlook the fact that, owing to its lack of verbal symbols whereby impressions

become co-ordinated, animal consciousness must necessarily be too fleeting to be called religious or moral. Surely the great difference between animal and human consciousness is that, whereas in the one case it is purely substantive with no differentiation of form, in the other form assumes a separate existence, a fixity in independent mental images. The reason why the animals do not speak is in no wise to be found in externals but essentially in psychical momenta. It is possible for the animal to grow up in human society to a great extent as the child does. It not only exactly apprehends speech-sounds, but can itself produce them and yet—it cannot speak. Nay, it can understand other signs and can even project itself into the mood of others, fully taking part in human life, though more as rogue than as a worker. In many respects it is wiser than ‘John’ and ‘Jane’, and yet it does not learn to speak. Why not? Let us first of all remember that one does not become wise by speaking; the animals may be very wise and not a little clever in adapting means to ends: the lack of language does not make them stupid. That is to say, it is not the content of consciousness which is immediately affected by language, but only its form. A talking man may have less mental content, less mental mobility than the animal, but he has his content in higher form. Of course, under favorable circumstances the higher form will further the content. The form of animal consciousness is *perception*, that of human consciousness is *apperception*, which constitutes the fourth stage in psychical development. Feeling, sensation and perception may be completed and thoroughly comprehended without speech, but apperception is only possible with the help of language. ‘Speech is form, speaking formation.’

We have, then, to do with man, and when we say with man we mean, with the author of Genesis, עֲלָם אֱלֹהִים. It is not necessary for our purpose to determine the dimensions of the protogenes Hæckelii or to investigate the capabilities

of Huxley's bathybius. All we say, is that, what the Turanians call 道, the Sēmites נֶפֶשׁ, the Hamites , and what we Aryans call आत्मा or Λόγος is to be found in man alone, however long it may have been evolving. It is astonishing how firm a hold this truth had upon the best minds of the Roman world. Cicero says of man: 'Deus homines, primum humo excitatos, celsos et erectos constituit, ut deorum cognitionem, caelum intuentes, capere possent'. 'Sed nostra omnis vis,' writes Sallust, 'in animo et corpore sita est; animi imperio, corporis servitio magis utimur; alterum nobis cum Dis, alterum cum bellis commune est. Quo mihi rectius videtur ingenii quam virium opibus gloriam quaerere.' And Ovid sings:—

Os homini sublime dedit, coelumque tueri
Jussit, et erectos ad sidera tollere vultus
Sic, modo quae fuerat rudis et sine imagine, tellus
Induit ignotas hominum conversa figuras.

As Prof. Steinthal well observes: 'If we are told that the Hottentots and Bushmen are nothing but *simiae lingua praeditae*, we answer with the king and poet of the Hebrews when he says of man (psalm 8): attamen paulhulo tantum Deo est inferior.'

In seeking the spiritual history of the various races of the globe let us begin by asking: what is the etymology of *spirit* and of *soul*? For, the biography of the word will show us how the concept was framed and named, and how man came to believe he could know so much more than he ever can know, to realise a world of thought far removed from that of sense.

Now, as is well known, our word spirit is the Latin spiritus 'breath', from spir-are (for spīs-â-re, speis-â-re, spois-â-re) 'to breathe'. The root is *spu* which underlies pūs-ula, pus-tula blis-ter; Sanskrit pupṣu-sa-s 'lung'; Greek φῦσα 'windbag'; Lithuanian pūs-ti 'to blow', and pus-lė 'bladder'.

From this root comes also the Greek ψυχή (= spu-ch-ê), which was destined to play so great a part in the history of philosophy. The direct descendants of 'spiritus' are the following:—

√SPU

<i>Italian:</i>	spirito	<i>Spanish:</i>	e-spiritu.
<i>Roumanian:</i>	spirit	<i>Oldform:</i>	e-sprito
<i>Portuguese:</i>	e-spirito	<i>Old-French:</i>	e-spir
<i>Catalan:</i>	e-sperit	<i>English:</i>	sprite, spirit
<i>French:</i>	e-sprit	<i>Welsh:</i>	y-sbryd.

Here we find the primary concept to be 'breath' or 'wind', and the question naturally presents itself: is this true of other words for spirit? Let us examine a few. The root of 'animus' and 'anima', 'mind', 'soul', is *an* 'to breathe', as may be seen from the following list of cognates:—

√AN

Skt.: **अनस्** an-a-s 'breath', **अनिलस्** an-ila-s 'wind'
 अनिमि an-i-mi 'I breathe', **अनोकस्** an-ika-s 'face'.

Send: **ਅਨਿਕਾ** ain-ika 'face' (originally 'mouth').

Greek: **ἀν-ε-μω-ς** 'wind'.

Irish: **an-a-man** 'revelry'.

Latin: an-i-mu-s 'mind'; an-i-ma 'soul'; an-i-mal.

French: â-me.

Gothic: **an-st** 'grace, favor'. **unz-an-a** 'I expire'.

Old High German: un-st 'wind'; an-do 'anger'.

Ags.: an-da 'anger'.

Old Norse: Ön-d 'soul, life'.

Swedish: andedrag 'drawing the breath'.

„ An-de 'spirit'; hellige Ond 'Holy Ghost'. (Norsk).

The change of meaning has nowhere been so great as in Latin. When, for instance, Cicero says: 'quaedam animalis intelligentia per omnia ea transit', we have to translate: 'a kind of living mind goes through them all.'

The mystery of *breathing* was the first to wake the wonder of our Aryan ancestors. When, wandering on the banks of the Sarasvatī and looking up at the blue dome above, the venerable R̥ṣi asked himself whence this great creation sprang, he could not but break forth into ‘mystic, unfathomable song’ :—

‘The birth of Time it was, when yet was naught nor aught,
Yon sky was not, nor heaven’s all-covering woof;
No life, no death, no amplitude of breath was sought
In those primeval days. What clouded all? what roof
Of many twinkling eyes, if need of such could be?
Unknown alike were sun and moon; no light or sound
E’er broke the awful sameness of that vast, wan sea;
The One alone breathed breathless, waiting, self-profound!’

आनीत् अवातं स्वधया तद् एकम्

R̥gvēda x. 129.

A matchless line, unrivalled in the poetry of any nation!

Similarly from a root $V\hat{A}$, metathesized AU we get:

Gothic: 𐌰𐌿𐍂𐌿 ‘spirit’, Ahma sunjōs ‘the spirit of Truth’.

$V\hat{A}U \cdot V\hat{A}$ ‘to breathe, blow’.

Skt.: वामि ‘I breathe’, वायुस् vâ-ju-s ‘wind’.

Sd.: 𐎧𐎡𐎴𐎧 vaju ‘wind, air’; 𐎧𐎡𐎴𐎧 vaja ‘The Death-Bird’,
which conducts the souls of the dead into the
Beyond.

Gk.: $V\hat{A}F$ ἄ-ω ‘I breathe’, ἄ-ος πνεῦμα, ἄη-μι ‘I blow’,
ἄη-τη-ς ‘wind’, αὔ-ρα ‘breath’, ἀήρ (= ἄφερ) ‘air’.
‘mist’; ἀ-ῖ-σθ-ω, ἀά-ζ-ω, ἀσθ-μα ‘difficult breathing’.

Lat.: ven-tu-s, ven-ter.

Eccs.: vē-j-a ‘I breathe’.

Lith.: vē-je-s ‘wind’, ó-ra-s ‘air, weather’.

Goth.: 𐌶𐌰-𐌿𐌱𐌴 ‘to blow, to breathe’. Ah-ma = ἄη-μα vi-nd-s
‘wind’.

An expansion of this root (*AU-T*) gives us the following important words:—

Skt.: आत्मन् ât-man 'breath, soul, self'.

Gk.: ἀϋτ-μήν 'breath, incense'; ἀτ-μός-ς 'mist, smoke'.

Old Saxon: âth-om. *Old High German*: ât-um 'breath'.

Ags.: æð-m 'breath'. *Modern High German*: Od-em.

Irish: adh-m 'cognitio', adh-ma 'gnarus'.

Again, from the root *PNU* come:—

Gk.: πνέ-ω 'I blow', πνεῦ-μα 'breath, spirit'; πνεύ-μων 'lung';
πε-πνυμένος 'intelligent'; πινυ-τή 'understanding'.

Lat.: pul-mo(n) 'lung'.

Eccs.: pluš-ta 'lung'.

Lithuanian: plaú-czei 'lung'.

Yet another root, with the same fundamental concept, has given us words for 'thought, spirit, soul'.

VDU

Skt.: धूमि d'û-nô-mi, धूत d'û-ta 'I shake, kindle'; धूमस् d'û-ma-s 'smoke'; धूलि d'û-li 'dust'.

Sd.: धूम dun-man 'mist, incense'.

Gk.: θύ-ω 'I rave, roar, sacrifice'; θύ-ν-ω 'I storm'; θύ-νο-ς 'assault'; θύ-ελλα, 'storm-wind'; θυ-μός-ς 'courage, passion, emotional frame of mind; soul'; θυ-μα, θυ-σία 'sacrifice'; θυή-ει-ς 'odorous'; θυμόμαντις 'having a prophetic soul'.

Lat.: fû-mu-s, 'smoke'; sub-fî-o 'I fumigate'; sub-fî-men 'incense'.

Russian: духъ 'spirit'; духъ святой Duk' svjatoj 'Holy Ghost'.

Boh.: du-ch; *Pol.*: du-ch; *Cro.*: du-h; *Gypsy*: dû-k 'spirit'.

Eccs.: du-na-ti 'to breathe'; dy-mu 'smoke'; du-chu 'spirit'; du-ša 'soul'.

Lith.: dú-mai (pl.) 'smoke'; du-ma-s 'thought'.

Goth.: daun-s 'odor'. *Olg.*: tun-s-t 'storm'; tou-m 'vapor'.

ON.: du-s-t 'pulvis'. *Eng.*: du-s-t.

The conceptual evolution here is very significant:—

- α) d'ûmas 'smoke'
- β) θυμός 'soul'
- γ) dumas 'thought'.

Anglosaxon *gâst* 'spirit', *gâst-banu* 'devil', i. e. 'spirit-murderer', German *Geist*, English *Ghost* all point to the same idea, for, they are connected with *gas*, *yeast*, *geyser*.

On the other hand *soul* is connected with *sea* and *swell*.

γ SU

Skt.: सुनोमि su-nô-mi 'I press juice'; सवम् sav-am 'water';
सूमम् sū-ma-m 'milk, water'; सूनस् sū-na-s 'river'.

Umbr.: sav-itu 'rain'.

Gk.: ὕει 'it rains'; ὕ-ε-τό-ς 'rain'. σείω (= σφε-ῖω) 'I shake';
σάλο-ς (for σφέ-λο-ς) 'oscillation, hesitation'; σάλαξ
'sieve'; σαλαγῇ 'tumult'.

Lat.: salu-s, salu-m = σάλος.

Goth.: 𐌱𐌹𐌶𐌰 'sea'; 𐌱𐌹𐌶𐌰𐌱𐌰 'soul'.

Ohg.: swe-ll-an 'to swell'; wider-swal-m.

Ags.: japul 'soul'. *Dan.*: siel. *Isl.*: saal. *Dutch.*: ziel.

Ger.: See, Seele, schwellen. *Eng.*: sea, soul, swell.

Compare for a moment now we know the etymology, English *soul*, German *Seele*, French *âme*, with *Geist*, *esprit*, *spirit*.¹

All three former words may be said to denote the whole of consciousness—idea, feeling, will, though not quite in equal degrees. Soul, Seele, âme form the world within, the κόσμος νοητός as Plato would say. These forceful and beautiful words express that deep and mysterious well whence issue and flow the streams of our manifold being. Who can say when it will be exhausted? How truly the poet sings:—

‘Kein Dichter hat sein Tiefstes ausgesungen,
Kein Maler je sein Tiefstes hingestellt.
Tief liegt es in der Seele Dämmerungen
Ein dunkles Sein, von keinem Strahl erhellt.’

¹ See Prof. C. Abel's "Psychology of Language."

But it is different, as Prof. Abel well points out, "if dividing the soul into its various capacities, we endeavour to mark out the proper sphere of each. Geist, esprit, and spirit indeed concur in that part of their comprehensive signification which approaches closely the meaning of soul. Seele, âme; the difference mainly consisting in soul emphasizing the capacity rather than its application, while spirit and its foreign kindred do the reverse. But the moment this capacity, which they all equally recognise, begins to enter on the sphere of action, the genius of each nation profits by the opportunity for the display of its own peculiar calibre and taste. The German Geist discovers the more delicate features, resemblances and dissemblances of things, without expressly attending to their more patent qualities, qualities which they have in common with many other things and which reason and sense suffice to ascertain. Geist endeavours to penetrate the essence of matter—I had almost said, to enter into the Geist of a thing, so identified is the term with inner individuality and special type. French esprit certainly proceeds on the same lines, but, in conformity with the peculiar workings of the Gallie mind, shows a tendency to illustrate speciality by strong contrast, and, as brief and daring comparisons are apt to be incorrect, frequently succeeds in being more brilliant than true. As regards the English term spirit, in this particular application, it is essentially a sensible quality, but it is sense shaded off with a warm appreciation of what is correct, right and true. Instead of pretending to weigh, gauge, and assess the very soul of a person or an object, as the German and French relatives of the English term undertake, spirit is content to discern main facts and clothe them with colors supplied by principle and sense alike. The diversity of national character stands out well in these various ways of distinguishing the leading forces of the soul. The German endeavours to penetrate the inner essence of things by patient

research; the French attempt to reach the same goal by brilliant leaps; and the steady-going, confident, and hearty valuation of surrounding objects by English sense equally betray some of the leading characteristics of the three national types compared."

This examination of the more cultivated idioms has shown us that, roots, be they reflected sound-gestures or evolved phonetic types, are for the most part indicative of *human action*, pointing thus to the significant fact that, man was, before all, conscious of his own activity, that it was to him the best known, the most intimate of all. And this truth will become clearer when we go on to consider the speech of tribes of the lowest order.

Among the West Australians we find the same word for 'breath,' 'spirit,' 'soul,' namely, *Waug*, whilst in the Netela language of California *Piuz* means 'life, breath, soul.' To the Malays of Java 'breath, life, soul' are all expressed by *ñava*, which at once reminds us of the Hebrew and Arabic נֶפֶשׁ *nefeš*, نَفْسٌ *nafs*, רוּחַ *ruak*, رُوح *rūh*, the stages of development being identical. Of the Seminoles of Florida we are told that, 'when a woman dies in childbirth the infant is held over her face to receive her parting spirit, and thus acquire strength and knowledge for its future use.' At the death-bed of an old Roman the nearest kinsman used to lean over—et excipies hanc animam ore pio—to inhale the last breath of the departing!

The various terms *life, mind, soul, spirit, ghost* are not so much descriptive of really separate entities, as rather the several forms and functions of one individual being. Indeed, the doctrine of Animism, so admirably enunciated and worked out by Dr. Tylor in his 'Primitive Culture,' lies at the root of primitive man's philosophy of life.

According to Malagasy psychology, the *saina* or mind vanishes at death, the *aina* or life becomes mere air, but the *matoatoa* or ghost hovers round the tomb. The Karens

distinguish between the *lâ* or *kelah*, the personal life-phantom, and the *t'ah*, the responsible moral soul. In the same way the Fijians make a distinction between a man's 'dark spirit' or shadow, which goes to Hades, and his 'light spirit', which is a reflexion in water or a mirror, and stays near where he dies.

In savage biology the functions of life are said to be caused by the soul. Of one insensible or unconscious it is alleged, in the language of the South Australians, that he is *wiljamarraba* i. e. 'without soul.' Some of the Burmese tribes, the Karens, for instance, "will run about pretending to catch a sick-man's wandering soul, or as they say with the ancient Greeks, his 'butterfly' (*leip-pja*), and at last drop it down upon his head." According to the Caribs, the chief soul of man, which is to enjoy the heavenly life, is to be found in the heart, hence *jouanni* means 'soul, life, heart.'

Again, Soul has been conceived as the phantasm of the dreamer and the visionary, that insubstantial form which is like a shadow and indeed has been often identified with it. In Arawak, for instance, *ueja* means 'shadow,' 'soul,' 'image.' Amongst the Algonquins a man's soul is described as *otahk'uk* 'his shadow,' and in *ki'ê* we have *natub* for 'shadow, soul,' whilst the Abipones employ the word *loákal* for 'shadow,' 'soul,' 'echo,' 'image.' Similarly amongst the South African tribes we have Zulu *tunši* and Basuto *seriti* for 'shadow,' 'spirit,' 'ghost.' Of the latter, indeed, it is said that 'if a man walk on the river bank, a crocodile may seize his shadow (*seriti*) in the water and draw him in.' The people of Old Calabar identify the spirit with the *ukpon* or 'shadow,' the loss of which is fatal. Nay, even in Christian Dante's Purgatory we find the dead know the poet to be alive, because, unlike theirs, his figure casts a shadow on the ground. According to Dante the dead soul forms for itself a shadow-body from the air by which it is surrounded. In

that lovely and touching scene in the *Purgatorio* (xxi. 130) between Statius and Virgil, when the former learns that Virgil is before him, he bends at once to kiss his feet, but Virgil holds him back with: 'We are both but shadows'; and he: 'Now thou canst measure the greatness of my consuming love for thee, which led me to forget that we are shadows, and to clasp shadows as though they were solid bodies.' In the Hebraic doctrine of the רפאים Rep'aim and the more or less obscure teaching of the Ékimmê in Assyria and Babylonia we again meet with the 'shadow-soul.' When the body dies, there is detached from it a sort of impalpable and invisible image or double, the רפה Râpêh which descends into שׁוֹל še'ôl, the Shadow-land, the Ékimmu which goes down to Arâlû

'The undiscovered country from whose bourn
No traveller returns.'

And now that we have learned a little about the rise and growth of the concept, it seems almost ludicrous to think of the amount of useless speculation as to the seat of the Soul. Aristotle placed it in the heart, Plato in the brain. Herakleitos, Kritios and the Jews sought for it in the blood, Epikouros, on the other hand, in the chest. More recently Ficinus placed it again in the heart; Descartes in the pineal gland—a little organ situated in the centre of the brain, containing sandy particles. Sömmering declared the soul's seat must be in the ventricles, and Kant in the water contained in them, whilst Huxley can only think of it as a 'mathematical point.' 'The brain,' says Büchner, 'is not merely the organ of thought and of all higher mental faculty, but also the sole and exclusive seat of the Soul.'

Already our study has shown us how great is the difference between the outer and the inner, the body and the soul of language, nay, between thought and its expression! Who would have thought that the same radical idea, the simple act of breathing, would have given us words for Mind and Wind, for Thought and Dust, for very Soul

itself? It is a remarkable fact in Sanskrit that the oblique cases to the substantive *svajam* are formed from *âtman*, and there can be no doubt that the Greek αὐτός comes from the same root *an* to breathe, just as in Arabic we find *nafs-û* 'self', and *hu* 'he', *harîjat* 'ipsecity' from *hava* 'to breathe, be'; and *nafs* 'breath, soul'.

animus : ἄνεμος :: d'ûmas : dumas.

It is perhaps not unnatural that 'the act of breathing, so characteristic of the higher animals during life, and coinciding so closely with life in its departure' should have repeatedly been 'identified with the life or soul itself.' But what a gulf between the *breath* of a savage and the *Âtman* of the Vêdânta, the udgî'ta, the Ôm, the Brahman of the Aryan world, representing the high-watermark of speculative thought and finding its best expression in the Upanîsads!

आत्मानम् आत्मना पश्य

To the uncultured mind it is simply 'in breathing see breath,' but to the philosopher, to the paṇḍit of Aryan thought it is: 'know the Self by the self,' i. e. know thyself to be a limited reflex of the eternal Self, that thy spirit is part of Spirit supreme! Hence Sadânanda, the author of the Vêdântasâra exclaims:—

Akaṇḍam Sak'îdânandamavanmanasagôkaram |
Âtmânamakîlâd'âramâsrajê 'bîstasidd'hajê ||

'In order to obtain my heart's desire, I flee to the indivisible Self of the World (Âtman), the Upholder of All, beyond speech and reason, and consisting of Being, Thought, Joy!'

Indeed I am not sure that we should not be justified in translating *Âtman* 'the Prayer of the World.' It is the λόγος of feeling, the incense of the heart, the Breath of the Eternal! What to the Hebrews was objective—עֶזְרָא the smoke of the sacrifice, was to the Aryans intensely

subjective, was, in fact, the aspiring will of man: Brahman (Vbarh). Ātman. εὐχεσθαι. молиться, orare, precari, bidjan. Unlike the children of Israel, the Arabs seem ever to have depended more upon the *inner* than the *outer*: ملوّة (from ملى).

How great, again, is the difference between the ψυχή of the Greek peasant and that of the Homer of philosophers! It has been truly said that, if not the best, Plato's definition of the soul is certainly one of the best ever written: τῷ μὲν θεῷ καὶ ἀθανάτῳ καὶ νοητῷ καὶ μονοειδεῖ καὶ ἀδιαλύτῳ καὶ ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα ἔχοντι ἑαυτῷ ὁμοιοτάτην εἶναι ψυχὴν. 'The soul most nearly resembles an essence which is divine, immortal, intellectual, homogeneous, indivisible, and always and uniformly the same.' Accepting the οὐσία or Eternal Substance of Parmenides, Plato argues that the forms of this universal οὐσία are certain eternal, simple and self-like (ὁμοιώματα) pictures, which exist in the human soul as νοήματα, immutable concepts. It is these alone which really exist, τὰ ὄντα, ὄντως ὄντα, and form the κόσμος νοητός. From them come all ideas of the True, the Beautiful and the Good, whilst the world of sense, κόσμος ὁρατός, has no real existence, is, in fact, the οὐκ ὄν. Indeed, the whole system may be described as a philosophy of the soul (φιλοσοφία τῆς ψυχῆς). God (ὁ νοῦς) has created the human soul immortal as part of himself, because it is itself the cause of motion (αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ κινεῖν), and because it is the necessary antithesis of the death of the body. The ψυχή has two parts (μέρη) by which it is united with the body: whilst the λογιστικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς or the νοῦς has its seat in the head, the animal part (τὸ ἀλογιστικόν or ἐπιθυμητικόν) is to be found in the abdomen, the θυμός or the θυμοειδές in the breast. The souls of men have not always been bound to this weak body; they might indeed be enjoying the eternal contemplation of the ἰδέαι

but having turned away from them, they have sunk into mortal bodies, wherein by memory (ἀνάμνησις) they pant after the eternal types!

It was, doubtless, in recognition of the *instinct* of immortality that the Greeks and the Karens were led to adopt the butterfly as the emblem of the soul. Dr. Owgan has well shown the twofold analogy between the two cases. Firstly, between the three states of existence through which the insect passes, and those through which the human being, if immortal should also pass. Secondly, between our spiritual instinct which leads us to anticipate another life, and that evident instinct which guides the lower animal to make preparation for the transformation of which it is impossible that it can have any fore-knowledge; from which it is naturally inferred that, as the instinct of the butterfly is infallible, so also is man's.

Between ψυχή and πνεῦμα there is precisely the same nuance of thought as between נִפְשׁ and רוּחַ, نَفْسٌ and رُوح. Perhaps this is nowhere so clearly seen as in Isaiah xlii. 1:—

הֵן עַבְדִּי אֶתְמַדְּבֹו בְּחִירִי רָצְתָה נַפְשִׁי נִתְּתִי רוּחִי עָלָיו מִשְׁפָּט
לְגוֹיִם יוֹצִיא:

Hên abdî etmâḵ-bô bk'iri rāztâh nafsî nât'atî Rûk'i âlâiv mišpât lagôjîm jôzî.

‘Behold my servant, whom I will uphold; my elect, in whom my *soul* delighteth: I have put my *spirit* upon him, that he may bring forth justice to the nations.’

As quoted in the New Testament:—

«Ἰδοὺ, ὁ παῖς μου, ὃν ἡρέτισα, ὁ ἀγαπητός μου, ὃν εὐδόκησεν ἡ ψυχή μου· θήσω τὸ πνεῦμά μου ἐπ’ αὐτόν, καὶ κρίσιν τοῖς ἔθνεσιν ἀπαγγελεῖ.»

The Arabs distinguish not only between نَفْسٌ Nafs and رُوح Rûh but between عَقْل Akl-i-kul ‘Universal Reason’, ‘Cosmic Intelligence’ and نَفْسٌ كُل Nafs-i-kul ‘all-embracing

Spirit. Over-Soul', which, as an emanation from God, is subordinate to the former.

It was the Πνεῦμα ἅγιον of which, on the day of Pentecost when the whole house was filled with the sound of a mighty, rushing wind, the Apostles were full. Nay, of the Eternal himself it is said that, He is Spirit: Πνεῦμα ὁ Θεός! This is the supreme revelation of the Son of Man to the children of God!

Spirit of all the spirits of our race,
Who of all souls art ever Over-Soul,
Thine is the creative secret, thine the roll
Of aeons and the stately stretch of space.
In thine infinitude for each a place
Be found as facet, jewel, or as Scroll
Whereon the alphabet of love, the whole
Of being, thought and joy thou mayest trace.
O Son of Man! the brotherhood of man
And sisterhood of woman in one faith
And fire of heart art thou, and thine the plan
Of service, till the gentle hand of death
Reveal the banner of all souls unfurled
In thee, o Heart, whose flutters fill the World!

Having thus traced the development of the concept *Soul* from the simple act of breathing to the sublime thought of God, let us go on to consider the predicate of Deity, which will show us how, in all ages though in different ways, man has been conscious of dependence on a Higher Power, a Nobler will than his own, and has panted after God as the hart after the waterbrooks.

The idea of God: was it evolved, revealed, or arrived at by a play of subjective intellectual activity?

In discussing this important question philosophers have, for the most part, employed the deductive method. Thus, so subtle a thinker as Hume tried to show that the idea of Gods arose out of the ignorance and fear which personified the "unknown causes" of the accidents and eccentricities of Nature, the idea of one God—Monotheism—out of the

gradual concentration of flattery and offerings on one of these personifications. According to him polytheism is the deification of many unknown causes of natural phenomena; monotheism the deification of one unknown cause. Comte supposed the so-called primitive fetishism to spring from infant or savage by a tendency which it had in common with dog or monkey to ascribe to natural objects organic or inorganic, a life analogous to its own. In Comte's view the individual passes, as the race has passed before him, through three states, the theological or fictitious, the metaphysical or abstract, and the scientific or positive. He says:—

“En étudiant ainsi le développement total de l'intelligence humaine dans ses diverses sphères d'activité, depuis son premier essor le plus simple jusqu'à nos jours, je crois avoir découvert une grande loi fondamentale, à laquelle il est assujetti par une nécessité invariable, et qui me semble pouvoir être solidement établie, soit sur les preuves rationnelles fournies par la connaissance de notre organisation, soit sur les vérifications historiques résultant d'un examen attentif du passé. Cette loi consiste en ce que chacune de nos conceptions principales, chaque branche de nos connaissances passe successivement par trois états théoriques différents; l'état théologique ou fictif; l'état métaphysique, ou abstrait; l'état scientifique ou positif. En d'autres termes, l'esprit humain, par sa nature, emploie successivement dans chacune de ses recherches trois méthodes de philosopher, dont le caractère est essentiellement différent et même radicalement opposé; d'abord la méthode théologique, ensuite la méthode métaphysique, et enfin la méthode positive. De là, trois sortes de philosophie, ou de systèmes généraux de conceptions sur l'ensemble des phénomènes qui s'excluent mutuellement; la première est le point de départ nécessaire de l'intelligence humaine; la troisième son état fixe et définitif; la seconde est uniquement destinée à servir de transition.”

In his 'Descent of Man' Darwin combines the various elements of an ascription of life to natural objects, dreams, fears, &c. Mr. Spencer considers the propitiation of dead ancestors, who are supposed to be still existing and to be capable of working good or ill to their descendants, the rudimentary form of all religion. Sir John Lubbock is perhaps the only man of any authority in England who considers that tribes of the lowest culture, representatives of primitive man, are utterly destitute of belief of any kind. The transition to fetishism he describes as arising partly from dreams and disease, and, in some cases, owing to divination and sorcery.

With the exception of Comte's, all these theories agree in the following propositions: α) that primitive man had no kind of idea of a God; β) that the animism of savagery was the rudimentary form of all belief; and γ) that, in the progress of the species from savagery to advanced civilisation, anthropomorphism grew into theology.

That these propositions, arrived at by the deductive method, are not tenable, we hope to be able to show by the application of the method of induction, by national and international linguistic analysis. We want, in fact, fewer theories and more facts; and for these facts we must look to the Logic of Signs or, in other words, to the Science of Language. It is customary with logicians to assume that, all objects of belief are susceptible of propositional form; but the evidence of language when examined ideologically will, I think, conclusively prove that, confidence in a Divine reality may be expressed in other than our familiar affirmative forms of language.

CHAPTER II.

ARYAN THOUGHTS OF GOD.

To begin with our own Teutonic concept of Deity, what is the etymology of "God?"

"Parmi les noms européens de Dieu", says M. Ad. Pictet, "qui n'ont pas de corrélatifs orientaux, mais dont quelques-uns peuvent être fort anciens, je ne m'occuperai ici que du gothique *Guth*, et de ses analogues germaniques. Les essais multipliés qui ont été faits pour l'expliquer montrent bien à quel point nous sommes livrés aux incertitudes étymologiques quand les termes sanscrits ou zends nous font défaut." Starting from the base *guta* M. Pictet would naturally look for a Sanskrit form घुत *ghuta*. Not finding this, however, he suggests that the Gothic word came from हुत *huta* (√*HU*), which has the double sense of *sacrificatus* and *is cui sacrificatur*, "et ce dernier conviendrait parfaitement à Dieu," giving us the formula

$$\text{हुत} : \chi\upsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma :: \chi\upsilon\tau\pi\alpha : \alpha\delta\epsilon\omicron\delta\omicron\varsigma$$

Now, though this may at first sight seem a tempting etymology, especially as we have the analogue यजत *yajata*, जासता *jasata*, يزدان *jaṣdān* and *Isten* (√*JAG*), yet I cannot but agree with Ebel that *Gud* and not *Guth* is the true Gothic form, as the corresponding term in old High German is *Kot*.

That "God" cannot come from "Good" will, I think, be no longer doubted by any competent philologist. Not only is it that in Gothic the vowels are different, *Gud* in the one case and *gôd* in the other, but there is the never-failing distinction between the long and the short vowel in

Anglo-Saxon. Let us take, for instance, two passages from Beóvulf (1554—1563):

And hálíg *God*
Geveóld víg-sigor, vitig drihten.

	bät väs væpna cyst,
Búton hit väs máre	þonne ænig mon óðer
Tó beadu-læce	ätþeran meabte
<i>Gôð</i> and geatolic	giganta geveore.

And in the following verse from St. Luke (viii. 19):—

Ða cwæð se Hælend: hwi segst þu me gôðne. nis
nan man *gôð* buton *God* ana.

In Gothic:—

Kvath than du imma Jaisus. hva mik kvthis gôðana.
ni ainshun *gôðs* niba ains *Gud*.

In Norsk:—

Men Jesus sagde til ham: Hvi kalder du mig *god*?
Ingen er god, uden Een, nemlig *Gud*.

The forms *Gud* and *gôð* in Gothic become, according to a phonetic law affecting the Aryan stratification of speech. *Kot* and *kuot* in Old High German. Of the former we have proof in a translation of St. Ambrose's three Hymns, beginning:—

Kotes kalaupu dera Iepames
Dei fide, quâ vivimus, etc.

whilst in the word *kuotchunti* for Gothic *gôðkundi* 'gospel', we have an interesting verification of the latter. It is a law as well understood and as regularly applied as the so-called 'Celtic process', according to which initial consonants are changed into others of the same origin, to denote a diversity of logical or grammatical relation. For instance,

Tad	'father'
Ei Dad	'his father'
Ei Thad	'her father'.

In his *Etymologische Forschungen* Prof. Pott suggested the root *śud* 'to purify', but we know that *śud* is a corruption of *kud* or *krud* (cf. καθ-αρός, cas-tus, cis-tu) which could only give us *Hud* or *Huid* in Gothic.

Similarly when Ebel connects *Gud* with Sanskrit *gud* (κυθ-ον, κεύθ-ω, cus-tos), the reply is that an Aryan form *kudā* would have given us what in fact we find, namely, *Huda*, *hide*, *Hut*.

Nor do I think Schweitzer and Leo Meyer have been more successful. The hypothesis of the one being *Guth* = véd. *Dāti*, because, forsooth, skt. *d* is sometimes reduced to *h*, and *h* = *g* Gothic! whilst that of the other is that *Gutha* is the original form and corresponds with *Guta*.

No, if we want an etymology which is to be of any scientific value, we dare not disregard the *Lautverschiebungsgesetz*. If the exact phonetic equivalent cannot be found in Sanskrit, let us turn to Ancient Bactrian.

What I venture to submit is that the word 'God' is derived from the Erānian verbal adjective 𐬐𐬀𐬎𐬌𐬎𐬎𐬎𐬎 *kudāta*, meaning 'self-evolved' or 'self-determined', 'obeying one's own law', as opposed to 𐬐𐬀𐬎𐬌𐬎𐬎𐬎𐬎 *stidāta* 'following the law of the world'. So far from agreeing with M. Pietet when he says: 'le *g* gothique, en effet, ne saurait en aucun cas répondre au *q* zend', it seems to me that a sound which is the equivalent of Pahlavi and Persian *k* cannot have been very different from Greek *χ*, which is the normal exponent of Gothic *g*.

Very remarkable are the passages in the Avesta in which the word *Kadāta* occurs. I shall quote at least three, firstly word for word, and then in M. Darmesteter's excellent translation.

𐬐𐬀𐬎𐬌𐬎𐬎𐬎𐬎	𐬐𐬀𐬎𐬌𐬎𐬎𐬎𐬎	𐬀𐬎𐬎𐬌𐬎𐬎𐬎𐬎	𐬎𐬎𐬎𐬎𐬎𐬎𐬎𐬎	𐬀𐬎𐬎𐬌𐬎𐬎𐬎𐬎𐬎
self-determined	Universe	Zoroaster	thou	Invoke
𐬀𐬎𐬎𐬌𐬎𐬎𐬎𐬎𐬎	𐬀𐬎𐬎𐬌𐬎𐬎𐬎𐬎𐬎𐬎	𐬀𐬎𐬎𐬌𐬎𐬎𐬎𐬎𐬎	𐬀𐬎𐬎𐬌𐬎𐬎𐬎𐬎𐬎	
high-in-action.	Vaju	boundless	True	

‘I call upon Mərəşu. In the creation of the two spirits the Ancient-of-Days, who follows His own law, was a mighty warrior.’

K’ad’âta is composed of K’a ‘self’, and dâta, the perfect participle passive of 𐬓𐬢𐬀 (Skt. d’â, Gk. θε) ‘to lay, make, create’. Hence ‘law’ as that which is ‘laid down’. The Sanskrit equivalent is स्वधात *svad’âta*, for, Old Bactrian 𐬔𐬀 *k’a* is another form of 𐬔𐬀 *hva* which represents Skt. स्व *sva*. We have seen that it is used both as an adjective and as a substantive, and I think it is not going too far to hold that we have here an Aryan phonetic type expressing a concept of Deity.

To this etymology proposed by me, it is only right to state that, Prof. de Harlez has objected on the following grounds: firstly, that the expression *svad’âta* is not Aryan, that, outside the Avesta it is nowhere to be found; secondly, that it never designates the divinity. Ahura Maşda is not described by *K’ad’âta*. He argues that, in the third century of our era when the Germans already used the word *Guth* the Persian-Pahlavi *k’udât* was nothing but a transcription of the Avestic and that the *k’udâ* of the fifth and sixth centuries had the exclusive sense of ‘king’, ‘master’, ‘chief’. “How should the Germans”, he asks, “who were besides in the north of Europe, have understood and borrowed a term unknown beyond certain mountainous districts of Asia? What motive could they have in adopting and applying it to God?”¹

Now, in the first place, my answer is that, although the form *Svad’âta* is peculiar to the Avesta, the expression *Svad’â* (स्वधा), which is a personification of माय, is thoroughly Aryan, and is used in connexion with the worship of deceased ancestors. Thus, in the Bāgavad-Gītā (ix. 16) it is the solemn religious exclamation of those who offer an

¹ The Babylonian and Oriental Record: Vol. 1, No. 7, page 109.

oblation to the Manes. And though *kād'âta* is not specifically applied to Ahura Maşda, it is applied to *Şrvâna-akarana*, boundless Time, by which deity, according to at least one sect of the Persians, Ahura Maşda was created. Alike from 'Sahrâstâni, from the reports of the Armenians Esnik and Eliseus and from Damascius, as Prof. Spiegel informs us, we learn that, the Zervanites hold that *Şrvâna-akarana* is really the eternal unconditioned Ruler, that he created Fire and Water and that from the union of these two elements Ahura Maşda arose.

Thus स्वधा and 𐬯𐬀𐬭𐬀𐬎𐬌𐬭𐬀 may well have been permanently before the Aryan religious consciousness, nor is it more surprising to find *kād'â* among the Goths as *Gul* than to know that an obscure son of Aditi—भग—has become the Supreme Being to the Slavonic nations—БОГЪ. Let us but look at the following list of cognates:—

√D'Â

<i>Aryan:</i>	स्वधात	Svad'âta
<i>Old Bactrian:</i>	𐬯𐬀𐬭𐬀𐬎𐬌𐬭𐬀	K'ad'âta
<i>Pahlavi:</i>	𐬎𐬀𐬭𐬀𐬎𐬌𐬭𐬀	K'utât
<i>Parsi-Gujarati:</i>	𐬎𐬀𐬭𐬀𐬎𐬌𐬭𐬀	K'ôdâo
<i>Persian:</i>	خدا	K'udâ
<i>Kurdish:</i>	juout	K'ôdê
<i>Pâştu:</i>	خداي	K'udâi
<i>Osseti:</i>	Xyuaŷ	K'uzau
<i>Kâsmiri:</i>	خداین	K'udâin
<i>Sind'î:</i>	خُداء	K'udâ
<i>Urdu:</i>	خدا	K'udâ
<i>Dâk'ani:</i>	خُدا	K'udâ
<i>Muslim-Bengâli:</i>	𐬎𐬀𐬭𐬀𐬎𐬌𐬭𐬀	K'ôdâ

<i>Kumikian:</i>	خدا	K'udā
<i>Gothic:</i>	𐌿𐍅𐌺	Gud
<i>Icelandic:</i>	Guð	
<i>Swedish:</i>	Gud	
<i>Norsk:</i>	Gud	
<i>Anglo-Saxon:</i>	God	
<i>Low German:</i>	God	
<i>Frisian:</i>	God	
<i>Flemish:</i>	God	
<i>Dutch:</i>	God	
<i>English:</i>	God	
<i>Old High German:</i>	Kot	

Thus, alike in extension and intension, this Aryan concept of Deity is a truly noble one; it is the *absolutism of the supreme*—‘Law unto Himself’, Lawgiver to man.

‘God is law, say the wise, o Soul, and let us rejoice,
For if He thunder by law, the thunder is yet His voice.

Law is God say some; no God at all, says the fool.
For all we have power to see is a straight staff bent in a pool.

And the ear of man cannot hear, and the eye of man cannot see,
But if we could hear and see this vision—were it not He?’

And what of Slavonic БОГЪ, which is to Russians, Bulgarians, Servians, Slovenians, Croatsians, Bohemians, Wends, Slovaks and Poles the supreme thought? As already hinted Бѣгъ, modern Богъ Bog is really the Vêdic भग B'aga, one of the sons of Aditi. Here again, however, it is not to India but to Erân that we must turn for the supremacy of the concept. In the Vêda the place of B'aga is always one of subordination. Even amongst the Âditjas, the phases and forms of the Infinite, he is by no means chief. Thus we read (ii. 27. 1):—

इमा गिर आदित्येभ्यो घृतमूः ।
सनादाजभ्यो जुहुश्चा जुहोमि ।
D

शृणोतु मित्रो अर्थमा भगो नः ।
तुविजातो वरुणो दत्तो अंशः ॥१॥

Imâ gira Âditjêb'jô g'rtasnûh |
Sanâdrâgâb'jô guhuâ guhômî |
Śr̥pôtu Mitrô Arjamâ B'agô nah |
Tuviġâto Varuṇô Dakṣô Anśah || | ||

May this song be poured forth to the Âditjās:
I bring the offering to the Kings of long ago!
May Mitra, Arjaman, B'aga hear us!
Varuṇa, Dakṣa, Anśah, the mighty-born!

Nowhere do we find भग as a synonym of देव *dêva* ब्रह्मन् *Brahman* or आत्मन् *Ātman*. In the minds of those early Aryan poets he was but one of the many sides of the अदिति *Aditi* by which they were surrounded.

But to the dwellers in Erân he had become Ahura Maşda himself. In an Inscription of Alvend we read:

|| Baga vaşraka Auramaşdâ hja imâm bumim
God great Ahura Maşda who this earth
adâ hja avam asmânam adâ hja martijam
created, who that heaven made, who man
adâ hja śijâtîm adâ martijahjâ hja dârajavaum
made, who plenty made of (= for) man, who Darius
k'sâjat'ijam akumauş aivam parunâm k'sâjat'ijam aivam
king made one of the many kings one
parunâm framâtâram
of the many rulers. ||

Again, in the Avesta there are at least three passages where *Baġa* cannot but apply to Ahura Maşda. In one of the hymns addressed to Haoma, the Vêdic Sôma, we read:—
(Jasna x. 26—27).

հալաւորաւ փօսյ * ԲՅՈՒՅ-ԲԵՍՅ ասօճ ԲՅՈՒՅԱՅԻՆ
 աստուծո

Aurvañtem t'wâ dâmi-dâtem Bagô tataşad hvâpâo.

The God who fashioned thee, the swift dispenser of wisdom, was a supreme Artist!

Prof. Spiegel translates:—

‘Dich, den grossen Spender der Weisheit, bildete ein kunstreicher Gott.’

The same sentence follows, with հաճայջ nidatad for հալաւորաւ tataşad.

Then, in the 19th Fargard of the Vendîdâd, which constitutes the framework of the whole book and gives us the wonderful history of Šaratuštra's temptation and victory, we find the following (78):—

ԲՅՅԱՆՈՒՄՆՈՅՆ-ՓՆՅԱ ասճայջ-ՓՅԱԲ-ԵՍՓԻՆ ԴԱՍ
 -ՆՆՆԱ ԲՅՅԱՆՈՒՅ-ՓՆՅԱ ԲՅՅԱՆՈՒՄ ՆՆՆ ԴԱՍՈ ԲՅՆՈՒՅՓԱՅԻ
 աստուծոյ փա՛ն

Āad Vohu-manô-nidaitis sūro-t'war-stanām raok'agām
 jad hē stārām Bagô-dâtanām aiwi-raok'ajâoñti.

And the prayer of man shall be under the mighty structure of the bright heavens, by the light of the God-given stars!

Now, भग *Baga* comes from √भञ्ज *bağ* just as ասայ *Bağ* is derived from √բայ *bağ*, the fundamental meaning being ‘to bestow’. Hence from this root we have many words expressing *fortune, property*.

√BAG to bestow, to obtain.

Skt.: b'aga ‘son of Aditi, fortune, happiness, wealth’;
 b'agavat ‘adorable’.

Šd.: bağa ‘God, the Highest Good’; bağ-a-s ‘piece’; bağô-bak'ta ‘God-given’.

Persian: bak't 'fortune'; bad-bak't 'unfortunate'.

Russ.: Bog 'God'; boga-tüi 'rich'; u-bogüi 'poor'; bogat-stvo 'riches'; bog-inja 'goddess'; beş-boşie 'godlessness'.

Lith.: bago-tas 'rich'; na-bagas 'a poor man'.

Gk.: φαγ-εῖν 'to eat'; φαγ-ᾶ-ς 'devourer'; φαγ-όν-ες 'teeth'.

Goth.: ga-beig-s 'rich'; mamma gabigs 'a rich man'.

Eng.: big.

Welsh: ffaw-d 'fortune, luck'.

Irish: fuigh-im 'I get'; fagh-aíl 'getting'; fuigh-eall 'profit'.

Skt.: भग Baga

Sd.: 𑀧𑀲𑀭𑀸𑀓 Baḡa

OP.: 𑀧𑀲𑀭𑀸𑀓 Baga

Pvi.: 𑀧𑀲𑀭𑀸𑀓 Baḡ

Pers.: 𑀧𑀲𑀭𑀸𑀓 Baḡ

Phrg.: Βαγάος (Ζεύς)

Sd.: Compounds: 𑀧𑀲𑀭𑀸𑀓-𑀧𑀲𑀭𑀸𑀓 Baḡô-dâta God-made.

Persian: بغداد Baḡdâd, the City of Irâk.
built A. C. 762.

Old Slavic: БѢГ

Russian: БОГЪ *Polish*: Bog

Bulgarian: БОГЪ *Wendish*: Бѣб

Slovenian: Bog *Croatian*: Bogu

Servian: Bory *Bohemian*: Бѣб

Slovak: Бѣб *Tungusic*: Buga.

Hence *Baga* is God as the great Bestower, the All-giver, the bountiful Dispenser of Riches. Few, if any, of the sons of Aditi have had so interesting and important a history. Whatever be the view taken of the Âditjas, whether solar or meteorological, certain it is that the भग of the R̥g-vêda has developed not only into the 𑀧𑀲𑀭𑀸𑀓 of the Avesta and into the Clan-God of the Cuneiform Inscriptions, but has actually become the Πρώτη Θεοῦ ἐννοία of all the Slav nations.

Of the Tungus Tatars Castrén tells us that, besides the Sun and Moon, Heaven, Earth and Water, they worship a Supreme Being whom they call *Buga*, and perhaps it is not going too far to hold that it was through *this* channel that the Slav peoples obtained and retained their thought and predicate of God. Whilst worshipping the forces and beauties of Nature it is hardly to be wondered at that one of the Turanian tribes should have adopted the Eránian generic name for deity, especially when we remember the etymology which, in this case, seems never to have been lost sight of.

The history of this Name is interesting in many ways, and especially as an illustration of the law so clearly perceived and so poetically described by Dante in the Paradiso (xxvi. 130):—

Opera naturale è ch' uom favella.
Ma, così o così, natura lascia
Poi fare a voi secondo che v'abbella.
Pria ch'io scendessi all' infernale ambascia,
I s'appellava in terra il sommo Bene
Onde vien la letizia che mi fascia;
Eli si chiamò poi: e ciò conviene;
Chè l'uso de' mortali è come fronda
In ramo, che sen va, ed altra viene.

In dealing with the great Aryan family of mankind, to which we ourselves belong, let us not forget those thoughts of the Eternal which have sprung from the primary concept 'to shine', 'to be bright', from the ever-growing consciousness that 'God is Light and in Him is no darkness at all.'

To the early Aryan framers of thought and speech, to the R̥sis of our race all atoms in space were mirrors, fronted with the perfect face of God! The sun, the moon, the stars, the seas, the hills and the plains were देव *dēva*, 'bright', from the root दिव् *div* 'to illuminate'. And the sky was देव *κατ' ἑξοχὴν*, it was द्यौ *djô* 'the Illuminator', from the metathesized form of the same root—द्यु *dju*. Nor was

this all. In some of the oldest hymns of the R̥g-Vêda we meet with the great Asura द्यौस् Djâus, Heaven, the supremely Bright one, and more especially in that close connexion with पिता pitâ, 'father', which is so familiar to us in the religion of Greece and Rome. द्यौषपिता Djâus-Pitâ, points to a primitive Aryan द्युपत, Dju-Patar 'Heaven-Father'. 'This discovery of Dyaushpitâ', says Prof. Max Müller, 'was like finding at last, by means of a powerful telescope, the very star in the very place of the heavens, which we had fixed before by calculation'. Thus we read (R̥gv. vi. 51. 5):—

द्यौः पितर इति पृथिवि मातः अधुक् ।

अग्ने भातः वसवः मृत नः ।

Djâuh Pitar iti Pṛthivi mâtah ad'ruk |

Agnê b'râtah vasavah mṛtata nah |

'Father Heaven and kind mother Earth.

Brother Fire, bright spirits, have mercy on us!'

He is often invoked as द्यौषपिता जनिता Djâus pitâ gânitâ (= Aryan Dju-patar ganitar), Ζεὺς πατήρ γενετήρ, Ju-piter genitor—'Heaven-Father creator'.

In Homer we read:—

Ζεῦ πάτερ. ἦ ῥά τις ἐστὶ βροτῶν ἐπ' ἀπείρονα γαῖαν,
"Ὅστις ἔτ' ἀθανάτοισι νόον καὶ μῆτιν ἐνίψει;

Heaven-Father, who of mortals on the boundless earth
Can now the immortal mind and will speak forth?

And in those beautiful lines of Sophokles:—

Θάρσει μοι, θάρσει, τέκνον.

ἔτι μέγας οὐρανῷ

Ζεὺς δὲ εἰσφορᾷ πάντα καὶ κρατύνει·

ψὶ τὸν ὑπεραλγῆ χόλον νέμουσα.

μήθ' οἷς ἐχθαίρεις ὑπεράχθεο μήτ' ἐπιλάθουν.

Courage, courage, my child;

Still is in heaven mild

Almighty Zeus; he, watching, ruleth as of yore:

To Him commit thy grief exceeding sore,

And be not wroth henceforth for evermore!

Amongst the Romans we find besides Jupiter the form *Diespiter*. Thus Horace (lib. I. xxxiv):—

—Namque Diespiter,
Igmi corusco nabilia dividens
Plerumque, per purum tonantes
Egit equos volacremque curum.

There is a passage in Ovid which gives us in two lines the two other forms:—

Di pia facta vident. Astris delphina recepit
Juppiter et stellas jussit habere novem.

In Welsh we have the striking motto:—

Heb Dduw heb ddim: Duw a digon.
Without God without Everything: God is enough!

And this name, once found, was never to be lost. There has been no solution of continuity. Subject, as every other name, to dialectic growth and phonetic decay, it has survived in many a forceful way to bear witness to the eternal truth that God is our Father and we His children! Whether uttered on the Himālayas, amongst the oaks at Dodona, in the Roman Capitol, on the Welsh hills or the plains of Brittany; whether whispered in the forests of Germany, proclaimed from the peaks of Scandinavia, the heights of the Isle of Man, or wafted across the lonely lakes of Scotland and of Erin—it is the selfsame word.

√दिक् *DIV: DJU*

<i>Skt.:</i>	देवस् dêvas 'God'; द्यौ djô 'Heaven, Day'.
<i>Šd.:</i>	𐎠𐎡𐎴𐎧 daeva δαίμων
<i>Gk.:</i>	Ζεύς, Διῖ-ος; Διώνη; δαίμων.
<i>Lett.:</i>	Dievs 'God'
<i>Lith.:</i>	Dievas 'God'
<i>Samo.:</i>	Dievas 'God'
<i>Lat.:</i>	Deus; Diov-is; Jū-piter; divus; div-initas; Diana dies; sub dio.

<i>Pāli:</i>	𑖀𑖧𑖦𑖫	Jēbba 'God'
<i>Marāṭī:</i>	देवाने	dēvânē 'God'; Dēvânē
<i>Sinhalese:</i>	දෙව්	Devijô 'God'
<i>Gypsy:</i>	Dew-el	'God'
<i>Persian:</i>	دئو	dēv δαίμων.
<i>Tosk:</i>	Tia, in the compound	Περντία = Paramdēva
<i>Geg.:</i>	Peren-dia	= Paramdēva.
<i>Welsh:</i>	Duw	'God'
<i>Armoric:</i>	Done	'God'
<i>Irish:</i>	Dia	'God'
<i>Gaelic:</i>	Dea	'God'
<i>Manx:</i>	Gi = Dji	'God'
<i>Rom. (Oberl.):</i>	Deus	
<i>Rom. (Engad.):</i>	Deis	
<i>French:</i>	Dieu	
<i>Vaudois:</i>	Dion	
<i>Rumanian:</i>	Zeş in the compound	Dzimezeş Dummedeu = Dominus-Deus
<i>Italian:</i>	Iddio, Dio.	
<i>Piedmontese:</i>	Dion. Iddiou.	
<i>Catulan:</i>	Deu	
<i>Spanish:</i>	Dios	<i>Old Norse:</i> Tivar 'gods'
<i>Portuguese:</i>	Deus	<i>Gothic:</i> Tius
<i>Prov.:</i>	Dieu	<i>Old High German:</i> Zio
	<i>English:</i> Tues-day.	

Of the tribes Non-Aryan who have adopted this word we find many in America, doubtless owing to the presence of the Spaniards:—

<i>Totonaki:</i>	Dios	<i>Lules:</i>	Lios (for Dios)
<i>Ajmara:</i>	Diosaja	<i>Abiponese:</i>	Dios
<i>Mayan:</i>	Dioz	<i>Colorados:</i>	Dios
<i>Paeşes:</i>	Dios	<i>Timukua:</i>	Dios


Of the Malay race there are two instances:—

Kâgutt: Dêw-sê

Batta:  Deb-ata

Amongst the Drâvidas we find at least two examples:—

Telugu:  Dêvvaḍa

Konkani:  Dêvâta

In his Hibbert Lectures of 1878 Prof. Max Müller says of this pre-eminently Aryan concept:—

“Five thousand years ago, or, it may be earlier, the Aryans, speaking as yet neither Sanskrit, Greek, nor Latin, called him *Dyu patar*, Heaven-father”.

Four thousand years ago, or, it may be earlier, the Aryans who had travelled southward to the rivers of the Penjâb, called him *Dyaush-pitâ*, Heaven-father.

Three thousand years ago, or, it may be earlier, the Aryans on the shores of the Hellespont, called him Ζεύς πατήρ, Heaven-father.

Two thousand years ago, the Aryans of Italy looked up to that bright heaven above, *hoc sublime candens*, and called it *Ju-piter*, Heaven-father.

And a thousand years ago the same Heaven-father and All-father was invoked in the dark forests of Germany by our own peculiar ancestors, the Teutonic Aryans, and his old name of *Tiu* or *Zio* was then heard perhaps for the last time.

But no thought, no name, is ever entirely lost. And when we here in this ancient Abbey, which was built on the ruins of a still more ancient Roman temple, if we want a name for the invisible, the infinite, that surrounds us on every side, the unknown, the true self of the world, and the true self of ourselves—we, too, feeling once more like

children, kneeling in a small dark room, can hardly find a better name than: "Our Father, which art in 'Heaven'."

Another Aryan thought of the Deity is that of Ruler or Commander, from the root ईश्, often in conjunction with param, 'supreme'.

√^Íś to rule, have dominion

<i>Sanskrit:</i>	ईश्वर	Îś-vara, ईश Îś-a Lord, God.
<i>Kait'i:</i>	इसन	Is-ana
<i>Pârbuti:</i>	ईश्वर	Îś-vara
<i>Multani:</i>	Is-ranai	Is-ranai
<i>Sand:</i>	Is	Îś to rule.
<i>Bengâli:</i>	ইশ্বর	Îś-wor God; ঔশ্বর্য ois-worjo
		'Power, might'.
<i>Hindi:</i>	ईश्वर	Îś-varanê
<i>Monduri:</i>	परमेश्वरा	Param-Êśvara 'supreme Ruler'.
<i>Gurmukhi:</i>	उप्रीमेश्वर	Param-Êsura
<i>Umbrian:</i>	Es-unu	'sacrum';
<i>Etruscan:</i>	Aes-ar	'deus'.
<i>Irish:</i>	Aes-ar, Aes-fhear.	

Perhaps the modern Bengâli will serve best as an instance of the use of this word for the Supreme. In the Tota-Itihâsa we read of a certain Sultân Ahmad who was a man of great wealth and power. 'A thousand horse, five hundred elephants, nine hundred camels, with their burdens, were wont to stand ready at his gate'. But he had no family.

এই কারণ তিনি দিবারাত্রি
ও প্রাতে ও সন্ধ্যাতে ইশ্বরপূজকেরদের
নিকটে গমন

Ei kâron timi dibârâtri, o prâte o sondjâte
Îśwor-pûgokerder nikote gomôn.

‘On this account he day and night, morning and evening was in the habit of going near worshippers of God’. Thus, by means of worship, he made request for the gift of a son.

An extremely interesting and significant Aryan thought of God is that of the Armenians, which seems peculiar to themselves. Nowhere in the Realm of Language do we find such a consciousness of the omnipresence of the Deity. The word is Աստուած Asdouaz, meaning *He-is-here*. The beautiful Gospel message of St. John iii. 16 is thus translated into Armenian:—

Ինչու որ Աստուած անանկ սիրեց աշխարհը, մինչև որ իր միածին Որդին տուաւ. որ ամէն ով որ անոր հաւատայ՝ չկորսուի, հապայաւթենական կեանք ընդունի.

Inkou wor Asdouaz anang sirhž askar he. minkjev wor miazin Worgin dwau. Wor amen uy wor auwor hauadaj kgorsoni, habajauidhnagan gjanke entouni.

‘For God so loved the world that He gave his only-born Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life’.

As to the etymology of Greek Θεός much has already been written. Many have attempted, notably Prof. Max Müller, to connect it with the root *div*, which has given us Deus, but the initial θ seems to me an insuperable difficulty. On the whole I venture to think that Döderlein has found the true solution. He connects it with √θεσ which we find in θεσ-σά-μενοι (= αἰτησάμενοι), θέσσ-ε-σθαι (= αἰτεῖν, ἰκετεύειν), θεό-ς standing for θεσ-ο-ς as a substantived adjective.

√ΘΕΣ *to beseech, pray to*

Greek: Θεός for θεσ-ο-ς God; πολύ-θεσ-το-ς *much-beseeched*; θεσ-πέσιο-ς, θέσ-φατο-ς, Θέσ-τωρ.

Latin: fes-tu-s, fes-tu-m, fes-tivu-s, fêr-iae.

French: fê-te, foire.

Port.: feira.

Prov.: feira. *Span.:* feria. *It.:* fiera.

Eng.: fair (cf. *German:* Messe = mass).

Hence Θεός is 'He-to-whom-prayer-is-made'. From this root, too, we learn how all holidays were originally *holy days*, nay, how even the fair itself was a place, a time of *prayer*!

Xenophanes says:—

Εἷς θεὸς ἔν τε θεοῖσι καὶ ἀνθρώποισι μέγιστος.

Οὐ τι δέουας θνητοῖσι ὁμοίος οὐδὲ νόημα.

Of gods and men One God alone is Lord
Nor unto mortals like in form or word!

Again, in Theognis:—

Θεοῖς εὐχου. θεοῖς ἔστιν ἔπι κράτος·

οὐ τοι ἄτερ θεῶν

γίνεται ἀνθρώποις οὐ-τ' ἀγάθ' οὐ-τε κακά.

But it is in the New Testament that the word has been hallowed and endeared to us all.

Μὴ παρασσέσθω ὑμῶν ἡ καρδία· πιστεύετε εἰς τὸν Θεόν, καὶ εἰς ἐμὲ πιστεύετε.

Before taking leave of Aryan theology let us not forget the specifically Hindû view of the Eternal as subjectively आत्मन् *Ātman* objectively ब्रह्मन् *Brahman*. We have already seen something of the evolution of the former concept, but the rise and growth of the latter are not so clear. There can, however, be little doubt that Brahman comes from √बृह् *barh* 'farcire', to cause to swell, so that it would at first seem to mean 'flood', i. e. *prayer*, whereby man's *aspiration* is met by God's *inspiration*. As soon as the individual soul, the *gīvâtman*, has learned to see that it is really part of the Over-Soul, the Paramâtman, Mukjâtman,

Aupanisadâtman, it becomes one with Brahman and lives the life of Prayer.

सर्वं खल्व् इदम् ब्रह्मन् ।

तज्जनान् ।

इति शान्त उपासीत ॥

Sarvaṁ kaly idam Brahman; taḡ-ḡalan; iti śānta upāsita. Kāndōḡja-Upaniṣad: iii. 11.

All is indeed Brahman; in Him it breathes, begins and ends; so let every one adore Him calmly!

ब्रह्मन् सत्यं जगन् मिथ्या जीवो ब्रह्मैव नापरः

Brahman satjam, ḡagan mitjā, ḡivô Brahmâiva nâparah!

Brahman is true, the world is false; the soul is Brahman only and no other!

When a man has once had this vision he exclaims: तत् त्वम् tat tvam 'that art thou' and loses himself in Self supreme, in सच्चिदानन्द Sat-Kit-Ânanda 'Being-Thought-Joy'!

This final solution of the search of the Hindû mind after the Eternal and the Infinite I have endeavoured to express in the following sonnet:—

O seeker after God, eternal rest
Alone in Self is found! All else is part
Of this great whole. See here, in this my heart
I feel its streams of light and life. No quest
Of first and last can now the soul molest;
For shines not 'neath the veil of soul, athwart
The vast dim sea of space, whose atoms dart
Refulgent through the worlds, supremely blest,
The beauty of the Self? No longer now
Do shadows of duality appear.
The sward of being rises; sweet and low
Come murmurs of glad music; crystal clear
The streams of peace upon the spirit fall;
Existence, thought, love, bliss—the all in all!¹

¹ The Evolution of Religious Thought in Modern India (S. P. C. K.) p. 36.

Of Indo-European thoughts of God which have become polarised in speech there yet remain for examination: *ماشداو* *Mašdāo*, *मानराह* *Mānrah*, *يهان* *Jahān*, *يزدان* *Jaṣdān*, and *مانیستار* *Mānistār*.

يزدان *Jaṣdān*, like *אלהים* *Elôhîm*, is a plural form, and may be taken as the Persian subsumption of the henotheistic phase of religious thought. In the *Gulšan-i-Raṣ* or *Rose Garden of Mystery* by Sa'd ud Din Mahmud Šabistari, which is a compendium of Sufi thought and faith we read:—

چنان طان گبر یزدان اهرمن گفت

Kuân tân Gabr Jaṣdân Ahriman guft.

“E'en as those Guebers speak of Jeṣdān and of Ahriman.”

As already hinted (p. 19) the fundamental meaning is ‘He-to-whom-sacrifice-is-made’. From the same root comes the Greek *ἅγιος* ‘holy’. And what is still more remarkable is the fact that, the Magyars, a Non-Aryan people, have adopted this very word for God, in the form *Isten*. Let us look at the congeners:—

यज् JAĠ to offer, to sacrifice

Sanskrit: *यजामि* *jaġ-â-mi* *I offer, worship; यज्यम्* *jaġ-ja-s* *to be revered.*

Sand: *جاستا* *jaṣ* *to offer to, praise; جاستا* *jaṣata* *venerable.*

Persian: *يزد* *jaṣd.* *يزدان* *Jaṣdān* *God.*

Greek: *ἅγ* *âġ-o-ma* *I revere; ἅγ-ιο-ς* (= *jaġ-ja-s*) *holy; ἅγ-νό-ς* *pure; ἅγ-ος* *consecration; ἅγίζω* *I offer.*

Magyar: *Is-ten* *God.*

Just as in Irân the Hindû *देव* *dêva*, God, became *داeva*, devil, so in Mesopotamia the Persian *يزد* *jaṣd*, God, became *Iṣed*, devil.

“The Izedis or Yezidis, the so-called Devil-worshippers”, says Dr. Tylor, “still remain a numerous though oppressed

people in Mesopotamia and adjacent countries. Their adoration of the sun and horror of defiling fire accord with the idea of a Persian origin of their religion (Persian *ized* = god), an origin underlying more superficial admixture of Christian and Moslem elements. This remarkable sect is distinguished by a special form of dualism. While recognizing the existence of a Supreme Being, their peculiar reverence is given to Satan, chief of the angelic host, who now has the means of doing evil to mankind, and in his restoration will have the power of rewarding them. 'Will not Satan then reward the poor Izedis, who alone have never spoken ill of him, and have suffered so much for him?' Martyrdom for the rights of Satan! exclaims the German traveller to whom an old white-bearded devil-worshipper thus set forth the hopes of his religion".

The Persian word جہان *Jahân* God goes back to Old Baktrian 𐬔𐬀𐬎𐬌𐬎𐬎𐬎 from the root 𐬔𐬀𐬎𐬌𐬎𐬎𐬎 *jâ* 'to go', so that *Jâna* is really the 'going' to the gods, i. e. *prayer, supplication*. And this is the etymology of the Latin *Jânus*.

𑂔𑂗𑂢𑂰 *Jâ* to go

Skt.: यान *jâna* a going.

Sd.: 𐬔𐬀𐬎𐬌𐬎𐬎𐬎 *jâna* a going, prayer, salvation, blessing.

Pers.: جہان *Jahân* God.

Lat.: *Jânus, jânuua, jânitor.*

Assamese মানুহ *Mânrah* God, and Persian مانستار *Mânistâr* Over-Soul or Supreme Spirit come from the root *man*, which has given us nearly all our words connected with *mind*. This is very significant: if, as has been often held by philosophers, there be nothing great in the world but man and nothing great in man but mind, then the Eternal must not only be spirit but mind supreme. Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ Λόγος.

√मन् *MAN to think*

Sanskrit: मन्मि man-mi *I think*; मनस् mind; मतिस् ma-tis *opinion*.

Sand: मन् man *to think*; मन्मन् man-agh *mind, man*.
 ॐमन् ॐमन् Vôhu Manô *Good Thought, the first of the Amesha Spentas*.

Assam: मान् Man-rah *God*.

Persian: مانىستار Mân-i-stâr *Over-Soul*.

Greek: μέν-ος mind, mood; Μέν-τωρ; Μοῦσα = Μοντια.

Latin: Men-s; Mon-i-tor; Miner-va; Monê-ta.

𑎢𑎡𑎣𑎤 *Maṣdâo*, the Supreme Being of the Parsis, probably comes from an extended form of the same root. The primary form seems to be *ma* 'to measure', the secondary *man* 'to think', and the tertiary *maḥ* 'to meditate, ponder'. Just as *maṣdišta* = *nêdišta* and *mjaṣda* = *mêd'a*, so 𑎢𑎡𑎣𑎤 = मेधा *Maṣdâo* = *Mêd'â* cosmic Intelligence. The word is usually found in connexion with 𑎠𑎡𑎣𑎤 *Ahura*, the breathing or living one, so that the thought is: *Living Mind!* Some have held that it is a compound, namely, 𑎢𑎡𑎣𑎤 *maṣ* great, and 𑎢𑎡𑎣 *Dâo* knowledge, which would amount to an intensification of the same idea.

Sand: Ahura Maṣdâo

Old Pers.: Aura Maṣdâ

Pahlavi: Ôharmaṣd

Persian: Ormuṣd.

Let me close the Aryan thoughts of God with the Persian جان جان *Gân-Gân* from the root जन् *jan* (Sd. 𑎢𑎡𑎣 *san*) 'to produce' which has given us *gen-ius* and (*gnâtura*.

Truly a beautiful thought: Life-Life!

"'Tis life, whereof our nerves are scant,
 O life, not death, for which we pant;
 More life, and fuller, that I want."

It was Life and abundance thereof that the Shepherd of Souls brought for His true followers: ἐγὼ ἦλθον, ἵνα ζωὴν ἔχωσι καὶ περισσὸν ἔχωσιν. And as the king and poet of the Hebrews sings:—

כִּי עִמָּךְ מְקוֹר חַיִּים בְּאֵוֶרֶךְ נְרָא-הָאֵוֶר:

kî imkā mkôr kajjim; bôrkâ uireh-ôr.

‘For with Thee is the Fountain of Life: in Thy light shall we see light!’

CHAPTER III.

SEMITO-HAMITIC THEOLOGY.

In trying to penetrate the hallowed precincts of the Semitic religious consciousness, to watch the first attempts to express the Inexpressible, to utter the Unutterable, we might à priori conclude, from the mould in which the mind was cast, that we should not find such an expression as ‘Heaven-Father’ or even ‘Heaven’ to be the symbol of the Divine. Whether we find him in Sidon or Tyre, in Babylonia or Mesopotamia the leading idea of God in the mind of the Semite was that of Strength, Awe, Sovereignty:—

אֲנִי-אֵל שְׂדֵי הַתְּהַלֵּךְ לִפְנֵי יְהוָה תָּמִיד:

Ani Êl-Šaddai: biṭḥalék lḥânai vehjêh tāmim!

‘I am God, Almighty, walk before me and be thou perfect!’

Gen. xvii. 1.

This name of God, Êl, اسم عظيم *ismi ʿaṣim* the Great Name, as the Arabs call it, is found not only in Hebrew, but also in Syriac, and Himyaritic and Babylonian In-

But it is amongst the Arabs that this form has become supreme, for الله *Allāh* stands for ال إله *Al Ilāh*. The key-note of Islam, nay, of Sūfism itself is the oft-quoted sentence ascribed to Muhammad:—

كَانَ اللَّهُ وَلَمْ يَكُنْ مَعَهُ شَيْ

Kām Illāhu, va lam jākun māhu sc!

‘God was, and there is nothing but He!’

The realisation that Allāh alone is Being, all else being Not-Being, is termed by the Sūfis توحيد *tawhīd* or ‘assertion of the Divine Unity’. One of the great objects of Sūfism is the attainment of this consciousness of the identity of the individual soul with the Over-Soul or Divine Essence, which state, when it is merely a temporary ecstasy, during which the soul beholds, as it were, its own Apotheosis or Absorption, is called حال *Ḥāl*, corresponding to the ἔκστασις or ἄπλωσις of the Neo-Platonists. The next state, which is that of utter selflessness, is called فناء الله *fanâ fi llāh* ‘Annihilation in God’, ἔνωσις or θέωσις, such as that of Moses on Mount Sinai. At this stage the Traveller on the Path is said to be مجذوب مطلق *muǧṣūb maṭlūq* *i Mutlak* ‘drawn into the Absolute’ or آزاد شرع *âṣād šaraʿ* ‘released into the Eternal Law’. There is yet another stage, which is considered final, namely, بقاء بالله *bakâ bi llāh* ‘abiding in God’.

√ אלה ALĀH to be agitated, fear

Hebrew: אֱלֹהִים Elôah

Arabic: الله = ال إله Allāh = Al Ilāh

Judaeo-Arabic: אלה Allah

Karsun: الله Allah

Aramaean: ܐܠܗܐ Alâhâ. E. g.:

Meltâ d'Alâhâ de-ḵabbel:

'The Word of God, which he had received'.

Alâhâ de-sâged att leh va-sâ'em att leh besmê
va-šema't ketâb'au.

'God, whom thou honorest, and to whom thou
bringest sweet savours, and whose books thou
hast heard'.

Phonician: ʾlīlat Alilat.

We now come to what the Rabbis call the שם המיוחד
'the isolated Name' or שם הנעלם 'the secret Name',
namely, יהוה.

From the third century B. C. down to our own day
there seems to have been a shrinking from uttering the
true name of the God of Israel. A passage in the Talmud
runs:—

'Said the Holy One, who is Blessed: I am not read
as I am written. I am written with Jod, He, and read
with Aleph, Daleth'. To this day in the Synagogue, when
he stands with the roll before the Ark, the priest pro-
claims the eternal truth:—

שָׁמַע יִשְׂרָאֵל יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵינוּ יְהוָה אֶחָד

Deut. vi. 4.

but instead of saying:

Šma' Jisrâêl, Jhôvâh Elohênû Jhôvâh ekâd!

he chants it:

Šma' Jisrâêl, Adonâi Elohênû, Adonâi ekâd!

Hence the true sound of the most important Name in
the whole realm of pre-Christian religion is still a matter
of uncertainty. As regards the first two letters, however,
there can be no doubt, for the Psalms are full of that
majestic paean: הַלְלוּ-יְהוָה *Hallû-Jah* 'Praise the Lord'.

ياهو ياهو يامن لايعلم ماهو الاھو

Jāhu. Jāhu. jā man lā jaalam māhu illāhu!

·O He who is. O He who is. O He whom none knows what
he is but Himself!

√ הוּהָ *HĀVĀH* to breathe, be

Hebrew: הוּהָ *Jahavah*, הָ *Jāh* God; הוּא *Hū* he.

Arabic: ياهو *Jāhu* God; هو *hū* he; هُوِيَّة *huv'jat* Ipseity,
Being.

Aramaic: ܝܝ *I-I* God.

From this root comes also that revelation of the
Eternal in Exodus iii. 14:—

וַיֹּאמֶר אֱלֹהִים אֶל-מֹשֶׁה אֶהְיֶה אֲשֶׁר אֶהְיֶה וַיֹּאמֶר כֹּה תֹאמַר לְבְנֵי
יִשְׂרָאֵל אֶהְיֶה שְׁלַחְנִי אֲלֵיכֶם:

Vajômer Elohîm el Môseh: Ehjeh aser Ehjeh. Vajômer
koh tômar libnê Jisrâel: Ehjeh slākani alêkem.

‘And God said to Moses: I-will-be that I-will-Be. And
He said: Thus say unto the children of Israel: I-shall-Be
sent me unto you’.

Now, we know that Moses was learned in all the lore
of the Egyptians, so that it is quite possible he may have
been aware of the forceful fact that, when the religious
Egyptian died, he had inscribed on a sacred scroll these
remarkable words, which were his sublime thought of
God:—



Nuk-pu-Nuk ‘I am that I am’, which is the exact
counterpart of אֶהְיֶה אֲשֶׁר אֶהְיֶה *Ehjeh-aser-Ehjeh*, as in this
case it is certainly open to us to translate the future by
the present.

We have thus seen how man-Aryan, Semite and Hamite, from the simple act and image of *breathing* has been led on to sublimest thought of the Infinite and Eternal!

In Arabic there are three concepts of Deity which are very striking and which we shall do well to consider here. Besides الله *Allāh*, which is understood all over the Muhammadan world, we have آمين *Āmīn*, وهَّاب *Vahhāb*, and حق *Hakk*.

The first is from a root meaning 'to be stable', 'firm', and means *Faithfulness*, *Loyalty-to-Truth*. Amen!

آمِينَ يَا رَبَّ الْعَالَمِينَ

Āmīn jā Rabba 'l ʿālamīn

Amen! o Lord of the Worlds!

אָמֵן *ĀMAN* 'to be firm', 'stable'.

Hebrew: אֱמֶת *Emet* stability, faith, truth.

אָמֵן *Āmēn* true, truth, so-be-it!

Arabic: آمين *Āmīn* faithfulness, God.

The second is the form used more especially by a sect which, in our own day, has been distinguished for its fanaticism. وهَّاب *Vahhāb* means *Bestower* and is therefore the Semitic equivalent of Aryan भग *B'aga*, of which we have already treated.

وَهَّابُ الْعَطَايَا







'God, the Bestower of Benefits!'

حق *Hakk* is a most important word in the East. Alike to Arabs and Persians it means *Truth*, 'The Truth', God, Of Him, whom St. John describes as the Λόγος, the Arabs speak as كَلِمَةُ اللَّهِ *Kālu'l Hakk*, Word of God. But it was through 'the friend by whom the head of the gallows was raised', namely, Hussain Manssûr, Hallag', the wool-

carder, that the word has become world-famous. He was born at Baidâ, a borough in Persia, and brought up at Vassit. His mystical writings, his eloquence, and the belief that he possessed the power not only of divining what went on in the homes but also the most secret thoughts, attracted many friends but made even more enemies. He was the first in Persia to spread the doctrine of the unity of the knower and the known, which he expressed in the memorable words:—

Ana'l-Hakku اَنَا الْحَقُّ
'I am the Truth'.

On returning from a journey to India, Transoxana and China, whither he is said to have gone in order to bring those lands to a knowledge of the One True God, he was charged with heresy and unanimously condemned to death by the Imams of Bagdad. After suffering the most fearful torture during which he constantly repeated the above words, he was hung as a heretic in the year of the Hîgra 309 (921 A. D.), under the Chalifate of Muktedir Billah.


Passing on to Hamitic concepts we come to Egyptian *Nuter*, which is derived from a root meaning 'to crush', 'to destroy'. It is also found in Hieroglyphics as  and  and in Demotic as , , , Koptic .

In the Turin Papyrus of Aufank we read:—



Enok Nuter âa k'oper t'esef: I am the great God, the
Am God great existing self [self-existent!]

Again:—



Neuck pu âmen ren-f' er nuter-u

'I am he whose name is more hidden than that of the gods!'



Nuter uâ ank em mâtu ar enti-u kam unen-tu.

‘God only living in truth, Creator of-that-which-is, Fashioner of-beings!’

The Koptie form may best be studied in translations of Holy Writ. Thus: ‘And God blessed Noah’ is expressed by

ⲁⲟⲩ ⲁⲓⲛⲓⲣ ⲉⲛⲁⲉ ⲫⲧ ⲉⲛⲟⲩⲉ

Uoh afsmu enje P-Nuti en-Nõe.

‘And blessed (Nom.) God Noah’.

✓ *NEK : NUT*

Hierogl.: *nek* to scatter; *neš-t* to strike.

Nuter God; *Nuter-u*, gods.

Demotic: *Nutr* God.

Koptie: ⲫⲧ *p-Nuti* God.

Sahidic: ⲛⲟⲩⲩⲉ concutere; ⲛⲟⲩⲩⲉ Deus; ⲛⲟⲩⲩⲟⲩⲩⲉ divinitas; ⲛⲟⲩⲩⲟⲩⲩⲟⲩⲩⲉ divinitatis essentia.

Memphitic: ⲛⲟⲩⲩⲉ contundere, molere.

In the languages known as Ethiopic, Amharic and Tigré we find a most remarkable conception of God: it is that of the rich Realm-Holder, the Land-Lord.

አገዛዝአብሔር

Eysâbehêr: i. e. *Eysâ* land, *Behêr* Lord.

In Ethiopic we also find the expression **አመላክ** *Amâk*, King. In Galla the thought is

ዋቃዮ (✓ **ወቃ**) *Wâkâ-jo* Potter

E. g. Kan nu hume Wakajo: ‘He who has made us, is God’.

Nâm-ni Wakajo sagada: ‘Man God reveres’.

On the other hand, in Bogos we have

ᐃᐅ Ḡâr Heaven

E. g. Duvâ takálân! ji ganát aiúr Ḡâr-lî dabingûn-lâ; intîn intá ganát Ḡâr-lî dabdâmmî-mâ: 'Say, ye daft ones! I bury my mother in Heaven; will ye not also bury your mother in Heaven?' Nân awágîn? Ḡâr mahadîla! 'What shall I do now? God help me!'

Alike in Kabyle, a Hamitic idiom, and in Barea, a language of the Nûba race, we find the Hebrew רבי *Rabbi Master*.

CHAPTER IV.

THE MONGOL CONCEPTS OF DEITY.

In nearly all the idioms known as Turanian we find it was the turkis-vaulted dome of the sky, the broad and beautiful firmament that seemed the Unchanging, the Infinite, the Divine.

'Aspice hoc sublime candens, quem invocant omnes Jovem' said Ennius to the Roman world, and, with equal truth, under another name, he might have said it to the Indians of North America and to the dwellers on the tablelands of Asia.

" . . . the whole circle of the heavens, for him
A sensitive existence, and a God,
With lifted hands invoked, and songs of praise".

Nowhere is this more clearly seen than in the speech and thought of the Chinese. 天 *T'jün* Heaven is not only the 極 *Kih*, the Principle, Origin, Being, but the synthesis of 極 and 無 極 *Wu Kih* Being and Not-Being, namely,

太 極 *T'ai Kih* Great Principle, First Cause.

It is the secret of 陰 *Jen* and 陽 *Jan* Rest and Motion, the norm of 乾 *K'ian* and 坤 *K'un* the male and the female elements in Nature.

Thus we read in the *Si-K'ün* (iii. 1. 1. 7) or Book of Odes and in the *Tai-kih-tu* or Table of the Primal Principle (I. a.):—

上天之載無聲無臭而實造化之樞紐品彙之根柢也。

Šai Tj'ün k'e zai: wu šên wu k'au, öl šì zao hwa k'e k'ü nju.

P'in wê k'e kan ti jê.

Translated into Manchu it is:—

Dergi Abka-i baita de, gîlgan akô, wa akô bime, jar-gijan-i bangîbure wembure horgikô šo šohon, eiten gaka-i fûlehe da ohohi.

'High Heaven's works are without tone and without aroma (i. e. immaterial), and yet indeed they are the axis and source of life and death, the root and origin of everything'.

Chinese: 天 *Tj'ün* God, Heaven.

Accadian: 𒂗𒂊𒂍 *Dingir*, Heaven, God.

Mongolian: 𐠶𐠦𐠳 *Tengri* Heaven, God.

Turkish: ٲانكرى *Tangri*.

Jakut: ٲанрапа *Tangara*.

Hun: ٲang-li.

Korean: 𠔁 𠔁 𠔁 *Tkien*.

The Jakuts divide their gods into white and black, good and evil. At the head of the former stands *Tangara*, at the head of the latter *Abanj*. Every disease has its

Siulinkiuu or black god, who is propitiated by pouring *vodka* on the burning coals and throwing tobacco and horsehair upon it. In ascending a ridge the Tungus and Jakuts avoid loud talk for fear of offending the mountain-spirit, who will then send a destructive snowstorm.¹

In Mangu the expression for The Highest is

天
主
耶穌

Abkai Egen Heaven-Lord, which is the exact equivalent of 天 *Tjün Kū*, the title adopted by Pope Clement XI.

主 in 1715 to designate God in Chinese.

The first Jesuits who visited China, notably Ricci, had chosen the word *Tjün* alone, but when the Dominicans arrived in 1631, a long controversy on the subject arose.

‘On accusa les Jésuites’, says M. Piry, ‘de chercher, par ce choix du mot *T’ien* et l’autorisation qu’ils accordaient à leurs néophytes de continuer leur culte à la mémoire des ancêtres et du Sage Confucius, à assimiler la doctrine du vrai Dieu à la religion des Chinois. La question fut portée devant Innocent X. qui, en 1645, condamna les Jésuites; mais, dix ans plus tard, Alexandre VII. leva cette sentence en déclarant que les rites chinois en litige étaient purement civils et ne pouvaient d’aucune façon porter atteinte aux dogmes de la foi chrétienne. La question en resta là jusqu’en 1703. date à laquelle Clément XI. condamna de nouveau les Jésuites, enfin, en 1715. ce même pontife décida que pour désigner Dieu en chinois on conserverait le mot *T’ien*, mais en y ajoutant l’épithète *Chu*, Seigneur, Maître Quant au choix du mot *T’ien* pour désigner Dieu, le Père Prémare dans sa “Lettre Inédite sur le Monothéisme des Chinois, 1728”, déplore la décision du Saint-Siège qui le condamne; on sait en effet que ce savant sinologue, et beaucoup d’autres après lui, ont voulu démon-

¹ See “To the Arctic Zone” by a Russian Exile.

trer que le *T'ien* ou *Shang-Ti* 上帝 des classiques chinois possède les principaux des attributs du vrai Dieu.

The *Hsjao Kîn* or Book of Filial Piety speaks of the three supreme Powers: 天 Tjān Heaven. 地 Ti Earth. 人 sin Man. Thus we have 天之經 Tjān ki Kîn 'the immutable Law of Heaven'; 地之義 Ti kî I 'the Justice of Earth'; 民之行 Min ki Hsin 'the Obligation of the People'.

In the Lu 'Sû we read:

天日神 Tjān jü 'sin Heaven is called God.

天大過神 Tjān tâ kwo 'sin Heaven is greater than the gods.

天日上帝 Tjān jü 'san Ti Heaven is called the Supreme Being.

But we must not forget that a very powerful Being amongst the Chinese, amounting in fact to what we in the West should call the Monon, is 道 Tau meaning primarily The Way, from Radical 辵 'to go'. Its Aryan equivalent is ~~Ṛta~~ Rta or ~~Ṛta~~ A'sa the Path of Righteousness, the Norm of Being, Λόγος. In China's oldest historical book 書經 'Su Kîn, we find the Emperor Kîn, of the K'au dynasty, directing three of his highest officers of State 'to discuss the Tau, to govern the States, and to harmoniously regulate the Jen and the Jan'. But the Tau K'jau or Doctrine of the Monon was most fully worked out by the philosopher Lî Er' or Po Jan, generally known as Lau Zô, in the 7th century B. C. His celebrated 道德經 Tau tê Kîn, known to the Japanese as Dau-toku K'jau, or Classic of Reason and Virtue, begins with the following remarkable words:—

道可道非常道

Tau kô tau fê kai Tau. Reason which can be embodied in speech is not the Eternal Reason!

名 可 名 非 常 名

Miù k'o miù fê kaù Miù. The name which can be uttered is not the Eternal Name!

According to M. Stanislas Julien 道 Tao is almost equivalent to निर्वृण Nirvâṇa. In his preface to the Tao-tê-kiñ he says: 'Dans Lao-tseu et les plus anciens philosophes de son école antérieurs à l'ère chrétienne, l'emploi et la définition du mot *Tao* excluent toute idée de Cause Intelligente, et qu'il faut le traduire par Voie, en donnant à ce mot une signification large et élevée qui réponde au langage de ces philosophes lorsqu'ils parlent de la puissance et de la grandeur du Tao.

Lao-tseu représente le Tao comme un être dépourvu d'action, de pensées, de désirs, et il veut que, pour arriver au plus haut degré de perfection, l'homme reste comme le Tao, dans un quiétisme absolu; qu'il se dépouille de pensées, de désirs, et même des lumières de l'intelligence, qui, suivant lui, sont une cause de désordre. Ainsi, dans son livre, le mot Tao signifie tantôt la Voie sublime par laquelle tous les êtres sont arrivés à la vie, tantôt l'imitation du Tao, en restant, comme lui, sans action, sans pensées, sans désirs.

As an illustration of the variety of views on this question, let us compare our own translation of Lau-zō's opening sentences with that of M. Pauthier on the one hand, and of M. Julien on the other:—

Via quae potest frequentari non aeterna-et-immutabilis rationalis Via.

La voie droite qui peut être suivie dans les actions de la vie n'est pas le Principe éternel, immuable, de la Raison suprême. (Pauthier).

La Voie qui peut être exprimée par la parole n'est pas la Voie éternelle. (Julien).

Nomen quod potest nominari, non aeternum-et-immutabile Nomen. (Pauthier).

Le Nom qui peut être nommé n'est pas le Nom éternel et immuable.

(Julien).

Again, it is said of the Tau:—

道 生 一 一 生 二 二 生 三 三 生 萬 物
 Tau señ jì jì señ öl öl señ san san señ wan ũ
 Tau produced One; One brought forth Two; Two begat Three; Three gave rise to all things!

Passing to the Land of the Rising Sun we come to the 'Way of the Kami' 4

力 三 ノ 三 十 Kami-no Miti

of which we may read more especially in the *Kō si ki* or *Furu Koto Buni*. Who or what these 力三 Kami are, it is perhaps at first sight a little difficult to determine. In all likelihood the Kamino Miti or 神道 'sin Tau as the Chinese call it, does not much differ from the Chinese worship of 神 'sin and 鬼 Kwê, their divine Ancestors. 'The Japanese', says Dr Tylor, 'are a comparatively civilized nation, one of those so instructive to the student of culture from the stubborn conservatism with which they have consecrated by traditional reverence, and kept up by state authority, the religion of their former barbarism. This is the Kami-religion, Spirit-religion, the remotely ancient faith of divine spirits of ancestors, nature-spirits, and polytheistic gods, which still holds official place by the side of the imported Buddhism and Confucianism. In this ancient faith the Sun-god is supreme. He is *Amaterasu oho Kami* the 'heaven-enlightening great Spirit'. Below him stand all lesser kamis or spirits, through whom, as mediators, guardians, and protectors, worship is paid by men'.

Here, then, we have as supreme Spirit

アマテラス	オホ	カミ
Amaterasu	Oho	Kami

Japanese thought, speech and writing owe a great deal to the Chinese. When, in the third century of our era, the

Japanese came in contact with the Chinese, the literature of the latter found its way into Japan, and with it, Chinese writing. But the characteristic ideology of each nation is still preserved. Thus, whilst the Chinaman says: *No pu ki ki* 'I not know that', the Japanese says: *Watakowa Korewo siru su* 'I that know not'.

In structure Japanese resembles the undeveloped languages of the Altaic peoples, Mangu and Mongolian, but differs from them in its lack of vowel-harmony. The local relations of the noun are sufficiently indicated by phonetic means, and even for the purely grammatical relations such as subject and object there exist elements of which the idiom makes excellent use.

Whilst the language lacks definite verbal forms, it possesses a great number of gerunds and participles, which doubtless explains the lack of a relative pronoun.

Within the sentence the defining element precedes the thing defined, that is to say, the genitive comes before the noun to which it belongs, the object before its verb, the defining sentence before the one it more nearly defines.

Numeration in Japanese seems to be based on the decimal system:—

1 fito	40 go-so
10 too	50 it su-so
20 futa-zi	100 momo
30 mi-so	1000 zi

From an ideological standpoint the language is *indirect*, the formula being 1. 3. 5. III; i. e. Genitive + noun, adjective + noun, object + verb, subject + verb.

In Korean, as in Chinese, we find as the expression for the Highest not only $\begin{array}{c} \square \\ \text{4} \end{array} \frac{\overline{\overline{\triangle}}}{\bigcirc}$ Tk'ien Heaven, but $\begin{array}{c} \square \\ \text{4} \\ \Pi \end{array}$ Tjiu Lord, and not infrequently in combination. For

Most interesting is the thought, most curious the speech of the Bödpa, the dwellers in Tibet. The language consists of monosyllabic radicals, the structure of the sentence depending partly upon combination, partly upon the addition of particles which in certain cases become suffixes by amalgamation.

There is no difference between noun and verb, the latter itself being really a noun, and the two most important cases lack a distinctive sign. As in active transitive sentences the nominative cannot stand to designate the agent, but the instrumental, we have the remarkable fact in Tibetan that, nominative and accusative or the subject-case can never appear in one and the same sentence. Number, spatial case-relations and the relation of dependence are denoted by annexed particles.

The verb is really a noun which expresses a state the bearer of which in a neutral sense is denoted by the naked stem (nominative), in an active-passive sense by the instrumental. In Tibetan there is no active verbal expression with subject and object; even in passive constructions, in which we conceive the subject in the nominative, it is generally put by preference in the dative. Thus, on the one hand, the language lacks the conception of the subject as something acting, and, on the other, that of the object as something affected by the action.

In the sentence the verb stands at the end; the defining expression precedes the thing defined, the genitive the noun, the object the verb. Only the instrumental or expression of the agent has a freer position; if the object is in the dative, it can either come before or after it. So that Tibetan ideology is really *natural*, the order being 1. 4. 5. 8. I, or genitive + noun, noun + adjective, object + verb and subject + verb. And with this goes the decimal system of numeration.

Now, in the language of the Böd-pa there are two expressions for God which seem to represent the high-water mark of the Tibetan religious consciousness, namely:—

མཆོག་ *Mkog*, pronounced *Koa*, The Best;

ལ་ *Lha*, pronounced *La*

ལ་ས་ *Lha-sa* = dêva-nâgari City of God.

Lha klu mi sogs-kjis sañs-rgjes-la phjag hjas so
(la lu mi sog-tji sañ-djä-la 'kag gä so)

‘By the gods, snake-deities, men and others adoration was paid

to Budd'a’ The form used by the missionaries རྒྱུ་མཆོག་ *Kon-Koa*. མཆོག་ *Ko* is applied by Buddhists to the Tṛatna.

Passing on to Burmese we find it to be a language consisting of monosyllabic root-words; but possessing a great many dissyllabic nominal expressions which have been borrowed from the ecclesiastical language of the Southern Buddhists, namely, Pāli. Indeed, in one particular the language itself goes beyond Isolation, by prefixing *a-* to the verbal stems for the derivation of nouns and by combining synonyms with the verbal and nominal composition for the nearer determination of the concept.

The various case-relations are indicated by annexed particles. There is no pure nominative or subjective, but the objective is known not only by its position in the sentence but by a suffix. The verb rests upon a nominal basis, though there are indications of a closer definition.

In the sentence the subject stands at the beginning, the verb at the end. The defining element precedes the thing defined; hence the subordinate sentence must be enclosed in the principal sentence, which involves a certain

looseness of construction sometimes almost amounting to unintelligibility.

Burmese possesses three modes of intonation:—

- α) the natural tone (without modulation of the voice);
- β) the rising tone;
- γ) the falling tone.

In a language of monosyllabic construction there is really no distinction between root, stem and word. Nay, from a morphological standpoint there is no difference between noun, verb and particle. Use only can determine to which category it belongs.

As regards the noun there are three points to be noticed. In the first place substantives are often derived from stems which signify a general quality by the addition of the prefix *a*. The result is that the meaning of the word is very general. For instance, from the stem *kauñh* signifying 'good, to be good,' we have *a-kauñh* 'the good, goodness.' But the nouns proper, or underived, are monosyllabic and are not intimately connected with any verbal root. E. g. *lû* 'man', *rê* 'water', *nê* 'sun', *k'wêh* 'dog'.

Then, the greatest number of compounds consists in expressions for definite persons and things combined with expressions denoting general categories and determining the former. E. g. *mrüñh-ta-zîh* horse-a-riding-object = 'a horse'; *lû-ta-küj* man-a-body = 'a man'.

Lastly, the various case-relations are throughout expressed by annexed particles of definite meaning. It is only the subjective, objective and genitive which, from their unique position, can dispense with them. For instance:—

	Lû-kâh man.	
	<i>Singular</i>	<i>Plural</i>
<i>Nominative</i>	Lû-kâh	lû-to-kâh
<i>Agent (Nom. Inst.)</i>	lû-tî	lû-to-tî
<i>Accusative</i>	lû-kü	lû-to-kü

	<i>Singular</i>	<i>Plural</i>
<i>Approximative</i> } (<i>spatial acc.</i>) }	lû-tô	lû-to-tô
<i>Genitive</i>	lû-i, lû-twäü	lû-to-i, lû-to-twäü
<i>Dative</i>	lû-âh	lû-to-âh
<i>Local</i>	lû-nhaik	lû-to-nhaik
<i>Instrumental</i>	lû-präü	lû-to-präü
<i>Social</i>	lû-nhäü	lû-to-nhäü
<i>Ablative</i>	lû-ka, lû-mha	lû-to-ka, lû-to-mha
<i>Causal</i>	lû-kraü	lû-to-kraü

As an attribute the adjective may either come before or after the substantive to which it belongs. In the former case it appears with the relative suffixes *tî*, and *tau*, in the latter it is the crude form. As predicate the adjective is equal to the verb and is put after the subject, receiving at the same time the suffix *tî*. E. g. *lha-tî meimma* 'a beautiful woman'; *meimma lha-tî* 'the woman is beautiful'.

There is no relative pronoun in Burmese, but, by way of compensation, we have a series of participial and gerundive formations.

With regard to the verb, it may be said to be quite formless in respect of person. If person is expressed at all, it is done by means of an accompanying noun or pronoun.

In its inner form the Burmese verb often resembles the Tibetan, and in one respect it reminds us of Korean and Javanese, namely, in the distinction it makes between *inferiors* and *superiors*. The tenses fall into two categories, actual and representative. Of actual or immediate action we find four forms of the present and three of the preterite, whilst the tenses of representative action are α) two forms of the future; β) two necessitative forms, expressing necessity both near and distant.

Burmese numerical expressions are based upon the decimal system. Like Tibetan, Burmese is *natural* in its ideology, the formula being 1. 4. 5. 8. L.

As a specimen of the language we may take the following:—

Mänl̥ -kriḥ-tī: mi-b'urâh-n̄rat! nâ-âh kjän-râ
 King-the: O great queen! to-me work-thing
 kauñ-râ-t'au t'än-i wut ma-kon-t'au-kraun̄
 completion-thing of thy business not-finished-on account of
 nh̄t-löḥ ma-t'a-si-ti liḥ ma-hot, tapâḥ-t'au akraunh-to-
 mind troubled is alike certainly not, others causes
 kraun̄ nh̄t-löḥ ma-t'a-si-ti liḥ ma-hot.
 on account of mind troubled is as also certainly not.

Divine sovereignty seems to be the Burmese view of the Eternal, for, the word for God is

ဗုဒ္ဓ B'urâ Lord

The language of the Siamese known as Dai is the purest example of a formless, wholly undeveloped monosyllabic idiom. In form all parts of speech are alike, the meaning alone determining which part it shall be. As regards the noun, there is no designation of number, and the spatial case-relations are only expressed by prefixed particles. The verb, too, does not denote either person or number.

Indefinite is the position in the sentence. The defining element follows the thing to be defined without distinction. Alike the genitive and the attribute are put after the expression which they more nearly define, as also the complement of the verb, namely, the object. Hence the predicate, which likewise follows the subject, is really indistinguishable from the attribute.

Like Chinese, the language distinguishes homonymous words by intonation, there being no less than five distinct tones in Siamese. Thus,

- α) the natural tone (without modulation of the voice)
- β) the higher rising tone (a quarter upwards)
- γ) the lower rising tone (a third upwards)

δ) the higher falling tone (weak rise and then sinking to the fundamental)

ε) the lower falling tone (a fifth downwards).

Every word in Siamese being a root-word, it is the lexicon and not the grammar which determines whether a word shall be taken in this or that sense. Nouns are either simple, such as (β) Hwa 'head', (α) tìn 'foot', (γ) fā 'heaven'; or compound, as in the three following modes:—

A. DERIVATION FROM A NOMINAL EXPRESSION.

1. Genitive relationship:

(ε) mǎ- (γ) nǎ 'mother of the water' (river); (ε) mǎ- (α) mī 'mother of the hand' (thumb); (α) lūk- (α) mī 'son of the hand' (artizan).

2. Determination:

(α) wat- (α) wā 'temple' (β) bai- (ε) lai 'leaves', where the second members wā, lai in themselves mean nothing.

B. DERIVATION FROM A VERBAL EXPRESSION:—

(α) gwâm- (α) nâm 'thing-beautiful' (beauty); (ε) p'û- (α) tāj 'this three-die' (dead man).

The cases being known for the most part by their position, it is well to pay particular attention to Siamese ideology. The subjective precedes the verb, the objective comes directly after it; thus: (α) fai (ε) hmai (α) rīen 'fire burn house'. The genitive is expressed either by putting the defining element after the thing to be defined, or by combining the latter with such words as (β) k'ôn 'thing', (δ) hân place. For instance, (α) Rīen (β) k'ôn (α) nāj (α) dahân 'house thing leader troops' = the house of the leader of the troops. The dative and ablative are expressed by prefixing (δ) kǎ 'to', 'after', and (δ) tǎ 'from' respectively. Thus, (ε) p'û- (γ) sǐ (ε) hai (α) n'ôn (δ) kǎ (ε) p'û- (β) k'āj 'this there-buy give money to this there-sell' = the buyer gives money

to the seller; (α) mâ (δ) tǎ (α) mǎn (α) dai (γ) lǎu 'come from kingdom T'ai already' = he has come from the kingdom of T'ai.

Whether as predicate or attribute the adjective comes after the substantive to which it belongs: e. g. (α) kien (β) sǎn 'house high' = high house, and, the house is high.

As in the Further Indian idioms generally pronouns in Siamese were originally nouns and vary according to the social position of the person addressed.

The verb dispenses alike with person and number. Not infrequently the verbal stem is joined to another of general meaning, as in Burmese. Thus, (ε) wâ- (α) pai 'to talk' (say-go); (α) tok (α) lǎn 'to fall down' (fall-descend).

Numeration is based upon the decimal system, but the substantives do not immediately follow the numbers, a numeral word such as 'person', 'tail', 'piece' being put between the two. E. g. (α) plâ (β) hok (β) hǎn 'fish six tails' = six fishes.

Siamese ideology is *direct*, namely, 2. 4. 6. 7. VII. or noun + genitive, noun + adjective, verb + object and verb + subject.

The Siamese thought of God is identical with that of the Burmese, namely

พระ Bra Lord.

St. John 111. 16. is thus translated into Siamese:—

เหตุว่าพระเจ้าทรงพระเมตตาความรัทษต่อมนุษย์ในโลกย์
เพียงโปรดประทานบิษยบัตรองค์เดิwmัน มิ, ให้ผู้ใดทเชื่อใน
พระ องค์มันถึงพิณพหาย.

If we pass up to the K'asia Hills of Eastern India we find that the language of the K'asia is one of peculiar interest, for, although it is a monosyllabic idiom, it expresses

the various relationships of the outer world by means of particles rather than by position within the sentence. K'asi is thus the exact opposite of Chinese. Indeed there are not a few signs of agglutination and several polysyllabic forms which have been borrowed from Bengali. It is noteworthy, also, that gender and number are regularly denoted.

As regards form there is really no distinction between noun, verb and particle, differentiation being effected by means of suffixes. In the formation of the parts of speech the pronoun plays the chief part.

With the substantive gender, number and case are all distinguished, but the form of the noun remains unchanged, these functions being performed by the personal pronoun of the third person. Thus we have:—

Nom. *u briu* 'the man', *ki briu* 'the men'; *ka ñ* 'the house', *ki ñ* 'the houses'.

Whilst the nominative as the subject-case generally comes before the verb, the dative and accusative follow it; e. g. *U Blei u la t'au ia ka p'ir'tei* 'God created the Earth'; *U Ġark'a u la pin-ih ia ña ia uta u lum* 'Ġark'a showed me this mountain'. In the genitive the definable expression precedes the defining, and not infrequently the word *goñ* 'thing' comes between the two; thus, *u kun u briu* 'the son of man'; *kip'a goñ ñi* 'father our'; *ka kti goñ mê* 'thy hand'; *ka ñ goñ ña* 'my house'. Then there are the dative, locative, ablative, comitative and instrumental, which are formed regularly.

When used attributively the adjective has a special form: it is derived from verbs or adverbs by means of the prefixed relative particle *ba*; e. g. *ba-lih* white, *ba-k'am-lih* whiter; *ba-b'a* good, *ba-k'am-b'a* better. The adjective can either come before or after the substantive to which it belongs; in the former case the relative pronoun which serves

as a demonstrative adjective or article must agree with the noun in gender and number. For instance. u kulai ba-lih 'the horse white'; u lum ba-k'rau 'the mountain high'; ki dok'a ba-b'a 'the fishes good'.

The K'asi verb is just as immutable and indefinite as the noun; all relations and definitions of time, mood and person are expressed by auxiliary verbs, particles and pronouns. In fact, except for the meaning of the stem, there is no distinction between noun and verb. E. g. u ioh 'he has', u briu 'the man'; ka pom 'she breaks off', ka briu 'the woman'. The tenses are the following: an aorist present, a durative present, an aorist preterite, a durative preterite, a durative perfect, a preterital perfect (= plusquamperfectum), an aorist future, a definite future and an imperative.

Numeration in K'asi is based upon the decadic system. As a specimen of the language we may take the Lord's Prayer:—

Ko kipâ gôn ñi u- ba ha b̄ineñ. loñ ba-k̄tūd ka
 O Father who our He who in heaven, be holy the
 k̄irteñ gôn mē, wan ka h̄ima gôn mē. loñ ka
 name which thine, come the kingdom which thine, be the
 mon gôn mē ha ka k̄indeu kum-ba ha b̄ineñ. ai
 will which thine. upon the earth so-as in heaven, give
 ia ñi m̄nta ka ḡiñ-bām gôn ñi ka ba-b̄iañ, m̄p
 to us now the food which our the sufficient, forgive
 ruh ia ñi ka r̄iñkañ gôn ñi kum-ba ñi m̄p
 also to us the transgression which our so-as we forgive
 ia ki-ba leh sniu ia ñi. Wat ialam ruh ia ñi śa
 to those who act badly to us. And not lead also us into
 ka ba-p̄in-śoi, hinrei s̄umar ia ñi na ka ba-sniu, na-ba
 the temptation, but shield us from the evil, for

ka hîma ka bor ruh ka bûrom ruh ki gôn mê
the kingdom the power and the glory also which thine
hala karta. Amen.
eternal time. Amen.

We have seen that Kasi ideology is *hybrid*, namely
2. 4. 6. 8. VI.

Like Burmese and Siamese, the Kasi thought of the
Supreme is that of divine Sovereignty:—

Blei Lord (= B'urâ, Bra).

« Blei u la pîn-mi ia ka pîrtei da ka gîn-p u-iap u kun gôn u
God made living the world (earth) by the death (die-make)
of His Son!

Having thus followed the language of Indo-China and
the course of theologic thought amongst the nations of this
vast area, it may be well to understand their mutual re-
lationship and interdependence.

Now, indo-chinese philology is a science of yesterday.
Were we to question a sinologist of any school of 50, nay,
20 years ago, as to the origin of the Chinese, he would
emphatically declare that, from time immemorial they had
occupied the same ethnic position, and for five thousand
years had had an isolating language and even a mono-
theistic religion. That is to say, hitherto the history of
China has been conceived as that of a gradual self-devel-
opment of a homogeneous stem, possessing almost the whole
land, from savagery up to a culture to which five hundred
years ago no Western nation had attained. From the
existence of this supposed self-rise and progress of an im-
portant focus of culture definite conclusions alike for political
and historical philosophy have been drawn.

The origin of the misunderstanding with respect to the
political and ethnological state of ancient China is remark-
able; it is to be found in the special divisions of the Chinese
annals and in the peculiarities of the geographical division

of the empire for the purposes of administration. It was thus that Klaproth was misled in his *Tableaux historiques de l'Asie*. The three thousand volumes of which the historical annals consist are not by any means a finely-spun narrative of all the political, social, artistic, scientific and economical subjects which, according to our Western notions, constitute history. They are rather analytical and encyclopaedic: every thing is considered simply. First come the imperial records containing the purely political relations of each reign, and more especially the deeds of the Emperor. Then follow sections on chronology, prescriptions, politics, political economy, music, geography and literature. In the last division of each part of the annals, where all the facts and relevant details are given, the immigrants who were not subject and, although within the Chinese Empire, were not Chinese, namely, the Mjau, Man, Lan, Pan, Ngu, etc. are treated as foreigners. The history of China having thus been mostly taken from the chronological parts of these annals, the Chinese seem always to have been in full possession of their empire.

Who, then, are the Chinese? This is a question which would seem to involve a reference to the very densest stratum of nebulous thought. It has been said of Art that 'with a special tenacity she has wrapped herself about in the grateful gloom of a mystic twilight', and with equal truth it may be said of China; for, indeed, in walking down a street in Hankow or Peking 'we survey a living past and converse with fossil men'. Though known amongst themselves as Pō Hsiū, 'the Hundred Families', we must not forget that the Chinese form a third part of the whole human race, and that this colossal agglomeration of 420 millions of human beings is cemented solely by the tradition of the Elders. Notwithstanding the fact that we possess a vast literature on both the race and language of this wonderful country, and despite all that has been set forth

by chinamen as to the possession of an unbroken history, we cannot rest satisfied that there is nothing more to be learnt about them. Consulting the first chapters of this venerable history we find the representation of a small band of Chinese immigrants settling down in what form the North Eastern province of the present empire, that is to say, in a territory surrounded on all sides by autochthonic tribes. These strangers are said to have been possessed of arts and Sciences by means of which they were able to exercise lordship over the more ignorant natives of the country. But then we at once ask: whence came these foreigners? From whom had they learnt astronomy, the art of writing and the science of government?

The only way of satisfactorily answering these questions is by national and international linguistic analysis. In dissecting words we are in reality writing the history of civilisation. As regards China the linguistic problem is undoubtedly that of evolution. According to Schlegel and others matter and form in Chinese remain distinct, on the other hand Humboldt and Bopp have declared that the Chinese language is without all form, without organism, without grammar. Wherein, then, lies the difficulty of general exegesis if not in a right view of the Law of Evolution? Be it natural or mental science, the student presses the law of the development of organisms or of the modes of thought and speech, which he accepts, with a magnificent and often enough successful onesidedness, as though he were obliged to derive everything exclusively from this. On the one hand the positive and inner formative causes are brought to the front, whilst on the other everything is explained by external processes.

Beginning with national analysis we must bear in mind the truth so well enunciated by Wilhelm von Humboldt that the mental peculiarity of a people and the form of its speech stand to each other in such intimate relationship

that, the one being given, one should be able to completely deduce the other from it. For, intellectuality and language only admit and induce forms which are mutually correspondent. Applying this to the Chinese, we are not surprised to find that the principle which shows itself in their practical life, that, namely, of undifferentiated unity, is also the principle of their speech. The inner form is lacking, having become pure externality. Only by the external order of words are the inner relations and interdependence of concepts expressed. It would seem that the richness of Chinese linguistic phantasy has resolved itself into music. Position and intonation decide the meaning of the sentence. But what is the origin of the *Sen* or tones? 'The salvation of science', says Prof. Steinthal, 'must ever mostly depend upon a correct statement of the question; for every question contains its answer in itself, and if the former is wrongly stated, the latter is necessarily wrong. With new questions begin new epochs'. If, therefore, we have before us an organism of data, we have to ask, not so much after the *How* and *Why*, as rather after the *What*. Strange though it seem, it is to these *Sen* that Chinese owes its monosyllabism. This ingenious musical device has been brought about solely by phonetic decay. It is a phaenomenon which is found, though in a less degree in many African dialects, where it has produced the same result.

'To understand their origin', says Prof. Douglas, 'we must remember that on entering China the Chinese found the country occupied by races more or less civilised, with whom they freely mixed to a greater or less degree as circumstances determined. From this inequality of intercourse between races speaking languages with different morphological constructions, in which great importance was attached to the quality and quantity of vowels for the meaning of Words, there resulted a condition of phonetic poverty owing to contractions and elisions of the initial,

medial or final syllables of their words. By the movements of the organs of speech and the ordinary principle of equilibrium the place of these decayed articulations has been supplied by differences of tone in the pronunciation of the vowels, a system which, by the facility it gives for the economy of language, has received a full development.

The Chinese written language (*Kjai-Śû*) is a word-writing; every sign represents a concept. But since the number of the simple conceptual signs was limited, new concepts were formed partly by reduplication and to a great extent by addition. A calculation based on the Imperial Chinese Dictionary show that, at present, the Chinese language is represented by about 50,000 characters. Of these at least 13,000 are utterly irrelevant and consist of signs which are alike obsolete, incorrectly formed, and unexplained. In ordinary literature we do not meet with more than 4000 signs. A knowledge of only 2500 characters will enable one to understand the writings of Confucius and his disciples, in fact, almost any Chinese work on history and philosophy.

Now, the *Kjai-Śû* does not date further back than the 4th century of our era. It is a modification of the more rounded and thick writing known as *Li-sû* i. e. official script, which is ascribed to *Kin-mo*, rendered possible through the improvements in the scribe's apparatus, namely, his paper and hair pencil. The Chinese emperors have always considered it their special function to uphold orthography and have repeatedly tried to fix by law the form of the written signs. Hence, since the days of the Ziu dynasty the *Li-sû* had been the official text. It will easily be seen that, when once there was a deviation from tradition and new forms were created, there would arise the danger that, in the far-reaching provinces of the Chinese empire, independent forms would be developed and the highly-important unity of written language be destroyed. The character composed of meagre

and monotonous strokes which had immediately preceded the *Li-s'u* was the *Sjau-kwan* which was written on a bamboo with a stylus. But this again was an official modification of the ancient mode of writing called *Ta-kwan* in which, among the different States which had once been subject to the dominion of the K'au, many and great variations had been developed. Formed by the historiographer 'Sö K'au at the instigation of one of the greatest monarchs of the K'au dynasty, King Sün, the *Ta-kwan* was an undertaking in which the written character was reconstructed as one of hieroglyphics.

Having come thus far by an analysis of the Chinese language itself, let us now, under the guidance of that eminent philologist, Prof. Terrien de Lacouperie, apply our second canon of research, namely, international linguistic analysis.

The modern characters can be traced back through the changes they have undergone, partly in obedience to political necessities, in the fourth century and during the Zin (B. C. 255—200) and the K'au (B. C. 1122—255) dynasties, to a time when they were used to phonetically represent an *agglutinative* or *amalgamating* language. We have multifarious proofs that the writing first known in China was already an old one, partially decayed, but also much improved since its primitive hieroglyphic stage. Although many of them had kept their early pictographic and ideographic value, the characters, selected according to their sense, were used phonetically, isolated and in groups, to represent the monosyllabic and polysyllabic words as well as the compounds of the spoken language. At that time the writing of the *Ku-wan* was really the phonetic expression of speech. By an analysis of the old inscriptions and fragments and by the help of the native works on palaeography M. de La Couperie has compiled a dictionary of this period. With the results of Jai Hjun's researches in 25 dialectic

regions and by a comparison of the various idioms of modern China with those of the aborigines we are enabled to read the characters as the subjects of the Zin dynasty read them. The outcome of this process has then to be compared with the rhymes of the *Śi-Kin* or 'Book of Odes' and with the languages of the offshoots from the ancient Chinese confederation, such as the Siamese, the Burmese and the Annamites, and even with those of remoter kinship.

We have already spoken of that characteristic of Chinese, namely the *Sen* or tones. Now, a comparison of these tones as they are developed in the speech of the Middle Kingdom with the double initials in Burmese, Siamese and Sinico-Annamite, and with the mute letters in Tibetan, completes the evidence required to prove that they are the modern representatives of decayed syllables. As an instance of the transformation of ancient Chinese words we may mention the equivalent for 'eye' which, as Prof. Douglas has pointed out, from a combination of two words, *mut* and *kan*, becomes *mukan*, as it is at the present day among the Panicoochi tribe of aborigines. As this word gradually became the property of tribes some of whom laid greater stress on the final and other on the initial parts of their words, it was successively metamorphosed on the one hand to *mang*, *ngan* and the modern *jen*, and on the other hand to *muk* and *muh*.

Thus, notwithstanding its excessive attenuation, and disguised as it is by the influence of idioms belonging to a different morphology and conceptology, the Chinese spoken language is nevertheless an ancient member of that great family of speech which is known as Uralaltaic. And here it may be well, as Prof. de Laconperie suggest, to establish a third division of that family, which might appropriately be called *Amardian*; a group in which the first division embraces Akkadian and its dialect, and the second division Proto-Medic, Susian and Kossian.

The ideological characteristics of Chinese, coupled with

its peculiarities, place it as a link between the Amardian division and the Ugro-Finnish group. It is true that ancient Chinese shares certain very marked grammatical affinities with the Ugro-Finnish tongues, but its phonetic degeneration and its choice of certain articulations more closely connect it with the Akkadian and Susian dialects. To quote but a few instances of this linguistic relationship:

<i>Akkadian</i>	<i>Chinese</i>	<i>English</i>
lu	li	cow
umu	mu	mother
sik	sik	cloth
gan	gun	cloud
ka	ko	mouth

Of the Akkadian hieroglyphics there have as yet been deciphered rather more than 500, and it is very remarkable that Chinese tradition fixes the number of the original characters at 540.

‘Results no less remarkable’, says Prof. Douglas, ‘are, however, brought to light by a comparison of the social and religious institutions of the two peoples. In the early legendary records of China we find the first place in the list of the five Sovereigns who bore rule at the dawn of history occupied by Hwan-ti, anciently Kon-ti, whose family name is said to have been Nai or Nak. This ruler is credited with having invented astronomy, music, medicine and the other sciences, as well as the arts which contribute to the comfort and well-being of man. If we examine the old form of his name as preserved in the *Kwen-zö-wei* and the *Sü-su-jün-lui* we find it to be composed of one group of characters to be read Nak-Konti, a name which strangely coincides with Nak’unta or Nak’unte mentioned in the Susian texts as the chief of the gods. This name was added to their own by the oldest Susian Kings, as we find in the case of Kudur-Nak’unta who ravaged the country from Ur to Babylon and founded the dynasty called by Berosus

Medic (B. C. 2285). Again, tradition tells us that the inventor of Chinese writing was Zan Hie, or, as his name was pronounced in old Chinese, Dum-Kit, who is said to have been an independent chief, though by some writers he has been described as reigning in succession to Fû-Hi and by others as a minister of Hwai-Ti. The resemblance between his name Dum-Kit and that of Dungi, King of Ur, who succeeded the famous Sikkagas or Likkabi on the throne, is curious, and the interest in the comparison is heightened when we recognise that the meaning of the Akkadian characters composing the name Dungi is the man of the reed tablet'.

Turning now to the political institutions of the early Chinese we find in the fragments of Ssian history as yet made known complete explanations on two points which have hitherto baffled the investigation of scholars both native and foreign. In the second chapter of the 'Book of History' we are told that the Emperor 'San (B. B. 2255—2205) gave daily audiences to all the pastors', who are understood to have been the Princes of the various states; and, in another passage, that 'he sacrificed specially, but with the ordinary forms, to God, and with reverent purity, to the Six Honored Ones.' The epithets 'pastors', as applied to Princes, and 'Six Honoured Ones' have been much commented upon, but no satisfactory explanation has been offered of them. Now, however, that which has been a riddle to the people themselves for tens of centuries is made plain to us by the Ssian texts. There we are told that the Princes of the second rank were called 'pastors', and that in the Divine hierarchy there were next in order to the principal god six deities of the first rank'.

And here we must stop to notice what is, after all, the most important work in the whole realm of Chinese literature, namely, the *Ji-Kin*. It was of this book that Confucius said that, if he had 50 more years to live, he would devote them to the study of the original text, which

consists of short sentences arranged under certain diagrams, formed by the combination of straight lines.

‘As a matter of fact’, says Prof. de Lacouperie, ‘the *Ji-kin* is the oldest of the Chinese books, not certainly as it now stands, but as far as concerns the greatest part of the documents which are compiled in it. Some of these parts are most likely contemporary with the early leaders of the Chinese Bak families (*Pöih-Sing*). It has all the appearance of being a series of notes, documents, and informations collected by the early chiefs of the Chinese immigrants. It looks like a repository of indications drawn up by the early leaders of the Bak families, for the guidance of their officers and successors, in the use of the characters of the writing, by the native populations with whom the newly-arrived people had to deal, for the customs, the produce of the soil, the animal kingdom, etc.; and it is in this sense that the *Ji-kin* is the most valuable of the Chinese classics, the one in which, according to the non-interrupted and unconscious feeling of the Chinese themselves, was embodied the wisdom and Knowledge of the sages of yore’.

The work is attributed to the legendary Emperor Fû-Hi (B. C. 2852) and seems to have been first arranged under the Hia dynasty (2205—1766 B. C.). The fact that 1450 works on the *Ji* were selected for the library of Kien-Lai shows pretty clearly the inability of the successive early commentators — Wan Wan (B. C. 1150), K’au Kuñ (B. C. 1120), and Kun-pu-zö (B. C. 500) to understand the book. Native and European scholars have alike supposed it to treat exclusively of philosophy and divinatory lore, but the researches of Prof. de Lacouperie and his collaborateur, Prof Douglas, prove that the original text consists to a great extent of vocabularies in which important words and their characters are explained in the (probably eight) different dialects spoken within the limits of the Chinese supremacy, and in which to other words are appended lists of their equivalents. Inter-

mingled with these vocabularies are important records of unusual interest, such as ephemerides bearing on the ethnology and history of the ancient East'.

Now, it would seem that these Chinese vocabularies have been framed in obedience to the same principles, very much with the same materials, and according to the tradition of the old syllabaries of South-Western Asia. Both in Elam and China we find not only the phonetic vocabularies, but also the converse system, namely, lists of the words or characters which have a common meaning. Thus we have many proofs of a theory which has been held by Prof. de Lacouperie for many years, that before their emigration to the far East, the Chinese Bak families had borrowed the pre-cuneiform writing and elements of their Knowledge and institutions from a region connected with the old focus of culture of Susiana. There is, however, evidence of a multifarious kind to show that the borrowing took place after the Semitic influence had been brought to bear upon the Akkadians and Sumirians, and at a time when the cuneiform strokes already introduced were not yet exclusively used to draw the characters, straight and curved lines being still used at the same time, and the introduction of the wedge-shaped implement had not effaced the pictographical forms of the signs'.

To historically determine this remarkable propagation of culture, we must remember the following interesting and important facts, which have been pointed out by M. de Lacouperie.

1. The writing was communicated with all its peculiarities and complexity of ideograms and phonetics, the latter keeping their sounds, and the former receiving sometimes new appellations in the language of the borrowers according to their picture-meaning.

2. The characters were still in the plastic stage which allows a certain range of alterations and occasional variations

for the facility of the compound characters. A comparative analysis of the compounds in the early Cuneiform characters discloses this parallel fact, and it is a feature of the so-called Hittite characters, which on the inscriptions are modified according to their position as opposed to the rigidity of the Egyptian hieroglyphs more early crystallized.

3. Many characters were still pictographic, but a great number had lost their original hieroglyphic shape and had assumed apparently arbitrary forms.

4. The writing had not been drawn at first by an oblique eyed people.

5. The facing process, upwards or downwards, of drawing the pictographic characters, had been preferred as often as possible to the profile process (Egyptian and Hittite), probably to avoid the boustrophedon.

6. At the time of its propagation to the Chinese Bak families, the pre-cuneiform writing was disposed in horizontal lines, but it had been written previously horizontally and vertically, according to the size of the characters as in Egyptian and so-called Hittite hieroglyphs.

7. The borrowers, perhaps in imitation of the knotted cords and notched rods previously used by them, disposed the writing in vertical lines instead of horizontal, and for that purpose had to put up the characters single a compound not easy to disintegrate, which had too much width for the regularity of the lines. The putting-up of the pictographic characters was ruled by the figure of their subject.

8. In the script borrowed, the characters were used phonetically in the formation of compounds, without neglecting their ideographic values, which were taken into account and ruled their selection; their reading was from left to right or from top to bottom.

We have thus answered the question with which we started. The early leaders of the Chinese borrowed their culture from Elam, that confederation of states of which

Susa was the chief town, and the *Kussi* the chief population. 'From a body of evidence', says M. de Lacouperie, 'it results that they were at first settled south-east of the Caspian Sea; and that, in order to escape a heavy yoke, they extended on the east, along the head-waters of the Oxus, following its main affluent, the Red Water (Kisil Su), and then passing into Chinese Turkestan along the other Kisil-Su, the head-waters of the Ka'sgar River (the Tarim), which conducted them after a time to the Yellow River and 'The Flower Land', of which the fame was without doubt already attractive enough to make it a suitable place of colonisation'.

The same distinguished scholar suggests that the break up which happened in those states and resulted in the conquest of Babylonia by the Elamite King, Kadur-Nakunta, in 2285 B. C. was also the cause of an Eastern conquest and a settlement in Bactria, and that this would account for the old focus of culture coeval with the earlier period of Assyrian monarchy said to have existed in Central Asia.

Now, the two ethnic names which were those of the future Chinese invaders, namely, *Bak* which is the ancient form of *Pöih* (Pöih Siu — Bak families), and *Kutti* or *Kutta* (now *Hia*) are not foreign to these regions; nay, is it not likely that the Chinese *Kutti* and the *Kussi*, the Chinese *Bak* and *Bak'* (Bak'-di: Bactria) are the same?

The population of Indo-China thus consists for the most part of ethnic elements previously existing in China, so that, to fully understand the ethnology of the whole peninsula and adequately to appreciate the necessary interdependence of various human races, we must study the Chinese immigration itself.

As we have seen, the results of ancient Chinese philology point to the fact that China received her language and the elements of the arts, sciences and institutions, from the invasions of the Ugro-Altaic Bak families. These tribes came from Western Asia about 2300 B. C. under the leader-

ship of men of high culture who, through their neighbors the Susians, were acquainted with the civilisation which came from Babylon and was changed in the second focus.

When these Bak families came in contact with the aborigines they found tattooed tribes, two stems indeed, whose characteristics strike the traveller even to-day. One was a race of dwarfs, the Tjan, who are still represented by α) the Trau, in the east of Bienhoa in Cochin China, well-nigh the smallest of the human race; β) the Hota'-San, Southwest of Junnan; γ) the Minkopies of the Andamans; δ) the Simangs of the Malay peninsula, and ε) one of the native Formosan stems. These races are all representative of the once so widely-spread Negrito stem. Near the first Chinese colony on the Hwañ ho was the other stem of the Kāñ Kjô, the 'long-legged'. The French scientists of the *expédition du Mekong* observed that the Moïs, P'noñs and K'as of the Southern Indo-Chinese peninsula had long legs. Since at that time the Chinese knew nothing of the regions and races South of the Jañ-zö-Kjañ, since, further, the present representatives of these remarkable men live not far from one another, it seems highly probable that the Chinese immigrants of both stems knew one another, that the then settlement was in North China, and that it was only afterwards they were driven South. By the unequal amount of affinities and parallelisms which they have in common with the Chinese, the non-Chinese race of the 'flowery land' together with their younger relatives of Indo-China show that, some obtained them by fortuitous proximity, others by mixture.

Now there are two facts which make it difficult for us to follow the linguistic history of a country and at the same time to keep fast hold of the identity of a race always speaking the same language, namely, racial succession and linguistic tradition. As regards the problem before us here, the primary data are ethnological; the linguistic evi-

dence does not go beyond the tracing of the effect of aboriginal speech upon the idiom of the Chinese immigrants.

The means used for determining the classification of native dialects are lexical and ideological affinities. Since it is the very nature of language to be in a state of restless evolution and change, we ought not to suppose that, in former times, other forces and influences were at work than those which we find dominant to-day. If roots are produced by the unconscious working of the mind in its search after signs for general ideas, then the radical period is with us still, and will never cease. The language of Tibet, Burmah, Pegu, Siam, Annam and China are generally called monosyllabic and are still mentioned by some as living examples of the *primaeval* speech of monosyllabic roots. But it is very doubtful whether there ever was such monosyllabism. According to Prof De Lacouperie there are but three kinds: one of decay, that of pronunciation, and one of writing. The languages of South Eastern Asia belong to the second, whilst that of English, for instance, arises from decay. By reason of the separation of matter from form in these languages they are sometimes called *juxtapositing*; now it is just the stuff- and form-words which run together and then gradually decay. The decay is often produced by distinction of pitch in pronunciation. These tones have been considered as the residue of the speech of primitive humanity, when language was pure soul-song, the fact is, however, that they are merely a common phaenomenon of linguistic equilibrium. By this process of decay the languages of South Eastern Asia became in many ways destroyed, but their former and fuller phoneticism can to a certain extent be restored by palaeography and dialectic comparison. The same savant divides them into the following six classes:—

1. Incapsulating. 2. Incorporative. 3. Alliterative.
4. Juxtapositing. 5. Annexing. 6. Amalgamating.

But we must remember that they are not stages following

one upon another but states resulting from the two great forces which produce language, namely, the mental capacity to conceive and express general ideas and the laziness of the organs of speech. Sometimes these two forces work harmoniously together and sometimes against one another. We have, for instance, the remarkable phaenomena of mixed and hybrid languages. A language is mixed when only the lexicon shows foreign elements, hybrid, if the grammar is cut up. Grammar shows inner and outer development: inner, if, making use of the possibility of evolution, it yet remain true to its own nature; outer, if it become mixed with another grammar. Of this phaenomenon comparative conceptology gives adequate proof, for, ideology has to do with the position of words in the sentence and shows how languages are built up according to different modes of thought, and that if an idiom with direct (logical) word-order come into contact with one of indirect or inverting ideology, the grammar develops, mixes and changes.

Dr. de Lacouperie suggests the following laws of conceptual evolution and mixture:—

1. Where an immigrant idiom comes into contact and mixes with a language of different ideology which is spoken by the earlier settlers, the power of preserving the order of the sentence is greater with the less-refined idiom, whether autochthonic or nomadic.

2. When, in the case of two languages spoken by two stems of different stages of culture, imposition and not suspension takes place, the prevailing position of the noun and adjective of the more refined language holds its own.

3. Other things equal, the dominant position of the verb with regard to subject and object will be that of the less developed language, often with the addition of repeating pronouns.

Where a language of indirect form (V) is modified by an idiom of direct form (IV, VI), we find the phaenomena

of incorporating pronouns, which frequently repeat subject and object.

If, then, we wish to understand the inner speech-sense, the speech-creating mind or the national consciousness, it is highly important to know whether the ideology is natural, direct, indirect or hybrid. Speaking generally one may say that, the dolichocephalic stems have *direct* ideology, the brachycephalic *indirect*.

Excepting that of the Northern races which had gone before them into the Middle Kingdom and probably belonged to the Turko-Tataric stem, the language of the primitive Chinese or immigrant Bak families was wholly unlike the idiom of the aborigines. Primitive Chinese was related not so much to the Altaic as rather to the Western or Ugric branch of the Turanian family and more particularly to the Ostiak dialects. The ideological formulae of this idiom were probably those which are common to all the Ugro-altaic languages, when not complicated, namely, 1. 3. 5. 8. III. But there are no texts with this ideology extant. In all Chinese dialects the formula of to-day is 1. 3. 6. 8. VI; an earlier formula 1. 3. 5. 8. I is sometimes found in the older of these dialects, e. g. those of Fukau, Kanton and Tuñkin. In the writings of the Tau-sö we even find traces of the primitive ideology 1. 3. 5. 8. III. Yet even with these three formulae the linguistic evolution of China is not complete. Remarkable instances of a formula 2. 3. 6. 7. are occasionally found in older texts. The numerals 6. 7., which indicate the postposition of the subject, and imply a syntax IV or V, are extant in the earlier texts of the Hia dynasty about 2000 B. C.; in the Calendar, for instance, and in certain parts of the Ji Kin. The former was instituted at the time when the founder of the said dynasty made his way down to the mouth of the Jan-zö-Kjan in a South Easterly direction. In this way the idiom of the conquerors became mixed with the speech of the autochthons. And since this calendar

was written and spread for the benefit of the mixed population, it follows that, the deviation from the Chinese of that day corresponded with the linguistic traits of the district. Indeed, they are just those which are peculiar to the Tagalo-Malay idioms, the position of the subject after the verb not being found in the other dialects which have influenced Chinese. By the position of the object after the verb and by the synthetic arrangement of the sixth standard as against the pure numerals of Uralian, which were formerly common to it, there can be little doubt that Chinese has borrowed from the indigenous Môn and Tai-San languages. The revolutionary stages of Chinese ideology are, therefore, the following: 1. 3. 5. 8. III., 1. 3. 6. 7. IV., 1. 3. 5. 8. I., 2. 3. 6. 8. VI and 1. 3. 6. 8. VI.

Phonetics, morphology and semasiology all show how great was the influence of the native idioms. The introduction and growth of the tones as the result of linguistic equilibrium by reason of phonetic decay are to be ascribed to the same influence.

The postposition of particles in Ugro-Altaic to express relations of space and time has been replaced in Chinese by the exactly-opposite principle.

On the ancient dialects there are three Chinese dictionaries, namely, the Er'-ja, the Fañ Jen and the 'Swö Wan. The first is a work of the K'au dynasty (1050—255 B. C.) and is divided, according to the subject, into 19 sections. Small collections of words arranged according to their related meanings constitute the first section, 'Si Ku, which is ascribed to the celebrated Duke of K'au. 'Si jen, the second section, consists of a series of words of which the last gives the meaning of the others: its composition is generally ascribed to Zö Hia, a disciple of Kuñ. The next division is arranged in pairs with explanations. This kind of double words, which is a characteristic of the Tai-San languages, is often found in the popular songs, the 'Si Kiñ, for instance, and

must be looked upon as the result of the influence of the native idioms of this family upon the speech of the Chinese. The Er'-ja is primarily a guide to the classics, but it contains many words which are found in no Chinese text. To a great extent they are loan-words which appear in Chinese only by homonyms as phonetic exponents. In this work we have a fifth of the whole repertory, i. e. 928 words which do not occur elsewhere. According to the Wu Kiñ Wan the five Kiñ or canonical books contain only 3335 different word-forms. If we add the four 'Su the number is only 4754. The great collection of the 'Si San Kiñ or 13 Kiñ, which, besides those mentioned, contains the I-li, K'au-li, Hjai-Kiñ, Ko-liañ, Kuñ Jan and Er'-ja, contains 6544 different words.

As regards the Fañ Jen it is nothing but a comparative glossary which was made by Jan Hjuñ (5—3 B. C.—18 A. D.). Its full title is: Jao hien 'se ké zjüê tai jü 'si piê kwô Fañ Jen 'the speech of the past explained by messengers in light carts together with words from different parts of the country'. In this work Jan Hjuñ has collected over 12,000 words from more than 44 districts.

Hü 'Sen, the author of the 'Swö Wan, lived in the first century of our era. The 'Swö Wan, which consists of 9353 words, is still the chief work with Chinese lexicographers. In this great work Hü 'Sen has collected all the characters of the so-called Sjai K'wan, which he considered the best, and has given 441 of the Ku Wan.

If, therefore, we would critically arrange the data which are to be obtained from the Er'-ja, the Fañ Jen and the 'Swö Wan, together with the commentaries of Kwô Pò, much of the linguistic history of China between 500 B. C. and 250 A. D. would be elucidated and explained.

Let us now sum up the results of the Indo-Chinese philology, for they are of far reaching importance. In the first place they reveal the remarkable fact that China's

interesting culture is derived from Babylonia and Syria. that the so-called Chinese list of kings is based upon the early Babylonian canon and restores the first dynasty of the 86 kings mentioned by Berosus. The duration of the Chinese canon, without any astronomical reference, has been calculated at 44 centuries B. C. On the other hand, the earlier dynasty (13, 11, 9 kings) at 600 years, which would give us about 3800 B. C. for 'Sen-Nuñ = Sargon. Then, besides the similarity in names and facts between Chinese tradition and Babylonian history, we get two great synchronisms: Ku Nak K'un-te = Kudur Nak-Kunte about 2300 B. C. and 'Sen Nuñ = Sargon about 3800 B. C.

Still more important are, perhaps, the linguistic facts which have been brought to light by scientific research. Especially remarkable are the ideological changes which are manifest in the two types of speech known as Turano-Scythian and Indo-Pacific. The original ideology of the Kwanlunic family was 1. 3. 5. 8. III, but that of the Chinese of to-day is 1. 3. 6. 8. VI, whilst that of Karengian is 1. 4. 6. 8. VI. and that of Tibeto-Burmese 1. 4. 5. 8. III.

Speaking generally, one may say that the great difference between inflecting languages and those of the agglutinative type is this, that whilst in the former the single parts of the perception are presented to the hearer according to their importance, the sketch thus developing into the perfect picture, in the latter the conceptual framework is put together like a mosaic, and only at the end of the sentence or conversation is it possible to have a review of the whole. Again, what a contrast between the vocalisation of the Aryan idioms, with the *Umlaut* of Ancient Baktrian, Old Irish and German, and the *vowel-harmony* as we have it in the Uralic and Altaic tongues!

As a type of the Samoyede forms of speech we may take Jurak. The language has a richly-developed inflexion, the noun possessing the usual case-forms to express space.

On the other hand, the verb is tolerably poor in expressions for inner modifications. Every noun can be used as a neuter verb and every transitive verb can assume the form of a noun with possessive suffixes. The object is expressed phonetically, but the subject is not. The attribute precedes the noun, but the predicate taking the form of the verb, follows. The subject stands at the head of the sentence, the verb at the end, the object, as the verb's complement, going before.

From a phonetical point of view there is no distinction between noun and verb. E. g. *iano-u* my boat; *madawae-u* my section i. e. 'I have cut.' There is no expression of grammatical gender, but we have the three numbers, namely, singular, dual and plural, and 8 cases, namely, subjective, objective, genitive, dative, locative, ablative, prosecutive and instrumental.

The language of the Samoyedes possesses two phonetically different series of suffixes, namely, predicative and possessive, applying alike to noun and verb. Tense is only imperfectly expressed in Samoyede. As a rule there are but two forms: a fundamental form which may be designated an Aorist expressing present and future—durative, in fact, and a preterite derived from it by means of a sign pointing to the past. There are two moods, the conjunctive and imperative, the optative being found in the Jurak dialect only.

Samoyede numeration is based upon the decimal system, but it is very doubtful whether originally, the Samoyedes could count beyond six.

1	Nopoi nob	(Jurak);	ôker	(Ostjak)
5	Samljañ	„	somblañ	„
10	ju', lûtsa-ju'	„	kôt	

Jurak ideology is indirect, as will be seen from the following examples (1. 3. 5. 8. III):—

Sawa	njenetje	tubka-si	har-si	nji	jili-inu'.
brave	man	club-without	knife-without	not	live will.

Mañ jili-^{no}-ma-u ja-u

I dwell-shall-of-my place-mine = A place where I will dwell.

Ostjak-Samoyede.

Äsä-m tåksemel-kum-en njälä-md mi-nge-d, wuenel
 Father-my rich-man-to daughter-his give will, another
 kum-en aša mi-nge-d.
 man-to not give will.

The Jurak and Ostjak thoughts of the Supreme are common to all the Uralic tribes, namely:—

Num Thunder; Tôrîm Earth.

Nor must we forget that ‘the Tatar tribes with much unanimity recognize as a great god the Sun, whose figure may be seen beside the Moon’s on their magic drums, from Siberia to Lapland. Castrén, the ethnologist, speaking of the Samoyed expression for heaven or deity in general (jilibeambaertje) tells an anecdote from his travels, which gives a lively idea of the thorough simple nature-religion still possible to the wanderers of the steppes. “A Samoyed woman,” he says, “told me it was her habit every morning and evening to step out of her tent and bow down before the sun; in the morning saying, ‘When thou Jilibeambaertje risest, I too rise from my bed!’ in the evening, “When thou Jilibeambaertje sinkest down. I too get me to rest!” The woman brought this as a proof of her assertion that even among the Samoyeds they said their morning and evening prayers. but she added with pity that there are also among them wild people who never sent up a prayer to God”¹

The chief characteristic of the idioms of the Uralic tribes is the truly astounding development of flexion. The noun, for instance, for the living expression of various spatial relations shows an unrivalled richness of forms. There are

¹ Tylor; *Primitive Culture*, 291.

no less than 17 cases or modifications of the stem, namely, subjective, objective, indefinite, essive, inessive, relative, illative, adessive, ablative, allative, abessive, translative, prosecutive, comitative and instructive, genitive and instrumental. The two important categories Noun and Verb are generally distinguished, as are also the attribute and the predicate, the former going before, the latter coming after, the subject. As regards the subject, its position is not always the same. Whilst in Magyar the object precedes the verb, in Finnish, as a rule, it follows. The genitive comes before the word it defines.

The decimal system underlies Uralic numeration. For the sake of comparison I give the figures in the words of 8 languages:—

<i>Suomi</i>	<i>Lapp</i>	<i>Syrianian</i>	<i>Mordwinian</i>	<i>Kerenissian</i>
1 yksi	akte	ötik	ifkä	iktä
2 kaksi	kuekte	kik	kafta	kok
3 kolme	kolma	kuim	kolma	kum
4 neljä	nelje	njol	nilä	nil
5 viisi	vita	vit	vetä	viz
10 kymmenen	lokke	das	kemen	lu
	<i>Ostjak</i>	<i>Wogul</i>	<i>Magyar</i>	
1	it	akvä	egy	
2	kât	kit	ket	
3	kûdem	korom	három	
4	njel	njile	négy	
5	vêt	ät	öt	
10	joñ	lau	tíz	

As a specimen of Finnish we may take a Rune from the great epic Kalevala (III, v. 91):—

Tuli	nuori	Joukahainen.	Ajoi	tie-llä	vastatusten
Came	young	Joukahainen,	Harried	way-up	towards;
Tarttu-i	aisa	aisa-n	pää-hän;		
smashed-itself	pole	pole-the	head-against;		

Rahe rahke-hen takist-i,
Pole-ring pole-ring-against was knocked,
Länge-t puultu-i länki-löi-hin,
Harness entangled-itself harness-with,
Vemmel vempele-n nenä-hän.
Horse-collar horse-collar-of top-against.

And the following prayer addressed to Ukko:—

Oi Ukko ylijumala, Ukko, thou, o God above,
Tahi taatto taivahinen, Thou, o Father in the heavens.
Vallan pilvissä pitäjä, Who reignest in the clouds
Hattarojen hallitsia! And ledest cloudlings all!

R. II, V. 317.

In Finnish the Pater Noster is as follows:

Isä meidän, joka olet taiwaissa: Pyhitetty olkoon sinun nimes. Lähestyköön sinun waltakuntas. Olkoon sinun tahtos niin maassa, kuin taiwaassa. Anna meille tänäpäiwänä meidän jokapäiwäinen leipämme. Ja anna meille meidän welkamme anteeksi, miinkuin mekin anteeksi annamme meidän welwollistemme. Ja älä johdata meitä kiusaukseen. Mutta päästä meitä pahasta. Sillä sinun on waltakunta, ja woinna, ja kunnia, ijankaikkisesti; Amen!

Mordwinian may be represented by part of a fable entitled 'Fox and Wolf':—

Kelas asdi kapa prea-sa, mez-divik
Fox sits hay-rick head-upon, something (abl.)
jarhtsai mol'-s malaz-inza virgas kizift-izä:
he eats. Came neighborhood-his wolf asked-him:
'mezdä jarhta-t kelas jalgai?' 'Da vaga! Kal-nät
'What eatest-thou fox friend?' And there! fishes-which
kunda-ii.' 'Ko-sta kunda-t'?' 'Af aza-n.'
I have caught.' 'Whence has thou caught?' 'not I say.'

Of Magyar we may take an example from Kisfaludy:—

Bús örje a sir-nak, magas Cyprus! te a
Sad guardian the grave-to, high Cypress! thou the

halál-nak néma biztos-a;— minő titko-t fedez nemes
 death-to dumb confidant-his; what secret conceals sublime
 példázat-od? felhő-t oszlat-va tör-sz fel a
 image-thine? clouds dividing strugglest-thou upwards the
 magas-ra 's az eg csillagos tér-e-i-n örök
 height-up and of-the heaven starry spaces his-eternal
 feny-ben mereng-ve hízte-id tisztá-bb levegő-nek
 splendor-into fixing gaze-thine purer air-to-the
 szív-od árja-i-t 's komor-dan még is
 thou drinkest-it-in floods its and earnestly yet also
 bü zke lét-ed-et keskeny hant-ok dísz-é-re
 proud being-thy narrow sod adornment-his-to
 szentel-ed!
 thou consecratest it!

Ideologically the Uralic tongues are either *indirect*
 (1. 3. 5. 8. I) or *hybrid* (1. 3. 6. 8. III).

With the Magyar Concept of Deity, namely, Isten, we
 have already dealt. The remaining Concepts are:—

Finnish: **Jumala** Thunder-place
 Itse ilmoinen Jumala Thou, o God among the breezes,
 Valjastele varsojasi, Catch the colth and have them ready;
 Rakentele ratsujasi Harness, thou, the lively steeds,
 Aja kirja-korjinesi: Hither drive in sledges gay!

Küll jumal teeb, kui anname teha.

God indeed will do (it) if only we will let Him!

Esthonian: **Jummal** Thunder-place

Keremissian: Юма Thunder

Lapp: **Juümei** Thunder-place

Wogul: Төрпм Earth

Kuva's: Тóра Earth

Mordvinian: Пазъ The Hidden One.

Pas povni God-fearing.

Mok'sa: Шкай The Holy One.

In the Mok'sa form of Mordwinian we find the word Skai for Deity:—

Oh! otsu škai kormelets! värä Škai kormelets! Ma; anatama, makst: vārdā pisem, alda lihtima, pakšas šora, kuts sembendi šumbraši, kaldasiš živatat; vanimast vorda, tolda, kaldun lomañdä!

O great God, Guardian! God above, Defender! What we long for, that give: rain from above, springs from below; corn in the field, health for all at home, cattle in the pens. Protect us from thieves, fire, and sorcerers!

There are many forms of the Tatar word, namely, Jum, Juma, Jub; Num, Nom, Nome, Nup, Nop, Som, but the Idea is always the same: primarily *Sky*, then *Thunder*. As Prof. Tylor well observes:—

‘Over the vast range of the Tatar races, it is the type of the supreme Heaven that comes prominently into view. Nature-worshippers in the extreme sense, these rude tribes conceived their ghosts and elves and demons and great powers of the earth and air to be, like men themselves, within the domain of the divine Heaven almighty and all-encompassing. To trace the Samoyed's thought of Num the personal Sky passing into vague conceptions of pervading deity; to see with the Tunguz how Boa the Heaven-god, unseen but allknowing, kindly but indifferent, has divided the business of his world among such lesser powers as sun and moon, earth and fire; to discern the meaning of the Mongol Tengri, shading from Heaven into Heaven-god, and thence into god or spirit in general; to follow the records of Heaven-worship among the ancient Turks and Hiong-nu; to compare the supremacy among the Lapps of Tiermes, the Thunderer, with the supremacy among the Finns of Jumala and Ukko, the Heaven-god and heavenly Grandfather—such evidence seems good ground for Castrén's argument, that the doctrine of the divine Sky underlay the first Turanian conceptions, not merely of a Heaven-god,

but of a highest deity who in after ages of Christian conversion blended into the Christian God'. Nor must we fail to mention a beautiful expression for the deity found amongst the Samoyeds, namely, Jilibeambaertje Protector of the Living!

CHAPTER V.

THE THEOLOGY OF THE NÚBA RACE, FROM THE STAND-POINT OF PHILOLOGY.

Passing on to the Núba race we may well begin with the language of the Fûl-be known as Fûl-de or Fulfûl-de. Speaking generally the language has a harmoniously-evolved phonetic system. It is fond of polysyllabic forms. The two categories Noun and Verb are distinguished from each other, the latter being built up upon the relation of predicate. Subject and object are only distinguished by position in the sentence, and attribute and predicate are not quite adequately distinguished. Definition follows the thing to be defined, consequently the genitive comes after the noun, the attributive adjective after the substantive, the object after its verb. The idiom possesses alike relative particles and relative pronouns. With the pronoun of the first person there is a double form in the plural, namely, inclusive and exclusive.

Very interesting is the phonetic denotation of the correlation of unity and plurality. In certain cases both with the noun and the verb it is effected by a regular change of initial consonants, which, as Prof. F. Müller well observes, occurs again in no idiom and implies an uncommonly cute linguistic consciousness. Thus, *kû-do* slave, *hû-be* slaves; *gor-ko* man, *wor-be* men; *pûl-o* a fulah, *fûl-be* fulahs. Nay, more, we find two forms of the substantive, the indefinite and the definite.

Indefinite form

singular plural

Sagata sagatâ-be youth, youths;

Ko-do hô-be

stranger, strangers;

Definite form

singular plural

Sagata-on sagatâ-be-be

Ko-do-on hô-be-be.

But although as regards number and individuality the language shows a rich and original evolution, in respect of Case it is very poor. The two most important cases, the subjective and objective can only be recognised by position in the sentence. As already stated, the genitive follows the substantive to which it belongs and the other case-relations are expressed by prepositions preceding the nouns.

The adjective in the sense of the attribute follows the substantive to which it belongs, agrees with it in number and, instead of the noun, takes the articular ending. For instance, bâba moto a good father, bâba moto-on the good father; bâba-râbe moto-be good fathers, bâba-râbe moto-bebe the good fathers.

One may do well to compare the nominal expression with possessive suffixes, with the verbal expression with predicate suffixes:—

Sing. 1. Pers. gelô-ba-am my camel fudor-mi I begin

2. Pers. gelô-ba-mâ fudor-da

Plur. 1. Pers. gelô-ba-ammiñ fudor-meñ

As in Arabic, the distinction between transitive and intransitive is made by difference of vowel, *a* in the one case, *i* or *u* in the other. The verbal stems are six in number, namely, the simple, the definite, the causative, the reflexive, the reciprocal, and the limitative stem-form. Every verb has a passive and every expression can appear either in the positive or negative form.

The quinar-decimal system underlies Fúlde and the ideology is hybrid, namely, 2. 4. 6. 8. VI, as may be seen from the following examples:—

Timba wi-i jo be-deff-ana-mo mâro jo onjam

Timba said that they boiled-him rice that he might eat.

Sapal-be nat-i e Gaḡaga, be-kel-i
 Moors-the pressed into Gaḡaga, they destroyed
 tata Maḡana be-mbar-i im-be fop.
 the wall (of) Maḡana they killed people all.

The thought of Deity is that of divine sovereignty:—

Ḡomam Lord.

Ḡomirâdo.

If we take the language of the Nuba we find that it has a harmoniously-developed phonetic system, excluding too great an accumulation of either vowels or consonants. As a rule forms are produced by means of suffixes. It is, in fact, the process of the simplest agglutination.

Noun and verb are distinguished from each other but the nominal expression predominates. Subject, predicate, and object and attribute are denoted partly by position and partly by the speech-form. The thing to be defined comes after the defining element. The language possesses no relative pronoun.

In Nubian a great part is played by compounds whereby both substantives and adjectives are formed. They consist of two expressions with definite denotation of the reciprocal grammatical relationship. The latter is either one of the object or of dependence. Thus, *kare-kal* 'fishes eating' = pelican; *munê-g-att-i* 'thoughts bringing' = wise; *id-ên* 'of the man woman' = wife; *man-isse* 'eyes water' = tear. Nubian not knowing the categories of grammatical gender one has only to consider those of number and case. Alike in the singular and plural an *i* is added to the stem, in the former short, in the latter long. E. g. *ḡogort-i*, *murt-i* (sing.); spirit, horse; *fâb-î* fathers, *ḡîd-î* grasses.

As regards case, the nominative as subject has no sign; as predicate it is denoted by a suffixed -a, the expression of the copula. E. g. *burû mas* 'the beautiful maiden', on the other hand *mas-a* 'it is good', *mas-a* immun 'it is not

good'. The genitive is expressed by putting the defining element before the thing to be defined: *burû-n ukki* 'the maiden's ear'; *fâb-in ur* 'the father's head'. The object-case corresponds with our accusative and dative and is formed by the suffix *-gâ* in Mahas, and *-gi* in Kenus and Dongola.

In the sentence the expression of the direct object (Accus.) as a rule goes before the finite verb. If a direct (accus.) and an indirect (dat.) object occur in the sentence, the direct takes the first place, the indirect the second.

Both as attribute and predicate the adjective follows the substantive to which it belongs. In the former case it takes the suffixes of the substantive, in the latter it remains unchanged and must be joined to the copula.

There is no relative pronoun in Nubian, so the relative sentence has to be treated as a noun, and construed as such in relation to the principal sentence. E. g. 'the mountain upon which Moses spake with God they call Sinai' is expressed thus: Moses with God spake-of which mountain Sinai they call.

The Nubian verb is characterized by peculiar suffixes, and in speech by the preceding forms of the personal pronoun. The former are divided into those of the durative and those of the aorist. There are six tenses: durative, aorist, perfect, pluperfect, two forms of the future, the exact future.

With regard to modality Nubian distinguishes between positive and negative expression.

The decadic system underlies Nubian numeration, and here it may be well to compare five dialects:—

	<i>Mahas</i>	<i>Kenus</i>	<i>Dongola</i>	<i>Kuljân</i>	<i>Koldagi</i>
1	wêr	wêra	wêri	ber	bera
3	tusko	tosku	toski	tojn	todje
5	dîga	dîgn	dîgi	tisn	tessn
10	dimer	dimenu	dimini	bure	bure
20	aro	ari	ari		

THE PATER NOSTER.

Ûf-fâb semâ-lâ taïs inni gudsî-kir-takk-eiâ,

Our Father heaven-in name thine holy-be-made-indeed,
 mulk inni kir-eiâ û-logo, irâda inn âw-takk-eiâ
 kingdom thy come-indeed us-to, will thine made-be-indeed
 semâ-gôn ardi-gôn-lâ, kabîre kâfi-g' û-gâ
 heaven-and earth-and-upon, food enough-which us-to
 dên-g-ê elî, gafra-dên-g-ê sembi ûni-gû-gâ
 give-us-indeed to-day, forgive-us-indeed sins our-they
 sikkir û-gôn gafra-tig-g-uru ter-î-n û-log ûs-k
 as we-and forgive them whom-of us-to bad-of
 âw-innan-gâ û-g uda-ggâ-tam-ê gerrîb-îd-lâ lâkin
 making (Acc.) us lead-us-not-indeed temptation-in but
 negi-g-ê sarri-ltônî, il-lo dâr-in-nogo
 deliver-us-indeed evil-out, thee-with is-because
 mulki-gôn gudra-gôn gurandi-gôn abad-lâ. Amin.
 kingdom-and power-and glory-and unity-to. Amen.

Nubian ideology is natural, the formula being 1. 4. 5. 8. I.

Of the supreme concept we have the following forms:—

<i>Nubian:</i>	Nôr	Lord
<i>Mahus:</i>	Nôr	Lord
<i>Dongolawi:</i>	Arti	Knower
<i>Barea:</i>	Rebbi	Master.

In Barea the Pater Noster is as follows:—

He-aben nere-ge ut-ko, eng-ade kuddusnej-am

Our-Father heaven-in is who, thy name hallowed be
 engâ simet wo-n-em, engâ solînga ej-am nere-gi
 thy kingdom come, thy will done be heaven-in
 lug-go, he-koberi wal-n-i-gin-der-ko enton
 earth-upon, our bread day-spend-make-to-which to-day
 da, he-waigel fine ha, heige le he-negus-guma-go
 give, our debt forgive us, as also our debtors

fin-in-dere-k,	fitnet-gi	ma	nanegine	lakin	kośei
we forgive,	temptation-in	not	lead into	but	evil
mesa-ko-gi	dihin-ni-gin-ha.	Amen.			
great-out	save us.	Amen.			

CHAPTER VI.

THE DRĀVIḌA RACE.

Like those of the Nûba race, the languages of the Kolh or Vind'ja stems possess a richly-developed phonetic system. The principle underlying their structure is suffix-agglutination. By the side of this is the formation by infix. The verb rests upon a predicative basis, which formally cannot adequately be distinguished from the possessive relationship; but its structure is quite formless, since the personal pronoun is only loosely connected with the verbal stem. A verbal expression can be derived from any part of speech by the addition of the verbal suffixes. In number there are singular, dual and plural with the noun and pronoun, and by the pronoun this distinction is transferred to the verb. And, as regards the first person dual and plural of pronoun and verb, we even find the distinction between exclusive and inclusive. By the infix-formation, the structure of the verb, the dual, the two forms of the first person dual and plural, as well as by the vigesimal system, the Kolh idioms are essentially distinguished from the Dravidian. Subject, object, and predicate and attribute are kept apart alike by formal and syntactical means.

The vigesimal system is at the basis of the Vind'ja numeration. The numbers one to five are as follows:—

	<i>San'āl</i>	<i>Mundari</i>	<i>Kolh</i>	<i>Gwai</i>	<i>Kurku</i>
1	mi(t)	mija(t)	mīd	mi	mia
2	barea	baria	barea	ambar	baria

3	pea	apia	apia	sgota	hapia
4	ponea	upunea	upunja	gudami	upunia
5	moŕe	moŕea	morea	—	monoja

Here are a few sentences in Mandari:—

Ora'-ete dâru salahi mena. Sane-te diri hambala-
House-of tree high is. Wood-of stone heavy

tan-a. He gomke alih hîgu-tan-a-lih. Ihi
being-is. O Sir we two (excl.) coming-are-we. He
apia merom-ko kirin-ked-ko-a. Aih horo kagi
four goats bought them has. I man speech (lan-
ka-ih bu'gaw-a.
guage of the Mundas) not-I understand.

Vind'ja ideology is that of primitive mankind, 1. 4. 5. 8. I, being absolutely *natural*.

So far we have been considering the Vind'ja idioms of the Drâviḍa race, we have now to deal with the languages more specifically known as Dravidian, namely, Tamil, Canarese, Malayalam, Telugu, Tulu and Oraon.

By their phonetic system these tongues are sharply distinguished from their neighbours, the Aryan. They all possess five, some even six, classes of explosives, viz. gutturals, palatals, cacuminal or cerebral and dental Dentals and labials. In Tamil and Malayalam the cacuminal dentals are palatalised, whereby a new class of explosives arises. The cacuminal dentals are in these idioms not only transformations of ordinary dentals into suffix-syllables, as, for instance, in Sanskrit and the allied dialects, but integral parts of the roots.

Words are formed from roots by means of the process of suffixing. The noun is rich in case-endings of a spatial nature, but the denotation of grammatical cases is somewhat meagre. The verb rests on the predicative relationship and is formed by suffixes, which represent contracted pronouns. By position in the sentence subject and object,

predicate and attribute are distinguished. The defining element goes before the thing defined, the object before the verb, which regularly closes the sentence. The subordinate sentence also precedes the principal sentence, which it more nearly defines. Possessing no relative pronoun the Drāviḍa languages have recourse to participial constructions, whereby their structure becomes in many respects like that of the Altaic tongues.

In these Dravidian tongues we have the phaenomenon so common with the Uralian, Altaic and Samoyedic idioms, namely, the so-called vowel-harmony, whereby one vowel determines the nature of a neighbouring vowel. But whilst in the Uralian and Altaic family of speech the vowel of a suffix is assimilated to the vowel of the preceding stem, i. e. retrograde assimilation, in the Dravidian languages the last vowel of the stem is assimilated to the vowel of the following suffix.

Originally the roots of these tongues were undoubtedly monosyllabic, though now it is not always possible to find them so. Attaching to the added elements is a definite meaning, as in all word-forming elements of agglutinative tongues.

As regards the noun there is, with the exception of the pronoun of the third person, no adequate appreciation of grammatical gender. But we find a distinction similar to that which prevails in several American idioms, namely, that between things rational and those irrational. The two classes are called by native grammarians 'forms of the higher cast' and 'forms of the lower cast'. To the former belong designations for men, gods, demi-gods, spirits, etc., to the latter those for animals, lifeless things and abstract ideas.

The Drāviḍa verb rests upon the union of a predicative nominal stem and a personal pronoun standing as subject.

Dravidian numeration is based upon the decadic system.

	<i>Tamīl</i>	<i>Malayalam</i>	<i>Telugu</i>	<i>Canarese</i>	<i>Tulu</i>	<i>Kulagu</i>
1	Oṇḍru	onna	Okati	Vondu	vonḡi	ondu
5	eindu	aṅka	aḡidu	eidu	einḡi	anṡi
10	pattu	patta	padi	hattu	paltū	pattu

	<i>Poda</i>	<i>Oraon</i>	<i>Brahui</i>
1	Vodd	Onta	asiṡ
5	ük	panke	panḡ
10	paltu	dase	dah

The Dravidians do not seem to have counted beyond 100, at all events, in the first instance.

The following may serve as instances of Dravidian construction and ideology:—

Tamīl.

Parābaran uṇḍ-enḍr-um avar eṇṇ-ei ppaḍei-tt-ār
 God is-said-having-and he me created has
 enḍr-um viḡuvâḡi-kkiḍr-êṇ.
 said-having-and believe-I.

‘I believe that God exists and that He has created me.’
 A-ppadi âṇ-âl avan êṇ i-ppaḍi kḡollu-giḍr-âṇ?
 That way being-through he as this way speaks?

‘If that is the case, how can he speak thus?’

Malayalam.

Maṡi koṇ-ṡu var-eṇam-enna avan-oṡa paḍra-ka.
 Ink taken-having come-beg-said having him-with speak.

‘Tell him to bring ink.’

Tamīl: ûril evaḡavu viḍuḡaḡ irukkiḍradu?

Telugu: pallelô enmi inḍlu ummavi?

Kanari: ûralli eṡṡu manegaḡavê?

Town-in how many houses are?

Oraon.

Pater noster.

He embai ḡe merka-nu rak-adaj. niṅahi nâne
 O Father who heaven-in art. Thy name

pavitr mano, niñahi rāgi bark'o, niñahi suuwak ekane
 holy be, Thy kingdom come, Thy will as
 merka-nu aneho kekal-nu ho-mano, emahi ulla-ulla-nta
 heaven-in even so earth-upon be-done, our daily
 asma ina emage kia, antle emahi dosan muaf
 bread to-day us give, and our debt forgiveness
 nana, ekane em-ho emahi dosnanur-in muaf
 make, as we-also our debtors forgiveness
 nandam, antle eman pariksa-nu amba kaka, pahē
 make, and us temptation-into not lead, but
 burai-nti kar-a-bak-a; rāgi, sawan antle mahatm sadau
 evil-from deliver; kingdom, power and glory ever
 sadau niñahi rai. Amen.
 ever Thine is. Amen.

Tamil Pater Noster.

பரமண்டலங்களில் இருக்கிற எங்கள் பித
 வே. உம்மூடைய நாமம் பரிசுத்தமாய் வணங்
 கப்படுவதாக. உம்மூடைய இராச்சியம் வருவ
 தாக. உம்மூடைய சித்தம் பரமண்ட லத்திலே
 செய்யப்படுகிற துபோல, பூயியிலேயும் செய்யப்
 படுவதாக. இன்றைக்கு எங்களுக்கு வேண்டிய
 ஆகாரத்தை எங்களுக்குத் தாரும். எங்கள் கட
 னைகளுக்கு மாங்கள் மன்னிப்பதுபோல, தே
 வர் எங்கள் கடன்களை மன்னித்ததளும். மா
 ங்ள் சோனையில் பிரவேசியாகுபடிசேய்து, த்நை
 மயில் நின்று எங்களை இரட்சித்துக்கொள்ளும்
 இராச்சியமும், வல்லமையும், மகிமையும் உமக்
 கே எ ன்றேன்றைக்கும் உண் டாயிருக்கின்றன.
 ஆமன்.

Para-maṇḍalaṅ-gaḷ-il iru-kkiṭṭa eṅ-gaḷ Bidā-v-e!
 Highest circles-in being our Father-o

umm-uḍeija nāmam bari-ġutta ppaḍu-vad-āga. Umm-uḍeija
 Thy name holy be made be. Thy
 irakkijam varu-vad-āga. Umm-uḍeija ġittam bara-maṇḍal-
 kingdom come may. Thy will highest-circles-
 att-il-ē ġejja-ppaḍu-ġiḍra-du bōla ppūmi-j-il-ē-j-
 in- in truth done be as earth-upon-forsooth-
 mi ġejja-ppaḍu-vad-āga. Aṇḍr-aṇḍr-ulla eṇ-gaḷ app-att-ei
 also done is. Day-day-being our bread
 eṇ-gaḷ-u-kku iṇḍru dār-um. Eṇ-gaḷ-u-kku virōdam-āḷ
 us-to to-day give. Us-to inimically
 kkuṭṭṭraṇ ġej-ġiḍra-var-gaḷ-u-kku nān-gaḷ maṇṇi-kkiḍr-adu
 guilt making we forgiving
 bōla eṇ-gaḷ guṭṭṭraṇ-gaḷ-ei eṇ-gaḷ-u-kku maṇṇi-j-um.
 as our debts us-to forgive.
 Eṇ-gaḷ-ei kḱōḍaneī-kku uṭ piravēḡi-kka . . ppaṇṇ-āmal
 Us temptation-to into to enter not making
 dimei-j-iṇṇḍru eṇ-gaḷ-ei iraṭki-ttu . . . kkoḷḷum!
 evil-from us saved having take!
 Irakkijam-um vallamei-j-um magimeī-j-um eṇḍr-eṇḍrei-kk-um
 Kingdom-and power-and majesty-and eternity to
 mum-uḍeija-vei-gaḷ-ē! Āmen.
 Thy property forsooth! Amen.

Thus, speaking generally, the ideology of the Dravidian idioms proper is *indirect*, i. e. 1. 3. 5. 8. III.

The Dravidian forms of the theistic Idea are the following:

Tamīl: கருவுகோன் Kāḍruveḡuraṇ Omnipotent.

Rāḡmahālī: गोकर्णियः Gosarṇijit' Leader of the Flock

Urija: འཇམ་མཉམ་པུ་ Bûra-Pennu Light-God

Gond: तारिपेवु Tari-Pennu Earth-Goddess

Munda: Oraon: Sant'al: सिद्धबोद्ध Siṇ-Boha Sun-God

A very usual name for God in Tamil is ஸரீரஸரீரஸ் Parābaraṇ, but this is only another form of परम्परम् the

Supreme. Nay, the one given above, namely,

சுதருவேசுவர்

is really सर्वेश्वर The Omnipotent.

“Rooted as they are” says Dr. Tylor, “in the depths of nature-worship, the doctrines of the supreme Sun and Heaven both come to the surface again in the native religions of Asia. The divine Sun holds his primacy distinctly enough among the rude indigenous tribes of India. Although one sect of the Khonds of Orissa especially direct their worship to Tari Pennu the Earth-goddess, yet even they agree theoretically with the sect who worship Bûra Pennu or Bella Pennu, Light-god or Sun-god, in giving to him supremacy above the manes-gods and naturegods, and all spiritual powers. . . . In tracing its old World development (i. e. Sun-worship), we begin among the ruder Allophylian tribes of Asia, and end among the great polytheistic nations. The north-east quarter of India shows the doctrine well defined among the indigenous stocks. The Bodo and Dhimal place the Sun in the pantheon as an elemental god, though in practical rank below the sacred rivers. The Kol tribes of Bengal, Mundas, Oraons, Santals, know and worship as supreme. Sing-bonga, the Sun-god; to him some tribes offer white animals in token of his purity, and while not regarding him as author of sickness or calamity, they will resort to him when other divine aid breaks down in sorest need.”

CHAPTER VII.

THE BASQUES AND THE CAUCASIANS.

The organism of the Basque language principally rests upon that polysynthetic suffixing structure which characterizes most of the North American idioms. The verb forms the

centre of the sentence, taking up into itself the pronominal subject and object, both the nearer (accusative) and the further object (dative) as necessary complement.

Phonetically noun and verb are sharply distinguished from each other, but an essentially-nominal conception underlies the verb. Speaking generally one may say that, there is no absolute demarcation of the subject from the object. There is a separation of the predicate and attribute, but the various attributive expressions are not all treated alike. The language possesses both a relative pronoun and a relative particle.

The numerical system rests upon a vigesimal basis, but from a hundred onwards we find the decimal system, which was introduced later.

1. Bat 10. hamar, amar 20. hogeï, ogeï.

The three dialects are well shown in the

PATER NOSTER.

a) *Guipuzcoan.*

Aita	gure-a	ceru-et-an	za-ude-n-a	
Father	our the	heavens-in	Thou-dwelling-who-the	
santificatu-a	izan	bedi	zure	icen-a, b-etor
hallowed-the	become	he-be	Thine	name-the, it-come
gu-gana	zure	reinu-a	eguin	b-edi zure vorondate-a
us-to	Thy	Kingdom-the	made be	Thy will-the
nola	ceru-a-n	ala	hurre-a-n.	Egun igu-zu gure
as	heaven-the-in	so	earth-the-in.	Day give our
egun-oro-z-ko	ogui-a	eta	barca	di-zqui-gu-tsu gure
daily	bread-the	and	forgive	them-us-Thou our
zorr-ac	gu-c	gure	zordun-a-i	barca-tcen die-gu-n beccla.
debts	we	our	debtors-to	forgiving them-we as.
Eta	ez	g-ai-tza-tsu-la	utci	tentacio-a-n eror-ten,
And	not	us-thou-indeed	let	temptation-the-in fall.
baicic-an	libra	g-ai-tza-zu	gaitc-etic.	Amen.
but	free	us-Thou	evil-from.	Amen.

β) *Biscayan.*

Aita guri-a cerub-it-an z-agoz-an-a santificadu
 Father our-the heaven-s-in Thou-be-ing-the hallowed
 bedi zure icen-a. b-etor gu-gana zure erreinub-a,
 he Thy name-the, it-come us-to Thy kingdom-the,
 eguin bedi zure borondati-a nolan cerub-a-n ala
 made he be Thy will-the as heaven-the-in evenso
 lurri-a-n. Egun-ian-egun-ian-go gueure oguij-a
 earth-the-upon. Day-in-day-in-for our bread-the
 egun igu-zu eta parcatu ei-gu-zuz gueure zorr-ac gu-c
 to-day give and forgive us-Thou our debts we
 gueure zordun-a-i parque-tan deutse-gu-zan legue-a-z
 our debtors-to forgive we them way-the-in (as)
 eta ichi ez ei-gu-zu tentacioni-a-n jans-ten baña
 and let not us-Thou temptation-the-in fall but
 libradu g-aizuz gache-tie. Amen.
 free us-Thou evil-from. Amen.

γ) *Labourdan.*

Gure Aita ceruëtu-an aic-en-a sauctifica bedi
 Our Father heavens-in being-the hallowed he-be
 hire icen-a ethor bedi hire resun-a, eguin
 thy name-the coming he-be thy kingdom-the, made
 bedi hire vorondate-a ceru-a-n beçala lure-a-n
 he-be thy will-the heaven-the-in as earth-the-upon-
 ere. Gure egun-eco ogui-a igu-c egun eta quitta
 also. Our daily bread-the give to-day and forgive
 ietza-gu-c gure çorr-ak nola gu-c-ere gure çordun-c-y
 them-us our debts as we-also our debtors
 quitta-tzen baitraue-gu eta ez-g-ai-tza-la sar
 forgiving them-they-we-are and not-us-thou-indeed enter
 eraci tentation-et-an baina deliura g-ai-tza-c gaichto-tie.
 make temptations-in but deliver us-thou evil-from.

Ecan hire-a du-c resum-a eta puissanç-a eta
 For thine is kingdom-the and power-the and
 gloria secul-ac-otz. Amen.
 glory-the eternities-for. Amen.

Basque ideology varies with the dialect, but, speaking generally one may say that it is hybrid, 2. 4. 6. 8. VI.

The theistic thought is one of great significance, namely,

Jainkoa = Jaun-goi-ko Master above.

e. g. Jainkoa-gan-a bihots goititsea 'to lift the heart to God'.

The Caucasian languages consist of at least two families, which differ alike from those of the Ural-Altaic tribes on the one hand, and of the Aryan on the other. With a great poverty of vowels we find a marked abundance of consonants. The principle of agglutination, which governs these idioms, in certain cases almost amounts to inflexion. Formation is both by prefix and suffix.

In the North Caucasian idioms we have the interesting appreciation of gender which rests upon the antithesis of animate and inanimate, rational and irrational, as well as of male and female. The object is taken up into the verb, as in Basque. As regards numeration, with a few exceptions the vigesimal method obtains.

Unlike the South Caucasians those of the North are so loosely connected that, at first sight, one would be inclined to consider each language a distinct individual. Nevertheless, on closer inspection, we can discover certain likenesses which we should do well to remember, namely, α) the denotation of gender; β) the same syntactical treatment of the verb, in so far as it denotes a state or an act, i. e. appears transitively or intransitively. In all the idioms the transitive verb is connected with the instrumental of the agent. (genitive in Kasikumikian), excepting only Abkasian; γ) denotation of the plural; δ) appreciation and phonetic denotation of case.

In numeration, with the aforesaid exception, all the

Caucasian idioms agree about the numbers 10 and 20 and, as regards the rest, there are many striking resemblances.

According to Prof. F. Müller these languages may be classified as follows:

A. North Caucasian tongues:

1. Abkasian and Kerkessian
2. Avaric, Kasikumikian, Arki, Hirkanian, Kūrinic, Udic, Kēkenzie.

B. South Caucasian Stem:

Georgian, Mingrelian, Lazian and Suanian.

Owing to its peculiar prefixing verbal flexion combined with the infixing of the pronominal object Abkasian is unlike all the other North Caucasian idioms, and this applies to its expressions for number.

As regards the question of linguistic affinities between North and South, the present state of science will hardly admit a definite answer.

As an instance of nominal richness in the South Caucasian languages let us take Suanian, where the declension is as follows:

	<i>Sing.</i>	<i>Plur.</i>
Subj. Objective	Mare 'man'	mare-l
Genitive	mare-ś	marel-ś
Dative	mare-s	marel-s
Locative	mare-sa	marel-sa
Instrumental	mare-śu	marel-śu
Ablative	mare-ken	marel-ken
Approximative	mare-t'e	marel-t'e
Superessive	mare-śi	marel-śi
Subessive	mare-kuk'an	marel-kuk'an
Caritive	mare-ul	marel-ul.

The reflexive pronom in Georgian is interesting. The word *tawi* 'head' is used in the sense of our 'self' (Ar. nafs-ū). From *tawi* we may probably derive the reflexive *tvisi*, which in use corresponds with the Sanskrit *sva*. In

Basque the word *buru* 'head' is used in a precisely similar sense; e. g. *beren buru-ak bil' oš-ak ikuši siran* 'they saw themselves naked' (their heads naked they saw).

The most striking feature of the South Caucasian Verb is the distinction made between the direct and the indirect conjugation. In the former the psychological subject is conceived in the nominative, in the latter it occurs in the sense of the dative.

To show the degree of phonetic affinity between two of the South Caucasian languages we may take the verbum substantivum in Georgian and Lazian. This verb is the more important as it is used in the formation of periphrastic phrases.

Present			
	<i>Georgian</i>		<i>Lazian</i>
<i>Sing.</i>	W-ar	I am	W-ora
	K-ar	thou art	ore
	ar-s	he is	onu
<i>Plur.</i>	w-ar-t'	we are	w-ore-t
	k-ar-t'	ye are	ore-t
	ar-i-an	they are	ore-r-an

The Perfect-Aorist is in Georgian derived from *ḡaw* corresponding with the Lazian infinitive *konu*, but in the latter case the root used for the preterite is *or*. Thus:

	<i>Georgian</i>		<i>Lazian</i>
<i>Sing.</i>	w-i-ḡaw	I was	w-or-ti
	i-ḡaw	thou wast	or-ti
	i-ko	he was	or-tu
<i>Plur.</i>	w-i-ḡne-ni-t'	we were	w-or-ti-t
	i-ḡne-ni-t'	ye were	or-ti-t
	i-ḡu-n-en	they were	or-te-s

The Lazian verb 'to be' is the only verb which possesses a future; it is as follows:

	<i>Singular</i>	<i>Plural</i>
1. Pers.	w-i-a-re	w-i-a-t-e-re
2. Pers.	i-a-re	i-a-t-e-re
3. Pers.	i-a-s-e-re	i-a-n-e-ne

Underlying numerical expressions of the South Caucasian family of speech is the vigesimal system. Numbers 1, 10 and 20 are as follows:

	<i>Georgian</i>	<i>Mingrelian</i>	<i>Lazian</i>	<i>Suanian</i>
1	ert'i	art'i	ar	ešku
10	at'i	wit'i	wit	iešt'-ešku
20	otsi	etši	öts	iern-iešt'
	<i>Abchas.</i>	<i>Avar.</i>	<i>Kasikum.</i>	<i>Arki</i>
1	ak _i	tso	za-va	os
10	šp'a-ba	ank-go	ak-va	uiz
20	gh'o-šp'a	ko-go	ku-va	ka-it'u
	<i>Hürkan.</i>	<i>Kürin.</i>	<i>Ulic.</i>	<i>Keč.</i>
1	za	sad	sa	ka
10	vik-al	zud	vik	it'

As a specimen of Georgian we may take a Portion of a Letter from Prince Sul'kan to M. le Comte Pontchartrain, dated 23. March 1714, which appeared in the 9th Volume of the 'Journal Asiatique' for 1832:—

მე სიგელს სწამ თბილისად
 ამ წიგნს ვწერ და მამს
 უცხოებებ რომ იქყენდ მდგომ
 მეცმე ბაძნებდითა ვსწავთობით
 და ნიჭითა თა დიდს ქვეყნს
 უბრძოლველად

Me Sulk'an Saba Orbeliani am zigns gzer da amas waznobeb rom tkwenis mag'lis mep'is brdšanebiť a zkalobiť a da niťiťa ak dids kalaks Parišs mowedit'.

I. Sulk'an Saba Orbeliani, write you this letter and make known to you that, by the commands, favors and gifts of your exalted Sovereign, I have arrived at this great city of Paris.

PATER NOSTER.

Mama-o kwen-o romeli k-ar za-t'a šina. Kmida
 Father-o our-o who who-art heavens in, holy
 i-ķawn sakeli šeni. mo-wedin sup'ewa šeni i-ķawn
 it-be name Thy, hither-come Kingdom Thy, it-become
 neba šeni wiťar-za za-t'a šina egre-za k'uckana-sa šeda.
 will Thy like-as heavens in even-so earth upon.
 puri kweni arsobi-sa mo-mez kwen dge-s, da
 bread our existence-of hither-give us day-to, and
 mo-mitew-en kwen tana-nadeb-ni kwen-ni wiťar-za kwen
 here-forgive us debt-s our like-as we
 mi-u-teweb-t' tana-mdeb-t'a mat kwen-t'a, da nu
 them-forgive the debtors those ours, and not
 še-mi-ķwaneb kwen gansazdel-sa aramed mi-ķsnen kwen
 lead us temptation-to but deliver us
 boroti-sa-gan, romet'u šeni ar-s sup'ewa da ġali da
 evil-from, for Thine is kingdom and power and
 dideba sankune-t'a mimart'. Amin.
 greatness eternitie-s unto. Amen.

As we have seen, the ideology of these South Caucasian tongues is *indirect*, namely. 1. 3. 5. 8. III.

Alike in Georgian, Mingrelian and Suanian or Swa-netian we have the same thought of God:—

Georgian: ღმერთი - მღვდელ G'mert- (man), stem:
 G'mert'i.
 ღმერთი = خدا
 G'mert'-oba divinity, deity. G'mert'i-s sitķwa God's Word.

Mingrelian: **ᲗᲙᲗᲠᲚᲗ** G'oront-i

Swanetian **ᲗᲙᲗᲠᲚᲗ** G'ermet.

Here we have perhaps the answer to Prof. de Harlez's question (see p. 23). K'udâ came to the dwellers in the Caucasus as G'ti whence it may well have passed over to the Goths as Guth. Afterwards it was expanded to G'mert'i or G'ermet in the sense of 'The Self-Existent above'.

In T'uś and K'ekenziś we have a common concept namely, Dal, Dêle. **ᲃᲚᲗᲠ** **ᲃᲚᲗᲠ** Giver.

Dal-go-ih 'up to God' (conversive); Dal-go-re 'down from God'. Naḱkwô or K'ekenziś: śi huma d-u kigamat-añ dîm-aḱ.

Two things are resurrection-of the day-on

Dêle śeś-k'e ḱôś-u-r w-ôzu-ś.

God himself see-will not. .

Then we have

Avaric: **ᲃᲚᲗᲠ** Betśed Riches, Wealth; the exact equivalent of **ᲃᲚᲗᲠ**. Bitś-ase ḱu'-eḷ hetśo; adam-aşul

God-to dying not is; men-of

ḱulare-u wak'inaro. Ğungutal-dasa tsai kaḱ

not-dying-one not is. Ğungutal-of men very

betśed-a-l r-ugu.

rich they-are.

Lastly, we have the Abkaşian

ᲃᲚᲗᲠ Anka, Mother.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE THEOLOGY OF THE HOTTENTOTS.

Let us now turn to the theologic speech and thought of savagery. Beginning with that yellow race of woolly-haired men, the Hottentots, or more correctly K'oikoi and Săn: by what name did they try to express the Inexpressible,

to utter the Unutterable? What was their predicate of God?

Before finding an answer to this supreme question it may be well to get a glimpse at the prehistoric ethnical condition of this interesting people. In ancient times this race, which consisted of two branches, inhabited the greater part of South Africa, at least the territory South of the rivers Kunéne and Zambesi. As Dr. F. Hahn points out: 'We should apply the term *Hottentot* to the whole race, and call the two families each by the native name, that is the one, the *Khoikhoi*, the so-called *Hottentot proper*; the other the *Sân* (Sâ) or Bushmen.' The meaning of the former term is 'men of men', i. e. men par excellence, but the derivation of *Sân* is not quite certain: most probably the root is *Sâ* to inhabit, to be settled, so that *Sân* would mean Aborigines or Settlers. In the Colonial Annals they are styled *Bosjesman* or *Bosmanneken* to indicate their abode and mode of living, whilst in the Cape Records they are called *Sa-gu-a*, *Sonqua* or *Sounqua*.

'While the Bushmen are hunters, the *Khoikhoi* are nomads, cattle and sheep farmers; and while the Bushman family has with the *Khoikhoi*, linguistically speaking, only the clicks and some harsh sounding faucals and a few roots of words in common, the various Bushman languages hitherto recorded differ among themselves as much as they differ from the *Khoikhoi* idioms. This difference and variety in speech is mainly due to their wandering habits and unsettled life. The wild inaccessible mountain strongholds and the arid deserts of South Africa, where nobody can follow them, are their abode; constantly on the alert, constantly on the move, constantly on the path of war either with other tribes or with the wild animals, no inducement is given to them for a settled life, the necessary condition of the development of a more articulate speech and a higher intellectual culture.

The *Khoikhoi* or Nomadic *Hottentots* have all the

same language which branches off in as many idioms and dialects as there are tribes. The idiomatic peculiarities, however, are not very prominent, indeed not so striking as to hinder a Gei || khan or ‡ Auni or || Habobe of Great Namaqualand and the ‡ Nûbe of Ovambóland, or the Gei ‡ nam of the North Western Kalihari conversing easily with the inhabitants of the Khamies Bergen (North Western Colony) and with the | Koras and Griquas of Griqualand West and the Orange Free State.'

Considered formally the K'oikoi language is amalgamating, formless and suffixing throughout. Its ideology is hybrid, the formula being II. 8. 1. 4. That is to say, the order of the K'oikoi sentence is: Object + verb + subject; subject + verb; genitive + noun; noun + adjective. Noun and verb, originally identical, can only be determined in the sentence by affixed pronominal elements. From a psychologico-grammatical standpoint the language distinguishes the subject from the predicate principally by the different position within the sentence, as is also the case with the attribute and predicate, the subject and the object. As there is no relative pronoun in K'oikoi, such a sentence as 'the ox which they had seen in Hoakanas, preceded them' can only be expressed thus: see-ox the-Hoakan-as in-they seen him went before them. mû-ře goma-b|hoa-ka-|nas |na-gu gje mû-b gje ei-ei-ba-gu.

But there is one fact about the K'oikoi distinguishing them from all the Bushmen tribes which shows how high must have been their intellectual evolution even before migrating from their primaeval home. I mean their power of forming concepts or abstract words. For instance: —

‡ Eî to think, from ‡ ani to cut to pieces; ‡ eîς (= ‡ anis) thought; ‡ eî ‡ eî-sen to consider, think over again; ‡ eî ‡ eî-sen-s the result of one's own consideration, idea, perception.

A yes; ama true; amab truth; amasib truthfulness.

| Amo endless, eternal; | amosib infinity. This word

is derived from | á to be sharp, pointed; hence am the end, the point; o is privative and corresponds to the *a* privativum of the Greeks, so that | amo is that which is without end—the Infinite.

| nám | nam to love; | nams love; | nam | nám-sa fond.
| K'om to have mercy; | koms mercy.

| u to forget; | ã to forgive.

‡ Kâ to refuse; ‡ kaba stubborn, wicked; ‡ kaba sib wickedness.

ã to feel; ãb feeling, taste, sentiment; ã | ka to condole: ã- | kasib condolence.

| Anu neat, clean; am and Anuka sacred, pure, refined; anusib holiness, sacredness, purity.

Nor is this all. The abstract power of the K'oikoi idiom is perhaps nowhere so fully shown as in the great number of its names for the various divisions and subdivisions of *color*. | uri white, ‡ nú black, | am green, | ava red, ‡ hoa blue, | hai fawn-colored, | humi yellow, ‡ gama brown, | kau grey, | nai ‡ n | garu dotted. Then there are the subdivisions: | uri- | humi whitish-yellow, | urisi whitish, ‡ nu | ho black-patched, ‡ nu | garn black-dotted, ‡ nu ‡ ura black-shining, | ava ‡ ura red-shining, | ava ‡ gani with white and red patches, | ava | ho or | gi | ho chestnut-color, | avara or | avaka reddish, | am ‡ ura green-shining, ‡ gama | ho brown-dotted, ‡ gama | garu same; ‡ gama ‡ hoa brownish-blue (the color of *Bucephalus capensis*), ‡ gama ‡ ura brown-shining, like the *Vipera Cornuta*.

Prof. F. Müller would therefore seem to be going too far when he says:—

„Da die Sprache nicht im Stande ist ein Nomen unbestimmt zu fassen (wie unsere „Pferd, Kind“), sondern jedes Nomen, falls es nicht als Prädicat in der dritten Person (gleich einem prädicativ gebrauchten Adjectivum) zu fassen ist, mit dem Zeichen der Person, des Geschlechtes

und der Zahl ausstatten muss, so ersieht man wie bei dieser streng individualisirenden Auffassung der Sprache jeglicher Weg zur Bildung der Begriffe von vornherein abgeschnitten ist.“

Now, it is a remarkable fact that in all the K'oi'koi idioms we have various forms of the same word for God, namely, *Sumi* || *Goam*.

K'oi'koi: *Sumi* || *Goam*: *zui* || *Kwap*

Nama: *zui* || *Goab*

! *Kora*: *zui* || *Goam*: *K'u* || *koap*

Cape K'oi'koi: *Tan-kwoa*: *Ti* || *kwoa*

! *Gonakwa*: *Tui-kwe*

zui || *Goab* *K'oi-b-a* | *kai-b-a* ña ma 'God gives blessing to mankind,' and *zui-b* ge *zui* || *Goab* | *nã-b-a* ge mũ | *gai-b-a* ! *kaie* 'And God saw the Light, that it was good.'

This K'oi'koi word has long been a riddle to etymologists. Most missionaries have translated it "wounded knee", from *zui* wounded, and || *goab* knee. And even Dr. Hahn himself in his paper 'Der Hottentotische Tsumi || Goam und der griechische Zeus', which was written in 1870, adopted this view. In a more recent work, however, he has given us a different interpretation. In *Sumi* || *Goam* we have two independent roots, \sqrt{zu} to wound and || *goa* to approach, go on. And it is the same whether we say in K'oi'koi || *Goab*, || *Goam* coming-he i. e. he comes or the coming one, namely, Day, or whether we say: || *Goab* || *Goam* the walking one, i. e. Knee. *Sumi* || *Goam* is, therefore, the wound of Day, the Red Morning, the Dawn. What a lovely glimpse into the primæval picture-gallery of human thought and faith: the *Uśas* and *Ἥως* of the K'oi'koi!

The ! *Koras* believe *zui* || *Goam* to live in the red Sky, and when day dawns the K'oi'koi go and pray with the face turned toward the East: 'O *zui* || *Goa*, All-Father!' The following simple and beautiful Hymn which is at the same time a Prayer is still sung when the Pleiades first

appear above the eastern horizon, when the ! Gami ‡ mus in the || K'oras mountains the || Habobes or so-called Veltschoendragers (Sandal-wearers) in the North East || K'aras, and the Gei || K'ous, || O-geis and the ‡ Aumis of the K'omab Mountains East of Sandwich Harbour come together for a | gei i. e. a religious dance.

ǃũi Goaze!	Thou, o ǃũi Goa!
Abo íze!	Father of fathers!
Sida íze!	Thou, our Father!
Nanuba avire!	Let rain the thunder-cloud!
Ên kuna ûire!	Please let (our) flocks live!
Êda sida ûire!	Let us live, please!
‡ K'abuta gum goröö!	I am so very weak indeed!
Gâs Kâo!	From thirst!
! As Kâo!	From hunger!
Êta Kurina amre!	That I may eat field fruits!
Sazgum Kave sida izao?	Art thou then not our Father?
Abo izao?	The Father of the fathers!
ǃũi Goaze!	O ǃũi Goa!
Êda sida ganganzire!	That we may praise Thee!
Êda sida Kava Kaizire!	That we may give thee in re- turn (i. e. may bless Thee!)
Abo íze!	Father of fathers!
Sida ! K'uze!	Thou our Lord!
ǃũi Goaze.	O ǃũi Goa!

It is, however, highly probable that the term || ǃũũ Ruler, Lord (√! kũ to be laden, rich, powerful) was used even before ǃũni || Goam as a predicate of the Godhead. This name was formed long before the tribes separated to migrate to the right and left, and we are correct in presuming that at that time their religious ideas were much purer than we find them now, when various circumstances have worked to accelerate their annihilation' (loc. cit. p. 149).

CHAPTER IX.

THE PAPUANS.

In passing on to the Papuan race we are now able to analyse the New Guinea dialects known as the Môtû of Port Moresby and the Mapôr of Doré Bay.

Judging from Mapôr the Papuan languages are totally different from the Melanesian and Malayo-Polynesian. They lack, for instance, the literal agreement of the possessive pronouns suffixed, and though the dictionary of Môtû is Eastern Polynesian, the grammar is Papuan throughout. Môtû is spoken not only at Port Moresby, but also at Pari, Borebada, Lealea, and Maunumanu, as well as by the natives of Belena, Boera, Tataue, Vabukori, Tupuselei, Kaile and Kapakapa.¹

As regards the noun and the verb the former, if not primitive as *âu* a tree, *nali* a stone, is formed from the latter by prefixing *i*, as *ilapa* a sword, from *lapaia* to smite; *ikoko* a nail, from *koko* to nail. The plural is made in many ways; sometimes by reduplicating a syllable, sometimes by adding *dia*, the pronominal suffix of the third person plural, or, again, by dropping one or even two syllables, as *Tauhau* a young man, *Uhu* young men; *Haniulato* maiden, *Ulatu* maidens. Prepositions and suffixes *na* singular and *dia* plural are used for family relations and parts of the body, and to express the genitive.

Mero Sinana boy mother his; the boy's mother.

Lohiabada aena chief leg his; the chief's leg.

In other cases *ena* is placed after the principal noun. Plural nouns take *dia* and *elia* instead of *na* and *ena*:—

Hanua taudia elia ramadia village men their houses =
the houses of the villagers.

Môtû is an indirect language, the ideological formula being III. 1. 3. 5. 8. Owing to the dearth of particles

¹ See Chalmer's Môtû Grammar.

the sense is sometimes obscure. For instance, 'He Jerusalem journey made; he towns and villages passed through; he them taught went' is a literal translation of Luke 13. 22.

Very remarkable is the use of Reduplication. Instead of increasing it diminishes: e. g. *kekeni* girl, *kekenikekeni* little girl. Adjectives expressing colors are all reduplicated, as *kurokuro* white; *koremakorema* black. There are two forms of the plural, the inclusive and the exclusive; thus *ita* is 'we' when the person addressed is included, *ai* when excluded.

The verb is, for the most part, a primitive or underived word, as *gini* to stand, *noho* to sit or dwell. Person is expressed not by change in the verb itself but by the pronoun and a vowel or particle placed between it and the verb. Similarly tense itself is shown by particles put immediately before the verb. To express reciprocity *he* is prefixed and *heheni* suffixed to the verb which is generally reduplicated, as:—

Hebadubaduheheni To be angry one with another.

There being no verb *to be* in Môtu, it is expressed by the pronoun and noun or adjective with a verbal particle as copula.

Lau vata dika I (am) bad.

Lau baina gorere I (shall be) sick

With active verbs the agent comes first, the subject acted upon next and the verb last. *Lau ia dudabaia* I he beat him *Ia natuna lau hadikaga* he his child I abused me. A noun-suffix requires its corresponding pronoun to precede it. *Lau imagu* I hand my, my hand. *Idia motadia vata hapapadia* their eyes them were opened them. *Hanau taudia idia edia rumadia* village men their houses them. *Mero idia tohu baine henidia* boy they sugarcane will give them.

Causation is expressed in the following remarkable way. 'He bananas anger angry' (*Ia biga baduna badu*), he

is angry on account of the bananas. *Idia boroma garidia gauli* 'they pigs their fear afraid', they are afraid because of the pigs. *Oi lau garigu gari* 'thou I fear my afraid', you are afraid of me. *Mero hitolo taina tai* 'boy hunger crying his cries', the boy cries from hunger.

The negative is put between the two nouns, as *Umui idia gaudia basi o gari* 'You they fear-their do not fear'. do not be afraid of them.

Many of the customs of the tribe may be learnt from a study of its semasiology. When the men are away on a voyage a sacred woman performs certain rites to ensure the safe return of the voyagers. If the misfortune or death of a foe be desired, incantations are used, whilst the spirits of those killed are believed to appear to survivors in some dreadful form. The function of the sorcerer is to bring back the soul when, during sickness, it leaves the body. This he does by making passes over the body of the sick man, for which the former receives payment.

"When grieving for the dead", says Mr. Chalmers, "they scratch their faces so as to draw blood, or else they cut themselves with a flint or shell. A coarse cloth is worn as a mourning garment, or a cane is plaited round the body. On the death of a husband an enclosure of mats is made round the grave; inside of this the widow sits and mourns. They bury their dead. To feel pity is to have the stomach-ache, for the stomach is said to be the seat of the affections. To an enemy treachery is practised, but hospitality is shown to strangers. The man who stores up for future use is praised, whilst the lazy man and the thief are abused."

What, then, is the Môtu concept of Deity? If we look for a Papuan theosophic Archetype we are not likely to find it, for nowhere is the principle of evolution more fully to be recognised than in the history of the spiritual life of man. And yet the Môtuans have no mean idea of God.

Indeed, in *extension* they have the concept which Christ Himself has given us: they call Him *Dirava* 'Spirit'. *Dirava kara* religion. *Dirava urana ura kara* Godliness. It is Spirit κατ' ἑξοχήν. For ghost there is the word *Lauma*, for the unknown spirit of evil *Vatavata*, but God, the Lord of all is *Dirava*. So that we can translate

·||·. Ia Dirava hekischekise kara nahuana. ia laueku varavara, mai laueku taihuna, mai laueku sinana ·||·.

'Whosoever doth the Will of God, the same is my brother, my sister and mother.'

Mapôr or, as the Dutch write it, Noefoor (Nupôr) is spoken by about 2000 people, not only at Doré Bay but also on the islands of Manaswari and R'un. But there is no native name for the Supreme in Mapôr. The word used is *Hari*, a cognomen of Viṣṇu, borrowed from India, from the Aryan root *gar* to be light, to burn.

Mark xi is translated thus:—

· ·.	Maka	manseren	Jesus	piápîr	be	Jerusalem
	And	Lord	Jesus	came	to	Jerusalem
ma	ro	rûm	<i>Hari</i>	ma	i-mam	kojâr
and	into	house	of-God	and	he	observed everything
orîja	ma	mandira	rapé	i-be-sasiâr	i-mbran	
there	and	evening	when	he-withdrew	he-went	
be	Bethanië	ro	murid-si	sampûr	sissêr	suru.
to	Bethany	with	disciples	ten	and	two . . .

CHAPTER X.

THE AFRICAN NEGRO RACE.

Next in order comes the African Negro race. Here our material is singularly rich and varied. We have independent predicates of Deity in no less than 23 languages.

Beginning with the speech of the Dinkas (G'jen-ke) on the White Nile we find that most of the forms are mono-

syllabic and end with a consonant. It is a formless language. Noun and verb are identical; subject and object, predicate and attribute can only be distinguished by external means. And this is true of the dative and accusative, the former being found regularly behind the verbal expression, whilst the latter invariably stands between the elements *a-bi* (future), *a-ki* (perfect and negation) and the following verbal expression.

E. g. Dative: *An a-ki kan jek ran*
I have this given man (to the).
Accusative: *Jen a-bi piu bei*
He will water bring.

The category of grammatical gender is unknown to Dinka per se, and can only be represented by such expressions as 'man, woman'. Thus mare is expressed by 'little-woman-this-horse' (tiñe ñonkor).

Alike in an attributive and in a predicative sense the adjective comes after the substantive to which it belongs; e. g. *ran dið* great man, *rôr dið* great men; *ran a-dið* the man is great, *rôr a-dið* the men are great. The ideology is hybrid, the formula being 2. 4. 6. 8. VI.

Now the Dinka name for the Supreme is *Dendið* 'that Great One', from *den* that and *dið* great.

Luke vi is translated as follows:—

Kedi	jen	a-ki	lo	gun-e	<i>Dendið</i>	ko
As	he	went	into	house of this	God	and
a-ki-nai	mono	ki	tau	ko	a-ki-kam	ko
took-away	bread	set	being	and	ate	and
a-ki-jek	koik-ke	ke	jen	mono	a-kie	jik
gave	people	with	him	bread	not	allowed,
bi	tok	kam	e	tit	e	<i>Dendið</i>
that	one	eat	but	priests	these	of God
ke-peK						
they-themselves?						

In a Diuka poem we read of *Dendid*:—

On the day when *Dendid* made all things.

He made the Sun;

And the Sun comes forth, goes down, and comes
again:

He made the moon;

And the moon comes forth, goes down, and comes
again:

He made the stars;

And the stars come forth, go down, and come again:

He made man;

And man comes forth, goes down into the ground,
and comes no more'.

The Bari, who are neighbors of the Diuka, have a great deal in common with them, though their word for *il Sommo Bene* is very different.

Though here and there showing a tendency to agglutination and even to inflexion, Bari must be described as a formless language. Subject and predicate, subject and object can only be distinguished by syntactical means. As in Hottentot, the dative must always precede the accusative. Noun and verb are identical, the latter being distinguished by the attachment of the personal pronoun. Bari is remarkable for its regularity of accentuation. Whenever the object follows the verb, the latter is accentuated: *Nan újájár* *Ñun* I love God. The formative elements *lo* this, *ti* these; *i* on, in; *ko* with etc. also receive the tone. Thus, *ló-but* a good one, *ná but* good (fem.), *i kakhí ná* *Nun* in the house this God (of), *i kahí* on earth, *kó do* with thee.

The nominative precedes the verb, the dative and accusative follow it, and the former is always placed before the latter, as *nan a-tín lu muntje* I have given him bread, *ti nan piom*, *nan momoje do* give me water, I beg thee.

The interrogative *íjo* what, why? and *ko-íjo* whereby,

wherewith? appear at the end of the sentence; as *do dek ñjo?* wilt thou what? *Nun a-gweǵa ñutu ñjo?* God created men why? *ji popo li ko-ñjo?* we enter heaven whereby?

The Bari verb does not express modality, time, person or number. All these must be distinguished by external means alone. The feeling of the language for grammatical gender is mostly manifest in the case of the genitive, which is expressed in the following noteworthy way. First comes the thing possessed, then a demonstrative pronoun and lastly the possessor. In gender and number the demonstrative must agree with the word to which it refers; masc. *lo*, fem. *na*, plur. *it*. For instance, *ǵur lo Bari* the land of the Bari, *ñutu lo Bari* the Bari-Negro. *kali na Nun* the House of God (lit. house-this-God), *ñutu na Bari* man this (fem.) Bari = the Bari negress, *kulja ti Bari* voice these Bari = the language of the Bari.

As in Dinka so here the ideology is hybrid, namely, 2. 4. 6. 8. VI. Though such near neighbors there are considerable differences in speech between the Dinka and the Bari, as may be seen from a comparison of the Pater noster in the two languages.

Pater noster.

DINKA.

Uâ-da	ke	jin	a-to	wnjal	kôg	a-wtjök
Father-our	this	thou	art	(in) heaven	we	beg
rin-ku	a-bi	lêk,	pan-du	a-bi	ben	
name-thine	praised	become,	land-thine	will	come	
puon-du		a-bi	loi	piñ-ik	akit	wnjal-ik
will-thine	(will)	made	be	earth-in	as	heaven-in
Jeke	kôg	nivd-kua	akol-é	a-vton	pal	
Give	us	meat-our	day-this	sufficient	forgive	
kôg	karak-kua	akit	kôg	ja	a-pal	koik
us	sins-our	as	we	also	forgive	people

kí	kerak	loi	etoñ	kûg	ko	dûne
having	sin	done	to	us	and	not
pal	bi	kôg	kuat	temak-ik	lone	koiñ
give to	so	us	lead	temptation-into	but	deliver
kôg	etoñ	Kerak.	Amen.			
us	from	Sin.	Amen.			

Pater noster.

BARI

Baba likañ do lo gwo-gwón ki. Ti
 Father our thou this art (in) heaven. Give
 añjan karín kunök kwá-kwaka. Añjan tumatjan
 that name thine honored-be. That lordship
 inot po-po ka-ján ni. Añjan deket inot gwegwé
 thine come to us here. That will thine become
 gwôko í ki kona luña í kak ni.
 so in heaven even-as also on earth here.
 I ló-lor tí ji muntje nikan ná
 On this day give us bread our that (of the)
 loron liñ. Kôlôki ji torónjeki kan gwôko ji
 days all. forgive us sins our as we
 kôkölökin katorônjak kan. Kó pik ji
 forgive sinners our. Not lead us (to)
 du-dúmagi. ama hûki-luök ji i nárok liñ.
 temptation-bring. but deliver us from evils all.
 Amen.
 Amen.

We have already seen that, the Bari name for God is Ñun. A Bari Ave Maria runs:—

Do ro-rómue Maria, do na-budja, Ñun kó
 Thou greeted Mary. thou blessed. God with
 do, do ra-ráta i wâte liñ. luña ra-ráta
 thee, thou anointed amongst: women: all also praised

tore ló mogun inot Jesu Kristi. Maria a-na-ke
 son this body of-thy Jesus Christ. Mary pure,
 note ná Nun mol-é-mo kó ji katorónjak
 mother which God beg for us sinners
 kunána luña i diñit na tuan nikañ. Amen.
 now also in time which dying (of) our. Amen.

Now, this Bari word Nun is neither more nor less
 than the Egyptian $\overline{\text{Nun}}$ of which we read in the Turin
 papyrus of Anjánk and the Hieratic papyrus of Taho.

|| Enok nuter áa Koper kesej mu
 I-am God great existing of self water
 pu Nun pu tep nuter-u ||
 namely Nun namely Father of the gods.

Again:—

|| Iri pe-t Kem un-t-u ká
 Who-made Heaven Creator of things ruling
 em Nun
 as Nun ||

Nun, then, is the chaos of Heaven and Sea, das Ur-
 gewässer, the $\overline{\text{Nun}}$ or $\overline{\text{Nun}}$ of Genesis; and there is
 perhaps no other instance of a change so remarkable as
 that from the vague Chaos of the Egyptians to the sublimest
 Kosmos of the Bari!

In the Woloj language we find no native name for
 Deity, the word used being the Arabic $\overline{\text{Jalla}}$ in the form
 Jalla, as we have it in the fable of The Grub and the
 Butterfly. (gaşak ak laplap).

|| Wajaj! Jalla bólé-wu-nu Két!
 Truly God has-not-us-together given origin!
 man de mâ-nâv tje asaman. jov sup rekə
 I hover about heaven, thou earth only
 ña-kam.
 thou knowest. ||

The languages of the Bullom and Temne are closely related, but, as in the case of the Dinka and Bari, the names for the Highest differ.

As regards external organisation they remind us of the Bantu family. Noun and verb are distinguished from one another phonetically, but subject and object and subject and predicate are shown by purely syntactical means. Between attribute and predicate there is a complete phonetic distinction. Originally the root seems to have been mono-syllabic and to have had both nominal and verbal meaning; e. g. *Son* 'dream' and 'to dream', *ket* 'to cut off' and 'slice.'

The adjective follows the noun, when used attributively, and is distinguished by the copula (often only a pronoun) when used predicatively. *Pokan kêtên* man-good 'a good man', *kil bomuî* house-high 'a high house', on the other hand *pokan woa kêtên* 'the man is good', *a-pokan ña kêtên* 'the men are good'. The attributive adjective agrees with the substantive in number. Thus *a-pokan a-kêtên* 'the good men', *kil tî-bomuî* 'the high houses'.

The nominative or subject-case and the accusative or object-case have no phonetic expression and can only be distinguished by position in the sentence. *Ja-no kuneli tamu* mother-your-born-son 'your mother has borne a son'. The genitive is expressed by placing the thing possessed before the possessor, *wom bai tre* 'the canoe of the king', *kil bai tre* 'the house of the king.' The genitive can also be expressed by putting the particle *ha* or *hoa* between. Thus *bai ha a-ÿju tre* King of the Jews.

Now the Bullom word predicative of Deity is *P'oi* from the root *ÿoe* to go out, beyond. *Malaka ha P'oi* Angel of God. To the Bullom, therefore, God is 'the Beyond'.

As in Dinka and Bari so here the ideology is hybrid, namely, 2. 4. 6. 8. VI.

The Temne word for God is *Kûru* meaning Old-One,

the 'Ancient of Days'. *Pa bōnē-ko trāka an-tōi na Kūru*
He delights in the Law of God.

For completeness' sake, that we may see how savage idioms lend themselves to religious expression, I add, where possible, the Pater Noster.

TEMNE.

Pā-ka-su, ɔwó jì ro-Riánna, tra aĩ' és-'a-mu ùa jì a-sam;
Tra 'ra-baĩ-ra-mu ra bēk; tra 'ma-sélo-ma-mu ma jōnē sō
ka an-top, ma ma jōnē ro ka Riánna; Jer-su tēnōn ar'
á-ra-su ra-di ará bēki; Dē zéra-su tra-beĩ-tra-su, ma sjān
sō sà zéra aĩá bá tra-beĩ-tra-su; Dē zē su wóna ka tr'eĩ
tra-gbósa; kéré wúrasu ka tr'eĩ tra-las; za múno bá 'ra-
baĩ dē aĩ'-pósa, dē aĩ'-jiki, táũkaĩ ó táũkaĩ. Amína.

As in other idioms of the Negro race we find a regular phonetic evolution in Ibo. Consonantal groups are avoided: vowel and consonant stand harmoniously together. A peculiarity of the languages of West Africa is the tendency to nasalise the initial consonant. The distinction between verb and noun which did not originally exist, is made in the case of the noun by an increase at the beginning of the word, and in that of the verb by the position of the pronominal element denoting person. Similarly subject, predicate, and object are only distinguished by their position as regards the verb. The attributive and possessive relationship is often expressed by the relative pronoun. Indeed this not infrequently serves to co-ordinate the sentences, which shows that the idiom has a certain striving after logical combination of thoughts.

The accusative or object case is made known by its position to the verb, which it regularly follows. *Ja-suk-wa úbi na* he bought this country-house; *ja-sa akwa-ja* he washes his garment. The genitive is expressed in two ways, either by putting the thing possessed immediately before the possessor or by connecting the two expressions by the

relative pronoun *ike* (as in Bari, Wolof etc.). For instance, *opara wôke* son-man = the son of the man; *opara nke Kuku* son-who-God = son of God; *na eze ike ôdibo na ebere me-ja* and Lord who servant this had pity on him = And this servant's Lord had pity on him.

Whether as attribute or predicate the adjective follows the substantive to which it belongs. The predicate is known by the preceding copula, the attribute by the relative pronoun joined to the substantive. Thus, *Osisi ike o-fo ogagi meu ukporo omma* tree which bad can not bring fruits good = a bad tree cannot bring forth good fruit.

As verba substantiva the stems *wa* (wo), *bi* (to exist, dwell) and *do* (de, di) are used. But the pronominal meaning predominates, as the sign for the third person is lacking. Hence such expressions as *una-gi wo ese* father thine is king? = Is thy father a king? On the other hand *a-wun* existence-mine = I am. In cases where the copula is not needed to distinguish the predicate from the attribute it may be omitted. Thus *ôle ôla-îi?* what thy people? = of what people art thou? *Ôle una-îi abua?* Father thine now? = where is now thy father?

Time is expressed by the addition of certain elements to the verbal stem. Thus *na* denotes the present and perfect, whilst past generally is expressed by the elements *kwa* and *ra* (re, ri, ro, ru) which can be combined with each other and with *na*. The future is expressed by the stem *ga* which precedes the verb. For instance,

<i>Mbe-m</i>	<i>lu-kwa</i>	<i>ese</i>	<i>a-ga-m</i>	<i>kara-îi</i>	<i>îîie</i>
When-I	seen-have	the-king	shall-I	tell-thee	what
<i>ja-kuru-m</i>					
he-commanded-me.					

Ibo ideology is hybrid, the formula being 2. 4. 6. 8. VI.

The Ibo idea of Deity is very remarkable. The word is *Kuku* the Seeker, from *ŷko* to seek. *Eô. Kuku ejeren akka ôgamá hûja* Yes, God helping me, I shall see him again.

Closely connected with Ibo is the language known as Nupe and the expression for God is another form of the same word, namely, *Soko* the Seeker (*kó* = *tso*, and *Kúku* = *Tsúku*).

The languages Ewé, Gâ or Akra, Okí and Joruba are so intimately related that we may take the first as typical of all. Considered grammatically these tongues are formless with more or less richly evolved propensities to agglutination, in some cases almost amounting to inflexion. Phonetically noun and verb are identical, whilst expressing for subject and object, attribute and predicate can only be distinguished by their position in the sentence. Everything else must be indicated by particles, originally nominal or verbal roots. Of course there is no relative pronoun known to these tongues.

The root is originally monosyllabic, beginning with a consonant and ending with a vowel. Thus *ku* 'to die' and 'death'; (Okí *wu*;) *do* 'to sew' and 'seam'. Reduplication applies alike to verb and noun. For instance, *bôbô* to humble oneself, from *bô* to bend oneself, *dada* to creep, from *da* to lie; *jójó* resurrection, from *jó* to stand up; *gbô-gbô* breath, spirit, from *gbô* to breathe; *kuku* dead, from *ku* to die.

In Ewé the noun is formless, showing phonetically neither number nor case, to say nothing of gender. *To* 'ear', *to eve* 'two ears'; *ame* 'man'. *am-blave* 'twenty men'. The cases are expressed partly by position within the sentence and partly by auxiliary particles. The subject-case precedes, the object-case follows the verb. E. g. *Ati e-mu* the tree is green, *e-wu ame* he kills a man. To express the genitive the possessor is put, as in English, before the thing possessed: *jójó ap'* 'father's foot'; *ngoi-nje avo* my brother's clothes. Sometimes the relationship is expressed by the word *wé* 'property', with the word for the thing possessed in apposition. For instance, *Mawu we mo* God-

property-face; *eda iwe ta* Snake-property-head. In Yoruba the position is reversed: *ile baba* house father = father's house, sometimes also by means of the relative particle *ti*: *ile ti baba* house-which-father. The Ewe dative is shown by the verbal root *na* 'to give' which is used as a preposition. Thus, Mupiala *na mo na srɔlao* teacher gives way gives (= to) pupils = the teacher dismisses the pupils.

The preceding languages of West Africa have been classified by both Bleek and F. Müller. The former classifies as follows:—

- I. The Niger branch: Efik, Bonny, Yoruba.
 - II. Gold Coast Branch: Fanti, Aschanti, Akwapim.
 - III. Sierra Leone branch: Fullom, Sherbro, Timneh.
- On the other hand the Gôr family consists of:—

- I. Southern branch: Ga (Akra).
 - II. Middle African branch: Wolof, Fulah.
 - III. Nilotic branch: Tumale.
- F. Müller's classification is the following:—

- I. Wolof (isolated)
- II. Bullom and Temne.
- III. Ibo and Nupe (uncertain whether isolated, possibly related to the following).
- IV. Languages of the Guinea Coast:—
 - α. Ewe, Ga, Odshi, Yoruba.
 - β. Efik.

We have now to find out in what way these West African idioms have named the ineffable Name, have conceived the concept supreme. In the first place we must remember that though their resemblance is so great, they differ in ideology, which would lead one to expect an individuality in theology. Ewe ideology is a hybrid natural one, namely. 1. 4. 6. 8. VI; the Yoruba formula, on the other hand, is indirect and hybrid. 2. 4. 6. 8. VI; whilst that of Efik is another form of the indirectly hybrid, namely. 2. 3. 6. 8. VI.

To trace the Ewe theological idea to its root is not now easy, but so far as the data permit the induction, it seems probable that Mawu is to be derived from *√wō* to strike, which gives us *e-wu* drum and *a-wunu* shore. In many respects Mawu reminds us of his Polynesian counterpart *Maui* who is first Man, lord of Heaven or Hades, the lord of Day, and South Sea Island hero; and perhaps above all he is the Storm-God who holds the winds imprisoned in his cave, and we may seek sublimity in

. . . the hall where Ewe Mawu
Howls his war-song to the gale'.

Besides Onjañkòpòñ we find in Kwi the following forms for the Highest:—

Odōmañkāmā All-giver, fr. dōmañkāmā, manifold; plentiful.

Borebore Potter, fr. *√bore*, to stir, mix.

Onjañkòpòñ ouje Ondomañkōma Sunsūm God is an Eternal Spirit.

By-names:—

Amā-omē

Amosu

Amowia

Totoro-bo-nso Rain giver

Tweadu-ampon Almighty

Otamfoe Almighty

Of the shorter form Onjame we have many instances:—

Onjame-je Godhead

Onjame-nipa God-Mau

Njame-njansa divine wisdom.

Njame-su divinity

Onjame njae ade bo da God never ceases to create things.

Osorosoro Njame the Most High God!

Anjame-Sēm Word of God. Bible.

The Akrà or Hâ predicate of deity is Njònmò, which in all probability is another form of the Okì Njànkòpò and the Akwapim Jankupò. It is *Heaven* itself, worshipped as Supreme Deity. 'The idea of him', says Riis, 'as a supreme spirit is obscure and uncertain, and often confounded with the visible heavens or sky, the upper world (sorro) which lies beyond human reach; and hence the same word is used also for heavens, sky, and even for rain and thunder'. And this applies to Joruba *Olórún*, though here we have the more interesting form Olodumare He-who-has-a-Name; i. e. The Named par excellence.

OKÌ PATER NOSTER.

Jèù agjá a wowò sorò, wo òh hō utew; 1 wo ahenni mura; nea wope nje wò asase so nso se nea ejé wò sorò; 1 ma jèù jèù dà aduap ne; 1 na pá jèù akaw píri jèù se nea jèù nso de píri won a wode jèù akaw; 1 na mpá jèù òkò sòpójé mu. na jì jèù pí bone mu; na wo na ahenni nè ahòedèh nè amonjam jé wodea dà. Amen.

JORUBA.

Baba wa ti mbe li ọrún. Owọ li orukọ rẹ. Ijọba rẹ dẹ; Ipẹ ti rẹ ni ki aṣe, bi ti ọrún, bẹ ni li aṣẹ. P'un wa li onḡḡ ọḡḡ wa li oni. Dari gbese wa ẹi wa. bi awa ti ndarigi awon onigbese wa. Ki o ma si pa wa sinu idewo, sugbon gba wa ninu tulasin.

Nitor i igoba ni ti rẹ. ati agbara, ati oḡḡ lailai. Amin.

'In West Africa', says Dr. Tylor, 'let us take an example from the theology of the Slave Coast, a systematic scheme of all nature as moved and quickened by spirits, kindly or hostile to mankind. These spirits dwell in field and wood, mountain and valley; they live in air and water; multitudes of them have been human souls, such ghosts

hover about the graves and near the living, and have influence with the under-gods whom they worship; among these 'edrô' are the patron-deities of men and families and tribes; through these subordinate beings works the highest god, Mawu.'

Next come the Mande languages upon which Prof. Steinthal has bestowed such excellent labor. His book "Die Mande-Neger Sprachen" is an epoch-making work in West African philology, a lasting monument to the genius of the Berlin linguistic philosopher.

As regards the general character of Vai, Mandingo, Susu and Bambara, they are distinguished by a high degree of euphony. All combinations which tend to make a language either too hard or too soft are strictly shunned. They are altogether formless, the sentence forming the true unity, in some cases more nearly defined by auxiliary particles. Noun and verb are morphologically identical; the latter being a nominal expression determined by possessive prefixes. Subject and object are defined by their position to the verb. The copula serves to distinguish between attribute and predicate. The substantive precedes, the adjective (attribute) follows.

The root, which is monosyllabic, is used both verbally and nominally, as in Chinese, though there is occasionally an attempt at phonetic distinction. The formative elements in Vai and Mandingo and Susu are specially interesting. Nomina agentis and Nomina instrumenti are made as follows:—

Susu: *še* thing. *gāhu še* fear-thing (a thing causing fear); *bi še* key (opening-thing); *pūtun še* thrashing-thing (whip).

Vai; *pēn* thing. *Suma pēn* measure-thing (measure).
Mandingo: *miselme pēn* sacrament (holiness-thing).

Susu: *jé* thing. *kon jé* play-thing (pleasure); *doko jé* settlement (dwelling-thing).

Vai and Mandingo: *Mo* } Man, Person, E. G. Susu:
 Susu: *Maŋe* }
Rānie maŋe bravery-person (hero); Vai: *wuru mo* procreation-thing (father); *kom-mo* (= koñ-mo) hatred-person (hater).

The noun denotes neither number nor case: the latter is known not only by its position to the verb but also by particular particles, as in K'oikoi. Thus in the Vai the demonstrative subject-particle *ra*, *a* serves to distinguish the genitive, and *la* in Mandingo. In Susu *ra* acts emphatically, as an intensive of the subject.

E. g. Vai: *wu-ŋa ra ŋa* were your father has died to-day; *kaie ra būwarū ŋa* the man a sheep killed. Mandingo: *ate le si altolu baptisa Alla nio-la niñ dimba-la* he will you baptize God spirit-with and fire-with. Susu: *najele naka mini* light has arisen; *Abraham nani Isaak soto* Abraham the Isaac begat.

In the Mande languages the same elements often serve to bring into prominence alike the emphatic subject-case (Nominative) and the object-case (Accusative). The object may then follow the verb, which, as a rule it precedes, or the object-particle may attach itself to the verb, whereby the latter becomes transformed into an expression which needs an object as complement which, again, necessarily governs the preceding nominal expression (in Mandingo). Thus Vai: *m-ma Buraim-a ŋa* I not have Abraham killed; *tā bira du-jè-ra* fire seized the house; Mandingo: *ie Alla kanu le ba?* thou God lovest, yes?

The genitive is as a rule expressed by the application of the demonstrative relative particles, the possessor preceding the thing possessed. Occasionally, however, the demonstrative-relative is lacking, and then the sense must be ascertained from the position of the two members. E. g. *ŋāri a kira* alligator-of the same-way (way of the Alligator); *kai koro ā deñ* man old — of the same — child (the child

of the old man). In Bambara the order is reversed: *kuu a jali* head this pig (this is the head of the pig).

Although in the Mande idioms the genitive of definition comes before the thing defined, yet the adjective follows the substantive to which it belongs, whether used predicatively or attributively. Thus Vai: *Mang'â bu nâ nîe* prince great came hither; *de mesê-nu gbi buri* children small all ran away. If a substantive connected with an attributive adjective is to be made plural, the suffix, instead of being attached to the noun, is added to the adjective. Thus,

Vai: *Mang'a bâ-nu* great chiefs (*ba* great)

kai kirarê-nu poorly men (*kirare* ill)

Mandingo: *ke bette-o lu* good men (*bette* good)

pane kuoirin-o-lu white clothes (*kuoirin* white)

In expressing the relation of predicate the pronoun *nu* (Vai, Mandingo), *na* (Susu) is added, whilst the adjective remains unchanged. *Î gboroâ-re nu* thou demented this = thou art mad; Mandingo: *nte le na* I who there = it is I; *Mansa le nu nan* king who this once = a king was once.

Of these languages the verbal expression is nothing but a noun furnished with possessive prefixes. Compare for instance,

Vai: *m-ja* my father

i-ja thy father

a-ja his father

nu-ja our father

wu-ja your father

an-ja their father

n-do I say

i-ro thou sayest

a-ro he says

nu-ro we say

wu-ro ye say

an-do they say

By combining the verb substantive *be* with the postpositions — Mandingo: *la*, Vai: *na*, *ro*, into, with, a durative expression is formed. Thus, Ni *i-be salle-la* when thou art prayer in = when thou prayest; Vai: *m-be pen don na* I-am-thing-eating-in, i. e. I eat; *nbe tâjê-ro* I-am-

going-in = I go. To express the habitual form in Mandingo the word *kare* to do is used. 'Rachel wept for her children' is therefore expressed as follows: Rachel-did-eyes-water-pour-her-children-over: *Rahel kare nja-gi-bo a diio-lu-je*.

As regards ideology Vai, Mandingo and Susu are *natural*, the formula being 1. 4. 5. 8. III and VI, whilst Bambara is *hybrid*, namely, 2. 4. 5. 8.

SUSU PATER NOSTER.

Wun Pápé nakan na arrijana, Ikili ka senijen. Ika jamine ka pa. Isague ka naninama dunia ma, eme aninaki arrijanama kinaké. Muku ki to muku ka loke loke buita sera. Anun ika muku donii lu, eme mukutan pian nei doni lu nakai muku doni nan. Anun inama muku raso maninai, kono ika muku rakissi pékobi ma: Pénaakaara Ituan gbe nan jamméra, anun sembe, anun darağa, abada, Aminua.

As theosophic Archetypes in Mande we have:

Mande: Ngéwo = Nga-wo That (art) Thou!

Vai: Kaniba, = Kanu-ba, Love-great!

I bira Kaniba-ma Trust thou in God!

Bambara: Ngñala, a form of the Arabic الله Allah. Ngñalasira religion.

St. John iii. 16. has been translated into Mande as follows:—

|| Gbâmailê Ngéwo ije lòi lo ní a ndôloi, ta loingi lòi jakpéi vèni, ije joni; ta lo nûmúi gbi lo ngi hòua lo a tónja, è lòiñ, kè kûnápó lèvu lo a jo. ||

The language known as *Sonrai* is essentially Negro in its formation. The root was originally monosyllabic and was used both as verb and substantive. Thus *bâ* means alike 'to will', 'to love', and 'good'; *ma* 'to understand' and 'name'. There is moreover no phonetic distinction between the subjective and objective case. In the genitive relation-

ship the possessor precedes the thing possessed. Kôru dène fire's tongue (flame); tuguri idgé tree's child (fruit); hio koi ship's lord (captain); beri koi horse's lord (rider).

An article or rather a demonstrative adjective is not altogether unknown to Soñrai. For things animate it is *di*, for the inanimate *ni*. For instance, nî-jô-di thy-camel-it, wôki jiri-wô-ni this our-this it. The verb is nothing but a noun with the possessive prefix. 'I go', to take a simple example, is expressed by 'my-being-going' a-go-koi. Ideologically Soñrai is an indirect hybrid, the formula being 1. 3. 6. 8. VI.

The theology of the Soñrai conceives the Highest as the celestial Ruler — Jer-koi our Lord.

Whether the root-words of the *Logonê* language were originally mono- or dissyllabic or possibly a reduplicated syllable it is now difficult, if not impossible, to determine. One thing, however, is quite certain, namely, that noun and verb can both be expressed by the same word. *Sâ*, for instance, means both 'to drink' and 'beverage'.

The noun is absolutely formless. As regards Case the genitive is expressed by placing the thing possessed before the possessor; sometimes, however, the position is reversed, showing how weak is the feeling generally for the adequate expression of case-relations. Thus, *sköol eman* pot of honey; *benne rô* wall of the town; and *vgola bunhê* of corn bundle; *kusku-n-tâbu* of the hen young (chick); etc. The attributive adjective is often expressed both by a substantive in the relationship of the genitive and by juxtaposition of both expressions in phonetic identity. For instance, *lebu-n-tu* shirt-this-blackness; *lebu-m-pau* shirt-this-whiteness.

Between noun and verb there is complete distinction by reason of the law of prefixing personal elements. By prefixing the particle *âl* to the verbal stem a durative form is produced. Thus, *indâl-u-gur* 'now-I-going', I go; *n-âl-a-kula-halgê* 'now-he-making-song', he sings. The ideology is indirectly hybrid, viz. 2. 4. 6. 8. VI.

In Logonê the theistic idea is thus embodied in speech: Mal-uâ Our Master, corresponding with the terms in Kanuri and Soñrai.¹

We now come to the Wandalâ or Mandara language. The root is for the most part monosyllabic and serves both as noun and verb. Thus, *ga* is both 'rest' and 'to rest'; *maga* 'to work' and 'work'.

There are two points of interest about the noun. The first is with regard to the expression of the possessive, which is as follows: camel-possession-mine = my camel (*lugumarûâ*), the second has to do with the genitive case which is represented either by placing the thing possessed simply before the possessor, *hâ gaje* house (of the) bird (nest); *bêlissa uñgule* horse (of the) journey, or by putting the demonstrative-relative particle *na* (n) between the two expressions: thus, *edša-n-belissa* child (of the) horse, *edša-n-apâ* child (of the) tree (fruit), *ubbenê-n-apâ* flower (of the) tree (bloom).

As regards the adjective, when used attributively it follows the substantive, when predicatively it precedes it. For instance, *golondo gaji* finger small, but *kotkia ura-terê mî-terê?* numerous totality—of them what—of them? = which is the more numerous of them?

The expression of the verb in Mandara is almost identical with that in English except as regards the position of the pronoun: thus, *tu-ge-me* they beat us, *ku-ge-ñga* ye beat us, *je-malu-ku* I help thee. When the verbal stem is combined with *wa*, we 'to do' the object-element is put between the two expressions, the verb itself remaining formless. Thus:—

We-n-we *baja* do-him-love-I = I love him.

We-ñkorê-gur *beterê* do-you-love-they = they love you.

We-ñgarê-gur *wokorê* do-us-love-ye = ye love us.

Wandalâ ideology is, therefore, the same as Logonê, namely, 2. 4. 6. 8. VI, or indirectly hybrid.

Very beautiful is the Mandara view of God: they call Him Dadá-mia our Father!

About the Mâba or Mobba language there are several points of interest. Consonantal combinations are for the most part avoided. The possessive pronoun, which follows the noun to which it belongs, is derived from the substantive form by affixing to it the demonstrative particle *ne*. As regards the Cases the subject-case or nominative is not distinguished phonetically. The object-case or accusative precedes the verb and is often known by the suffixes *-en*, *-go*. Thus, *berek-en atani* horse I mount, *dreke-n ukâ* shirt wash = wash the shirt. In expressing the genitive the possessor is put before the thing possessed. For instance, *beri melek* of horses lord (rider), *taig melek* house lord; sometimes the suffix *-aig* (with, of) serves to express the possessor; thus *ganga-ig melek* of the drum lord (drummer), *linga-ig melek* of the way lord (Street robber), and when this is the case the position of the members may be reversed, as *taig kebel-aig* dwelling of the bird (nest). The suffixes *-nak*, *-na* and *-in* are also used in the same sense: for instance, *berik sūk-nak* place of the market, *gōrik nīl-nak* urn of Indigo.

Now, it is quite possible that *-nak*, *-aig*, *-na*, *-in* are only different forms of one and the same suffix consisting of the relative particle *na* and a demonstrative element *ka*, so that *berik sūk-nak* would be 'place-market-which-this.'

The adjective follows the substantive to which it belongs whether as attribute or as predicate. Thus, *suigo papada* trees sparse, *kedâde sasala* land waste; *deeke-tû kumduk* shirts (are) torn. The structure of the verb rests upon the connexion of the verbal stem with the pronominal prefixes.

Mâba ideology is the most interesting with which we have yet had to deal. It is altogether natural, the formula being 1. 4. 5. 8. I.

The Supreme, in Mâba is expressed by Kálak the Great One = Fâr Kalge.

Tedâ, the language of the Tibbu is peculiarly interesting to the philologist, as it presents alike the nominal and the purely verbal form of verb-construction.

It is still an open question whether the Tibbu are to be considered as relatives of the Berber, i. e. Hamites, or a mixed tribe of negroes and Hamites. Prof. F. Müller considers the Tibbu, as well as the Kanwis and Hausas as ethnologically belonging to the Negro tribes.

In Tedâ the noun is absolutely formless, indicating neither number nor case. Nominative and accusative or the subject- and object-case can only be determined by their position to the verb, that is to say, to the centre of the sentence. The object regularly precedes the verb, sometimes with the particle *-he*. Thus, *aski-he tu-muni?* horse hast thou bound? *Sirdi ai aski-he ke-bâbi* saddle this horse hurts = this saddle hurts the horse. The genitive can be expressed in three ways. In the first the thing possessed precedes the owner, in the second it follows, and in the third by the addition of the possessive pronoun. For instance, α) *tuguî derdai* house (of the) chief; β) *kom-molo soro* (of the) illness remedy; and γ) *derdajê dê henuâ* prince-mother-his, *agrê bui hentâ* slaves-great-one-your = your Overseer, etc.

Whether as attribute or predicate the adjective follows the substantive to which it belongs. Thus: *nemai torô-ho buerik* town-one-I destroy (eat); *tirâ buja-he betterri* street great we go.

Verbal construction in Tedâ rests upon two principles: the one being the prefixing to the verbal stem of the stems of the personal pronoun, in the relation of subject and predicate, and the other the annexing to the nominally-conceived verbal stem of the possessive pronouns.

As in Mâba so in Tedâ the ideology is natural, giving

us the formula 1. 4. 5. 8. I, i. e. genitive + nominative, noun + adjective, object + verb, subject + verb, and object + subject + verb.

Now, the conception of God in Tedâ is this: K'en-uô our Master?

Coming to the Kanuri language we find it is one of a suffixing and agglutinative order, with a harmonious phonetic evolution. The Kanuri noun is formless but the verb is wonderfully rich in forms, reminding us of the same part of speech in Finnish and Turkish (Osmanli).

Subject and object are determined partly by their position in the sentence and partly by definite particles. As the dative is distinguished phonetically, the ideology may be varied to a great extent. Thus: 'I brought a horse to the king' may be expressed by *wu per meî-rô kúskô* I horse king-to brought; *wu meî-rô per kúskô* I king-to horse brought; *meî-rô wu per kúskô* king-to I horse brought; *per wu meî-ro kúskô* horse I king-to brought; *wu per kúskô meî-rô* I horse brought king-to; *per meî-rô wu kúskô* horse king-to I brought.

Attribute and predicate, which always follow, are distinguished by the fact that the former constitutes a unity with the substantive to which it belongs and to which the case-particles are added. The language possesses no relative pronoun.

As regards the root, it is sometimes mono- and sometimes polysyllabic. By means of reduplication intensive, iterative and durative stems are formed. Thus: *kér-igin* I bind, *kérkér-igin* I bind together; *tem-gin* I build, *tem-tem-gin* I build much and continuously.

As already stated the noun is formless, defining neither number, sex, nor case. The same form may be both singular and plural, both subject and object. When an adjective follows a substantive attributively the case-exponents (suffixes) are annexed to the former and not to the

latter. Thus, pēr kárité horse fine = beautiful horse is declined as follows:—

- N. pēr káriti-jê horse fine
- G. pēr káriti-bé horse fine-of
- D. pēr káritù-rò horse fine-to
- A. pēr kárite-gâ horse fine
- L. pēr kárite-n horse fine-in.

Now the construction of the verb in Kanuri does not rest, as in most other languages, on the union of a nominal verbal stem used predicatively with a subjective pronominal element, but the relationship of the two elements constituting the verbal expression is that of dependence, identical with that of the possessive between noun and pronoun.

The Kanuri concept of God is that of a Lord, a divine Ruler — Komá'-ndé' Lord our. Thus the sentence 'If thou dost try to get by force what God has not given thee, thou dost not obtain it', is expressed as follows:—

ágô	komá'-ndé'	n-kí-ni-te	dínô-n
What	Lord-our	thee-he-not-given	force-with
má'-nem	pánd-em	bá'gô.	
seekest-thou	obtainest-thou	not.	

As already stated Kanuri ideology is somewhat uncertain, being sometimes 2. 4. 5. 8. I and sometimes 2. 4. 5. 8. III.

And here we may notice that the Kanuri theosophic idea coincides with that of the Soñrai: Jer-koi: Komá'-ndé' our Lord.

For symmetry of tone and euphony of form there are few languages, if any, which can surpass *Huusa*.

Considered morphologically the language shows formation both by suffix and prefix, the verb being the centre of attraction and constituting a veritable masterpiece of linguistic architectonics! Subject and object, attribute and predicate are distinguished by their position to the verb.

The verb substantive is derived from the pronoun. The genitive is expressed by means of the demonstrative-relative.

Hausa knows a relative pronoun, but makes little use of it, the connexion of sentences being of the simplest kind. A point of unusual interest about the language is the phonetic expression of grammatical gender, not only with the pronoun and the verb but with the substantive and partially with the adjective. This is the more astonishing as there is no phonetic expression either of the subject- or object-case.

According to Prof. F. Müller the root was originally monosyllabic, as *kî* to eat, *ša* to drink, *sî* to hear, but as there are many of the dissyllabic order, it is quite open to question whether in the first instance the root was not the repetition of a syllable. Stems of more than one syllable may be used both as nouns and verbs: thus, *mâgana* 'language', 'word', and 'to speak', *taja* 'aid' and 'to help'.

The verbal formative elements in Hausa are peculiarly interesting and instructive. The vowels *u* and *o* form stems with intransitive or medio-passive meaning. For instance, *gamma* is 'to connect', *gammu* 'to meet'; *koja* is 'to teach', *kojo* 'to learn'. 'It is difficult to teach Kanuri' is expressed in Hausa by *Koja-n-mâgana Kanuri da wâja* teaching-language Kanuri is hard. 'It is hard to learn English' by *Kojo-n-mâgana Elibi da wâja* learning-language English is difficult. *Da* forms transitives and reflexives, as *kî* to eat, *kî-da* to feed oneself; *sai* to buy, *sai-da* to sell; *karwo* to bring, *kau-da* to take away. *Šie* forms causatives: *zai* to stand *zai-šie* to place. *Jes* and *as* form stems of distinctly transitive meaning as *sai* to buy, *sâ-yes* to sell to somebody. *Jes-da* and *as-da* form strengthened transitive stems expressing an exhaustion of the action, as *ba-jes-da* to give away altogether, *fitt-as-da* to draw out wholly.

The demonstrative stem *wonne* or *wonda* (masc.) *wodda* (fem.) serves as the relative pronoun. For instance,

<i>Ba</i>	<i>ši-sanni</i>	<i>ba</i>	<i>wonda</i>	<i>ja-danki</i>
Not	he knew	not	(him) who	taken had

kurdi-nsa
money-his
is the Hausa for 'he did not know who had taken his money!'

As regards the noun we have to consider three points, namely, grammatical gender, number and case. Gender from a grammatical point of view is conceived as twofold, the spontaneous (masc.) and the receptive (fem.), as in the hamito-semitic languages, but it is not always phonetically manifest. Number is expressed in many ways. First of all there are collective names denoting natural products and single psychical qualities in one single form, as *mugunta* badness, *murna* joy, *tamaha* hope. The plural is formed in various ways; usually by suffixes of which the following are the chief: -âna, -ânn, -âne, -û, -je, -i, -še and -ki. It is also formed by the simple means of Reduplication.

Amongst relationships of case it is only the genitive which is manifest phonetically; the nominative, both as subject and predicate, and the object-case are distinguished by their position to the verb whilst the others are indicated by particles (Dat. *ga*, *da*. Ablat. *daga*, *gare*). Thus: *ja-ɲaddi ga mutane maganganu-n-Obangisi duka* He proclaimed to men the words of God; *Na-ɲitto daga Bornu* I come from Bornu. *Jâro ja-kûka* the boy cries; *Timbuktu gari karami nie* Timbuktu is a small town.

To express the genitive the thing possessed is put before the possessor, and both are united by means of the demonstrative-relative pronoun *na* (masc.), *ta* (fem.). That is to say, 'the boy's name' is equivalent to 'name-this-boy'. For instance: *kwâra-na-šinkaɲɲa* corn of the journey.

magana-ta-bakinsa speech of his mouth.

The *a* of demonstrative-relative is generally elided, as
Oba-n-gişi Father of the house
dâ-n-uwa-na child-this-mother-mine = my mother's child
 (brother).
suna-n-jâro name of the boy.

As a rule the adjective remains unchanged and only follows the analogy of the noun when it is used substantively, and in rare instances denotes grammatical gender. E. g. *jâro karami* a small boy; *jârîniâ karamiâ* a small girl. Used as an attribute the adjective may either precede or follow, but as predicate it must always follow. Thus, *baba sarki* a great king, but *sarki baba* the king is great. *Mutun nâgari ba ši-šin-gôro mutua* a good man does not feel terror at death.

The Hausa verb is a pure verb, having nothing nominal about it. Its construction rests on the connexion of the verbal stem with the affixed personal pronominal element. Thus we are reminded of the prefix form which characterizes alike the Semitic and Hamitic languages. The scheme of the verb is as follows:—

	<i>Singular</i>	<i>Plural</i>
1. P.	na-ba I give	mu-ba
2. P.	{ masc. ka-ba fem. ki-ba	ku-ba
3. P.	{ masc. ja-ba fem. ta-ba	su-ba

This simple form, as in Hebrew, expresses momentary action in the past and corresponds to the Greek aorist. By prefixing to the verbal stem the elements *na* and *ka* we get forms with the function of the present and the pure perfect. The negative form is expressed by prefixing and suffixing the element *ba*: e. g. *na-sanni* I know; *ba na-sanni ba* I know not.

Generally speaking the infinitive is without any definite sign and is represented by the naked verbal stem. Thus, *na-tap̄p̄i kwana* I go to sleep; *su-n-tap̄p̄i k̄i tuo-nsu* they went to eat their bread. The infinitive can also be used as a pure substantive and then sometimes in the sense of a genitive or dative-objective with regard to the verb. For instance, *i-na-so en-kawa nullami, don i-na-so en-koja ga mutane-n-kassa-mu* I wish to become a priest, as I wish to teach the people of our land; *mu-tap̄p̄i ga sa-n-hiska* we go to the drinking of the wind, i. e. we are going for a walk. The Malay says: *Órañ p̄atih mākan anin* 'the white man eats wind' i. e. goes for a walk.

In many African languages we find no elaboration of the passive form of the verb, its place being supplied by the corresponding active construction and this is the case with Hausa. Instead of 'I am caught' we have 'they catch me' (*su-n-kama-ni*). But though it is not a verbal construction, the passive can be expressed in a very real sense by a perfect passive participle with a possessive genitive suffix indicative of the person to whom the action relates. E. g. *a-n-kama-ni* my caught being = I am caught; *a-na-ba-ni* my given being = I am given; *a-ka-ba-ni* my given having been = I have been given.

What the copula is to Aryan languages the verbum substantivum is to Hausa. As in Egyptian so here it is of pronominal origin. The stems used for the substantive verb are *ne, ke, ke*. Originally they were doubtless used to distinguish the three persons, but now there is no distinction. Thus, *ni talaka ne* I am poor; *kura ke* it is a hyaena; *jāro nan ba ši-ke karami ba* this boy is not small; *jārînâ mûgûniâ k̄e* the girl is bad; *make ba ta-ke mûgûniâ ba* the woman is not bad.

From the point of view of accident Hausa is peculiarly interesting to the comparative philologist. Prepositions, for instance, are evidently of nominal origin, as in

the Semitic languages. With the exception of *da*, *ga*, *ma* (to, at) the noun to which they belong appears in the genitive case and with the possessive suffixes.

The most important of the purely nominal prepositions are:—

bâja (hinderpart) behind	gare (place, side) with, by
bissa (height, upper part) upon	júska (face) before.
dsakka (middle) in	kiki (abdomen) in
gaba (bosom) before	

Daga kiki-n-gidda-mu in our house; *bâja-m-birni* behind the town; *daga bâja-nsa* behind him.

With regard to the striking similarities between Hausa and the languages of the Hamito-Semites Prof. F. Müller well observes:—

‘Diese tiefgreifenden Uebereinstimmungen des Hausa und anderer afrikanischer Idiome mit den hamito-semi-tischen Sprachen können nach unserer Ueberzeugung ohne die Annahme eines tiefgreifenden vor-historischen Einflusses der Hamito-Semiten auf die Neger nicht erklärt werden.

Wie bekannt lagen die Sitze des Hausa-Volkes ehemals weiter in Nord-Osten und Heinrich Barth bringt die Hausa's mit den Ataranten Herodots (IV 184) in Verbindung, welchen Ausdruck er als die „Versammelten“ (a-târa) erklärt. Ist diese Annahme richtig — und wir haben keinen Grund sie in Zweifel zu ziehen — dann sassen nach jener Stelle Herodot's die Hausa's zu jener Zeit (2300 Jahre vor dem heutigen Tage) um Bilma im heutigen Gebiete der Teda (Tebu), also in einer Gegend, die den Hamiten näher lag als jene Sitze, welche sie heut zu Tage einnehmen.

Wir haben schon zu wiederholten Malen die Ansicht ausgesprochen, dass die Schichtungs-Verhältnisse der Völker Afrikas von dem Einrücken der Hamiten in den Norden und Nord-Osten dieses Continents und dem dadurch erzeugten Vorwärtsdrängen einzelner Stämme bedingt sind.

Wir haben namentlich die Fulah's, die vom Osten nach Westen, und die Kafir-Völker, die vom Norden nach Süden gedrängt wurden, im Auge. Es scheint uns, der Sprache nach zu urtheilen, dass die Hausa's durch längere Zeit den Hamiten benachbart wohnten, bis sie von den nach dem Westen rückenden Fulah's von ihren Heimathssitzen abgedrängt wurden. Und zwar muss dieser Zeitraum des Nebeneinanderwohnens ziemlich lang gewesen sein, da sich nur daraus der tiefe Einfluss hamitischer Sprachbildung auf das Hausa-Idiom, der beinahe einem Aufpfropfen hamitischen Geistes auf ein Negervolk gleich sieht, erklären lässt.

Ohne diese, wie wir glauben, nicht unbegründete Annahme bleiben das Hausa-Volk und die Hausa-Sprache für den Ethnologen und Sprachforscher ein Räthsel, nämlich einerseits der ächtste Negertypus, andererseits eine Sprache, die von den eigentlichen Negersprachen bedeutend abweicht und offenbar vieles Fremde in sich enthält, so dass sie einzelne Sprachforscher (Lepsius) den hamitischen Sprachen zuzuzählen keinen Anstand nehmen'.

It will be seen that Hausa ideology is indirectly hybrid, the formula being 2. 3. 6. 8. VI.

The Hausa theological concept is indeed most remarkable. It is perhaps the only language in which God is called 'the Father of the House'. Obangişi.

In his Grammar of the Hausa language Schön gives us the Magana-n-mallami da kurege or Story of the Priest and the Fox, of which the following forms part:—

Mallami	şı-na-da	dukia	dajawa	da	şanie	da
Priest	had	things	many	and	cows	and
awaki	da	tumaki.	Kurege	ja-şakka	gare-sa	ja-ke:
goats	and	sheep	Fox	came	to him	said:
mallami	ina-so	en-ji	ma-ka	bara-nta-ka.	ja-ke:	
priest	I wish	to make	to thee	service thine.	he said:	

da keao, ja-ke: mi a-ka-ji ma-mi? ja-ke:
 is good, he said: what wilt thou do to me? he said:
 ina-ji ma-ka síra garike tumaki-nka da
 I make for thee clean place sheep thine and
 awaki-nka. Ja-ke: da keao. su-nka-samma.
 goats thine. He said: is good. they-themselves-seated.
 Kowoke sâpía kurege sí-na-dauka kâsí-n-tumaki.
 Every morning fox he took dung of sheep
 sí-na-gerta turike-n-tumaki da na-awaki. Samma
 he made clean stall of sheep and of goats. Being
 samma su-na-nan.
 being were they there.

HAUSA PATER NOSTER.

Obamu, da ke zikin alizana, sunanka si samma
 keaokeawa. Sarautanka, tama sakkua, abin da ka
 ke so anajinsa kamma zikin alizana hakkana zikin
 dunia. Ka bamu jao abinzimu dakulum. Ka
 jape mamu sunubaimu, kammada mu muna jape masu,
 woddanda suna ji mamu sumpi. Kada ka kaimu zikin
 rudi, amma ka zieziemu daga mugu. Don sarauta taka
 ze, da alhorma, da haske, hal abbadu abbada. Amin.

Of the remaining African Negro concepts of Deity we
 have:—

Sarâr: Rôg and Gbatê

Basa: Grepô or Gelipô

Grebo: Njesôa

Musuk: Alaú

Bišârî: Ankwane

Fernando Po: Rupî.

CHAPTER XI.

THE KÂFIRS.

Our attention must now be directed to the languages of Kâfir race, which form what is known as the Bantu linguistic stem.

In spite of the great diffusion of this branch of speech, namely from the seat of the Hottentots and Bushmen in the South as far as and even beyond the equator in the north, all the dialects and languages belonging to it exhibit such striking signs of relationship alike in vocabulary and in the phonetic evolution of forms, that we may well accept for them all a common grammatical system. Hence these languages, as in the case of the Aryan, Hamito-Semitic, and Dravidian idioms, have been regarded as offshoots of a common primitive form of speech which no longer exists and the characteristics of which can only be inferred from finding out what is common to them all.

Now, what Sanskrit is to the Aryan languages and Arabic to the Semitic, Kâfir is to the Bantu group, preserving most faithfully the features of the mother-speech. It will therefore be best to begin with this language.

From a phonetic point of view these languages are distinguished by a regular evolution of sounds. Combinations alike of vowels and consonants are for the most part avoided. Speaking generally, articulation in the south, in the neighborhood of the Hottentots, is strong and manly, whereas in the north, that is to say, in the neighborhood of the negroes, the vocal element predominates, rendering the language weak and effeminate.

As regards grammatical structure these idioms hold the mean between the form—and the formless languages.

They belong to the so-called agglutinative or amalgamating type, i. e. they have an inkling of form, but the feeling for form is not strong enough to create means adequate to its expression. Hence they fall into the opposite extreme of absolute formlessness. 'Wir wüssten, says Prof. F. Müller, keine Sprachklasse, welche — ausser den sogenannten uralaltaischen Sprachen — so geeignet wäre, den wesentlichen Unterschied zwischen formlosen, formbildenden (fleetierenden) und agglutinirenden Sprachen ad oculos besser zu demonstrieren als die Bantu-Familie'.

In these tongues grammatical definition is effected for the most part by prefix-formation; indeed we may regard it as the express character of these idioms just as the opposite formation, namely, that by suffixes, is the prominent characteristic of the Ural-Altaic family.

Originally verb and noun were not to be distinguished; the former is nothing more than a nominal expression with dependent pronominal elements. Hence a purely predicative relationship is impossible. Subject and object are distinguished by their position to the verb, a failing which led to the incorporation of the expression for the object into the verbal form, as in Mexican and many languages of the new world.

We meet with three inspirates or clicks in Kâpîr which have been borrowed from K'oikoi, namely, the palatal *i*, the dental *ɬ*, and the lateral *ɮ*. As a rule the accent rests on the penultimate syllable, rarely at the end. There is however a subsidiary accent which, as far as possible, is placed at the beginning of words.

In Bantu forms of speech the root is of two kinds: nominal and pronominal. Speaking generally, the nominal roots are polysyllabic and from these, by combination with the pronominal roots, words are formed. The common distinction between word and stem is here unknown. In the

process of word-formation the pronominal roots regularly precede the nominal.

As regards the inner form of the nominal root, it unites both the nominal and verbal meaning, i. e. one and the same complexus of sound can act as noun and verb according to the pronominal stems with which it is combined. Thus *tja* is 'to eat', *uku-tja* fodder; *sa* 'to dawn', *uku-sa* 'morning'.

Nevertheless, in most cases the language endeavors to keep the two forms distinct by means of elements attached to the root. The following are the principal formative elements.

1. To form nominal stems.

The suffix -i, -e, Kâfir: *teŋa* to buy, *um-teŋ-i* merchant; *sindisa* to save, *um-sindis-i* Savior; *lingana* to be equal, *um-lingan-i* friend. The suffix -o. *Alata* to point out, show, *im-alat-o* first finger; *pilisa* to keep alive, *im-pilis-o* life, health; *kala* to call, *isi-kal-o* cry, call.

The suffixes -*ana* and -*jana* form nomina diminutiva, and -*anjana* (= *ana* + *jana*) diminutivissima. E. G. *Isi-lo* animal, *isi-lw-ana* small animal, *isi-lw-anjana* animalcule.

2. Formation of verbal stems.

a. Suffixes.

-*La* or -*ila* (Herero: *ra*, *na*. Kiswahili: *a*) forms verba relativa. Before -*la* the *a* which regularly ends the verbal stem is turned into *e* (Kiswahili: *i*). Thus Kâfir: *hamba* to go, *hamb-e-la* to rush at something; Sekwana: *bona* to see, to look after somebody (*bon-e-la*); Herero: *šepa* to kill, *šep-e-ra* to kill for somebody. Kiswahili: *pata* to reach, *pat-i-a* to reach something for somebody; Mponwe: *kambu* to speak, *kamb-i-na* to speak for somebody.

The suffix -*isa* before which the closing *a* of the stem disappears, forms Verba causativa. Kâfir: *tanda* to love,

tand-isa to induce to love; Sekwana: *bona* to see, *bon-isa* to cause to see; Herero: *rara* to sleep, *rar-isa* to send to sleep; Kiswahili: *penda* to love, *pend-esa* to cause to love; Mpoñwe: *kamba* to speak, *kamb-isa* to induce to speak.

-*Ika*, -*eka* forms the reflexive-causative. Kâfir: *hamba* to go, *hamb-eka* to prepare oneself to go; Herero: *huika* to clothe, *huik-ika* to dress oneself.

-*Ana* forms Verba reciproca. Kâfir: *tanda* to love, *tand-ana* to mutually love one another. Sekwana: *sebeletsa* to work, *sebelets-ana* to work for one another. Herero: *šepa* to kill, *šep-ana* to mutually kill one another. Kiswahili: *penda* to love, *pend-ana* to mutually love one another.

The suffix -*u*, which has here become formally an infix, coming immediately before the final *a*, forms the passive. Kâfir: *tanda* to love, *tand-w-a* to be loved; *tand-isa* to cause to love; *tandis-w-a* to be induced to love. Sekwana: *rata* to love, *rat-o-a* to be loved. Herero: *hungira* to speak, *hungir-u-a* to be spoken; *šepa* to kill, *šep-o-a* to be killed. Kiswahili: *penda* to love, *pend-o-a* to be loved. Mpoñwe: *tonda* to love, *tond-o* to be loved.

β. Prefixes.

Ši- (kiswahili: *gi*-, Herero: *ri*-, Sekwana: *i*-) forms verba reflexiva. Kâfir: *tanda* to love, *ši-tanda* to love oneself. Kiswahili: *penda* to love, *gi-penda* to love oneself. Herero: *šepa* to kill, *ri-šepa* to kill oneself. Sekwana: *bona* to see, *i-pona* to see-oneself.

γ. Reduplication.

This forms Verba frequentativa and intensiva. For instance, Kâfir: *hamba* to go, *hambahamba* to make a circuit; *teta* to speak, *tetateta* to chatter. Herero: *kanda* to move oneself, *kandakanda* to tremble.

All these elements admit of combinations amongst themselves, whereby the following forms, which may be illustrated by the Kâfir word *teta* to speak, arise:—

a. Simply derived Forms	b. Doubly derived Forms		
	Relative	Causative	Ref. Caus. Reciproc.
Relative: tet-ela	tet-el-ela	tet-el-isa	tet-el-eka tet-el-ana
Causative: tet-isa	tet-is-ela	tet-is-isa	tet-is-eka tet-is-ana
Reflex-Causative: tet-eka	tet-ek-ela	tet-ek-isa	tet-ek-eka tet-ek-ana
Reflexive: ši-teta	ši-tet-ela	ši-tet-isa	ši-tet-eka ši-tet-ana
Reciprocal: tet-ana	tet-an-ela	tet-an-isa	tet-an-eka tet-an-ana

By suffixing the character -u all these forms can be turned into the passive.

Another instance of the extraordinary complexity of savage modes of speech is the elaboration of the personal pronoun in the Bântu idioms. For the first and the second person singular and plural there are four forms, whilst for the third person there are no less than seven pronominal stems, whereof some are expressions of unity, some of plurality and others of both. By means of this distinction the language has been able to build up nominal forms expressing number and a kind of gender, being furnished with pronominal elements in the sense of our Article or demonstrative adjective.

From the seven Bântu character-sounds of the third person arise the following stems in Kâfir and Sekwana:—

I. Singular Forms.

a. <i>Primitive Form</i>	b. <i>Kâfir Form</i>	c. <i>Sekwana Form</i>
uMu	um, u	mo
iLi	ili, i	le
iMi	im, in.	me, m
iSi	isi	se.
uLu	ulu, u	lo
uMu	um	mo

II. Plural Forms.

a. <i>Primitive Form</i>	b. <i>Kâfir Form</i>	c. <i>Sekwana Form</i>
aBa	aba, o	ba
aMa	ama	ma
iSi	isim } isi } isim }	lin, rin
iMi	imi	me

III. Collective Forms.

a. <i>Primitive Form</i>	b. <i>Kâfir Form</i>	c. <i>Sekwana Form</i>
uBu	ubu	bo
uKu	uku	ko, ho.

The possessive pronoun is represented by the genitive of the personal pronoun. It either precedes or follows the substantive to which it belongs. In the latter case the demonstrative element which refers to the preceding noun is prefixed in the shortest form to the possessive pronoun, whilst in the former the demonstrative, coming before the nominal form, must be prefixed to the possessive pronoun in its full form, united with the preceding demonstrative-relative particle *a*.

Examples:—

a. Postposition of the possessive pronoun:

um-páši wake his wife = um-páši w-ake; the prefix w- points back to *um-* and *ake* is genitive of *je-na*, the pronoun of e. g. *um-tu* man.

i-haše lajo his horse = i-haše l-ajo; the prefix l- points back to *i* (for *ili*) and *ajo* is the genitive of *jo-na*, the pronoun for e. g. *iñ-kosi* chief.

uku-tja kwawo their fodder = uku-tja ku-awo; the prefix *ku* points back to *uku* and *awo* is the genitive of *wona*, the pronoun for e. g. *ama-haše* the horses.

b. Preposition of the possessive pronoun:

omake um-páši his wife = a-umu-ake um-páši
 elajo i-haše his horse = a-ili-ajo i-haše
 okwawo uku-tja their fodder = a-uku-awo uku-tja
 obam ubuso my countenance = a-ubu-ami ubu-so
 abam abantu my men = a-aba-ami aba-ntu
 elako i-haše thy horse = a-ili-ako i-haše.

The personal pronominal stems of the third person in their full form with the prefixed relative particle *a* act as demonstrative pronouns. Stems with initial *m*, being weak, take the stem *li* also, which is prefixed.

We have to distinguish three forms of the demonstrative pronoun, one simple and two compound, whereof the

one is compounded with *wa* (and *au* = *o*), the other with *wa-ja* (*o-ja*, *ja*).

The demonstrative pronouns are so intimately connected with the following nouns, that in most cases the initial vowel of the latter falls away. For instance:—

lo-mtu, *lowa-mtu*, *lowaja-mtu* this man
lo-mpaši, *lowa-mpaši*, *lowaja-mpaši* this woman
eli-haše, *elo-haše*, *elija-haše* this horse
le-inkosi, *lejo inkosi*, *lejaja inkosi* this chief.

There is no relative pronoun in Bantu but only the relative particle *a*. This is invariable, so that, where in a relative sentence, a case-relationship has to be expressed, a demonstrative pronoun must be joined to it, as in the Semitic languages. Thus, *ihaše elinjau šinkulu* = *i-haše a-ili-njau šin-kulu* the-horse-which = that-his-feet-great. *in-klu ejaugo lukulu* = *in-klu a-i-jaugo lu-kulu* the-house-which = that gate-is-great.

As regards the noun, it is unable to express phonetically either gender or number. And indeed we may say the same of case, and more especially of the subject- and object-case. All these categories are indicated either by connecting the noun with the pronominal stems of the third person or by position in the sentence. For a few examples we may take:—

<i>Singular</i>	<i>Plural</i>
<i>um-ntu</i> the man	<i>aba-ntu</i>
<i>u-dade</i> the sister	<i>o-dade</i>
(for <i>umu-dade</i>)	(for <i>aba-dade</i>)
<i>ili-šwi</i> the word	<i>ama-šwi</i>
<i>i-haše</i> the horse	<i>ama-haše</i>
(for <i>ili-haše</i>)	
<i>u-bambo</i> the rib	<i>išim-bambo</i>
(for <i>ulu-bambo</i>)	
<i>um-ti</i> the tree	<i>imi-ti</i>

ubu-lumko wisdom and uku-tja fodder are collectives and have no plural.

These pronominal elements which precede the nominal stems occur in all the Bantu languages with the phonetic modifications peculiar to each idiom.

In Bantu the adjective is generally expressed as follows:—

Kâfir: um-tu a-u-na-ubu-lumko (umtu onobulumko) the man who with wisdom = the wise man.

um-lambo a-u-na-in-hlabati (umlambo onehlabati) the river which with sand = the sandy river.

Herero: omu-ndu u-n-oşondunge the man who with understanding = the intelligent man.

When the adjective is expressed in the usual way it follows the substantive to which it belongs, whether as attribute or predicate; for instance, umhlaba ubanzi wona earth extended it = the earth is wide; um-paşi omkulu (um-paşi a-um-kulu) the woman who great = the great woman.

As regards the verb it depends, as in every case, upon the connexion of the stem with the personal pronominal elements. The latter appear as prefixes, and in cases where the object is taken up into the body of the verb, it immediately follows the subject, so that the structure of the sentence is: 'I-thee-love'. But the subject-denoting prefixes are rather of an objective than subjective nature, 'I love' being not so much 'I loving' as 'to me is love' or 'me catches love'. Thus:—

u-Satani	wa-m-kohl-isa	u-Ewa.
The Satan	he-her-deceived	the-Eve.
u-ja-başi	aba-ntu	b-onke.
Thou-them-knowest	the-men	all.
U-ja-wad-ela	ama-şwi	ami.
He-them-despises	the-words	my.

For the sake of comparison I here give the Pater Noster in three languages.

I. Kâfir (language of the Ama-||osa).

Bawo	w-etu	os-eşulw-ini	ma-li-patwe
Father	who-our	who-heaven the in	may-he-borne-be
ngo-bu-ng wele	i-gama	l-ako	Ubu-kumkani
with-holiness	the name	the thine.	The-kingdom
b-ako	ma-bu-pike.	In-tando	j-ako
the thine	may-it-come.	The-will	the-thine
ma-j-enşiwe	emhlab-eni	ngengokuba	i-s-enşiwa
may-he-done-be	earth upon	as	he done being
eşulw-ini	Ma-u-si-pe	uku-tja	kw-etu
heaven-in	Mayest-thou-us-give	the-food	the-our
kw-emi-hla	nge-mi-hla.	U-si- olele	
the-of the-days	with-the-days.	Thou-us-forgive	
i-sono	ş-etu	ngengokuba	nati
the debts	the-our	as	also
			we-forgive these
ba-sonajo	tina.	U-nga-si-ngenisi	ekuhendweni
the-debtors	we.	Thou-not-us-lead	into-temptation
s-u-si-sindise	enkohlakalweni.	Amene.	
but-thon-us-deliver	evil-from.	Amen.	

II. Şulu (language of Ama-şulu).

Baba	w-etu	os-eşulw-ini,	ma-li-dumjiswe
Father	the-our	which-heaven-in	may-he-hallowed
i-gama	l-ako.	U-mbuso	w-ako
the-name	the-thine.	The-kingdom	the-thine
			may-it-come
In-tando	j-ako	ma-j-enşiwe	emhlabeni
The-will	the-thine	may-it-done-be.	earth-upon
			so
ngengaseşulwini.	Si-pe	namhla	isin-kwa
as-heaven-in.	Us-give	this-day	need-ful
s-emi-hla	s-etu.	Si-jekele	i-sono
the-of the-days	the-our	Us-forgive	the-debts
			the-our

ngeṅgokuba tina si-ba-jekela bona abo-najo
as we we-them-forgive these the-debtors
ku-ti. Uṅa-si-ṣisi ekulingweni kodwa si-kuhule
also. Thou-not-us-lead temptation-in but us-deliver
ekwoneni. Amene.
evil-from.

III. *Se-suto* (language of the Ba-suto).

Ntate o-a-rona o-kua ma-gorimo-ṅ, le-bitso
Father the-our the-who the-heavens-in the-become
la-gao le-galalele. Bo-pitile bo-gosi joa-gao.
the-thine the-name-holy. The-kingdom the-thine may-it-come.
Go-ratsaṅ ki-uena go-etsoe mo-le-pātsi-ṅ jualeka
The-will the-thine the-done-be as-the-earth-in so
be-gorimo-ṅ. U-re-pé kajenu b-ogobe ba-rona
the-heavens-in. Thou-us-give the-which the-food the-our
ba-metle e-otle. U-re-ikwarele libe jeika
the-days with-days. Thou-us-forgive also as
rea-lebala melatu ea bamelatu mo-go-rona.
we-too sins which the-debtors the-our.
U-si-ke-ua-re-isa li-beṅ, u-re-tlose bo-beṅ.
And-not-us-lead into-evil but-us-free from-evil!

Bāntu ideology, as will have been observed, is almost invariably indirectly hybrid, the formula being 2. 4. 6. 8. III, or nominative + genitive, nom + adjective, verb + object, subject + verb, subject + object + verb.

The theology of the Kāfir race is in many ways most instructive. In Kāfir itself we have another form of the K'oikoi Zuni || Goam, namely, uTi||o the Dawn, other forms being Tekeṣa and Tillo; e. g.

Ilī-swi li-ka-Ti || o The word of God

Ubu-lumbo bu-ka-Ti || o The wisdom of God

But the thought which most frequently occurs and seems to have sunk most deeply into the Kâfir religious consciousness is that of

Munkulunkulu

the reduplicated form of *kulu* old, so that the root-idea is

The-Old-Old-One.

Şulu: (M) Unkulunkulu

Inhambane: Muluŋgulu

Kinika: Muluŋgu

Ki-hjáu: Muluŋgu

Ki-kamba: Muluŋgu

ki-Swahili: Mluŋgu

Makua: Mulúgo

Otji-Herero: oMukuru

Swahili: Muŋgu

Sopála; Muruŋgu

Tette: Moruŋgo

Ki-pokómo: Muŋgo

Such a concept would lead one to anticipate ancestor-worship amongst these tribes, nay, the very word for God in Sekwâna and Se Suto means Ancestral Spirit-Morimo, Molimo. On the other hand, the Girjama word is Mwenje, Master.

The Kâfir Pater Noster is:—

Bawo wetu oseşulwini! Malipatwe ngobungewe
igama lako. Ubukumkani bako mabufike. Intando
jako majenşıwe emhlabeni. ngengokuba isenşıwa eşulwini.
Sipe namhla ŋge ukutja kwetu kwemihla ngemihla. Usi-
xolele isono şetu, ngengokuba nati sixolela abo basonajo
tina. Ungasingenisi ekulingweni. şusisindise enkohlakalweni.
Ngokuba bubobako ubukumkani, namandhla, nobung-
cwalisa, kude kube ngunapakade. Amene.

We are on more delicate ground when we come to deal with the other words for *Spirit*, namely:—

Maravi: Nsimmo
 Sena: Muşimo
 Kwellimane: Muşimo
 Benga: Anjambi
 Mpoiwe: Anjambia
 Kongo: Nşambi-a-mpungu Spirit on High
 Angola: oNşambi
 Kiteke: Nşamo-rupuo Spirit above.
 Bôgîgîgî: Pûluga Good Spirit

Now, the worship of ancestral spirits may not unjustly be described as a service of fear: the dead are propitiated because it is in their power to injure the living. The ghost of the dead man lurks near the dwelling of the living relative, often assuming the form of a snake or a reed, so that of the Kongo, the Kiteke and the Bôgîgîgî at least we may predicate that the theological concept does *not* arise from ancestor-worship.

Isubu stands by itself as a monument of the spiritual genius of that tribe: the thought of God is

Obasi the Father,

reminding us of the Hausa Obangîsi. of the Negro race.

CHAPTER XII.

THE AUSTRALIAN RACE.

In dealing with the languages of the Australian Race we have to remember first of all that, morphologically they fall into several categories. Those of the west, for instance, stand no higher than the formless idioms of Further India, others show an agglutinative structure, whilst others, again, show a tendency to raise themselves to a higher level by amalgamating the formative elements with the stem.

Most interesting is the evolution of case-forms in these tongues, and yet, strangely enough, there is no specialisation

of case either for subject or object, the nominative and accusative being expressed by the naked stem. In contradistinction to the Papuan idioms and those of Melanesia and Polynesia the morphological process of the Australian languages is that of attaching suffixes to what are considered radical forms.

Our knowledge of these tongues is for the most part confined to the eastern and south eastern part of the continent, where they are more highly evolved. We propose to examine the languages known as Turrubul and Kamilaroi or Gumilroi. In Wiraturai or Wiradurei and the idiom spoken in the vicinity of Hunter's River and Lake Macquarie there seems to be no native thought of God, the word used being the Hebrew Jehovah, so we must be content with the Pater Noster.

Wiraturai:	Jehova-gu	guobini	malñidjãli-gññ
	Jehovah	ceased	work-from-his

biambul.

all.

MACQUARIE: PATER NOSTER.

Pejuñ-pai	ñearun-pa	wokka-ka-pa	moroko-ka-pa
Father	our	above-in	heaven-in

ka-tan	kumunpilla	jituña	ñiroumpa	jirijiri kakilliko.
being	be make	name	thine	holy to be.

Paipipumpilla	piriwul-kopa	ñiroumpa;	ñururpumpilla
Appear make	kingdom	thine;	heard be make

wijellikane	ñiroumpa	janti	purai-ta-pa	janti	ta
word	thine	even as	earth-in	as	is

moroko-kapa	ñuwã	ñearun	pureun	ka	janti	ka-tai
heaven-in	give	us	day	is	as	always

takilliko.	Natun	warikulla	ñearumpa	jarakai	umatoara,
to eat.	And	throw away	our	evil	done,

janti ta nêen warika. janti ta wijapajeen
 as since we throw away. as is spoken
 nearumpa. Natun jutiji-kora nearun jarakai umilli-kan
 our. And lead not us Evil doing
 kolañ. Miromulla nearun jarakai-ta-piruñ, kulla
 toward. Deliver make us Evil-from, for
 ta niroumpa ta piriwul-ko-pa natun killipimpin janti
 as thine is kingdom and Glory as
 ka-tai.
 Amen.
 ever.

According to Ridley Kamilaroi or Gummilroi is the language of the Aborigines of the Namoi, Barwan, Bundarra and Balonue Rivers and of Liverpool plains and the Upper Hunter.

As regards the noun, case-relations are expressed by suffixes, whilst number is designated either by the preposition or postposition of the words *bûlâr* two and *burula* manifold, much. Thus:—

Subjective and objective: mulioñ the eagle.

Nom.: mulion-dû (as agent)

Gen.: mulion-nû of the eagle

Dat.: mulioñ-go

Abl.: mulion-di

Loc.: mulion-dâ

Soc. (rest): mulioñ-kûnda

„ (motion): mulioñ-kâle

In an attributive sense the adjective occurs both behind and before the substantive to which it belongs: e. g. *bûlâr giwir mûga* 'two man blind', *bain dina tuñgôr* 'sick foot lame'. In a predicative sense the adjective must follow the substantive: *Lajâru wibil ginji* 'Lazarus ill became', *nêane giujê duri* 'we happy become'.

The verb has had a manifold evolution: it has both a causative and a permissive form. Thus, from *îrûmi* 'to

see' we have ñumil-mule 'to cause to see', 'to teach'; from buma 'to strike' buma-nabile 'to allow somebody to be struck'. The tenses and moods of the verb are expressed by definite suffixes which are attached to the verbal stem. Person and number are designated by placing the forms of the personal pronoun before the verbal stem. For instance,

Jama	ñinda	ñuna	ñumi
Well	thou	me	has-seen?
Gir	ñaia	ñinuna	ñumi
Truly	I	thee	have-seen.
Kâmil	ñaia	ñinuna	ñumi
Not	I	thee	have-seen.

As a specimen of Kamilroi structure let me quote part of a translation of the Acts of the Apostles:—

“Baiaime búlar jarine jealokwai giwir.”
 “Gods two have-come-down like men.”

Paul Barnaba ñelibu bunañune, kâkûldone;
 Paul Barnabas also ran, called:
 “knria! kâmil ñeane baiaime, ñeane giwir jealokwai
 “away! not we gods, we men even-as
 ñindai. ñeane gujê duri. ñeane buda
 ye. we happy have-become, we sad
 ginji, ñeane jili ginji, jealo ñeane
 have-become, we angry have-become, again we
 muru ñurîñilone. Ñeane muru goalda burulabu,
 good have-become. We good announce to all
 kuria ñindai jealo kagil gigile berudi waraia,
 away ye again bad that-become; back go,
 ñumila Baiaime môron. Baiaime gir gûnagula,
 look (up to) God living. God really heaven,

taon,	burul	kole.	kamuño	mina-mina-bul
earth,	great	water,	everything	manifold
gimobi.	Baiaime	jalwuña	Baiaime”!	
has-created.	God	ever	God!”	

It will be seen that Kamilroi ideology is hybrid, though it very nearly approaches the natural order, the formula being 2. 4. 5. 8. III.

As we have already seen, the word for the Supreme in Kamilaroi is

Baiaime Creator, from 1 baia to form, fashion, so that the idea of God is that of the potter moulding the clay. By this tribe of the North Western district of New South Wales Baiaime is regarded as the maker of all things and according to their conduct, as the rewarder and punisher of men. He sees all and knows all, if not directly, through the subordinate deity Turramulan, who presides at the Bora. It is a very noteworthy fact that Baiaime is said to have been once on the earth and that, in all his dealings with man and man’s transactions with him, Turramulan is declared to be Mediator. The meaning of Turramulan is ‘leg on one side only’, ‘one-legged’.

Turrubul is the language of the Aborigines on the Brisbane River, and may fairly be described as a sonorous idiom.

Its principle of formation is that of postposition. Suffixes serve to denote cases and to express number when a distinction is made phonetically. The verb is either primary or derived, and the tense- and mood-forms are expressed by means of suffixes. To define more particularly person and number in the verb, the substantival and pronominal forms precede; thus, ‘What hast thou done?’ is: *inta minju jugâri* thou-what-done? In certain cases the pronoun follows the verb, as: *daie-duña* lay he.

Alike in Kamilaroi and in Turrubul arithmetic does not go beyond the number three:—

Kamilaroi	1 mál	Turrubul	1 kunar
	2 búlár		2 búdela
	3 gúlíba		3 mudân

Any higher number is formed by combining two of these.

Turrubul ideology, which is *indirect*, namely, 1. 3. 5. 8. III. may be well seen from the following translation of Genesis:—

Mûmbál	nâmbilebu	numankin	jugâ-ri,	Kâlôma
God	all	things	made has.	Once
bígi	jugâr,	ña	kilen	jugâr.
sun	not,	and	moon	not
daoun	jugâr	milbûlpû,	iki	târ.
creature	not	living	also	earth.
târ	jugâr.	Kurumba	mûmbál	nâmbilebu
earth	not.	Great	God	everything
Târ	beren	kârûn.	jugâr	nôr
Earth	there	dark.	not	form
wuñgun-ti	tabil	ñine.	Bâgûl	jugâr
above-upon	water	sat.	Tree	not
târ-ti.	kudal	jugâr.	duga-tin	jugâr.
earth-upon.	bush	not.	men	not,
jugâr.	ña	muri	jugâr.	ñurun
not.	and	cangaroo	not.	Emu
nâmbilebu	jugâ-ri	mudân	ña	mudân
everything	made has	six	days	(in).

What, then, is Mûmbál, the Turrubul thought and predicate of God? It is the rolling Thunder, the colossal manifestation in Nature, the Australian Thor!

CHAPTER XIII.

THE HYPERBOREAN RACE.

Next in order come the idioms of the Hyperborean Race. Let us begin with the language of the Jukagirs known as Odul or Ododomni.

The noun is peculiarly rich in cases, which are expressed by suffixes, namely, the objective, locative, ablative, allative, sociative and prosecutive. The relation of genitive is expressed by placing the defining expression before the thing defined, the letter *n* being put between the two. For instance, 'the Russian's faith' is *luki-n-mudol* "(of the) Russian-faith."

As regards the adjective, when used attributively it precedes the noun, when predicatively it follows. Thus, *omok'a towoku* 'good dog', *amun-gi adi* 'the bones (are) sound'.

When appearing as the stem-form the possessive pronoun precedes the noun to which it belongs, as *mit nuna* 'our house', but when the suffix *lä* is added, it follows, as *eke mylä* 'Father our', *k'ak'a tälla* 'brother thine'.

In the case of the verb the suffixes vary according as it is transitive or intransitive. E. g. *le-i* 'he is', *jeginu-m* 'he her kisses'. Let us look at a few sentences:—

Anure-mik	tät	puguv-danlege		Anure.
Lovest	thou	Sun-lord	(Emperor)?	I love.
Age-tei-il.				Koinin (for Koil-nin)
Raise-we-ourselves	(Let us rise)			God-before
naka-tei-li.	Motin	omok	age-tei.	kanin mot
bow-we-ourselves.	Me-to	good	begins.	if I
leit-am-ik	luki-n-mudol.			
know-should	Russian-faith.			

Ideologically Odul is 1. 3. 6. 8. VI. that is to say, hybrid.

What, then, is the meaning of **ᠠᠨᠠᠨᠠᠨᠠᠨ** Kōil?

The language of the Ainu is one of particles, expressing grammatical relationships by external means. Its type reminds us of the undeveloped idioms of the Mongol-Tungusic stem.

In the case of the noun, the category of number is only occasionally denoted, the singular and plural not as a rule being phonetically distinguished. Case, too, is only partially represented; the genitive by position and the rest by suffixed particles. For the subjective and objective there is no phonetic distinction.

When used attributively the adjective precedes the substantive, when as predicate it follows, receiving at the same time a particle representing the Copula. E. g. *bekere kuroro* glittering cloud. *širan guru* poor man. *tambaku êramus utara* a man accustomed to tobacco.

The personal pronoun comes before the expression to which it belongs, as *anokai tiše* our house, *k'okai po* my child.

As regards the verb, it seems to be absolutely formless, time, mood, person and number being expressed by elements which are attached to what serves as the verbal expression. Thus, *jaikota-no-ja* I am afraid, *ohono šियोmo u-nukara* we have not seen each other for a long time, *S'nenin ainu taban nobori kašketa rikin* an Ainu has gone up this mountain. In form the active and the passive are identical. Intransitive verbs are turned into transitive and transitive into causal verbs by means of the suffix -te, -ti (-de -di). For instance, *nukura* to see, *nukan-te* to cause to see, to show; *oman* to go out, *oman-de* to send.

To express number Ainu seems to have adopted the vigesimal system. The ideology is indirect, the formula being 1. 3. 5. 8. III.

And the thought of the Supreme? It is Kamui Spirit!

Judged by its richness in word-forms the speech of the *Aleuts* would seem to belong to the Turko-tataric idioms and the languages of the Uralian Branch, but the characteristic of these tongues, vowel-harmony, is unknown.

The ruling principle is agglutination or amalgamation and the process of word-formation that of suffixing. There is no definite case for subject or object, but attribute and predicate are distinguished phonetically. Most remarkable is the evolution of the verb, which can only be compared with that of the speech of Turkey.

Singular, dual and plural are all denoted in the noun: e. g. *agituda-k* brother, dual: *agituda-kik*, plural: *agituda-n*. The paradigm of the substantive is as follows:— (*ada-k* father).

	<i>Singular</i>	<i>Dual</i>	<i>Plural</i>
Nom. Acc.	Ada-k	Ada-kik	Ada-n
Gen.	ada-m	as Nom.	same
Dat.	ada-man	ada-kin	ada-nin
Abl.	ada-gan	same as Nom.	as Nom.

The defining cases come before the defined: thus, 'the word of the Kingdom of God' is *Agojtu-m ainali-gan tunu*: God-of Kingdom- by word.

When used attributively the adjective agrees with the substantive to which it belongs, whilst as predicate it becomes a verbal expression. For instance, *igamana-k* good (Sing.), *igamana-kik* (dual), *igamana-n* (plural), but *ada-n igamana-kuk* my father is good; *agitasu-n-ki malik'isulukan* your companions are not brave.

Wonderfully rich in forms is the Aleutic verb. The sum of all the forms derivable from one root is about 40 and if the persons and numbers of every form are added, it is said to be over 300. The verb would seem to rest on two formations whereof the one is a *nomen agentis* or its equivalent and the other a *nomen actionis*. To the

former are added the personal pronominal forms, to the latter the possessive suffixes. There are 5 moods and 5 tenses, namely, Indicative, Conjunctive, Potential, Imperative and Infinitive; Present, Aorist, Perfect, indefinite Future, lasting Future and Futurum exactum.

At the basis of the numerical expressions is the quinary system, and Aleutic ideology is hybrid, the formula apparently being 1. 4. 6. 8. VI.

The Aleuts have conceived God as Agogu-k Creator.

Of the *Inuit* or *Eskimo* language Prof. F. Müller observes that it is of great importance for the history of Language because it gives us a certain chronological criterion for estimating phonetic changes in nature-languages. We are told, for instance, that 'though the Eskimos in Labrador have been separated from the Greenlanders for at least 1000 years, the languages of both differ less than Danish and Swedish or Dutch and Hamburg Plattdeutsch. The dwellers in Boothia Felix, with whom Captain John Ross on his second polar expedition spent three years, understood much of what he read to them from a Greenland book and would certainly have understood more if they had heard it from a Greenlander, nay, perhaps everything if a Greenlander had spoken on matters of common life.'

The centre of gravity of the linguistic organism is to be found in the demonstrative roots or pronouns, as in K'oi-k'oi, and the principle of formation is that of suffixing. Noteworthy, too, is the fact that, as the Hottentots, the Eskimos of Labrador call themselves *men* κατ'ἑξοχὴν, for Inuit=K'oi-k'oi.

Singular, dual and plural are all expressed by the noun, whilst the denotation of the cases is singularly rich. Not only have we the purely grammatical cases, subjective, objective and genitive, but those which express spatial relations, namely, the locative, ablative, vialis, terminalis,

modalis and comparative. The object-case is represented by the naked stem; the genitive or rather possessive case is phonetically expressed by adding the pronominal suffixes to the expression which is to be defined, the defining expression preceding. If, for instance, we want to render the sentence "the tail of the whale touched the bows of the boat" we must say: *ak'fek'u-p sak'piata umia-p suju-a aktok'-p-â*, i. e., whale (subject) tail-his (subject of the sentence) boat (subject) bows-its (object of sentence) touched-he-it.

As attribute the adjective follows the substantive and agrees with it in number and ending. Thus, *ujak'k-at akitsu-t* stones weak; *ikdlu-t kû-p sinâ-ne-itu-t* = houses brook edge-its being, i. e., the houses which are at the edge of the brook. The predicative relationship is expressed by a form which also serves as a verbal expression. 'Our house is good' is *ikdlök'put ajuñilaḡ* = house-our good-is; 'our house begins to get bad' *ikdlök'put ojulekpok* = house-our bad-to be-to get-begins.

The pronouns are derived from the demonstrative roots *uw* 'here' and *ik* 'there', so that 'I' is equivalent to 'my here-hood', 'thou' to 'thy there-hood'. The forms of the pronoun are wonderfully rich; we find, namely, subjective, objective, locative, ablative, vial, terminal, modal and comparative. And, as regards the nominal stems with pronominal suffixes, they fall into two series: 1. subjective, 2. objective; whilst of the pronoun of the third person there are two subdivisions, viz. demonstrative and reflexive suffixes.

The quinar-vigesimal system of numeration underlies all the Inuit dialects: 5=one hand, 10=two hands; 11 to 15=first foot, 10 to 20 the other foot.

Now in the Eskimo idioms of Labrador we find no native word for God, the words used being *Gulib* and *Gude*, which are easily recognisable as forms of our own word. In Greenlandish, on the other hand, we have the remarkable and deeply-significant word *Torngarsuk*, which

is an augmentative of *Torngak* Spirit, so that the thought is: *Great Spirit*.

For the sake of comparison we may take a verse from the Gospel of St. John, which has been translated alike into Inuit and Greenlandish

Inuit.

Taimak Gudib sillaksoarmint naegligiveit, Ernetuane tunnilugo, illunatik okpertut tapsomunga, assiokonnagit nungusnitomigle innogutekarkovlugit.

Greenlandish.

Sillarsúb innue Torngarsuk taima assakigei, Ernetue untinillugo taukkonunga, tamarmik taursomunga opertut tammarkonnagit, nâksaungit somigle innursútekarkollugit.

St. John. iii. 16.

Eskimo ideology is hybrid, the formula being 2. 4. 6. 8. VI; i. e. indirect.

CHAPTER XIV.

THE RACES OF AMERICA.

Few languages are more interesting to the student of speech than the American. In the first place it is almost impossible to apply our familiar grammatical terminology, such categories as noun, verb, adjective, existing only in a very modified sense, if at all. Not only do we find a mingling of noun and verb but also the complete identity of the subjective and possessive pronouns. Sometimes singular and plural are not distinguished, nay, even the first and second person plural are not always phonetically separated.

A peculiarity of most of these tongues is the so-called *incorporation*, i. e. the taking up an object into the verbal body. The verb, in fact, represents a whole sentence, the remaining parts of which serve merely as elucidation. In

many respects we are reminded of the idioms of Dardistan. Only the intransitive or neutral verb can appear without reference to an object, whilst every transitive verb must in itself contain the expression of the object. To the Indian "love" in the abstract is unthinkable. His language has not emerged from the state in which it is impossible to have such a word as 'heart' as distinguished from 'my heart', 'thy heart' or 'his heart'. So it is to this day in Hunṣa. *Ik*, for instance, is 'my name', *ik* 'his name'. Take away the pronominal sign, and the remaining *k* means nothing. *Aus* is 'my wife' and *gus* 'thy wife'. The *s* alone has no meaning.

Speaking morphologically the American idioms do not all stand upon the same footing, or rather, have not all arrived at the same stage of evolution. Whilst some have hardly got beyond *Isolation*, others approach the *agglutinating*, *combinatory* or *amalgamating* stage, others, again, form a new linguistic type, that, namely, of *incorporation*.

To the Americans belongs that tribe which has absolutely no sense of number, and in this respect at all events, stands below the aborigines of Australia and the bushmen of South Africa, I refer to the Kikitos.

Beginning with the tongues of the Tinne and Kinnai Stems we find in K'ippewê a very instructive syntax. Amongst the cases those which denote purely grammatical relations are the most important. The nominative stands either at the beginning or at the end of the sentence but never immediately before the verb. It is the complement of the verb, the accusative or objective which precedes the verb. To express the genitive the defining element is put before the thing defined. Thus, the sentence: 'the house of the sister of the father of my friend' is:

se	l'a	bê	tka	bê	deṣê	jê	kâc.
my	friend	his	father	his	sister	her	house.

With things animate the plural is formed by adding *k* to the singular, with those inanimate *-n*. Thus, Algonkin: *anišinabe* man, *anišinabe-k* men; Mikmak: *lenu*, *lenu-k*; Senni-Lennape: *leni*, *lenow-a-k*. Ojibwē: *moskesin* shoe, *moskesin-o-n* shoes; Lenni-Lennape: *wikwahem* house, *wikwahem-a-l* houses, where we have *l* for *n*.

As regards the cases, the nominative or subjective stands at the head of the sentence; the objective or accusative both precedes and follows the verb; e. g. Kri: *ki-wâskâhigan nawak miwâsin ispiî ni-wâskâhigan* 'thy house is better than my house'; Sâkîhew *kigemantow-a* 'he loves God'; Ojibwē: *nin sagia n-ôs* 'I love my father.' But in Algonkin we can say either: *oşawakik sakîha otema*, or, *otema sakîha oşawakik* *Oşawakik* loves his horse, or, his horse loves *Oşawakik*. In the genitive case the thing defined follows that which defines and is furnished with the possessive pronoun. E. g. Lenni-Lennape: *Ketanitowit o-i-ahoaltoagan* God His-love = the love of God. The other case-relations are expressed by suffixes.

The adjective may either precede or follow the noun. in the latter case it must agree with the noun in number and gender. When used predicatively the adjective must be turned into a verbal expression.

These languages possessing no relative pronoun this relation has to be expressed by a participial construction.

There is, in fact, no essential difference between a nominal, adjectival and verbal stem. Noun, verb and adjective are all treated in the same way. A peculiarity of the Algonkin tongues is the mood known as *dubitative*. If the Indian wishes to speak of things which he has not himself experienced or the existence of which is not directly demanded by the mind, he makes use of this mood. It arises partly out of scrupulosity towards himself and partly out of politeness toward others. The sign of the dubitative is *tok*, *take*, *dog*. Algonkin: *ni-sakîha-tok* I love him per-

This is a concept with which, beautiful as it is, it is always difficult to deal, especially when it is a question of uncivilised races. One thing, however, seems to be certain: a word such as Kittanitowit could never apply to ancestor-worship. What we really want to know is its *intension*. Of its *extension* we have already had proof (pp. 79. 80).

‘The Algonquin’s belief’, says Dr. Tylor, ‘recognizes the antagonistic Kitchi Manitu and Matchi Manitu, the Great Spirit and Evil Spirit, who preside over the spiritual contending hosts which fill the world and struggle for the mastery over it. They are especially associated, the one with light and warmth, the other with damp and darkness, while some tribes identify them with Sun and Moon. Here the nature-religion of the savage may have been developed, but was not set on foot, by the foreigner’:

Amongst the Algonkins we find three words for the Supreme, namely:—

Atahôkan	Creator
Kuduagni	Framer
Ôki	One-Above.

From an ideological standpoint these tongues are naturally hybrid; viz. 1. 4. 6. 8. II.

In passing on to the speech of the Irokois, we find the curious fact that, nouns are divided into higher and lower. To the former belong the expressions for God, the higher beings and the male members of the human race, to the latter those for all animals, whether masculine or feminine, and for every thing else. There are three numbers; singular, dual and plural. The three grammatical cases are mostly known by their position in the sentence. The genitive is expressed by putting the defining expression either after or before the thing defined, in the latter case with the possessive element. Thus *ne hoauâk ne David* ‘the son David’s’, *Nioo ro-iêha* God his Son, *rakuî ôtât-*

enistēha of-the-queen her mother. The remaining cases, expressing spatial relations, are denoted by suffixes.

When used as an attribute the adjective is placed after the noun to which it belongs: *kaniatare koua* sea great; *kahomueia koua* ship great. As predicate the adjective must be turned into a verb. Thus, *ra-koua-nē* he is great.

The Irokese verb is very rich in tenses and moods: it has even what we may call the conjunctive pluperfect: e. g. *aō-k-a-thah-t-ō-hake* if I had seen. The incorporation of the object into the verbal expression in the compound objective conjugation generally takes place by precedence of the subjective and sequence of the objective, that is to say, the pronominal prefixes which precede the verb are composed of subjective and objective elements.

Ideologically Irokese is therefore indirectly hybrid:
2. 4. 6. 8. VI.

Unlike the thought of the preceding tribes, that of the Irokese is

☞ Δ ▷ Nioo Creator

Hawaniu pre-existent Creator

There is another thought, namely:—

Taronhiawagon Sky-Holder

In Slavé the theologic Idea is identical with that of Irokese:—

☞ ▷ 6 7 Niotsi Creator

Very interesting is the speech of the Dakota. The root is transformed into the stem and the stem into the word by means of prefixes, more seldom by suffixes. Thus, *ksa* to break to pieces; *ba-ksa* to cut to pieces with a knife; *ka-ksa* to split with a hatchet.

As regards the noun, inasmuch as there are no expressions for higher and lower, animate and inanimate beings, we have only to do with the two categories of number and case.

In Hidatsa the plural is not phonetically distinguished from the singular, and it is almost the same in Dakota. The grammatical cases: nominative, accusative and genitive are indicated by the position in the sentence. As a rule the objective or accusative precedes the verb: thus, *Witśašta wã wovapi wã kaja* man book made, 'a man has made a book.' If, however, there be no ambiguity about the matter, the object is put at the head of the sentence and the subject immediately before the verb, as in German. For instance, *witśašta Wakâtãka kaja* den Menschen hat Gott gemacht, 'Man God made'.

To express the genitive the defining element is put before the thing defined; i. e. Dakota *tipi tijopa* house gate; *išta midi* eye water (tear). Spatial relations are expressed by postpositions.

When used attributively the adjective follows the noun to which it belongs, when predicatively it must be turned into a verbal expression. Thus, *Witśašta šitše K'si* man bad; *ni-wašte* thou art good; *wa-ma-jašika* I am ill.

The pronouns are divided into inclusive and exclusive, and are put as a rule before the verb. By combining the subjective and objective pronouns we get the emphatic reflexive form, namely, *miś mije* I me = I myself; *niś nije* thou thee = thou thyself. The possessive pronoun is of a twofold nature, either *dependent* or *independent*. In the former case it appears as prefix to the noun, in the latter it is equivalent to an adjective. The demonstrative pronoun, which is put after the noun, corresponds to what used to be known as the definite or indefinite article. Thus, *witśašta ki* the man; *witśašta šitše ki* the bad man.

The Dakota verb rests on the union of a stem con-

ceived as predicate with the prefixed subjective pronominal elements. But the interesting verb *ekĩ* 'to think', with its synonyms, is conjugated not by means of prefixes but by means of suffixes.

E. g. <i>Sing.</i> 1. <i>E</i> kā-mi	<i>Plu.</i> 1. incl. ũ-ke <i>kĩ</i>
	excl. ũ-ke <i>kĩ</i> -pi
2. ekā-ni	ekā-ni-pi
3. ekĩ	ekĩ-pi.

The decadic system of numeration seems to underlie both Dakota and Hidatsa.

<i>Dakota</i>	<i>Hidatsa</i>
1. Wāka	dueza
2. nōpa	dopa
3. jamni	dami

As we saw just now, the form for the Supreme in Dakota is:

Wakātāka	Great Spirit,
Wakañ spirit	tañka great.

Dakota ideology is natural, the formula being 1. 4. 5. 8. I.

Passing on to the speech of the Koloś known as TKlinkit, we find that the verb departs from the type of American tongues. Prof. F. Müller tells us that it most nearly resembles the same part of speech in the languages belonging to the Hyperborean race. It is formed by means of suffixes which are connected with the stems of the personal pronoun. In transitive verbs the accompanying pronoun generally appears with the suffix *-k'*, which would point to an original instrumental form, *te-k'*, for instance, being 'with the stone', *tek'-k'* 'with the stones'. A peculiarity of this idiom is the fact that, in transitive verbs, the agent stands in the instrumental.

The possessive pronoun has two forms, whereof the one occurs as a prefix, the other as an adjective, and both are often combined. Thus, for the first person there are

the forms *ak'*-, *ak'-agi* (sing.), *a*-, *a-agi* (plu.): *ak'agi ak'-is* 'mine my father', *agi a-is* 'ours our father.'

To the Koloś the Eternal is known as *Aśakun*

For instance, *Aśakun-h' ik'atakāt agatin* God knows all. As we have seen, the ideology of *Tklinkit* is indirect, namely, 1. 3. 5. 8. III.

As typical of Mexican forms of speech we may take Nahuatl or Nawatl.

In this language it is not always easy to abstract the root from the words used singly. The derivation of stems takes place by means of suffixes. From *tell* stone, for instance, we get *tella* stony place, *tetejo* stony, *tetiki* hard, *te-ilitstli* hardness, *ni-tla-tetilja* I make it hard.

The most frequently-occurring process is that of Combination, wherein the defining element precedes the thing defined. Thus, *totoltetl* 'egg of the hen', consists of *totolin* 'hen', and *tetl* 'stone'. *Sok'ikal'i* 'fruit' means properly 'flower-food' from *sok'itl* 'flower' and *kal'i* 'what is edible' from *√ka* 'to eat'.

In dealing with the noun and verb we must remember the well-developed antithesis between animate and inanimate, rational and irrational beings. With inanimate things number is, as a rule, not denoted phonetically. On the other hand, the expressions for animate and more especially for rational beings have a manifold plural. Words expressing a business or nationality drop the individualising suffix *-tl* and lengthen the final vowel. Thus, *siwatl* woman, *siwâ* women; *meśikatl* Mexican, *meśikâ* Mexicans. Occasionally reduplication takes place. E. g. *kouatl* snake, pl. *kokoû*; *Teotl* God, pl. *teteô*. Expressions for animate irrational beings and for inanimate things conceived as animate, add to the form deprived of the individualising suffix, the suffix *-me*. E. g. *ik'katl* sheep, pl. *ik'kâ-mê*. *Te-petl* mountain, *tepe-mê* mountains.

Nor must we omit to mention certain suffixes which

are added to express respect, tenderness or contempt. *Petlo-zin* means 'the highly-honored Peter'; *Tu-zin* 'the much-honored father' but *uwe-ton* 'a despised old man'; *pil-tonlli* denotes 'a childish boy', *pil-zin*, on the other hand, 'son in the best sense'. *Okik'-pil* is a small, ridiculous little man. *-pul* implies blame or enlargement in a bad sense: e. g. *siwa-pul* is 'a bad woman', *no-siwa-pul* 'my bad woman'.

As regards the cases, the subjective and the objective become manifest only by position, the former preceding, the latter following, the verb. Like the dative, the objective is also indicated by the pronominal element which is incorporated with the verb. Thus:—

Ni-k-kiwi-lia in no-pil-zin se kal'i
I-it-make-for the-my-son a house.

Here *kal'i* is shown at once to be conceived objectively by the *k* which is incorporated with the verb, and the verb *kiwi-lia* indicates that *in no-pil-zin* is the dative.

The genitive is expressed by putting the thing to be defined before the defining expression, and by adding to the former the possessive pronoun applying to the latter. Thus, *i-tlas'kal okik'ti* his-bread Man = the bread of Man.

As attribute the adjective precedes the substantive. E. g. *K'ipawak atl* pure water. As predicate the adjective must be turned into a verbal expression.

When combined with the possessive pronoun most nouns discard the individualising singular suffix. Thus, *Teo-tl* God becomes *Teu*: *no-Teu* my God; *kal'i* house, becomes *kal*: *no-kal* my house, *mo-kal* thy house. The reflexive pronoun in a possessive relation is expressed by the stems *ne*, *mo*. E. g. *Ne-tlasotla-listli* Love to oneself; *mo-tlasotla-ni* one who loves himself; *ne-mak'ti-lo-jan* place where one instructs oneself, study.

In Nawatl almost every independent word can be used, when combined with the subject-prefixes of the personal

pronoun, as predicate, so as to make a whole sentence of a verbal expression. For instance, *ni-no-ma-popouca* It my+hands+wash = I wash my hands. *Nišok'itekwi* I+flowers+pluck = I am picking flowers.

There is no verbum substantivum in the sense of our Copula. As a rule this is rendered by the personal or demonstrative pronoun. Thus, *Newatl ni-wei ni-tlatlakoani* I I-great I-sinner = I am a great sinner.

Interesting is the position of the object. Sometimes it is found between the subject-pronoun and the verb: *ni-naka-ka* I flesh eat; more often, however, the noun is represented by the pronoun of the third person and it is then put after the verb.

Respecting numeration, the quinar-vigesimal system in its purest form underlies Nawatl:—

1 se	
2 ome	10 matlaktli
3 jei	15 kaštol'i
4 nauī	20 Sem-pual'i
5 makwil'i	

Ideologically this interesting language is indirectly hybrid, the formula being 1. 3. 6. 8. V. Now, what is the Nawatl thought of God? It is

		Teotl. The Adored.
Teotlatolli verbum Dei.		Teo-ḡualo God-eating.

Dropping the individualising suffix we have the root Teo, reminding us, curiously enough, of the Gothic *Tiu* which is still with us in our own *Tuesday*.

As typical of the so-called Sonoric forms of speech we may take that of the Otomi or *K'iũ-K'iũ*. According to Prof. F. Müller the relation of the highly-evolved *Astēl* to the simple idioms of the North is very much that of the Tagala tongues on the Philippines to the dialects which are spoken by the Polynesians and the Melanesians.

By combination of the pronoun with the verbal particle the root can become a verb, and when combined with the demonstrative article or adjective, a substantive or adjective. But the Otomi language possesses a series of phonetic means by which, and especially in the case of the noun, it is able to express the various modifications of concrete action. Thus, in roots beginning with a vowel the prefix *t* denotes the result of the action, the prefix *y*-the agent. For instance, *opk'o* to write; *t-opk'o* manuscript; *na y-opk'o* writer. Where the root begins with *m* or *n* the prefix is *k'*: e. g. *madi* to love, *na k'-madi* love; *nee* to wish, *na k'-nee* wish, will.

The most important of the Cases are recognised by their position in the sentence: the subjective precedes, the objective follows the verb. E. g. *Na bednu i-ma ok'h'ā* Peter loves God. The genitive is expressed by putting the thing defined before the defining element. Thus, *Na ma Okk'ā* the mother of God.

When used as an attribute the adjective comes before the noun to which it belongs: e. g. *Ka je* a pious man. As a predicate the adjective is treated as a verb.

The verb is conjugated by certain pronominal elements prefixed to the stem. Speaking generally, these elements amalgamate with adverbs which are put either before or after them, in order to more nearly define the temporal or modal quality of the state or action. For instance, *d-na-nk'o* I am good; *di-nū* I see. In the compound or objective conjugation the expressions for the object are suffixed to the verbal expression: e. g. *di-nū-i* I see thee, *gi-nū-gi* thou seest me, *gi-nū-gl'ē* thou seest us.

Underlying both Otomi and Maşahua is the quinary-vigesimal system:—

<i>Otomi</i>	<i>Maşahua</i>
1 Na-ra	daKa
5 Kuto	şika
6 Ra-to (1+5)	nan <u>to</u>

7 Jo-to (2+5)	jen-ko
8 kiā-to (3+5)	nin-ko
9 gu-to (4+5)	šin-ko
10 Reta	deka

From an ideological standpoint Otomi or K'ia-K'ia is hybrid, the order being 2. 3. 6. 8. VIII, i. e. noun+genitive, adjective+noun, verb+object, subject+verb.

As we have seen, the theologic thought of the Otomi centres round

Okkā

probably another form of *Ōki*, the Power that rules the seasons and controls the winds and waves.

Most interesting are the forms of speech familiar to the Caribees. The so-called language of the Caribees really embraces two wholly-different idioms, namely: α) the speech of the Caribees of the mainland, called by the French Missionaries 'la langue des Galibis'; and β) the language of the Caribees of the islands, 'la langue Caraïbe'. The former has cognates in several idioms of the mainland, i. e. in K'aima, Kumana-goto, Tamanak etc., whilst the latter shows quite another type, which is grammatically more akin to Arowak. Now, this type is connected with a very peculiar circumstance.

The language of the Islanders embraces two different forms of speech, whereof one is used by the men, the other by the women. In vocabulary the speech of the men is most akin to Galibi, that of the women to Arowak.

The curious fact, that one and the same people according to the sex of its individuals speaks two lexically different languages is to be accounted for by the habits of this tribe. The Caribee warriors, when they had landed on the neighboring islands, slew the men Arowaks (Lukunu) who had settled there and captured their women. Inasmuch, therefore, as it became the duty of the women to educate the children from the 10th to the 12th year, not only was

their language communicated to them but a knowledge thereof was for ever assured to the growing lads. Thus whilst the women learnt Galibi from the men, the latter had already from early youth been taught Arowak by the former. And so we have both sexes learning two lexically wholly-differing modes of speech, yet in intercourse with the same sex using but one; for, when talking to his fellows the Caribee (Kalipi) uses Karina or Galibi, his wife in intercourse with women using Lukunu or Goakira.

As regards the noun, there is the somewhat rare phenomenon of the denotation of sex alike in nouns and adjectives by means of the final vowel: e. g. *basabanti* boy, *basabantu* girl; Go: *ana'si* good, fem. *anase*. In Goakira the form for the singular can be used without any addition for the plural, the distinction being generally made by gesture.

Of the cases the three grammatical, the subjective, objective and genitive are only known by their position in the sentence. In Arowak the subjective precedes the verb, the objective follows: *damulitân bahü* 'I make a house', and the relation of genitive is expressed by simply putting the defining element before the thing defined. Thus, *da-ti ulu-kiti* 'of my father younger brother'. The remaining spatial cases are denoted by postpositions.

In Goakira the subjective comes before, the objective after, the verb. The relation of genitive is expressed by putting the defining element after the thing defined and by combining the former with the possessive pronoun referring to the latter, thus: *Nö-i ni-kon Mareiwa* 'the mother of the Son of God' = his mother his Son God.

The adjective follows the noun to which it belongs and agrees with it in number and sex.

In Goakira we find the decadic system of numeration, in Arowak the quinar-vigesimal.

The ideology is in both cases hybrid, being respectively 2. 4. 6. 8. and 1. 4. 6. 8. III. and the Thought of God

Mareíwa.

In dealing with Guarani-Tupi we find, first of all, that it is very rich in formative elements and is therefore able to express the chief distinctions within the perception.

As regards the noun the plural is either left undenoted or is expressed by suffixing the word *setâ* 'many' in the shorter form *eta*. Thus, *abâ* 'man', *aba-eta* 'men'. Of the cases the most important, namely, the subjective, objective and genitive are known only by their position in the sentence. Indeed it is only the genitive whose position is assured, the nominative and accusative both in relation to the verb and indeed to one another being uncertain of any definite position. For instance, one may say: *Pedro oû miapê* 'Peter eats bread'; *Pedro miapê oû* 'Peter bread eats'; *miapê Petro oû* 'bread Peter eats' or *oû Pedro miapê* 'eats Peter bread'.

In the relation of genitive the expression which defines comes before the word defined; thus *Tupan roka* 'God's house'. The remaining case-relations are expressed by postpositions of a purely material kind.

The adjective as attribute comes after the substantive to which it belongs, becoming, indeed, one with it, so that the case-signs are attached to the former. Thus, *mbae-katû* 'good thing', *úû-gatû* 'good field', *mbae-aiba* 'bad thing', *úû-aiba* 'bad field'. As predicate the adjective is treated as a verb: e. g. *i-katû* 'he is good', *i-katu-pe?* 'is he good?' *še-katu-ramo* 'as I am good'.

According as the verb is transitive or neutral it is really double. The transitive verbs have prefixes which stand in a predicative relation to the following verbal stem whilst the neutral verbs take the same possessive prefixes as the noun. With the exception of the future there is no exact definition of time in the Tupi-Guarani verb; *a-jukâ*, for instance, means both 'I kill' and 'I killed', 'I have killed', 'I had killed'. The future is really the only tense which

is adequately defined. The compound conjugation (objective) of Tupi, unlike what is usual in American languages, shows agglutination and not incorporation.

As regards numeration, the quinary-vigesimal system seems to underlie Guarani, Tupi and Omagua. 5 is expressed by *one hand*; 10 by *two hands*; 20 by *hands and feet* (ase-po-peteĩ; ase-po-mokoi; mbe mbi abê, ase-po ase-pi abê).

Ideologically Guarani is most irregular. Sometimes it is natural, viz. 1. 4. 5. 8. I, but we have also the final formulae II. III. IV. In Tupi the Supreme is conceived as

Tupan Thunderer.

In Guarani, on the other hand, as

Tamoi Lord of Paradise, Ancient of Heaven.

In Kiriri and K'ikito also we have the same thought, though the form of the word is, in the one case, Tupan, and in the other, Tupas. The ideology of these idioms differs from that of Tupi. Thus in Kiri we say: era Tupan House-God; Kaŋgi Tupan good God, for 'the house of God'; 'God is good'. And in K'ikito: I-poo-stii Tupas his house God or poos i-tsa-stii Tupas house his God = God's house.

The Molu-ke of Chili have likewise considered Thunder to be the surest manifestation of the Supreme.

Pillan = Thunderer.

Pillan is also the highest deity of the Araucanians, known sometimes as Huenu-Pillan Heaven-Thunder, and Vuta-gen Great Being. 'The universal government of Pillan', says Molina, 'is a prototype of the Araucanian polity. He is the great Toqui (Governor) of the invisible world, and as such has his Apo-Ulmenes, to whom he entrusts the administration of affairs of less importance. These ideas are certainly very rude, but it must be acknowledged that the Araucanians are not the only people who have regulated the things of heaven by those of the earth'.

Their language, which is known as K'ili-deñu, is in-

direct in ideology, the formula being 1. 3. 5. 8. III, and their system of numeration decadic. *Ki'ne* 1, *kek'u* 5, *mari* 10.

Other American forms of the theistic Idea are:—

Tukud': Vittukukankjo

Astek: Huizilo-Poktli = Ancient of Heaven

K'apaneki: Nomboni

Köggaba: Kalguašiša

Kvikuan: Pakakamakka World-Creator

Inka: Pakakamak World-Creator.

As an instance of theological deterioration none is perhaps so striking as the Astek Huizilopochtli. Originally representing the great thought of Heaven supreme he may now be found 'figuring as the demon Vizlipuzli in the popular drama of Doctor Faustus'.

"The very name of Mexico", says Prof. Tylor, "seems derived from Mexitli, the national War-god, identical or identified with the hideous gory Huizilopochtli. Not to attempt a general solution of the enigmatic nature of this inextricable compound parthenogenetic deity, we may notice the association of his principal festival with the winter-solstice, when his paste idol was shot through with an arrow, and being thus killed, was divided into morsels and eaten, wherefore the ceremony was called the *teoqualo* or "god-eating". This and other details tend to show Huitzilopochtli as originally a nature-deity, whose life and death were connected with the year's, while his functions of War-god may be of later addition".

Pakakamak, from kamani I create, kamak Creator Kama Soul, is really a title of Uirakoka, the supreme Deity in the religion of the Inkas. His other title is Pakajakakik World-Teacher. 'The three great deities', says Prof. Tylor, 'were the Creator, Sun, and Thunder; their images were brought out together at great festivals into the square of Cuzco, llamas were sacrificed to all three, and they could be addressed in prayer together: "O Creator, and Sun,

and Thunder, be for ever young, multiply the people, and let them always be at peace". Yet the Thunder and Lightning was held to come by the command of the Creator, and the following prayer shows clearly that even "our father the Sun" was but this creature':—

"Uiracocha! Thou who gavest being to the Sun, and afterwards said let there be day and night. Raise it and cause it to shine, and preserve that which thou hast created, that it may give light to men. Grant this, Uiracocha!

Sun! Thou who art in peace and safety, shine upon us, keep us from sickness, and keep us in health and safety".

Very remarkable both in thought and form is the expression for the Deity in the language of the Mikmak Indians, namely

△ Nikskam

Malisît

▲ Nukskam

The following is a translation into Malisît, the idiom of the Indians in New Brunswick, of St. John iii. 16:—

Îbukul Nukskam eduki-musagîtpun uskitkumikw wegé-meluetpun wihwebu Ukwusul, welaman 'mseu wen tan welamsutuk uhukek, skatup uksekâhawe, kânukulu utenip askumowsuagun.

Does it not seem a spiritual instinct to conceive of supreme Being in a threefold aspect? Here, at all events, we have the triangle, not less than three lines enclosing a space. Unlike as they are in forms of thought and modes of speech, the Brahman and the Mikmak Indian show a psychological likeness which is most significant.

△ = सच्चिदानन्द

Past, Present, Future;

Being, Thought, Joy.

The following is the Mikmak Pater Noster:—

ᑎᓄᓂᓂ

✱

ᑭᓂᓂᓂ

ᑭᓂᓂᓂ

ᑭᓂᓂᓂ

Nuśinen

wajok

ebin

Kiptuk

delwigîn

Our Father in heaven

sitting

it may

Thy name

⌚ ⚡ ⌚⌚ ⌚ ⌚⌚

megwidedemek wajok n'telidanen kiptuk ignemwick
be esteemed in heaven us may granted be

⌚ ⌚⌚ ⌚⌚⌚ ⌚⌚ ⚡ ⌚⌚

ula nemulek uledekinen. Natel wajok deli
Thee to see unceasingly. There in heaven as

⌚⌚⌚ ⌚ ⌚ ⌚⌚⌚⌚ ⌚⌚

škedulk kiptuk deli škedulek makimigwek
Thou art may so to-Thee-obede- upon earth
obeyed nience-be-given

⌚⌚⌚ ⌚⌚⌚ ⌚⌚⌚⌚ A

eimek Delamukubenigwal ešemigwel apś
where we are. As Thou us hast given in this way so also

⌚⌚ ⌚⌚ ⌚⌚⌚ ⌚⌚

negweś kiškuk delamukteś penegwuunenwin
now to-day give us our food

⌚⌚⌚⌚ ⌚⌚⌚ ⌚⌚⌚⌚

nilunen. Deljabikšiktakašik wegaiwinametnik
to us. We forgiving those who have insulted us.

⌚ ⌚ ⌚ ⌚⌚⌚⌚⌚⌚

elp Pel Nikskam abikšiktwın
so Thou o God forgive

⌚⌚⌚⌚ H ⌚⌚⌚⌚ ⌚⌚


elwaultik Melkeniures winśudil nu
our faults Hold us fast by the hand not



k'tigalina
to fall



keginukamke
hold far from us



winnsigwel
affliction



twaktwin
Evil



N'deliek
Amen.

CHAPTER XV.

THE MALAY RACE: ITS PHILOLOGY AND THEOLOGY.

From Madagascar in the West to Easter Island in the East, from the peninsula of Malacca, Formosa and the Hawaiian group in the North to New Zealand in the South, excepting only those of the Australian continent and those of the Papuas, the languages of these islanders form a Unity which, from the ultimate geographical points, has been subsumed under the title of the Malayo-Polynesian branch. In fact, Malays, Polynesians and Melanesians are really members of one family and once had a common mother-tongue.

We have here a graduated series of linguistic evolution, whereof the Polynesian particle-languages represent the lowest stage, the Melanesian the intermediate, and the Malay idioms with their extensive formation by means of suffix and prefix the highest development.

Morphologically these languages are interesting from the fact that, the element which corresponds to what in other tongues is known as the root, is here dissyllabic, representing a complete word, and may appear as noun, verb, adverb, preposition; in fact almost any part of speech.

The external means by which this type of speech is

made up, are repetition, reduplication, suffix, prefix and infix. Those parts of speech which belong almost wholly to the nominal sphere are made manifest by position.

Although these languages cannot be said to possess any very clear apprehension of number as a grammatical category, since one and the same word may be either singular or plural, it is nevertheless true that those belonging to the Melanesian branch possess not only a singular, a dual and a plural, but even a trial. Nay more, as regards the pronoun of the first person there is the distinction made by the speaker as to whether he includes or excludes the person addressed, giving us the possibility of seven different expressions, namely, one singular, two duals, trials and plurals (inclusive and exclusive).

As a rule the predicate precedes the subject, the attribute follows.

There are nine cases, namely, subjective, objective, genitive, dative, instrumental, local, social, abessive and ablative, and they are denoted by particles prefixed to the words. Originally the genitive seems to have been expressed by position only, the thing to be defined being put before the defining element. Thus, Maori: *tuke mata* 'bow of the eye' = eyebrow; Samoan: *lau ulu* = Tonga: *lou ulu* = Tahitian: *rouru* 'leaf of the head' = hair. The objective or accusative follows the verbal expression and the ablative can only be used in connection with a passive verbal form: e. g. Hawaiian: *E malamaia kakou e ke Akua* 'we are protected by God'.

In the Polynesian languages Reduplication plays a very important part. As already stated, the root is dissyllabic and serves either as noun or verb: e. g. Maori: *korero* = Tahit. *orero* = Haw.: *olelo* 'to speak' and 'speech'. In the verbal stem it forms α frequentatives; thus, Samoan: *tufa* 'to part', *tufa-tufa* 'to distribute'; Maori: *haere* 'to walk', *haere haere* 'to go to and fro'; β intensives; e. g. Samoan: *tala* 'to

speak' talatala 'to chatter', 'cry'; Maori: kai 'to eat', kakai 'to devour'; γ simultanea; that is to say, words in which the suggestion is that the action is done in concert with another. For instance. Samoan: moe 'to sleep', momoe 'to sleep with someone'; Tongan; nofo 'to dwell', nonofo 'to live with someone'.

In the case of adjectives it makes superlative expressions: Maori-Haw.-Rarot.: nui 'great', nunui 'very great'. With the substantive this process forms nomina collectiva and out of stems which are only used verbally forms those which are used nominally.

The adjective remains unchanged. As attribute it comes after the substantive to which it belongs, as predicate it precedes it. Comparison takes place either by reduplication or by certain periphrastic modes of speech. Thus, Sam.: E tele lenei i lela 'this is great to that' = greater than that. Maori: he tañata rahi ake ia Hoani 'a man great above John'.

The most essential points of the Polynesian verb are:—

- α) Stem-formation of the verbal expression, namely, active, passive, causative, desiderative, and reciprocal;
- β) particles, which more nearly define the verbal expression with regard to place, direction of the action and quality;
- γ) particles, indicative of time and kind; and
- δ) personal elements.

The decimal system of numeration underlies these idioms; numbers 1. 5 and 10 are, in eight dialects, as follows:

	<i>Fakaafo</i>	<i>Samoa</i>	<i>Tonga</i>	<i>Maori</i>	<i>Rarotonga</i>
1	tasi	tasi	tahu	tahi	tai
5	lima	lima	nima	rima	rima
10	fulu	sefulu	hoñofulu	ñahuru	ñauru
		<i>Tahiti</i>	<i>Haw.</i>	<i>Marq.</i>	
	1	tahi	kahi	tahi	

5	rima	lima	ima
10	ahuru	'umi	onohuu

As examples of these tongues we may take the following:—

Tongan.

Koe	Hotua	ko	Taiialoa	mo	ene	folu
The	God	of the	Tongaloo	with	his	sons

toka-ua na nau nofo gi Bolotu.

persons-two (pret.) they dwelt in Bolotu.

Pater noster.

Ko e mau Tamai oku i he lagi, Ke tabuha ho huafa. Ke hoko mai hoo bule. Ke fai ho finagalo i mama ni, o hage i he lagi. Ke foaki mai he aho ni haa mau mea kai. Bea fakamolelmole e mau agahala, o hage ko e mau fakamolemolea akinautolu kuo fai agahala kiate kinautolu. Bea oua naa tuku akimantolu ki he ahiahi, kae fakamoni akimantolu meihe kovi: He oku oou ae bule, moe malohi. moe nāunau, o taegata. Emeni.

Tahitian.

Ua	hoe	e	too-piti	tau	taata	i	tai
Were	gone	persons-two	(pl. sign)	men	to	sea	

e hi i te ia; o Roo te ioa o te tahi,

to catch the fish; the Roo the name of the one,

o Teahoroa te ioa o te hoe.

the Teahoroa the name of the other.

Pater noster.

E to matou Metua i te ao ra, ia rai to oe ioa. Ia tae to oe ra hau. Ia haapao hia to oe hinaaro i te fenua nei, mai tei te ao atoa na. Homai i te maa e au ia matou i teie nei mahana. E faa ore mai i ta matou hara, mai ia matou atoa e faa ore i tei hara ia matou nei. E eiaha e faarue ia matou ia roohia noa hia e te ati, e faa ora rā ia matou i te ino. No oe hoi te hau, e te mana, e te hanahana, e a muri noa 'tu. Amene.

Maori.

Tena		koe,	tena		koe,	Paraniti
That	(art)	Thou.	that	(art)	Thou	Francis
Johepa,	te	raiatira	nui	rawa	o	Atiria
Joseph.	the	king	great	very	of	Austria
katoa.	Ka	nui	to	maua	hiahia	kia
entire.	(part.)	great	the of	is two	wish	that
kite	maua	ia koe;	tenei	te	take	o to
to see	we two	Thee;	this	the	reason	of the
maua	haereia	mai	ki	tenei	wenua.	
our both	coming	hither	to	this	land.	

Marquesan.

E	to	matou	Motua	i	te	ao,	ia
o	the	our	Father	in	the	heaven	that
tapu	to	oe	inoa,	ia	koa	ia	oe
holy	(be)	the	Thy	name,	that	come	to Thee
te	fenua	ei	hakaiki,	ia	tupu	to	oe
the	earth	to	rule,	that	may-thrive	the	Thy
hinenao	i	te	fenua	nei	mai	to	te
will	upon	the	earth	here	hither	upon	the
ao	atoa,	a	tu'u	na	matou	i	teie
heaven	also,	lay	down	for	us	on	this
nei	a	o	te	a	o	te	kai
here	day	of	the	day	of	the	eating
a	o	te	kai,	e	haakoe	i ta	matou
day	of	the	eating,	forgive	Thou	our	debts
ma	te	matou	haakoe	i	ta	te	tali
as	we	forgive	the	of	the	other	debts
moi	ia	titii	atu	ia	matou	ia	koolia
not	indeed	that	lettest	to	us	that	tempted-be

matou i te pio e haapohoe ia matou
 we into the wrong but make-safe us
 i te mate. Amene.
 from death.

Passing on to the Melanesian languages we find that Viti is the most complete, showing us the highest development of this class of speech and standing midway between the Polynesian and the Malay idioms.

The Melanesian languages do not form that unity amongst themselves which is characteristic of the Polynesian and Malay. Whilst we can derive both Polynesian and Malay idioms from a single primitive speech-form, out of which, by purely phonetic processes, the single languages have for the most part issued, in the case of the Melanesian forms there seems to have been an early decay of the primitive idiom, and a predominance of foreign and more especially of Papuan influence.

According to Grundemann and F. Müller these tongues may be grouped as follows:—

A. The languages of the New Hebrides.

1. The speech of the island of Annatom (Aneiteum, Aneituum), the most Southern of the New Hebrides, 20° lat. 170° long. from Greenwich.

2. The language of the island of Tanna. On this island no less than three different languages are said to be spoken, namely, a native and two imported idioms whereof the one comes from Erronan (Eofuma), the other from Eromanga.

3. That of Eromanga.

4. That of Vate or Efat (Sandwich Island).

5. That of Api or Tasiko (Sesake-language).

6. That of Paama.

7. That of Ambrym.

8. That of Arag or Whitsuntide (Pentecost-Island).
9. That of Mallikolo.
10. The speech of Rotuma.

B. The languages of the Solomon islands.

1. The idiom of Bauro or San Cristoval.
2. That of Ulaua (Contrariety-island).
3. That of Guadalcanar or Gera.
4. The language of Mara or Malanta.
5. That of Anudá (Florida).
6. That of Ysabel (Mahaga-language).

C. The languages of the Carolines.

D. Those of the Marshall Islands.

E. Those of the Kingsmill islands (l'Archipel Gilbert).

The three last groups belong to the so-called Mikronesians and their inhabitants more closely resemble the Polynesians from a developmental standpoint.

The principal point about which all the Melanesian languages are in perfect accord is the pronoun, not only as regards the phonetic elements but also with respect to the development of this part of speech. Besides the singular and the dual we find two forms of the plural, namely, the inclusive and the exclusive.

In most of these idioms there are possessive pronouns which are attached to the noun as suffixes. In doubtful cases these possessive suffixes may be looked upon as an essential criterion in the examination and appreciation of a language and in the ascertainment of its position.

In estimating the connexion of these idioms the numerals are of special importance. They entirely agree with the numeral system of the Malayo-Polynesian languages, in some respects showing a closer relationship with the Malay tongues than with the Polynesian. Numbers 1, 5 and 10 are as follow:—

<i>Viti</i>	<i>Erromango</i>	<i>Marshall-Isl.</i>	<i>Isabel</i>
1 Ndua	Sai	t'uon	keha
5 lima	suku-rim	lalim	lima
10 tini	nduru-lim	t'oŋg-ul	salage

<i>Vate</i>	<i>Api</i>
1 sikei	sikai
5 lim	lima
10 ra-lim	lua-lima

<i>Pama</i>	<i>Ambrym</i>	<i>Araga</i>	<i>Tarawa</i>	<i>Bauro</i>	<i>Ulauea</i>
1 tai	hu	tuwa	te	eta	eta
5 e-lime	lim	lima	nima	rima	lima
10 ha-lua-lim	sañ-ula	hañ-wul	teñaun	tañhuru	tañahulu

<i>Mara</i>	<i>Anudô</i>	<i>Mallikolo</i>	<i>Tuna</i>	<i>Annatom</i>
1 Eta	keða	si-kai	li-ti	e-ti
5 nuña	lima	e-rima	ka-rirum	ikman
10 awara	ðaniavulu	siñgeap	—	—

Melanesian ideology is hybrid, the formula being 2. 4. 6. 8. VI.

As a specimen of these tongues we may take the Mahaga language on the island Ysabel:—

Na	vua	ke	vaia	na	tinoni,	gami
The	crocodile	it	devours	the	men.	we
boi	regi-a,	mara	ke	hutu	ke	na
not	see-it	men	they	great	they	have
ibauna.	Ki-ti	regi-a	na	vaña-nia		
long ago.	We	see-it	the	devouring-of	the	same
na	boðo.	na	iu.	Na	vua	ke
the	pig,	the	dog.	The	crocodile	it
seðe	na	kindoru-nia,	ki-ki-mua	ke	poha,	
much	the	eggs-his,	gradually	they	break,	
dade-nia	na	vua	ke	au	ikösi.	
young-its	of the	crocodile	they	come	forth.	

St. John III. 16 has been translated into Maré or Nengonese as follows:—

Wen' o re naeni Makase hna raton' o re ten' o re aw, ca ile nubonengo me nunuone te o re Tei nubonengo sa so, t'u deko di ma tango ko re ngome me sa ci une du nubon, roi di nubone co numu o re waruma t'a t'u ase ko.

As a specimen of Eromangan we may take the translation of the Christian's 'marching orders':—

Mûve kimi, mô mumpi ôvun nûriê enyx, ôvun numpûn lô sû, wumbaptisô iranda ra nin eni Itemen, im ra nin eni Netni, im ra nin eni Naviat Tumpora.

(Matt. xxviii. 19.)

The following is the Pater Noster in

Aneityum.

Ak Etmama an nohatag, Etmu itaup nidam. Etmu jetpam nelkau unjum. Uhmu injiaigi intas unjum an nobohtan, et idivaig an nohatag. Alaama aiek nitai caig nikama an nadiat ineig. Um gîm aru tah nedo has unjima aiek, et idivaig ekra eti aru tah nedo has o atimi vai kama aigama. Um gîm atau irama an nedo up aiek, gam injiatamaig kama va nigî itai has. Et idim unjum aiek nelkau, im nemda, im nimjahpas, irai igî mesese.

Emen.

We now come to the Malay languages, and here we must notice more particularly the substantive. In the Polynesian and for the most part in the Melanesian languages also there is no phonetic distinction between noun and verb; in the Malay, on the other hand, even before they enter into a syntactical relationship, both verb and substantive are distinguished phonetically. More especially is this the case with the categories of the concrete and abstract, agent and action, substance and accident. But, as regards a clear apprehension of the constituents of the sentence, the Malay idioms are singularly poor, their whole power being

concentrated on the distinction and exact appreciation of inner modifications, which are brought about by means of prefixes, infixes and suffixes.

The Malay adjective is well worthy of note. In form it remains unchanged. When used as a predicate, or rather, when, speaking generally, the adjective would be used as a predicate, it often assumes the form of a verbal construction or of a *nomen loci*. Instead of saying 'that is bad' the Malay says: 'that makes bad' or 'that is a badness-place' (badness personified).

With the exception of the Tagala languages, whenever the adjective is used attributively it follows the substantive to which it belongs, in the relationship of predicate it comes before the noun.

As regards the verb we know that, in the Polynesian languages it is wholly *formless*. By putting nominal particles before and verbal particles either before or after, the same complexus of sound one can cause to become either noun or verb. With the Malay, however, it is different. Here, as in the case of the noun, there is an attempt to more nearly define the verb by means of prefixes, infixes and suffixes. Yet, despite the interesting structure of many forms, there cannot be said to be a radical distinction between noun and verb in the Malay tongues.

The Malay numerals are the following:—

	<i>Tagala</i>	<i>Bisaya</i>	<i>Iloc.</i>	<i>Famp.</i>	<i>Ibanag.</i>	<i>Formosan</i>
1	i-sa	u-sa	meisa	isa	itte	na-ta
			<i>Batta.</i>	<i>Malag.</i>		
			sada	isa		
	<i>Dayak</i>	<i>Mauk.</i>	<i>Bugis</i>	<i>Alfur.</i>	<i>Jav.</i>	<i>Mal.</i>
1	idjã	si	si. sêdi	esa	sa	sa.

In all these tongues, with the exception of Formosan the word for 'five' is *lima* (Malag. *dimi*), which is a Malay word meaning 'hand', thus giving us proof, as in the case of the Innuït tongues, of the digital origin of Arithmetic.

It may now be interesting to see how eight of these languages express the Pater Noster:—

1. *Tagalic.*

Ama	namin	suima	sa	lanit	ka,
Father	our	being	in	heaven	Thou.
sambah-in	ai	nalan-mo.	mupa	sa	amin
holy-be	the	name-thine,	come	to	us
ai	nalan-mo,	mupa	sa	amin	ai
the	name-Thine,	come	to	us	the
ka-hari-an-mo,	sund-in	ai	loob-mo	dito	sa
kingdom-Thine,	done-be	the	will-Thine	here	upon
lupa	para	na	sa	lanit,	bigi-an-mo
earth	just	as	in	heaven,	given-be-from-Thee
kamin	nai on	nai	amin	kanin	sa arao-arao,
to-us	now	the	our	food	in day-day,
at	patauad-in-mo	kamin	nai	amin	maña
and	forgiven-be-by-Thee	us	the	our	many
otañ	para	nañ	pagpa-sawat		namin sa
sins	just	as	pardoned-are		by us the
nañagkakaotai	sa	amin,	at	hunag-mo	
sinner	against	us.	and	hindering-Thine (that)	
kamin	ipahintolot	sa	tokso,	at	
we	thrown be	into	temptation,		and
jadia-mo		kami	sa	dilan	masama.
freed be through Thee	we	from	all	evil.	

2. *Visayic.*

Amahan	namu	ia	itotat	ka	sa
Father	our	who	art	Thou	in
lanit,	i-papag-dajet	an	imoni	nalan,	moanhi
heaven.	praised be	the	Thy	name,	come

ka-namun an imon pagka-hadi, tuman-un
 to us the Thy kingdom, followed be
 an imon bnot dinhi si jata mainun
 the Thy will here over earth as
 sa lañit, ihatag-mo damun an kanun
 in heaven, given be by Thee us the food
 namun sa matagarlao, ug pauad-in-mo
 our in every day, and forgiven be by Thee
 kami san ña-sala namu mainun g-in-uara
 us the sins our as pardoned
 namun san ñanaka-sala damun, ñan
 our (are) the sinning-ones against us, indeed-not
 diri-imo tugot-an kami maholog sa
 by-Thee allowed-be (that) we fall into
 mañapanulaj sa amun maña-kaauaj, apan
 temptation by our many enemies, but
 barit-un-mo kami sa maña-maraut
 freed be-through Thee we from many evils
 ñatanan.
 all.

3. *Pampangan.*

Ippa-mi ati-ka bauua, pa-samba-mo
 Father-our art Thou heaven, hallowed be through Thee
 in lagjo-mo detañ ke kami in kerian-mo,
 the name-Thine come to us the kingdom-Thy.
 papaminto-mo in loob-mo keti sulip
 made be through-Thee the will-Thine evenso (on) earth
 anti bauua, in kakanan-mi keñ aldao aldao
 as (in) heaven, the food-our to day day
 ibe-mo keñ aldao ñeni, ampon
 be given through-Thee to day this, and

rapies ai, inau joa miŕo kakimit o ai
 evil this, for Thine property dominion this
 soo bar o ai soo adas ai ta-ulaulan.
 and power this and glory this ever.

Amen.

5. *Malagasi.*

Ni raj-naj, iŕaj ani an-danitra, hasino
 The Father, who art in-heaven, hallowed
 ni anara-nao, ampandrosoj ni fanŕaka-nao.
 the name-Thine, come the kingdom-Thine.
 Atavi ni fankasitraha-nao eti an-tani
 Come-to-pass the will-Thine evenso upon-earth
 tahaki ni ani an-danitra. Omeo anaj
 as the being in-heaven Give us
 anio iŕaj fiŕina-naj isa-nandro, ari m-amela
 that which food-our this-day, and forgive
 ni trosa-naj tahaki ni-amela-naj ni
 the sins-our as are forgiven by us the
 mi-trosa ami-naj, ari aŕa mi-tarikia anaj
 sinners with-us, and not lead us
 ami ni fakampanahi, fa manafaha anaj
 into the temptation, but deliver us
 ami ni ratsi.
 frow the evil.

6. *Dajak.*

Apañ ikäj iğä huañ sorga,
 Father our (excl.) who in heaven.
 ara-m im-prasi. Ka-rağ-a-an-m duma;
 name-Thine hallowed be. Kingdom-Thy come:
 ka-hendak-m gđdi kilan huañ sorga.
 Will-Thine come-to-pass as in heaven.

kakaj kea hungun petak. Peña talo kinan
 evenso also upon earth. Give the eating
 akan ikäj andau to, dan ampun karä
 to us (excl.) day this, and forgive all
 ka-salah-n ikäj kilau ikäj kea m-ampun
 sins us (excl.) as we also forgive
 olo, igä aton salah deñan ikäj, dan
 men. which are sinful with us (excl.). and
 alä menamäan ikäj huan tiñkese, baja
 not lead us (excl.) into temptation, but
 lapas ikäj bara talo papa, kрана
 deliver us (excl.) from the evil, for
 aju-m aton ka-rağa-an tuntan kwasa
 property-Thine is kingdom and strength
 tuntan ka-haie ka-tahi-tahi.
 and glory for ever ever.

Amen.

7. Javanese.

Râmâ kawulâ hiñkañ wonten hiñ
 Father (of thine) servants who art in
 swargâ wastâ sampêjan dadossâ sutgi
 heaven name (of thy) feet be holy;
 karaton sampêjan hañdathânâ; karsâ
 kingdom (of thine) feet come then; will (of thy)
 sampêjan dadossâ hiñ bumi kados hiñ
 feet come-to-pass upon earth as in
 swargâ; regêkki kawulâ kañ sa-dinten-dinten
 heaven bread (of thine) servants which a day-day
 sukanni dinten punniki mariñ kawulâ, hambî
 give day this to (thy) servants, and
 puntan mariñ kawulâ dosâ kawulâ,
 forgive to (thy) servants guilt (of the) servants,

kados kawulâ puntan mariñ sa-tuñgil-tuñgil
as (thy) servants forgive to one-each-each
titijañ kañ salah mariñ kawulâ hambí
enemy who sins to (thy) servants, and
sampung beкта kawulâ hiñ perkoban.
indeed not lead (thy) servants into temptation.
tapi kukullaken kawulâ bari pada sañ
but free make (thy) servants from what
ñawon. sabab karaton hambí kowasâ
evil, cause (for) kingdom and power
sartâ kamukten gusti kaguññan-nipun dumugi
with glory Lord (=Thou) property his until
hiñ ñawet.
into eternity. Amin.

8. Malay.

Bâpa kâmi jañ ada di-sôrga,
Father our (excl.) who is in heaven.
namâ-mu di-per-sukî-lah kirâ-nga! ka-ragâ-an-mu
name-thine be-hallowed-then please! kingdom-thine
dâtañ-lah. ka-hendak-mu gadi-lah seperti
come-then, will-thine come-then-to-pass similarly
di-dâlam sôrga demikian-lah di-atas
in-the-interior of heaven evenso-then upon-above
bûni; rôti kâmi sa-hâri sa-hâri beri-la
earth; bread our (excl.) of-day of-day give-then
akan kâmi pada hâri ini. dân
to us (excl.) to day this. and
ampon-i-lah pada kâmi segala sâlah
forgive-then to us (excl.) allhood (of) sins
kâmi seperti lagi kâmi ini meñ-am-
our (excl.) even as again we (excl.) there forgive
pôn-i pada ôrañ jañ ber-sâlah
to men who have-committed-sin

ka-pada	kâmi.	dân	gânan-lah	mem-bâwa
against	us (excl.).	and	indeed-not-then	lead
kâmi	ka-pada	per-kobâ-an,	hângâ	lepas-
us (excl.)	into	temptation,	but	loose-
kan-lah	kâmi	deri-pada	jañ	gâhat,
make-then	us (excl.)	from-to	anything	evil,
kârena	añkau	pûnga	ka-ragâ-an	dân kwâsa
cause (for)	Thou	owning	kingdom	and power
dân	ka-mulijâ-an	sanpej	sa-lâma-lanâ-nga.	Amen.
and	glory	unto	length-length-his.	

To sum up. The Malay race may be shortly classified as follows:—

- I. Australian negroes and Tasmanians.
- II. Papuas, including the inhabitants of New Guinea, of the Luisiad Archipelago, New Caledonia and the Loyalty Islands. Here also belong the Negritos, the inhabitants of the Andaman (Minicipies) and of the Nicobar islands.
- III. Malayo-Polynesians, namely. 1. Polynesians, 2. Melanesians and 3. Malays.

Ideology in these tongues varies. Whilst in the Melanesian and Malay it is *hybrid*, in the Polynesian it is *direct*, the respective formulæ being 2. 4. 6. 8. VI and 2. 4. 6. 7. VII.

Now, as regards the Malay Race, the human mind has evolved a very noble thought of God. In nearly all these idioms it is a form of *Atua*, 'the very Core of Humanity', *atu* being a kernel or core, and *a* an intensive. 'Eternity' is expressed by *e rimua ua atu* 'until covered with the moss of ages'.

Samoan: Atua
Aneityum: Atua
Maori: Atua
Tahitian: Atua

Rarotongan: Atua

Marquesan: Atua

Nju: Atua

Hawaii: Akua

Tongan: Otua

Lifu: Okōtdsi and Hase.¹

Rotuman: Oiiu

Fatá: Leatu.

The word *Jo* 'pith' or 'core' is also used for God: *Jo ora* living God.

Those that differ from this form are:—

Malagasi: Šanahari Creator; and

Andria Manitra Noble-Sweet.

The former is the older form, used by the ruder tribes, the latter has become polarized in Malagasi religious thought since the introduction of Christianity.

Balinese: Widi

Maré: Makaše

Dajak: Tapa Father

Jaian: Kón

Figi: Kalû Greatness

Viti: Kalou Greatness

Ngunese: Supë

Saibai: Augadan.

¹ Trenchase God-knower=Priest.

Hnei angeike hna loda kowe la uma i Hase.

By him was gone into the House of God.

CHAPTER XVI.

THE IDEA OF GOD: ITS GENESIS AND DEVELOPMENT.

We are now in a position to discuss the question which modern Science and Positivism have combined to raise: how did the idea of God arise? What was its earliest form? What the law or what the process of its evolution?

Already at the outset of our enquiry we had occasion to notice some of the natural histories of religion, and here, without attempting an analytic and categorical criticism, we may do well to point out that, they all assume the truth of an empirical philosophy. Religious concepts are resolved into sense-impressions, it being taken for granted that man started with 'an original atheism of consciousness'. But, how, upon this hypothesis, are we to account for man's faculty of faith, his tendency to believe in beings invisible, his conception of the Infinite? Can we accept an hypothesis which would derive the sublime predicate 'God' from dreams, delusions, fears? Surely *ex nihilo nihil fit*. Granted that savage and monkey, infant and dog, alike think natural objects alive, the one does, the other does not, formulate his thoughts into a religion. Nor must we forget that the evidence of religion is never entirely furnished by sensuous perception. 'In worshipping his fetish, the savage does not worship a common stone, but a stone which, besides, being a stone that can be touched and handled, is supposed to be something else, this something else being beyond the reach of our hands, our ears, or our eyes'.¹ If, with M. Comte, we argue that man can get out of *l'état théologique ou fictif*, we must also be prepared to admit that he can get into it. Is it not more true that mind makes nature than that nature makes mind? In the formation

¹ Max Müller: Hibbert Lectures for 1878. p. 168.

of beliefs the constitutive element is what mind brings to nature, not what nature brings to mind.

"It is not without significance", says Principal Fairbairn, "that, while M. Comte was introducing his law of evolution to the world, finding the roots of religion in Fetishism and the final and perfect system in a Positivism without God, the two profoundest thinkers then living were formulating very different doctrines—the one the doctrine that a nation and its religion rose together, that, apart from religion, a nation, with its institutions and laws, was impossible; the other, that 'the religion and foundation of a State are one and the same, in and for themselves identical', and that, 'the people who has a bad conception of God has also a bad government, and bad laws'."

Going back from these 'incomplete' Kantians to Kant himself, though it is doubtless true that he found a three-fold impossibility of proving the existence of the Ideal of Reason, yet, what is important for us is the fact so strongly held by him that, though experience may give the first impulse to faith, it is the *transcendental concept* which acts as Reason's guide and points the goal to all her aspirations. According to the Königsberg philosopher, theology is either *transcendental* or *natural*. In the former case there is the attempt to derive the existence of the First Cause either from experience generally, which is known as cosmotheology, or from mere concepts, without the aid of the least experience—ontotheology. Natural theology, on the other hand, induces the attributes and the existence of a World-Framer from the nature, order and unity met with in the world around us, wherein we must admit a twofold causality, namely, nature and freedom. It thus rises from this world to the highest Intelligence, either as to the Principle of all natural or of all moral Order and Perfection. That is to say, it is either physico-theology or moral theology.

Examining the subject from the standpoint of the archi-

tectonics of pure reason Kant could not but come to the conclusion that, from purely speculative reason, no satisfactory proof of the existence of a Being is possible, which would correspond to our transcendental idea of the *Ens originarium, realissimum, Ens entium*.

We know that the Cartesian school laid stress upon the ontological proof. Descartes held that there must be at least as much reality in the Cause as in the Consequence. Finite man could never arrive at the concept *infinite substance* unless it came to him from an infinite Being. In his third Meditation Cartesius says:—

Ideoque ex antedictis Deum necessario existere est concludendum: nam quamvis substantiae quidem idea in me sit ex hoc ipso quod sim substantia, non tamen idcirco esset idea substantiae infinitae, cum sim finitus, nisi ab aliqua substantia, quae revera esset infinita, procederet.

Again, in the fifth meditation we find the noble thought which had already been expressed by Anselm:—

Est aliquid quo majus nihil cogitari potest et in intellectu et in re.

Malebranche went even further and asserted that, in order to have ideas we must be in God. 'Dieu est très étroitement uni à nos âmes par sa présence, de sorte qu'on peut dire, qu'il est le *lieu des esprits*, de même que les espaces sont en un sens le lieu des corps. Dieu est le monde *intelligible ou le lieu des esprits*, de même que le monde matériel est le lieu des corps'. Again, 'Dieu renferme dans lui-même les perfections de la matière, sans être matériel; il comprend aussi les perfections des esprits créés, sans être esprit, de la manière, que nous concevons les esprits. Son nom véritable est Celui qui est. c'est à dire l'être restriction, tout être, l'être infini et universel'.

Passing on to Spinoza we find him to be so full of the idea of Deity that he has been aptly described as the God-intoxicated man. He says:—

Quicquid est in Deo est, et nihil sine Deo esse neque concipi potest.

God is the absolute, infinite substance, and without Him there is no substance.

Per Deum intelligo Ens absolute, infinitum, hoc est. substantiam constantem infinitis attributis, quorum unumquodque aeternam et infinitam essentiam exprimit.

Praeter Deum nulla dari neque concipi potest substantia.

Thought and extension are the attributes of Deity. 'Deus est res cogitans' and 'Deus est res extensa'. Whatever is founded in something else is a *mode* of that other thing. Thus, a triangle is a *modus* of the substantia extensa, a definite thought is a *modus* of the substantia cogitans. The sum of these modi is the 'Natura naturata'. God, considered as Free Cause, in whom the modes have their basis, is the 'Natura naturans'. He is the *causa efficiens* not only of the *existentia* but also of the *essentia* of things.

According to Spinoza the highest joy and the noblest virtue is *knowledge of God*. And if to joy is added the thought of its cause, we have love. Joy sprung from knowledge of God leads to love of God. 'Amor est laetitia concomitante idea causae externae'. Our happiness consists 'in sola Dei cognitione, ex qua ad ea tantum agenda inducimur, quae amor et pietas suadent'.

Leibniz, too, is full of the thought of God. He is 'centre par-tout et sur-tout'; the highest Monad; the final Reason. 'La dernière raison des choses doit être dans une Substance nécessaire, dans laquelle le détail des changements ne suit qu'émminemment, comme dans la source: et c'est ce que nous appelons *Dieu*'. In his *Monadology* he argues that God exists necessarily if it is possible:—

Ainsi Dieu seul (ou l'Être nécessaire) a ce privilège qu'il faut qu'il existe s'il est possible. Et comme rien ne peut empêcher la possibilité de ce qui n'enferme aucunes

bornes, aucune égaration, et par conséquence aucune contradiction; cela seul suffit pour connaître l'existence de Dieu *a priori*.

Again, in the Essais de Théodicée:—

‘Dieu est la première Raison des choses: car celles qui sont bornées, comme tout ce que nous voyons et expérimentons, sont contingentes et n'ont rien en elles qui rende leur existence nécessaire; étant manifeste que le tems, l'espace et la matière, unies et uniformes en elles-mêmes, et indifférentes à tout, pouvoient recevoir de tout autres mouvemens et figures et dans un autre ordre. Il faut donc chercher la raison de l'existence du Monde, qui est l'assemblage entier des choses contingentes: et il faut la chercher dans la substance qui porte la raison de son existence avec elle, et laquelle par conséquent est nécessaire et éternelle. Il faut aussi que cette cause soit intelligente: car ce Monde qui existe étant contingent, et une infinité d'autres Mondes étant également possibles et également prétendans à l'existence, pour ainsi dire, aussi-bien que lui, il faut que la cause du monde ait en égard ou relation à tous ces Mondes possibles, pour en déterminer un. Et cet égard ou rapport d'une substance existante à de simples possibilités, ne peut être autre chose que *l'entendement* qui en a les idées; et en déterminer une, ne peut être autre chose que l'acte de la volonté qui choisit. Et c'est la puissance de cette substance, qui en rend la volonté efficace. La puissance va à l'être, la sagesse ou l'entendement au vrai, et la volonté au bien. Et cette cause intelligente doit être infinie de toutes les manières, et absolument parfaite en puissance en sagesse et en bonté, puisqu'elle va à tout ce qui est possible. Et comme tout est lié, il n'y a pas lieu d'en admettre plus d'une. Son entendement est la source des essences, et sa volonté est l'origine des existences. Voilà en peu de mots la preuve d'un Dieu unique avec ses perfections et par lui l'origine des choses.’

Modern philosophy, in so far as it deals with the question before us, may be fitly represented on the one hand by Mr. H. Spencer and on the other by the late Prof. Green.

In his *First Principles* Mr. Spencer says:—

‘Our examination of Ultimate Religious Ideas has been carried on with the view of making manifest some fundamental verity contained in them. Thus far however we have arrived at negative conclusions only. Criticising the essential conceptions involved in the different orders of beliefs, we find no one of them to be logically defensible. Passing over the consideration of credibility, and confining ourselves to that of conceivability, we see that Atheism, Pantheism, and Theism, when rigorously analysed, severally prove to be absolutely unthinkable. Instead of disclosing a fundamental verity existing in each, our investigation seems rather to have shown that there is no fundamental verity contained in any. To carry away this conclusion, however, would be a fatal error; as we shall shortly see.

Leaving out the accompanying moral code, which is in all cases a supplementary growth, a religious creed is definable as an *à priori* theory of the Universe. The surrounding facts being given, some form of agency is alleged which, in the opinion of those alleging it, accounts for these facts. Be it in the rudest Fetishism, which assumes a separate personality behind every phenomenon; be it in Polytheism, in which these personalities are partially generalized; be it in Monotheism, in which they are wholly generalized; or be it in Pantheism, in which the generalized personality becomes one with the phenomena; we equally find an hypothesis which is supposed to render the Universe comprehensible. Nay, even that which is commonly regarded as the negation of all Religion — even positive Atheism, comes within the definition; for it, too, in asserting the self-existence of Space, Matter, and Motion, which it regards as adequate causes of every appearance, propounds an *à priori*

theory from which it holds the facts to be deducible. Now every theory tacitly asserts two things: firstly, that there is something to be explained; secondly, that such and such is the explanation. Hence, however widely different speculators may disagree in the solutions they give of the same problem; yet by implication they agree that there is a problem to be solved. Here then is an element which all creeds have in common. Religions diametrically opposed in their overt dogmas, are yet perfectly at one in the tacit conviction that the existence of the world with all it contains and all which surrounds it, is a mystery ever pressing for interpretation. On this point, if on no other, there is entire unanimity . . .

Nor does the evidence end here. Not only is the omnipresence of something which passes comprehension, that most abstract belief which is common to all religions, which becomes the more distinct, in proportion as they develope, and which remains after their discordant elements have been mutually cancelled; but it is that belief which the most unsparing criticism of each leaves unquestionable—or rather makes ever clearer. It has nothing to fear from the most inexorable logic; but on the contrary is a belief which the most inexorable logic shows to be more profoundly true than any religion supposes. For every religion, setting out though it does with the tacit assertion of a mystery, forthwith proceeds to give some solution of this mystery; and so asserts that it is not a mystery passing human comprehension. But an examination of the solutions they severally propound, shows them to be uniformly invalid. The analysis of every possible hypothesis proves, not simply that no hypothesis is sufficient, but that no hypothesis is even thinkable. And thus the mystery which all religions recognize, turns out to be a far more transcendent mystery than any of them suspect—not a relative, but an absolute mystery.

Here, then, is an ultimate religious truth of the highest

possible certainty—a truth in which religions in general are at one with each other, and with a philosophy antagonistic to their special dogmas. And this truth, respecting which there is a latent agreement among all mankind from the fetish-worshipper to the most stoical critic of human creeds, must be the one we seek. If Religion and Science are to be reconciled, the basis of reconciliation must be the deepest, widest, and most certain of all facts—that the Power which the Universe manifests to us is utterly inscrutable.

We now come to the greatest of the Neo-Kantians—the late Prof. Green. Speaking generally, the whole fabric of his philosophy may be said to rest on his theory of relations, which mainly consists of two propositions, namely, that objects are constituted by relations, and that relations are the work of the mind. According to him relations exist only for a self-conscious intelligence and are due to the activity of a self-conscious intelligence; in other words ‘nature results from the activity of the spiritual principle’. The relations constituting nature form a ‘single unalterable all-inclusive system’ implying as such the existence of a ‘principle of unity in relation’ which cannot be other than Universal Spirit.

Mr. Balfour has done well to point out the singular resemblance which Green’s system bears to that of Berkeley.

‘Berkeley by an examination of the nature of perception, Green by a criticism of the conditions of experience, alike reach the conviction that the world of objects exists only for mind; both deduce from this the reality of freedom; both assume the existence of a universal spirit in order that their idealised universe may be something more than the phantasm of the individual consciousness; with both this assumption develops into something which resembles, though it never actually becomes, a species of Pantheism.’

It will, then, surely be admitted that the best philosophy and the purest science do not pronounce against the

truth of theology nor do they accept the law of historical progression enunciated by Positivism.

But if we cannot admit any hypothesis whereby the idea of God is evolved from the lower faculties and passions of men or from *generatio aequivoca*, shall we trace it to a primitive revelation? Let us consider for a moment what this implies. In the first place it means that, far from being rooted in the nature of man, religion must be implanted from without. If there be no religious capacity or instinct man can never 'seek the Lord, if haply he might feel after and find Him'. The implication really is that, the human race was originally atheistic. Moreover, if there were a primitive revelation, it must have been either written or oral. And this involves us in hopeless difficulty. On this point none has spoken with greater clearness than Principal Fairbairn: 'If written, it could hardly be primitive, for writing is an art, a not very early acquired art, and one which does not allow documents of exceptional value to be easily lost. If it was oral, then either the language for it was created or it was no more primitive than the written. Then an oral revelation becomes a tradition, and a tradition requires either a special caste for its transmission, becomes therefore its property, or must be subjected to multitudinous changes and additions from the popular imagination—becomes, therefore, a wild commingling of broken and bewildering lights. But neither as documentary nor traditional can any traces of a primitive revelation be discovered, and to assume it is only to burden the question with a thesis which renders a critical and philosophic discussion alike impossible'.

There remains, then, the historical method by which to approach this interesting and important question. It is the method which, so far as it has been possible, has been applied throughout the whole of this work. But mental life goes back further than historical, although to have

historical evolution is an essential characteristic of the mental. There are tribes and times and relations which remain outside of the historical movement. Philology only embraces historical life: what lies beyond is the province of the science of Language. Where language oversteps the bounds of philology, it enters the province of psychological ethnology. There is undoubtedly a mental life which is not historical. Tribes without culture and history have language and religion, and the life they lead is one ordered by mental considerations such as marriage, work, law, authority. And here we must remember that, the mental or spiritual life of a nation is a connected whole, that a people is not a heap of individuals but an entire Being, and as such creates and thinks, frames notions and words, that in its life ideas are the leading and ruling forces, not blind chance or the vagaries of a single ruler. Moreover, our investigation has shown us that, religion is really co-extensive with man; that, tribes the most distant and the most unlike in genius, culture, and position on the earth's surface, having laws and tongues wholly different, yet have as their common characteristic the thought of God.

From the point of view of evolution our inquiry should doubtless have begun with the Hottentots and ended with the most cultured and refined Europeans of to-day. Nevertheless, by beginning with the Aryan family we have had the twofold advantage of at once connecting the discussion with ourselves and of proceeding from the more known to the less known.

Now, the primitive form of the theistic Idea amongst the Aryan peoples—that in which there is both radical and general agreement we have found to be *Djâus* (pp. 29, 30), the bright and beautiful Heaven. This is the specific term. Then, from the same root, we have the general term *dêva*, the Brilliant. This is especially noteworthy because it is the very concept which is supreme

with the Mongols—T'jän, Jum, Num (pp. 49, 50, 51). We cannot call this nature-worship in the strict sense of the term, the nature is so limited, excluding even Earth. The form Djäus—Prtivi, T'jän—Ti, Num—Torim is a distinctly later phase of religious thought. Perhaps the best expression is individualistic Theism, for Djäus, T'jän, Num is conscious, creative, moral.

To the early Aryan, as to the Tatar of to-day, the most natural thought was that Nature acts by virtue of an immanent life. The seat of this life both Aryan and Mongol placed in Heaven.

'The glory of the blue and brooding heaven was the glory of the immanent God'. To them Heaven was a Being capable alike of feeling and willing, to whom they prayed, to whom they offered sacrifice. There was no localisation of the deity upon earth, and hence no temple, hence no priest. 'The home, or the meadow, or the shadow of a giant oak, like that which stood in old Dodona, or those under whose spreading branches the Germans of Tacitus gathered to worship the invisible Presence, was the temple, and the patriarch of the family was the priest.

That worship may be termed a Nature-worship, because the one word was the name of Heaven and of God, but Nature is here only a synonym for God. The Nature was living, and the life in it was to our primitive man divine'.

Of Aryan and Mongol it may indeed be said:—

'They stood in the primeval home in the highlands of North-Western Asia, looked, as Abraham once did, at the resplendent sun flooding the world with life and light, at the deep, broad, blue heaven, a bosom that enfolded earth, bringing the rain that fertilized their fields and fed their rivers, and the heat that ripened their corn, at the glory its sunlight threw upon the waking, its moonlight upon the sleeping, earth, and at the stars that "globed themselves" in the same boundless Heaven, and went and came and

shone so sweetly on man and beast and they called that far yet near, changing but unchangeable, still but evermoving, bright yet unconsumed and unconsuming Heaven, *dēva* (𐬔𐬀𐬌𐬎) —God. To Aryan man Heaven and God were one, not a thing but a person, whose *Thou* stood over against his *I*. His life was one, the life above him was one too. Then, that life was generative, productive, the source of every other life, and so to express his full conception, he called the living Heaven, Diespiter, Djāušpitar—Heaven-Father'.

Now, this element of paternity, so characteristic of the Aryan conception of God—Djāušpitar, Ζεὺς πατήρ, Jūpiter, Alfadir—is precisely that which most distinguishes it from the Semitic thought of deity. The fundamental unlikenesses in feeling, thought, and worship can all be traced to this primary difference in the thought of God. Whether as monotheisms or as polytheisms we nowhere find in the Semitic religions the attribution to their God or gods of a fatherly or humane character. It is true that the Hebrew as a people may realise an abstract ideal fatherhood—of which we find traces in the Old Testament, but as an individual the Jew never does. The concept which is common to all the Semitic tribes is that of the Great Ruler sitting in judgment—Êl, Allāh (pp. 41, 42). To the Semitic mind the Supreme is an awful, invisible Presence, dwelling in inaccessible light, before whom, uncovered, man standeth trembling! In an exalted monotheism like this, the majesty of God is so conceived as well-nigh to annihilate the freewill and even the personal being of man. And here perhaps, as Dr. Fairbairn has suggested, we may find the explanation of the Hebrew horror at death, 'almost hopeless "going down to the grave,"' the often-asserted and often-denied silence of the Old Testament as to the immortality of man. So much is certain, whether the Warburtonian or the more orthodox theory be held, the doctrine of a future state occupies a less promi-

ment and less essential place in the religion of the Old Testament than in the Aryan religions in general. The belief in immortality was before Christ more explicit and more general among the Greeks than among the Jews'.

Here, again, we have no trace of the dead ancestor, the idol or the fetish. It is a concept of intense subjectivity. The Semitic finds his God in himself, and offers a worship such as would have been pleasing to him had he himself been Divine. Hence the designation of Deity in the Kabbala—**אֱלֹהִים** 'E. There is certainly one very striking passage in the New Testament where **Οὐρανός** is used as a synonym of **Θεός**:—

ἤμαρτον εἰς τὸν οὐρανόν. Luke xv. 21.

but we must not forget that the story of the Prodigal Son was told to 'publicans and sinners' amongst whom the majority were probably Greeks and Romans. It is also true that, amongst the Bogos, a Hamitic tribe, the supreme thought is **የርዳ** Heaven (p. 48), but nowhere do we find **אֱלֹהִים** used as the equivalent of **אֱלֹהִים**. Thus, while the Semitic religions developed themselves subjectively from the idea of Divine Sovereignty, whereby the thought of God almost shut out the concept of man, the Aryan religions were evolved objectively from the idea of Divine Fatherhood, whereby the two conceptions were mutually complementary, the one being incomplete without the other. The Semite delights in the frequent and prolonged fast, but the Aryan loves the gay religious festival. 'While the father in the Aryan religions soften the god, and gives, on the whole, a sunny and cheerful and sometimes festive character to the worship, the god in the Semitic annihilates the father, and gives to its worship a gloomy, severe, and cruel character, which does not indeed belong to the revealed religion of the Old Testament, but often belongs to the actual religion of the Jews'.

What, then, shall we say of the theology of so-called

savagery? Surely here we shall find not only traces, but the prevalence of, ancestor-worship. And indeed, were we guided solely by the evidence of the Kâfir race, there can be little doubt that we should come to that conclusion. Munkulunkulu 'Old-Old-One'. Nşambi-a-npungu 'Old-Spirit' may well represent the 'wandering double' of the departed forefather (pp. 162, 163). But this is not all. We have to deal with such concepts as Hausa Obangişi 'High Father' (p. 149.), Oki Onjañ-kôpõñ 'Heaven' (p. 133.), Joruba Olodumare 'One-who-has-a-name' (p. 133.), Kanuri Kemâ-ndê 'Lord-of-us' (p. 143.), Kamilaroi Bajame 'Creator' (p. 167.) and Malay Atua 'Core of Humanity' (p. 210.).

In seeking the genesis of the idea we cannot but see what light the form throws upon the question. Now, in this respect, we have seen that, with perhaps two exceptions, the already-considered Positivist theories are historically untenable. We have watched the theogonic process in its multiform manifestation, but have not found that it has been induced by fear, horrid dreams or the longing to propitiate the angry ghosts of the dead.

As regards the Aryan concept Prof. Fairbairn truly says: 'There were two real or objective, and two ideal or subjective, factors in the genesis of the idea. The two real were the bright, brooding Heaven and its action in relation to Earth. The two ideal were the conscience and the imagination. The real factors stimulated the action of the ideal. The ideal borrowed the form in which to express themselves from the real. Conscience knew of relation, dependent and obligatory, to Some One. Imagination discovered the Some One on whom the individual and the whole alike depended in the Heaven. Neither faculty could be satisfied with the subjective, each was driven by the law of its own constitution to seek an objective reality. Conscience, so far as it revealed obligation, revealed relation to a being higher than self. Imagination, when it turned

its eye to Heaven, beheld there the higher Being, the great soul which directed the varied celestial movements, and created the multitudinous terrestrial lives. Without the conscience, the life the imagination saw would have been simply physical; without the imagination, the relation the conscience revealed would have been purely ideal—the relation of a thinker to his thought, not of one personal being to another. But the being given by the one faculty and the relation given by the other coalesced so as to form that worship of the bright Dyaus, which was our primitive Aryan religion’.

Psychologists may differ as to the intensity of the action of these two powers, but that they were the faculties generative of the idea there can be no question. And this is true throughout the whole realm of comparative theology: the real or objective factors differ, the ideal or subjective remain the same. Nor is it only from the concept of Deity that we infer this. The existence amongst the primitive Aryans of such rudimentary ideas as faith, worship, holiness, sacrifice, prayer, imply no less a creative faculty than Conscience. In the case of our Aryan forefathers, then, we can be quite sure that the oldest is the highest. Far from rising by almost imperceptible gradations from the physical, the moral is really eclipsed by the physical. Some of the oldest hymns of the R̥g-Vêda are addressed to Varuṇa who, as Dr. Muir has well observed, ‘has a moral elevation and sanctity of character far surpassing that attributed to any other Vedic deity’. Take, for instance, hymns R̥gv. 2. 28; 5. 85; 7. 86. 7. 8. 9. Nay more, there is one hymn which is wholly ethical, that, namely, by Bṛikṣu, the beggar, on the duty of beneficence (10. 117). Speaking generally one may say that, more ethical elements are found in the earlier than in the later forms of our Aryan faith. It is the moral sense which alone can account for these primary religious acts and ideas. ‘Mind

conscious of self was also mind conscious of obligation. The "I am" and the "I ought" were twins, born at the same moment. But to be conscious of obligation was to be conscious of relation, and so in one and the same act mind was conscious of a self who owed obedience, and a Not-Self to whom the obedience was due'. In other words, 'consciousness and conscience rose together'.

In the very same act as the idea of self was given the concept of God; there was no question of precedence. Without the consciousness of God mind could as little be mind as without that of self. 'Certain philosophies may have dissolved the first idea as certain others may have dissolved the second, but each idea is alike instinctive, rises by nature, can be suppressed only by art'.

From a consideration of the genesis of this πρώτη Θεοῦ ἐννοία, which has been variously styled *relativer Monotheismus*, *henotheism* and *individual theism*, we pass on to its evolution. The aboriginal concept was essentially germinal, its developmental possibilities were great; though it did well as a starting-point it could never be the goal of the human mind. Now, if primitive man, whether Aryan, Semitic, Hamitic or Turanian had been possessed of a cultured reason, or, as in the case of the Semite, had a strong instinct anticipated its action there would in all likelihood have been a development to a complete Monotheism. But this was not the case. The two faculties which we have been considering acted in opposite directions; the moral sense, which was unifying, required an individual deity, but the imagination was multiplicative, demanded many. To again quote the admirable words of Principal Fairbairn:—

'The very conception of a life immanent in the luminous and impregnating Heaven strengthened the multiplying as opposed to the unifying tendency. The variety and contrasts of Nature helped the imagination to individualize

the parts. A different spirit seems to animate the calm, smiling Heaven from what animates a heaven tempestuous and thundering. Night seems distinct from day—the brilliant, beneficent spirit of the one from the revealing yet enfolding, distant yet near, spirit of the other. So the imagination, which had discerned and localized the God conscience demanded, pursued its creative career, not now in obedience to the moral faculty, but only to its own impulses. And so its creations graduated to Naturalism, became more physical, less moral—simple transcripts of the phenomena and aspects of Nature’.

Perhaps the first step to Physicalism was marked by वरुण in India, Οὐρανός in Greece from var to cover. Here we have the representation of the all-enfolding Night-Sky as opposed to the bright and beautiful द्यौस्. That is to say, the two aspects of the same object were apprehended as two beings. The deification, though comparatively recent, probably took place before the Aryan separation. But deified Night is incomplete without deified Day, hence, by the side of वरुण we find the god of Light, मित्र. This is the gradnation to naturalism, though the influence of the moral sense is not wholly lost. It is only when we come to इन्द्र, who superseded वरुण, to that splendid physical figure ‘borne on a shining golden car with a thousand supports, drawn by tawny steeds with flowing golden manes, hurling his thunderbolts, drinking the sôma-juice, slayer of Vṛtra’, that the transition is complete. And here we trace alike the decay of the old Vêdic religion and the beginnings of philosophy. Hymn 10, 151 expresses doubt and uncertainty as to the value of belief, and in 9, 112 we find Indra represented as an Egoist, in 10, 119 as drunken. Then there is the longing for unity, as we have it in the song of Dirgâtamas (1, 164) and in the Creation-Hymn (10, 129). This unity is more nearly defined in hymns 10, 121; 10, 81; 10, 72 and 10, 90.

In the primitive Aryan religion we find the two elements as spirit and letter, matter and form in a realised unity, but, in the course of evolution, mind became conscious of a dualism in its faith and, by exclusion of the ethical element, the physicalism of the Vêdas was developed, by exclusion of the natural, the spiritualism of the Avesta.

Nor was this all. There was an indirect action of the conscience on the theogonic process. It not only prompted to worship but furnished objects which could be personalised, the tendency being to increase rites and acts and ceremonies. At the beginning the process seems to operate in two distinct spheres—the natural and the sacerdotal. In the former we have already seen how *geographical* conditions have influenced its action, in the latter we shall find how marked is the influence of *social* and *political*. Our study of the religious consciousness of mankind has abundantly shown that, the physical phases and forces deified have throughout been borrowed from the Nature presented to the imagination. Under the rough and boisterous skies of the North the Scandinavians and Germans forgot the bright vision of Tius and worshipped, for the most part, the stormful Odhin and the thundering Thor. Unlike these, our Teutonic forefathers, the dwellers under the sunny sky of Hellas, that land of many mountains, rivers and islands, surrounded by the shining sea, were ever mindful of Zeus, and summoned round him the fairy-forms and many-colored spirits of forest, hill, and stream. Similarly in India, among the mountainous regions of Kāśmīr, we meet with the furious and tempestuous Rudra. ४३ whilst the Hindūs who came down into the hot plains and lived under a burning sky, sighed and prayed for the cooling Rain, and created the grand and glowing Indra.

In India, too, political and social conditions were such as to lead to the evolution of sacerdotalism. The fathers of the family were undoubtedly the first priests, but as life

became more complex the head of the household would gladly hand over his priestly office to another. And the sense of guilt would be likely to affect the worshipper to the extent of inducing him to distinguish between what he would consider sacred and that which would be called secular; until, at last, he would come to believe that, the man well-pleasing unto God must be one wholly devoted to things divine. Hence, a professional priesthood was formed, and, as a matter of course, forms of worship increased. Each reacted on the other. The worship became more elaborate as the priesthood became more professional, and the ritual the priest developed the imagination idealized—the form became to it the matter of religion. What could reveal deity was deified. What made the worshipper accepted, forgiven, was idealized into the acceptor, the forgiver; and hence, sacerdotal deities were evolved alongside the natural. The same period that witnessed the creation of Varuna-Mitra witnessed also the creation of Soma. The juice of the plant used in sacrifice to God became itself a god, just as to a certain section of Christians the symbol of Christ's sacrifice has become the sacrifice itself.

At the time of the Indian and Iranian unity many forces were operative in the realm of religious conviction, and, at the separation, the outer and formal powers and tendencies seem to have been carried away by the Indians, whilst the Iranians retained the inner and ethical. Hence the direction which the genius of each people took was different, and we have, in the one case, a development of the spiritual side of religion, and, in the other, an evolution of the external. Nowhere do we find such extreme sacerdotalism, which changes the form into the matter of religion, as in India, where even the physical deities assume a sacerdotal character. It is not only that Indra delights in the Sôma, as a thirsty hart in the waterbrooks, that अग्नि is a deification of the sacrificial fire and so

becomes 'the priest of the gods', but we find the creation of such sacrificial deities as **ब्रह्मनस्पति**, whom Prof. Roth well describes as an 'impersonation of the power of devotion', a deity in whom 'the action of the worshipper upon the gods is personified' (cf. Rgv. 10, 72) and **प्रजापति**, the order of whose development seems to be α) as Creator (10, 121); β) as Ruler and Upholder; γ) as Water and Not-Being; δ) as Mind and Speech; and ε) as a Cycle or Year and as Sacrifice. In other Aryan countries there was a tendency to regard the instruments of worship as sacred, but, the necessary social conditions being wanting, neither the sacrifices themselves nor the oaks and groves where they took place were considered divine.

In each sphere the early faith-faculty, the organ of the spirit seems to have followed a different course. Physicism descends, metaphysicism ascends. The earlier hymns of the Rgvêda show the worship of Heaven under two aspects—as luminous, **द्यौस्** ; as boundless, **अदिति**. But it is not long before Aditi becomes dissolved into the Âditjas, some eight deities partly physical, partly spiritual. Then we find the deification of such single objects as **सूर्य** the Sun, **मरुतम्** the storm-gods, and **उषस्** the Dawn. Nor is this all. Rivers such as the **सरस्वती** and **यमुन**, mountains like the **हिमाल** are looked upon as gods. In the sacerdotal sphere, on the other hand, the process is just the reverse. Starting with the juice known as **सोम** there is ascension through **अग्नि** and **ब्रह्मनस्पति** till we come to a culmination in **ब्रह्म** the highest deity of speculation.

Nor does the process end here. As the human mind develops there is an evolution of another double process, which starts from two opposite sides but springs from allied causes, namely, anthropomorphism and apotheosis. When once the worship of a nation has introduced human elements into the idea of God, the unconscious poetry of early society begins to import divine elements into the thought of

man. Hence the constant widening of the polytheistic circle and the difficulty of ascertaining not so much what was, as rather what was not, divine. But at last there is a limit to mythical creations and the period of amalgamation begins. This is the age of the world's great epics—the Mahâ Bârata, the Ramâjana, the Iliad and Odyssey, the Kalevala, the Edda and the Song of the Niebelungen. Here we have a more or less organized polytheism, a 'conscious effort to weave into historical harmony and form the mythical creations of the past.' As an instance of Aryan religious combination we may take Agamemnon's prayer in the third book of the Iliad:—

Ζεῦ πάτερ, ἴδῃθ' ἐν μεδέων, κύδιστε, μέγιστε,
Ἥλιός θ', ὃς πάντ' ἐφορᾷς, καὶ πάντ' ἐπακούεις,
καὶ Ποταμοὶ καὶ Γαῖα, καὶ οἱ ὑπένερθε καμόντας
ἀνθρώπους τίνυσθον, ὅτις κ' ἐπίορκον ὁμόσση,
ὁμῆς μάρτυροι ἔστε, φυλάσσετε δ' ὅρκια πιστά·

Il. iii. 276—280.

Thus, when multiplication is no longer possible we come to this product of the reflective consciousness, which combines heterogeneous elements, so far as this can be done, into a homogeneous system. That is to say, the meditative faculty is brought into play to lead to the evolution of the theogonic idea in another direction, namely, that of Unity. Assuming the truth of the many mythical creations of the past, granted that the gods have each their place and work in the world, it seeks behind and above them all a subsumptive Principle and ascribes to it, even over the gods supreme power. Thus in India the priestly deity **ब्रह्मन्** developed into **ब्रह्मा** the chief of the gods, and lastly into **ब्रह्मन्** or **आत्मन्** the Over-Soul or World-Will. Amongst the Greeks, Romans and Teutons we find the same unifying tendency; *Moira*, *Fatum*, *Ragnarökr* was the sombre, mystic power that controlled and directed alike gods and men. The various steps of this meditative con-

sciousness toward oneness doubtless depend upon the particular people's culture and power of abstraction, but, subsumption once having begun, poets and philosophers were eager to strive after theistic unity. What was thus found by reason was unity of a thought, something abstract, impersonal, self-centred; not monotheism but Monism.

The thought expressed by the R̥sis in the first Maṇḍala of the R̥g-vēda (i. 164. 46):—

एकम् सत् विप्रा बहुधा वदन्ति

In many ways,

The Sages say,

Doth God himself

To man display!

was developed by the Brāhmanas in the Brāhmaṇas and subsumed by the Vēdāntins in the Upaniṣads.

Of this एकम् सत् there are in the Brāhmaṇas four stages: α) as पुरुष Puruṣa Soul, vital Force; β) as प्राण Prāṇa Breath; γ) as स्कम्भ Skamb'a The Support; δ) as उच्छिष्ट UKK'īṣṭa the Rest supreme.

In the Upaniṣads we reach the standpoint of the ब्रह्मन् — आत्मन् Brahman-Ātman doctrine, the science of Being-in-itself. In tracing the history of Spirit we have already had occasion to consider the rise and growth of Ātman, the World-Self or Spirit supreme (p. 13). Brahman, from the root bṛh or vrh to grow, expand, corresponds perhaps best to Hegel's *das Werden*: it is the Reconciliation of Contradictions. Thus we read in the Bāgavad Gītā (xiii, 12):—

ज्ञेयं यत् तत् प्रवक्ष्यामि यज्ज्ञात्वामृतमश्नुते ।

अनादिमत् परं ब्रह्म न सत् तत्रासदुच्यते ॥ २४ ॥

'I will explain (to thee) what is to be known, what kind of knowledge it is that leads to immortality. That which is to be known is Brahma supreme, which is without beginning, and can neither be described as Being nor Not-Being.'

Again (ix, 19):—

अमृतं चैव मृत्युश्च शदसच्चाहमर्जुन ॥ १६ ॥

‘I am death and immortality, Being and Not-Being, o Arjuna!’

According to the Vêdânta ब्रह्मन् is
देशकालानवच्छिन्न ‘not split by Time and Space’ and
सर्वविक्रियारहित ‘free from all change’.

The great commentator Śaṅkara in discussing the theology of the Vêdânta distinguishes between the *saguṇâ vidjâ* or exoteric doctrine of the Âtman, and the *nirguṇâ vidjâ* or esoteric teaching. Of the latter, which alone concerns us here, the fundamental tenet is the utter inadequacy of human thought and speech to conceive and express God.

यतो वाचो निवर्तन्ते

अप्राप्य मनसा सह ॥

Hence the well-known formula of the Bṛhad-âraṇjaka-Upaniṣad:—

नति नेति ।

‘It is not so; It is not so!’ When we ask: is it this or is it that? the reply is always: nêti, nêti! The only adumbration of a definition is: शान्तो ज्यम् आत्मा Silence is Âtmâ!

Thus, to the Advâita Vêdânta, Brahman, grasped in ourselves as our own Âtman, is the only Reality, the Self in which all other selves live and move and have their being. This is the *samjagdarśanam*, perfect knowledge, but it is the great Secret revealed not by *jñâna* but by *anubhava*. By absorption into his own self the Brahma-kârin finds that he is one with the Over-Self (*Brahma-âtma-âikja*), whereby he exclaims: *aham Brahma asmi* ‘I am Brahma’, whilst he says to his Guru: *tat tvam asi* ‘that art thou.’ It is this which constitutes *môkṣa*, as has been well pointed out by Prof. Deussen:—

"The knowledge of this Âtman, the great intelligence: „*aham brahma asmi*," does not produce *moksha* (deliverance), but is *moksha* itself. Then we obtain what the Upanishads say:

भिद्यते हृदयग्रन्थिः
छिद्यन्ते सर्वसंशयाः ।
क्षीयन्ते चास्य कर्माणि
तस्मिन्दृष्टे परावरे ॥

When seeing Brahma as the highest and the lowest everywhere, all knots of our heart, all sorrows are split, all doubts vanish, and our works become nothing."

No student of Greek thought is likely to forget the noble conception of Deity given by Aristotle in his *Metaphysics* (xii. c. 7):—

Φαμέν δὲ τὸν Θεὸν εἶναι ζῶον αἰδίων ἄριστον, ὥστε ζωὴ καὶ αἰὼν συνεχῆς καὶ αἰδίους ὑπάρχει τῷ θεῷ· τοῦτο γὰρ ὁ θεός. "Ὅσοι δὲ ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, ὥσπερ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι καὶ Σπεύσιππος, τὸ κάλλιστον καὶ ἄριστον μὴ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἶναι, διὰ τὸ καὶ τῶν φυτῶν καὶ τῶν ζώων τὰς ἀρχὰς αἴτια μὲν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ καλὸν καὶ τέλειον ἐν τοῖς ἐκ τούτων οὐκ ὀρθῶς οἶονται. τὸ γὰρ σπέρμα ἐξ ἐτέρων ἐστὶ προτέρων τελείων, καὶ τὸ πρῶτον οὐ σπέρμα ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τὸ τέλειον· οἷον πρότερον ἄνθρωπον ἂν φαίη τις εἶναι τοῦ σπέρματος, οὐ τὸν ἐκ τούτου γενόμενον, ἀλλ' ἕτερον ἐξ οὗ τὸ σπέρμα. "Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἔστιν οὐσία τις αἰδίου καὶ ἀκίνητος καὶ κεχωρισμένη τῶν αἰσθητῶν, φανερόν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων. δέδεικται δὲ καὶ ὅτι μέγεθος οὐθὲν ἔχειν ἐνδέχεται ταύτην τὴν οὐσίαν, ἀλλ' ἀμερῆς καὶ ἀδιαίρετός ἐστίν.

So we say that God is a living, everlasting, best Being; life and perpetuity become Him, for such is the essence of Deity. But those are mistaken who, with Speusippus and the Pythagoreans, hold that the best and the most beautiful exist not originally, since even with plants and animals the beginnings are indeed causes, but the noble, the complete is contained in what results from them. In

error, for the seed comes from something earlier, something perfect; the seed is not that which is first, but the perfect. One may indeed say that man is earlier than the seed, not the man who is born from the seed, but he from whom the seed comes. From what has been said it is thus clear that there exists an eternal, immovable Being, removed from Sense. It has also been shown that this Being can have no extension, but that it is inseparable and indivisible'.

Xenophanes, too, has left us those fine lines:—

Εἷς θεὸς ἔν τε θεοῖσι καὶ ἀνθρώποισι μέγιστος,
οὗ τι δέμας θνητοῖσι ὁμοίος οὐδὲ νόημα.

Of gods and men one God alone is lord
Nor unto mortals like in form or word!

Nor must we forget that الله is sometimes referred to as *سبب لاسباب* cause of causes! And we have already had occasion to notice the speculative tendencies of the Sûfis.

The many monistic and subsumptive propensities of our own century in theology are perhaps nowhere better expressed than in Goethe's *Faust*. The man of culture κατ' ἐξοχήν, he who was at once philosopher and poet, who had scanned the whole horizon of the world of thought, could not but leave his Confession of Faith.

Wer darf ihn nennen?
Und wer bekennen:
Ich glaub' ihm.
Wer empfinden
Und sich unterwinden
Zu sagen: ich glaub' ihn nicht?
Der Allumfasser,
Der Allhalter,
Fasst und erhält er nicht
Dich, mich, sich selbst?

Wölbt sich der Himmel nicht da droben?
 Liegt die Erde nicht hierunten fest?
 Und steigen freundlich blickend
 Ewige Sterne nicht herauf?
 Schau' ich nicht Aug' in Auge dir,
 Und drängt nicht alles
 Nach Haupt und Herzen dir,
 Und webt in ewigem Geheimniss
 Unsichtbar sichtbar neben dir?
 Erfüll' davon dein Herz, so gross es ist,
 Und wenn du ganz in dem Gefühle selig bist,
 Nenn' es dann, wie du willst,
 Nenn's Glück! Herz! Liebe! Gott!
 Ich habe keinen Namen
 Dafür! Gefühl ist alles;
 Name ist Schall und Rauch
 Umnebelnd Himmelsgluth.

Him who can name,
 And who declaim:
 I believe?
 Who were afraid,
 Yet could himself persuade
 To say: I believe not?
 The All-embracer,
 The All-upholder,
 Embraces, upholds He not
 Thee, me, Himself?
 Is not above bright Heaven's eternal dome?
 And here on earth—is not a steadfast home?
 Mount not on high
 The eternal stars of night?
 See I not eye in eye
 Thine own most inner light?

And does not all in thee
 Press on toward Head and Heart,
 And move in eternal secret
 Around thee, about thee,
 Within thee, without thee?
 Thy spirit drink thereof unto her fill,
 And in her flight of feeling, striving still,
 Name it then as thou wilt:
 Joy! Heart! Love! God!
 No name have I for it!
 Feeling is all:—
 Name is but echo and vapor
 Enveloping heavenly fervor!

The deity thus discovered by Reason is a Principle of Order. Unity of a Cause, a World-Will. Here we have the Monon of philosophy, not the God of Religion. How, asks the philosopher, can we venture to ascribe personality, with all that it implies, to the Deity? The man of meditation, the Jôgi of East and West may perhaps find lonely solace in an abstract, impersonal Unity, but the common people, who heard the Master gladly, mankind at large can worship no other than a personal God, a living Being who can sustain relations with every human soul, who possesses qualities which appeal to the noblest and tenderest susceptibilities of every human heart. Well does a Persian poet exclaim:—

‘How can I know Thee who art beyond the vision of reason? *So concealed, Thou art the more revealed to the eye of the heart.* The world were an empty tablet but that Thou hast written thereon Thy eternal thought. Of thy divine poem the first word is Reason, and the last is Man. And whoso shall trace the words from first to last shall find them the unbroken series of Thy favors, the varied names of Thy love.’

Our enquiry has shown us how in all ages and in many ways man has been stretching out his hands toward the All-Father—*palmas ad sidera tendens*!

·Es sagen's aller Orten
Alle Herzen unter dem himmlischen Tage,
Jedes in seiner Sprache.'

The *dei sensus* is there, and the individual soul (*gīvāt-man*) is only man when conscious of the Over-Soul (*Para-mâtman*). The *Rsis* of our race will never find it hard to believe that God is Spirit (*Πνεῦμα ὁ Θεός*), but what we all have to learn—*stûfi* and *sophist*, *savant* and *seer*—is the truth brought to light by Him who was hallowed and sent into the world, that God is Love (*Ἀγάπη ὁ Θεός*), living and undying Love!

‘Ο Θεὸς ἀγάπη ἐστὶ· καὶ ὁ μένων ἐν τῇ ἀγάπῃ, ἐν τῷ Θεῷ μένει, καὶ ὁ Θεὸς ἐν αὐτῷ.



VOLUME II.

ETHICAL CONCEPTS.



CHAPTER I.

RIGHT AND WRONG IN CHINESE.



is representative of the Turano-scythian stock let us take the Chinese. Now, it would almost seem as though the Chinese, from time immemorial, had been conscious of the privative nature of sin. Indeed, the well-known saying of Augustine: ‘Nemo de me quaerat efficientem causam malae voluntatis; Non enim est efficiens sed deficiens; quia nec illa effectio est, sed defectio’, might have been written by Confucius himself. For, to the chinaman Right is 是 *shì* Being, τὸ ὄν, whilst Wrong is 非 *pé* Not-Being, τὸ μὴ ὄν. The established opinion is that, man is by nature good and that it is only as he falls away from the Tau 道 the Path, the Norm, the λόγος, that he becomes bad. As *Kau-zō* in his *Tai-kî-tu* says:—

‘All men have the rational principle of motion and rest, but in motion they miss it. For originally men and things possess altogether the Norm of the First Cause’. This, too, is doubtless the meaning of *Lau-zō* in his classic of Reason and Virtue, when he says (Tau-tê-Kiin: cap. 11. 9):—

‘Thus the saintly man does not become entangled in the meshes of Not-Being’. In the proverb in which, out of

four words, three are radicals we have this truth in its most terse form:—

口 是 心 非 *k'o 'sí, sin p'ê*.

Literally, the mouth (saying) yes, the heart (meaning) no, or, as we should say, 'in speech true, in thought false'. We may attempt to realise Being in speech, whilst at the same time our heart is set on Not-Being.

'To be or not to be, that is the question!'

It is only when, to quote another proverb, 心口如一 *sin k'o 'gu j'i* 'the heart and the mouth are as one' that we tread the Path of Being. 非 is sometimes used in the sense of fault, as in the saying: 見人一善忘其旦非 *kjan rin j'i san wan k'i p'ö p'ê* (when you) see a man (perform) one good (action), forget his hundred faults. *Šî* and *Pê* in the general meaning of Right and Wrong are common in such a phrase as 是則言是 *šî zê jen šî* (if) right say so, 非則言非 *p'ê zê jen p'ê* (if) wrong say so.

Having conceived wrong as a falling away from Being, the *modes* of this declension have seemed to the dwellers in the Flowery Land well-nigh infinite. No language is so rich in ethical terminology as the Chinese.

Viewed as a transgression, a going beyond, παράβασις, the expression for evil is *in action* 犯 *pan*, from the radical 犭 *k'juan* (94) 'dog' and *in speech* 過 *kwo*, from the 162nd radical 辵 *k'ô* 'to go'. Thus we read: 玉子犯法與民同罪 *wan zö pan 'pa ju min t'un zwi* when the king's son transgresses the law, the guilt is the same (as it would be) in the case of the people. And in the Lun-jü (Bk. vii. Cap. 16.):—

子 曰 加 我 數 年 五 十 以 學 無 可 以 易 大 過 矣
Zö jü: kja wo su njen wu šî i hjo Ji k'ô i wu t'u kwo i.
The Master said: 'If some years were added to my life, I would give 50 to the study of the Ji. and then I might come to be without great faults'.

But in order to gauge the concept of Evil in all its forms we must compare it with the corresponding forms of Good. For the law of relativity applies here as elsewhere, giving us sense and countersense, thesis and antithesis, positive and negative. Τῶν ἐναντίων, says Aristotle. τὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι ἐπιστήμην. Omnis determinatio, says Spinoza, est negatio. Or in the words of Hegel: 'Die Grundlage aller Bestimmtheit ist die Negation. . . . Als seiende Bestimmtheit gegenüber der in ihr enthaltenen, aber von ihr unterschiedenen Negation ist die Qualität Realität'.

Now the opposite of 犯 *fan* is 忠 *kui* loyal, from radical 61 心 *sin* heart, and 中 *kui* middle, to hit the mark; and of 過 *kwo* the antithesis is 信 *hsin* faithfulness, from 人 *rin* man, the 9th radical, and 言 *jün* to speak. In the 24th Chapter of the Lun-jü we meet with both these words:—

子以四教 文行忠信 *Zö i sö hjo Wan Hün Kui Hsin*. The Master taught four things: literature, ethics, loyalty to truth and faithfulness.

Then sin is conceived as the 'missing of a mark', ἀμαρτία. Thus in the *Sün Jü Kwan Hsün* or Amplification of the Sacred Edict we read (ix. 12):—

毋蹈縱恣之愆 *wu tau zuü zö ki kjen*: beware of the sins of your unbridled instincts! or as M. Piry translates it 'Gardez-vous des errements de vos instincts déréglés!' 愆 *kjen* is from radical 61 心 *sin* heart and 衍 *jen* overflowing, which is composed of the 144th radical 行 *hün* to act and 氵 *swê* water, so that the idea is: the heart acting as water. Opposed to this is 恕 *su* Reciprocity, the word that was so often on the lips of Confucius, from the same radical 心 *sin* 'heart' and 如 *ya* 'as', the heart being in equilibrium, acting harmoniously, hitting the mark. Hence it is often used in conjunction with 忠 *kui* loyal as 忠恕 *kui su* faithful and benevolent. When 孺 *kui* asked Confucius whether there were one word

which might serve as a rule of practice for all one's life, he said: 其恕乎己所不欲勿施於人 *k'i su hu: ki so pu jü wu si jü Rin!* 'Is not Reciprocity such a word? What you do not want done to yourself, do not to others!'

Evil is also conceived as 'disobedience to a voice', παρακοή. Thus we have the ethical antithesis: 誣 *wu* 誣 *sin*, both from the radical 言 *jün* to speak, a voice. Goodness, as obeying the voice, is the theme of *K'au Zō's* *T'ai K'i tu*. 'Sincerity' (誠), we read, 'is the foundation of the saintly man, the end and beginning of things and the norm of fate', which the Manku translator has rendered as follows:—

|| *Unenggi srengge, enduringge nijalmai jūlehe, jaka-i duben deribun, hesebun-i doro kai* ||

As in Hebrew so also in Chinese *sin* is looked upon as that which is *crooked*. For 惡 *ngo* wickedness, vice, is composed of 亞 *ja* 'two hunchback men looking at each other' and radical 61 心 *sin* heart; a froward heart, a stiff neck. Thus in the Analects we read:—

苟志於仁矣無惡也
kū k'i jü sên i: wu ngo jê.

'If the will be set on Goodness, there will be no practice of vice!'

Not only is 仁 *sên* straightforwardness, benevolence, opposed to 惡 *ngo*, but also 義 *i* righteousness, 善 *san* virtue and 美 *mê* excellence, which are all connected with radical 123 羊 *jan* sheep, the type and trope of simplicity. In the *T'ai-k'i-tu* we read of the 5 chief virtues, of which *sên* and *i* are two, in connexion with the *Jen* and the *Jan*:—

'The heart of Heaven and Earth, nay, the principle of humanity. Now, form arises from *Jen* and mind from *Jan*; the nature of the five chief virtues is manifested by contact with things: thus *Jan* is good and *Jen* bad'.

The heart of heaven and earth, the principle of

humanity, is the 太極 *tai-kî*; the 5 fundamental rules of conduct are: 仁 *sên* benevolence, 義 *i* sincerity, 禮 *li* propriety, 智 *kî* wisdom, and 信 *hsin* faithfulness.

According to *Kau-zö* matter is earthly, spirit heavenly; as, therefore, matter belongs to 陰 *Jen* and spirit to 陽 *Jan*, the former is the earthly whilst the latter is the heavenly principle. Now, the *Tai kî* is the resultant of these two great forces, Good and Evil, Motion and Rest, the earthly and the Heavenly, and is free only in so far as it follows the Tan of Jan, the Path of Right; for, if it abide in the way of Jen it is bound by the fetters of Sin, it is caught in the tissues of Falsehood!

Finally, to the sons of Heaven (*Tjün zö*) Evil has seemed a Net which is spread by unseen hands to catch the will that is weak. Alike in lore and language, in proverb and in prayer we meet with 罪 *zuî* sin, crime, from radical 122 罟 *wau* a net.

There is a celebrated passage in the *Lun-jü* (xx. 1. 3) in which this word occurs. It is a prayer addressed to God by *Tan* on his undertaking the overthrow of the Hia dynasty, which he rehearses to his nobles and people, after the completion of his work.

皇 皇 后 帝 有 罪 不 赦 敢

Hwau hwau hau Ti, ju zuî pu kan sê.

‘O most great and sovereign God, the sinner I dare not pardon!’

The opposite of 罪 *zuî* is 德 *tê* Virtue, from 𠂔 *kî* a step, radical 60. The full meaning of the character is: ‘the heart stepping out of the net’. With all his love of virtue Confucius had to admit:—

‘It is all over! I have not seen one who loves Virtue as he loves Beauty’.





已 矣 乎 吾 未 見 好 德 如 好 色 者 也
Kî i hu: wu wê kjan hau Tê ju hau: Sê kê jê.

CHAPTER II.

THE ETHICS OF EGYPTIANS AND HEBREWS.


As representing the Hamito-Semitic branch of the Midlanders let us take *Egyptian* and *Hebrew*.

By the Egyptians, as by the Chinese, the subtle enemy Sin has been looked at from many points of view, to such an extent, indeed, as well-nigh to hide the angel goodness.

As παράβασις, transgressio, a 'going beyond' it is  *sen* sin,  *sen-n-t* evil, from the root  *sen* to go beyond. Memphitic **sen senen**. Perhaps the most usual form is  *sonen*. Thus (D. Temp. l. l.) in the temple of Dendera:—

 *Sut'a-p' Horse er Soneu*


'He keeps the lake of Horus from defilement'.

A peculiarly interesting view of Good and Evil in Egyptian is that of an *Afflatus*, diabolical or divine. It is a polar expression, both in sound and sense, a synthesis of thesis and antithesis.  *nep'-a*, Memphitic **nep-a**.

Bašmuric **nep-a** sin;  *ben* Memphitic **ben** bad;



 *nip'* impious, enemy.  *nep'-r*, Sahidic **nep-r**








Memphitic **nep-r** good, useful. All these forms come

from the root  *nep'*, Sahidic and Memphitic **nep'**.


Bašmuric **nep'** to blow, in the sense of clouds passing over the sky, to be under a cloud, to be blown hither and thither. For instance, (Abyd. Mar.)





Nepau Krotu kemî hi tep 'The sins of the children who will know nothing of their father'. According to Brugsch the fundamental meaning of   is 'to arrive at the end'; 'to complete' (perficere, perfectum esse). In a Stele at Leiden we read:—

       *Ânk-señ em mû nepru-k.*





'Their life consists in the contemplation of thy perfections'.






 nefer α) good β) happy γ) beauteous.




Not infrequently  *ban* is opposed to  nefer, as




Bu nofer Keper in bu bân "bona fuit mala".

Then wrong has been conceived as a 'sword' piercing the heart and causing pain.   *mâh*: evil;  

   *mak-a-s-u* Coptic **MAX-I** a sword;  

mek-s sceptre;    *mâs-u* dagger; Sahidic **HOX-Z**

pain. Hier. *mes-h-u* S. *mek-h* M. *hem-k-o* to afflict.

At the basis of all these words is the root    *mât'-â* to cut, *t* and *k* being interchangeable, metathesized in Memphitic **KHI** to strike.



To fall away from righteousness is to fall into sin, hence a common view of evil is that of a *declension*, **παρά-πτωμα**. We meet with it in Egyptian.



 *he*   *ku*   *â-ha*   *â-hî*

Memphitic **ZO**, **T-ZO**, **ZOO-R**, **ZWO-R**, Sahidic **OO**. Baśmuric



ZA-R; Somali: *hu-ma* bad. Sahidic **ZB-B-E** worse.  



her fear, horror; Demotic *hâûr*, Sahidic **ZAP-E**. Memphitic

ZOUP-I excrement.   *knu* sin; all from the root


  *huû-a* to decline, fall away.



Sahidic κρ-ο-ο } circle;
 Memphitic κρ-κ-ο }


Demotic and Sahidic κρ-ο-ρ a ring  *k'er-s* to involve, bury.  *k'er-t-a* to fold.

 *k'er-aiu* crooked;  *k'er-ai-t* barrier.


The forms which have an ethical significance mostly come from the metathesized form of the root.

 *rek-aiu* to curve, to swerve; Coptic ρακ, ρικ-ε, ρεκρικ-ε a wink, a twinkling.

 *rek-a* to turn away from;  *rek* to be addicted to; Sahidic ροκ-ε.

 *rek-i* bad, an enemy. Memphitic ρικ-ι transgression; α-ρικ-ι fault.


 *rek-aiu-t* quarrel.


 *k'er* Sahidic ⲟⲩⲁ, Baśmuric ⲟⲩⲁ lie, concealment.

Thus, in an Inscription at Elkab (Gr. Atetlera's) we read:—



 *Ṭot-ai enten nen k'er im*















'In what I tell you there is no deceit'.






The corresponding virtue is represented by  *mâ-t*, dem. ⲙⲁⲧⲧ *me-t*, whereof the root-idea is 'to be open, straight forward': it is the parent of such words as truth, justice, uprightness.





 *k'er meter mâ-t* 'having the witness of truth'.



But sin is not only a going astray or speaking falsely, it is sometimes doing an injury, and of this also the

Egyptians were well aware. Thus from the root   *k'ab-t* to do an injury, we have:—











  *k'eb-n-ti* iniquity;   *k'ep-t* Memphitic
𓂏𓂏𓂏𓂏 *sin*; 𓂏𓂏𓂏𓂏 *sin*; 𓂏𓂏𓂏𓂏 to sin; 𓂏𓂏𓂏𓂏 violence;
Sahidic 𓂏𓂏𓂏𓂏 to avenge; Demotic *km-â* to avenge.  
        *He gives life to the*
virtuous but death to the corrupt. (Mélanges égyptologiques
III. p. 269.)

Opposed to the vice *k'ab-t* is the virtue *mer* 
Sahidic 𓂏𓂏. Memphitic 𓂏𓂏. Baśmuric 𓂏𓂏 to love.
    *Ar mer-â n Amon* 'I was a friend
of Amon'.



Besides this view of evil as the perpetration of bodily harm, there is the more subtle sense of sin as 'opposition to truth', as 'violence to the categorical imperative'. This is expressed in Egyptian by   *seṭeb*   *seṭeb*
evil, damage.





On the other hand, conformity to truth, fixity of ethical purpose is   *tesî*, Baśmuric 𓂏𓂏, Sahidic 𓂏𓂏, 𓂏𓂏-𓂏.
Memphitic 𓂏𓂏-𓂏 better, best. 𓂏𓂏𓂏𓂏 *altitudo, sublimitas.*


𓂏𓂏𓂏𓂏𓂏𓂏𓂏𓂏𓂏𓂏𓂏 *Au pe sop â panp' tesî*
καὶ τῆς αὐτῶν ἀρετῆς μέγιστον ὑπόμνημα.





Then we meet with a conception of sin which is Egyptian κατ' ἐξοχήν. It is that of the foul, the impure, the tainted.    *tata* Sahidic 𓂏𓂏. 𓂏𓂏𓂏𓂏; Memphitic 𓂏𓂏𓂏𓂏 to stain, be stained.   *tat* Sahidic 𓂏𓂏𓂏𓂏 impure, wicked.    *tata* enemy, impious.
Demotic *tetî*; Baśmuric 𓂏𓂏; Sahidic 𓂏𓂏; M. 𓂏𓂏
  *ta* foul.





The opposite of *ta* is *âb* to wash, to shine, to be pure.

 and  *âb*; M. **OTAB** B. **OTEB** pure, orderly; S. **OTOH** to shine, purity, holiness. Memphitic: **BOTBOT** to shine.







    *âk nib nop'ri âb*. lit. Things all good, pure. 'Everything good and pure'.




As the Chinese, though not to the same extent, the Egyptians were conscious of the privative nature of sin. They saw that, if persisted in, it would lead to the extinction of all Being. Thus, from the root  Demotic








   *bet* not to be, τὸ μὴ ὄν, we get  *bet* bad; Sahidic **BET** abominable; **BET** to wipe out, destroy; **BOT**, **QOT** to be sick, abominate.

  *bet-n* bad, enemy. M. **BOT-C**, **BOT-C** to wage war; and in metathesized reduplication   *tebteb*, Sahidic **TBB-C** to strike against.






Finally, there is a view of Good and Evil in Egyptian which is highly remarkable, reminding us of the tree in the Garden of Eden whereof Adam and Eve were forbidden to eat. It is that of *knowledge*.


  *sap*   *suu*   *sa* M. **CAB-G**, **COOH**, **COT**; S. **COOT-H**, **COOT**; to know, to understand, to enjoy.




   *sau* to teach; M. **CB-CO** science. S. to learn.


   *sau*   *sai*   *sa* S. **CA** M. **CAI**, **POC** beautiful, worthy.

In an Inscription of Paher at El Kab we meet with these remarkable words:—






Rek'-kuu *Nuter* *mert* *Rem* *sa*


 'I have known God in the midst of men, and have enjoyed Him!'
istu

The dwellers on the Nile also conceived the Bad as a disease  *men* and the Good as perfect health, or clearness of heart and mind   *ak*.


Ma-p' rek' in km ak-t in men-t 'He looks upon knowledge as ignorance and upon the good as the bad' (pap. Prisse 17. 6).

Of all forms of ethical consciousness there is none so deep, so inward and at the same time so far-reaching as that of the Hebrews, the people of the Geist, the people of the Book. Sin and righteousness, Good and Evil apply to Man only in so far as he is in touch with God. The leading idea is that of Psalm li. 4:—

לִי לְבַדְּךָ יְהוָה חָטָאתִי וְהַרַע
âsîtî b'ênêkâ v'hâra kââtî'î lbaddkâ ukâ

'Against Thee, Thee only have I sinned, and done evil in Thy sight!' and of Psalm xxxi. 1:—

בְּיָהוָה חֲסִיתִי אֶל־אֲבוֹשָׁה לְעוֹלָם בְּצַדִּיקְתָּךְ פָּלַטִי
Bkâ Jhōvâh kâsîtî'î al-âbôśâh lâlâm bzîdkât'kâ p'altêni.

'In Thee, o God, do I put my trust; let me never be ashamed. Deliver me in thy righteousness!'

As Franz Delitzsch well observes: 'all relations in which man stands to man, and indeed to creation generally, are only phaenomenal forms of his fundamental relationship to

God, and Sin . . . is opposition to the will of God, of Him who alone is the supreme lawgiver and judge'.

On the one hand we have the more or less passive sins arising from man's fallen nature, from his weakness as born of the dust. 'For He knoweth our frame. He remembereth that we are dust!' To this order belong **חַטָּאת** *kattât*, **עוֹלָה** *avlâh*, **רָע** *râ*, **עֵוֹן** *âvôn* and **תּוֹעֵה** *tôâh*. On the other there are the various forms of active wickedness expressed by **פֶּשַׁע** *peša*, **רָשָׁע** *reša* and **אֲשָׁמָה** *asmâh*, **אָוֵן** *âven*, **מִרְמָה** *mirmâh*.

As we have already seen in the Psalm li. 4.:—

חַטָּאת, Arabic **خَطِيئَة** is 'the missing of a mark', ἀμαρτία, das Verfehlen des rechten Zieles, the conscious lack of the divine Presence; from the root **חָטָא** to wander, to fail of the end. Opposed to this sin of Godlessness is **תְּמִימָה**, **תָּם**, **תָּמִים** *tâm*, *tmimâh*, *tummîm* whole-heartedness, truth, perfection, from **תָּמַם** whole, integer, insons, Arabic **تَمَام**. Thus in Genesis xvii. 1, we read:—

אֲנִי־אֵל שְׁדֵי הַתְהַלֵּךְ לִפְנֵי יְהוָה תָּמִים

Anî el šaddai: hithalêk l'pânai v'ehjêh tāmîm. 'I am God almighty: walk before me and be thou perfect!'

Next to the sin of atheism and agnosticism comes that of 'falling away' from God, **παράπτωμα**, which is expressed by **עוֹלָה** or **עָל** from **עָלָה** to fall away. This is particularly manifest in the 37th Psalm, where we have the striking contrast between those who trust and delight themselves in the Lord and such as bring about the forsaking of Jâhvéh:—

אֲלִיתָתָר בַּמְרָעִים אֶל־תִּקְנָא בְּעֵשִׂי עוֹלָה:

Al-tit'kar bammrêim, al-thannê bôsé avlâh. 'Fret not thyself because of evil-doers. Neither be thou envious against such as work unrighteousness (or, effect backsliding)'.

The counterpart of *avlâh* is **יָשָׁר** *jâsâr* straightforwardness, integrity, from **יָשַׁר** to make straight, to be equal. 'Good

and upright', says the Psalmist, 'is the Lord: therefore will he instruct sinners in the way'. Ps. xxv. 8.

טוב-וְיִשָּׁר יְהוָה עַל-בֶּן יוֹרֵה חַטָּאִים בְּדַרְךְ

Tôb vjâsâr Jâhvêh, al-kên jôreh k'attâim badârek. In many respects יִשָּׁר has had a similar development to the Vêdic ऋत.

We then come to the world-old antithesis of Good and Evil as a state of mind, manifest in רַע *Râ* and טוב *tôb* (Syriac ܬܘܒ *tov*). The former is from רָעַע *Râaa* 'to break in pieces', Arabic ردى so that the fundamental meaning would seem to be 'iconoclasm'. Thus in Genesis iii. 5. we read:—

כִּי יֵרַע אֱלֹהִים כִּי בַיּוֹם אֲכַלְכֶּם מִמֶּנּוּ וְנִפְקַחוּ עֵינֵיכֶם וְהָיִיתֶם
בְּאֵלֹהִים יֹדְעֵי טוֹב וָרָע:

Kî jôdê Elohîm kî bjôm akâlkem mimmenu v'nîpkku ênêkem vihjit'em kêlôhîm jôdê tôb vârà: 'For God knoweth that in the day when ye shall eat thereof, your eyes shall be open and ye shall be as God knowing Good and Evil'.

And in that majestic passage in Isajah (xlv. 7) in which the creation of Evil is ascribed to the Eternal Himself:—

יוֹצֵר אֹר וּבּוֹרֵא חֹשֶׁךְ עֹשֶׂה שָׁלוֹם וּבּוֹרֵא רָע

Jôzêr ôr ûbôrê kôšek, ôseh šâlôm ûbôrê râ. 'I form the Light and create Darkness; I make Peace and create Evil'.

Again in Solomon's beautiful prayer for an 'understanding heart':—

וְנָתַתְּ לַעֲבָדְךָ לֵב שֹׁמֵעַ לְשֹׁפֵט אֶת-עַמְּךָ לְהִבִּין בֵּין-טוֹב לְרָע

'Give thy servant therefore an understanding heart to judge thy people, that I may discern between good and evil'.

Right and wrong are, moreover, conceived as 'the crooked' and 'the straight' alike in the outer and the inner world, in the realm of thought and the sphere of action.

For these concepts we have the words עֲוֹן *âvôn* and צַדִּיק *zedek* perversity and rectitude. Of the former we have a notable instance in the opening words of the great prophet (Isa. i. 4):—

הוֹי גֹי חַטָּא עִם זֶרַע מְרִעִים מִשְׁחִיתִים:

Hôï gôï kôṭê, am kebed âvôn, sera mrêim, bânim maskitîm.

‘Wo! sinful nation, people laden with iniquity, seed of evildoers, children that are corrupt!’

Here we have sin in its triple form, as *kêṭ* or *kâttâi* the being estranged from God, as *âôn* or *âvôn* crookedness, turned from the Path, and *rû* evil-minded. Isajah speaks with burning words to the heart of Israel that has become corrupt. On the other hand, rectitude, straitforwardness, righteousness is *zedek*, *zdûkâh*, Arabic: صديق *sâdik*, righteous: صادق *sâdek*, to believe, as is peculiarly manifest in the noble words and stirring tones of the Psalmist (xxxvi. 7):—

צִדְקַתְךָ כְּתֹרֵי־אֵל זִדְקַתְּךָ כְּתֹרֵי־אֵל

‘Thy righteousness is like the mountains of God!’

תֹּעָה *tôah* impiety, defection from the Supreme. (פָּשַׁע *peša* from פָּשַׁע *peša* to aberravit) is the passive side of פָּשַׁע *peša* from פָּשַׁע to break faith. It is not only the breach of faith between man and man—Treubruch, of which Schiller so forcefully speaks in his *Bürgschaft* that: ‘Der Freund dem Freunde gebrochen die Pflicht’, as we read of Moab in its action toward the people of Israel:—

וַיַּפֵּשׁעַ מוֹאָב בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל: *Vajip’sa Môab bjisrâel:*

‘And Moab acted faithlessly toward Israel’: but also the rebelling against God. What saith the prophet Micah?

‘Hear, ye peoples, all of you; hearken, O earth, and all that therein is: and let the Lord God be witness against you, the Lord from his holy temple. For, behold, the Lord cometh forth out of his place, and will come down and tread upon the high places of the earth. And the moun-

tains shall be molten under him, and the valleys shall be cleft, as wax before the fire, as waters that are poured down a steep place. *For the faithlessness of Jacob is all this, and for the sins of the House of Israel!*

בַּפֶּשַׁע יַעֲקֹב כָּל־זֹאת וּבְחַטָּאוֹת בֵּית יִשְׂרָאֵל

Bpəša Jaakôb kol šôl' ûbl'attôt bêl' Jisrâ'el.

Again, in Isajah (xliv. 22):—

מִחִיתִי כָעָב פֶּשְׁעֶיךָ וְכַעֲנָן חַטָּאתֶיךָ

Makîti kâab pšêkâ v'keânân k'attôlekâ.

'I have blotted out, as a thick cloud, thy breaches of faith, and, as a cloud, thy want of communion with me!

Opposed to this Breach of Faith is **אֱמֶת** *emet'* stability, faith, truth, from **אָמֵן** to be firm, stable, which gives us also **אֱמֵן** truth, veracity.

Arabic: **يَمِين** *jamîn* right.

آمَنَ *âmân* to believe.

إِيمَان *émân* faith.

Thus, in the 37th Psalm we read (v. 3):—

בָּטַח בַּיהוָה וַעֲשֵׂה־טוֹב שְׁכֹן־אֶרֶץ וִרְעָה אֱמוּנָה

Bṭaḥ baJhōvâh va'asêh-ṭôb škôn-eretz vîrêh emânâh.

'Trust in the Lord and do good: dwell in the land and feed on faithfulness!

Then we have sin in the form of 'taking pride in self-sufficiency', having no sense of dependence on a Higher Power, which is expressed by **רָשָׁע** *reša* or **רִשְׁעָה** *riš'âh* from **רָשַׁע**. Of the man guilty of this sin the psalmist gives us a most vivid picture (x. 4):—

רָשָׁע כִּנְבִּיָּה אָפוּ בַל־יִדְרֹשׁ אֵין אֱלֹהִים כָּל־מִצְמוֹתָיו:

Râšâ kyobaḥ apô bal-jidroš ên Elohîm kol-mšimmôl'âiv.

'The wicked, in the pride of his countenance, (saith): he will have no need. All his thoughts are: 'There is no God!'

On the other hand, the man who is conscious of his

own weakness, who more than any other feels his need of God, is עָנִי *ânî* the poor; a truth which was afterwards to come in more simple and beautiful language and with a far deeper meaning from the lips of the Master himself: μακάριοι οἱ πτωχοί· ὅτι ὑμετέρα ἐστὶν ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ Θεοῦ. The Psalms speak thus of the *ânî* (exl. 12): -

יָדַעְתִּי כִּי־יַעֲשֶׂה יְהוָה דִּין עָנִי מִשְׁפַּט אֲבִינִים

Jâdaati ki-jausch Jaharah din ânî mišpat abjônim.

‘I know that the Eternal will maintain the cause of the needy, the right of the poor!’

A form of sin with which the Hebrews were not unfamiliar is that of מְרֻמָּה *mîrmâh* fraud, deceit, from the root רָמָה ar. رَمِيَ to throw; the idea being ‘to throw off the track’. Perhaps the most notable instance of this is the deception practised upon his father by Jacob, whereby he obtained Esau’s blessing. In Genesis xxvii. 35 we read:—

וַיֹּאמֶר בָּא אֵחָיִךְ בְּמִרְמָה וַיִּקַּח בְּרַכְתְּךָ

Vajômer bâ âkîkâ bmîrmâh vajikak birkâtekâ.

‘And he said: thy brother came with fraud and took away thy blessing’.

Then we come to the sin of Omission, the leaving undone, expressed by אָשָׁם *âšâm* or אֲשָׁמָה *âšmâh* from אָשַׁם *âšam*, which is sometimes described as culpa delinquendo contracta. It survives in the Arabic أَشَمُّ. We meet with it in the 69th Psalm (v. 5) and more particularly in the Proverbs, where we read:—

אֲלֹמִים יָלִיץ אָשָׁם וּבֵן יִשְׂרָאֵל רָצוֹן

Evîlîm jâlîz âšâm ûbên jîsârîl râzôn.

‘Fools make a mockery of guilt, but among the upright there is goodwill’.

Nor must we overlook an ethical contrast which occurs in that mine of moral antitheses—the Proverbs, namely,

תִּהְיֶה *ʔahpukôt* 'perverseness' from $\sqrt{\text{הפך}}$ to overturn, and תִּשְׁיֶה *ʔušijjâh* 'uprightness', 'discretion', from $\sqrt{\text{ישׁה}}$, ar. وشي 'it was solid', to be real and substantial. Thus, in the 8th Chapter we read:—

יִרְאַת יְהוָה שְׂנֵאת רַע גָּאָה וְגֵאוֹן וְדָרֶךְ רַע וְפִי תִּהְיֶה תִּהְפֹּךְ:
לִי עֵצָה וְתוֹשִׁיָּה אֲנִי בִינָה לִי גְבוּרָה:

Jirat' Jhōzâh snôt' Râa, gēâh v'gûôn v'derek' râa û-p'i
ʔahpukôt' sânel'i. Li êzâh v'ʔušijjâh, Anû vînâh, li gvûrah.

'The fear of the Eternal is to hate evil: pride, haughtiness and the evil way, and the mouth of perverseness have I hated. To me is counsel, is uprightness; I am Understanding; to me is strength'.

Lastly, in the Book of Job we meet with two expressions in one verse which forcibly remind us of the Chinese 非 and the Egyptian 𓂏𓂐𓂓 : I mean the 11th verse of the 11th chapter.

כִּי־יָדַע מְתִי־שׁוֹא וַיִּרְא־אֶנּוּ וְלֹא יִתְבּוֹנֶן

Ki-hû jâdaa m'ê sâv rajar âven v'lô jithbônân.

'For He knoweth men of vanity: he seeth wickedness also, and shall He not consider?'

These words שׁוֹא *sâv* and אֶנּוּ *âven* show us that the Semites, as Turanians and Hamites, were conscious that sin is rather a defect than an effect, for the root of the one is שׂאָה (ar. ثاى) defectus realitatis, inane; whilst that of the other is אָן which is a polar root meaning both 'to be and not to be', its other form being אָנ or אִן. Perhaps the best rendering for both expressions is the word 'vanity', *emptiness*, as we have it in the 10th Psalm (v. 7):—

|| *Ālâh pîhû mâlê imîrmôt' râʔok' takat' l'sônô âmâl vââven* ||

'His mouth is full of cursing and deceit and fraud: under his tongue are mischief and vanity'.

In Arabic there are two forms expressive of good and evil which deserve careful consideration, namely, خا and

ادم. Both these words imply reflexion resulting in choice on the part of the subject; in the former case it is that of the right and the good, whilst in the latter there is the distinct recognition of sin. One of the finest Sûrats of the Kūrân tells us how, in paradise, the faithful Moslem shall not hear any vain discourse nor any charge of sin, but only the salutation Peace! Peace!

لَا يَسْمَعُونَ فِيهَا لَغْوًا وَلَا تَأْثِيمًا [٢٥] إِلَّا قِيلًا سَلَامًا سَلَامًا

|| *Lâ jisamiâwun pîhâ laġwan wa lâ tâ'imân; illâ qîlun Salâmun Salâmun* || (lvi. vv. 24. 25.)

Again, in the Conclavia Medinensis (Surat xlix. 6) we meet with the expression فَاسِقٌ *pâsiqun*, the man of غش *ġus* 'deceit' and مَدح *mâd* 'praise', the Sycophant, from the root *pâsk* 'to act dishonorably'.

•Even if a tale-bearer come unto you with a message, investigate it'.

إِنْ جَاءَكُمْ فَاسِقٌ بِذَبَابٍ فَقَبَّيْنُوا

In ġâ-am pâsiqum bi-nabâ'in p'a-tabajjanû!

(O qui crediderunt), si venerit ad vos (aliquis) Sycophanta cum nuntio, rectè distinguite.

On the other hand, the man of probity (صَكِيح) and truth (حَقٌّ) is صَالِح *sâlih*. He it is who knows خَالِصَة *kâlisat* purity, and who is مُهَذَّب *muhâṣṣab* sincere. In him we know the 'Traveller on the Path'.

Finally, in two very remarkable passages of the Kūrân, in which the 'possessors of a religious book' (Éhl Kitâb) are acknowledged as spiritual brethren, we have the clearest statement of the ethical contrast:—

إِنَّ الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا وَالَّذِينَ هَادُوا وَالنَّصَارَى وَالصَّابِئِينَ مَنْ آمَنَ بِاللَّهِ
وَالْيَوْمِ الْآخِرِ وََعَمِلَ صَالِحًا فَلَهُمْ أَجْرُهُمْ عِنْدَ رَبِّهِمْ وَلَا خَوْفٌ عَلَيْهِمْ
وَلَا هُمْ يَحْزَنُونَ ۝

Surat ii. 61.

Inna 'llad'ina amanû va 'llad'ina hâdi va 'nnasârâh va ssâbâina man âmana billahî va l'jôm il akîr va 'amila sâlihan, p'a lahum aġirohum inda rabbêhim va lâ ġop'um 'alêhim va lâ hum jakîšanîn.

‘Verily those who have believed (in the prophets) and those who have become Jews, and the Christians and the Sabeans, whosoever hath believed in God and the Last Day, *and hath done that which is right*, they shall have their reward with their Lord and no fear upon them, neither shall they grieve’. Marracci translates: Certè qui crediderunt, et qui Judaei sunt, et Christiani et Sabaitae; quisquis (ex his) crediderit in Deum et diem novissimum, et fecerit rectum; erit ipsis merces sua apud Dominum suum, neque timor (erit) super eos, neque ipsi contristabuntur.

وَلَا تُجَادِلُوا أَهْلَ الْكِتَابِ إِلَّا بِالَّتِي هِيَ أَحْسَنُ إِلَّا الَّذِينَ ظَلَمُوا مِنْهُمْ وَقُولُوا آمَنَّا بِالَّذِي أُنْزِلَ إِلَيْنَا وَأُنْزِلَ إِلَيْكُمْ وَالْحَمْدُ لِلَّهِ وَآلِ الْوُحْدَانِ وَاحِدٌ وَذَنُكُنْ لَهُ مُسْلِمُونَ ﴿٤٦﴾

Surat xxix. 46.

Va lâ tuġâdilû ahil alkitâb illâ bilatî hê ah'sanu, illâ 'llad'ina şalamû minhum va kâlû: Âmannâ bilad'i unşila clænâ va unşila clak'um va Elahônâ va Elahôkum v'Âhadûn, va nak'nu lahu Muslimîn!

‘Dispute not with the people of the Book (Christians and Jews) unless in the kindest manner, *except with such of them as deal evilly*, and say ye: “we believe in that which has been sent down unto us (the Ḳurân) and in that which has been sent down unto you (the Old and New Testaments), and our God and your God is One, and to Him are we self-surrendered (resigned or Muslims)”’.

According to Marracci: Et ne disputetis cum familia Libri (i. cum Judaeis et Christianis) nisi cum eo, quod est pulcherrimum (i. verbis humanis, hortando eos ad religionem

vestram) exceptis illis, qui iniqui fuerint ex eis (contra vos: cum his enim non verbis sed gladio disputandum est). Et dicite: Credimus in illud, quod demissum fuit ad nos (id est Alcoranum) et (in id, quod) demissum fuit ad vos (id est Pentateuchum et Evangelium), et Deus noster et Deus vester unus est et nos sumus ei devoti.

Thus the antithesis is that of *صالح* and *ظلام* or the Path of Light and the Way of Darkness. *اصحاب بدع و ضلالت* Those who deviate from the right path.

CHAPTER III.

ARYAN VIEWS OF VIRTUE AND VICE.

We now come to our own race, the Aryan, and here, though we take Sanskrit as a basis, we shall feel at liberty to adduce evidence from nearly all the various members of the Indo-European family of speech.

In the R̥g-Vêda we meet with two concepts of Sin which seem to be peculiar to ourselves, so that he who would read the riddles of the race must know how to consult the oracles of the living word: *अघ* *ajā* or *अंहम्* *aihas* 'the throttler', 'the garotter'; and *एनम्* *ênas* 'the compeller', 'the oppressor'. Such a view of evil is highly instructive and has taken deep root in the Aryan consciousness, as may be seen from the following list of cognates:—

✓ *AG. n. ANH* ✓ *अघ*, nasalised *अंह* 'to press close together'.
Sanskrt: *ajā* sin. evil. *aih-as*, *aih-a-tis* sin. anxiety.
aih-u-s oppression, narrow.
Send: *aj-a* bad, hurtful. *aj-ra* tormenting, evil: *Ajro-Mainjus* the Evil-Minded. *Alriman*. *âs-aj* comp-
 pression, anxiety, sin.

Improbis bonum videt, quoadiu malefactum non maturefcit; ubi vero maturefcit malefactum, tum mala videt. Probus malum videt, quoadiu bonum non maturefcit ubi vero bonum maturefcit, tum bona videt.

Gothic: **BAIT-S** good, **BAITIZA** better, **BAITISTS** best.

Ags.: bet good, betepa better, betep best.

Oly.: baz good, beziro melior, bezisto optimus.

Eng.: bad, malus, better melior, best optimus.

Irish: badh-ach great, good; feodh-as better.

In the Hitôpadêśa, for instance, we read (Mitr. 4):—

। भद्रम् इदं न पश्यामि ।

B'adram idam na paśjâmi.

‘I do not see that this is good’.

Dr. Bühler informs us that the ancient royal title *b'udramuk'a* ‘of pleasing or gracious countenance’ is found in the Western *Kṣātrapa Svâmi-Rudrasêna*, where it is applied to the three kings *Rudradâman*, *Rudrasiniha* and *Rudrasêna*. It is the oldest document in which this rare word occurs, belonging to the end either of the first or of the second century A. D.

Thus in Firdusi’s *Salmamah* we read:—

کشاده بر ایشان شود راز من ۛ بهر نیک و بد هند هنباز
من ۛ

‘Manifestum fiat illis arcanum meum; in omni bono et malo socii mei sunt’.

The root-idea of शील is exactly that of χαρακτήρ, for the root शील meaning amongst other things ‘to make’, ‘to prepare’ is an expansion of शि to sharpen, ‘to make an impression’. Χαρακτήρ ἐν τύποις πέπληκται. (χαράσσω.) It may be rendered ‘nature’, ‘habit’, ‘disposition’, but always in a good sense. With the preposition म् we may translate it ‘good-tempered’. In combination with d’arma it means ‘versed in’ or ‘addicted to’ Law or Religion. Thus in *Mahâbârata* 79:—

किं पुनर्धर्मशीलस्य मम वा मद्विधस्य वा ॥ ८६ ॥

Kim punar'dharmaśīlasja mama vā madvīdhasja vā.

'Who, again, is so religiously-disposed as I, or can be compared to me?'

प्रशस्य and प्रकृष्ट *praśasja* and *prakṛṣṭa* from the roots शंस 'to praise' and कृष् 'to stand out' in the sense of unconscious excellence are more particularly opposed to एनम्.

We now come to the important antithesis पाप V पुण्य *pāpa* V *puṇya* Vice and Virtue. These words play a leading part in the drama of the Aryan ethical consciousness, and are to be met with more especially in the celebrated Buddhist work Dhammapadam. The root of the former is uncertain, but in all probability it is कृक् which has given us the Greek *κακ-ός*, *κάκκ-η*, the Latin *caco* and the Lithuanian *szik-ù*, the idea being that of 'dirt', 'filth'. That the labial and guttural tenues interchange is a fundamental fact in Aryan phonetics. On the other hand, पुण्य is from √पुण् which is an expansion of √पू 'to purify', a root underlying the Greek *ποινή*, *ᾗ-ποινα*, and the Latin *poe-na*, *pû-n-io*, *poe-nitet*. Let us begin with the Upanisads. At the end of the Talavakara or Kêna Upanisad we read:—

यो वा ज्ञातां श्वम् वेद अपहत्य प्राप्मानं अनन्ते स्वर्गे लोकज्ञेये प्रतितिष्ठति
प्रतितिष्ठति ॥ २५ ॥

*Jô vâ jñatâṁ śvamaṁ veda apahatya prāpmānaṁ anantē
svargē lōkējñējē pratitiṣṭati, pratitiṣṭati.*

'He who knows what has been set forth above, being delivered from his sins, obtains an everlasting joy in the heavenly mansions!'

In the Bāgavad-Gīta the word *puṇya* is used of Kṛṣṇa, who says: 'I am the pure odor in the earth and the splendor in the flame' (xii. 9):—

पुण्यो गन्धः पृथिव्यां च तेजश्च 'स्मि विभावसे ।

Puṇjō gandhaḥ pṛthivjāṁ k'a tējaśka 'smi vibāvasaṁ.

Of the true Bīkṣu we read in the Dhammapadam that, it is not 'he who begs' but the religious man who, 'above and away from the *good* and the *bad*, lives considerately in the world'.

॥ *Jō d'a puññañ k'a pāpañ k'a bāhetvā brahmacārijaṇā*
Samk'āja lōke k'arati, sa ve Bīkk'hū ti vuk'kati. ॥

Dham. 19. cclxvii.

Qui hic, bono maloque alienato, religiosus considerate in mundo vivit, is profecto *bīkṣus* appellatur.

Again:

- ॥ 17. Id'a tappati, pek'ka tappati
pāpakāri, ub'ajatt'a tappati;
'Pāpam me katan' ti tappati.
b'ijjō tappati duggatinā gato.
18. Id'a nandati, pek'ka nandati
katapūñño, ub'ajatt'a nandati;
'puññaṃ me katan' ti nandati:
b'ijjō nandati suggatinā gato. ॥

In hōc aevō cruciatur, morte obita cruciatur malum patrans, utrobique cruciatur; "malum a me peractum", ita (cogitans) cruciatur, magis cruciatur tartarum ingressus. In hōc aevō gaudet, morte obitā gaudet qui bonum perfecit, utrobique gaudet; "bonum a me peractum", ita (cogitans) gaudet, magis gaudet coelum ingressus.

Gogerly translates: 'The sinner suffers in this world, and he will suffer in the next world. In both worlds he suffers; he suffers, knowing—sin has been committed by me; and dreadfully will he suffer in the regions of torment'.

'The virtuous man is happy in this world, and he will be happy in the next world. In both worlds he is happy; he is happy, knowing—I have acted virtuously, and greatly will he rejoice in heaven'.

A painfully prolific root in Sanskrit is दुष् to corrupt, vitiate, which gives us दीय vice, blemish, sin; दुष्कृति *du'sprakṛti* 'of an evil disposition'; दुष्कृत and दुर्वृत *duṣkṛta* and *durvyṛta* wicked, criminal.

परिणते च गुणाः सर्वे मूर्खे दीपाश्च केवलम् ।
तस्मान्मूर्खसहस्रेषु प्राज्ञ एको विशिष्यते ॥

Paṇḍitē k'a guṇāḥ sarvê mûrkê dōśāśka kēvalam |
Tasmānmûrkasahasrêsu prâjña êkô viśiṣyatē ||

And in a learned man are all excellent qualities; but in a blockhead faults (or blemishes) only. Hence, amongst thousands of fools, one wise man is distinguished.

In the Avesta, too, we find the expression *dušvarsta* used in the sense of 'wrong-doing', 'sin'. Thus the Haoma worshipper says (Jasna x. 48):—

.. . . .
Hvarstahê ahmî dušvarstahê nôid ahmî.

'I am of those who do right, and do not belong to those who do wrong'.

As a prefix *dus* is opposed to *su* (Sd.: *duš V hu*) and appears in Persian as *duš*, Gr.: *δυς*-, Gothic: *tus*-, Old High German: *zur*- and Modern High German: *zer*-, Skt. *Dur-manâs* = Sd.: *duš-manag* = Gk.: *δυς-μενής*. With दुष् is connected √द्विष् to hate, so that we have दीय sin, द्वेष hatred. In Greek we have Ὀδυσ-εύ-ς; ὠδυσίη; ὀδυσσά-μενος hating.

Of the Brahmakârin to whom one may impart the secret of Vêdânta it is said:—

प्रशान्तचित्ताय जितेन्द्रियाय च प्रहृणदीपाय यथोक्तकारिणे ।

Praśāntakittâja gitêndrijâja k'a prahîṇadōśâja jat'ôktakârinê.

'Whose mind is at rest, who has his organs under control, whose sin has disappeared, and who acts according to command'.

Opposed to this root is √शुध् to cleanse, to purify. The derivatives are particularly interesting and worthy of study.

Skt.: शुध् *śud*, *śud'-jâ-mi* lustror, *śudd'i* puritas.

Gk.: καθ-αρό-ς pure. κάθ-αρσις purification. expiation.
Κασταλία.

Lat.: *cas-tu-s* for *cad-tu-s* pure.

Russ.: чистотá cleanliness. чист-ыйii pure.

Kro.: *čis-toća* }

Pol.: *czys-tość* } cleanliness. *Ecls.*: *čis-tŭ* pure.

Boh.: *čis-tota* } *Lith.*: *čŷys-ta-s* pure.

Ohg.: *heit-ar* innocent. happy.

Ir.: *cuidh* clean. pure.

न हि मे शुध्यते भावः

N. 8. 18.

Na hi mē śud'jatē bāvah.

‘Verily, my disposition is not purified’.

Μακάριοι οἱ καθαροὶ τῇ καρδίᾳ, ὅτι αὐτοὶ τὸν Θεὸν ὁψονται.

Блаженны чистые сердцемъ; ꙗко они Бога узрятъ.

Blahoslavení čistého srdce; nebo oni Boha viděti budou.

Blagosławieni czystego serca; albowiem oni Boga ogladają.

Blago onim, koji su čistoga srea jer će Boga vidjeti.

The well-known forms सत् and असत् tò ὄν and tò μὴ ὄν Being and Not-Being, Good and Evil, show us that the generalisation of the Aryans coincides with that of the Hamites, Semites and Turanians. In Persian بود و نا بود have also the sense of riches and poverty.

As we saw at the outset of our enquiry, the root अस् to breathe, to be, from which come सत् and असत् has been prolific of ethical terminology. Thus we have सत्य true; सत्यता truth; सत्त्व mind conscious of itself; सत्कार worship. In Hindūstāni اچھا is still used for ‘good’. E. g.: يه لڙڪا اس سى اچھا هي *Jih laṛkā us se akkā hai* ‘this boy is better than that’. سب لڙڪون سى اچھا *Sab laṛkoṇ se akkā* ‘best of all the boys’.

The concepts Being and Not-Being, Right and Wrong have long been familiar to the Hindûs. There are several very remarkable passages in the R̥gvêda and in the Upaniṣads in which these words occur. Thus we read (R̥gv. x. 5, 7.):—

असत् । च । सत् । च । परमे । विऽश्रीमन् ।
दत्तस्य । जन्मन् । अदितेः । उपऽस्ये ॥

*Asat ka sat ka paramê vi-ôman dakṣasja ġanman,
Aditêh upa-s'tê.*

‘Not Being and Being, Right and Wrong are in the highest heaven, in the birthplace of force, in the lap of the Infinite!’

देवानां युगे प्रथमे असतः सत् अजायत ॥ R̥v. x. 72. 3.

Dêvânâm jugê pratamê asatah sat ajâjata.

‘In the first age of the gods Being (Right) was born from Not-Being (Wrong)’.

But the most celebrated passage occurs in the Creation-Hymn ascribed to Pragâpati Paramêś'tin (R̥v. 10. 129):—

न असत् आसीत् नो इति सत् आसीत् तदानं ॥
Na asat âsît nô iti sat âsît tadânâm.

‘When Time was born, was neither Is nor Is-Not, Right nor Wrong!’

In the sixth prapâṭ'aka of the Kândôgja Upaniṣad we find Uddâlaka discoursing to his son Svêtakêtu about the origin of Sat and Asat:—

सत् एव इदम् अग्रे आसीत् एकम् एव अद्वितीयम् ॥
Sat êva idam agre âsît, êkam êva advitijam.

‘In the beginning there was that only which Is (Right): one only, without a second’.

The father continues: ‘Others say, in the beginning there was that only which is not (wrong): one only, without a second, and from that which is not, that which is was

born. But how could it be thus, my dear? How could that which is, be born of that which is not? No, my dear, only that which is, was in the beginning: one only, without a second'.

Like the Egyptians and Chinese the Aryans are fully conscious of the *crookedness* of Evil; that sin is a deviation from the straight and narrow path. Hence the contrast ऋजु *R̥gu* straight, upright; वृजिन *vr̥jina* crookedness, sin. E. g. in R̥gvêda 4, 1, 17 we read how Sûrja, the undying, looks down upon the right and the wrong (straight and crooked) amongst mortals.

आ सूर्यः वृद्धतः तिष्ठत् अजान् ऋजु मर्तेषु वृजिना च पश्यन् ॥

Â sârjah b̥hatah tiṣṭat agrân r̥gu martēṣu vr̥jinâ ka paśjan.

These words and ideas are specially interesting and important because they are radically and conceptually connected with our own words *right* and *wrong*. In order to fully gauge the concepts we shall do well to take note of the cognate words.

✓ARG. ✓RAG. to attain.

Skt.: अर्ज् अर्जामि *ar̥j-â-mi* I acquire; ऋजुस् *r̥jus* right, straight, upright; राजिस् *râjîs* row, line; ऋजम् *R̥j-ra-s* Leader.

Ṣd.: ṛ̥j̥ṣ̥ *ereṣu* straight, right, upright. As subst. 'finger.'

Gk.: ὀρέγ-ω, ὀρέγ-υυ-μι I reach, stretch; ὀριγ-βά-ο-μαι I stretch myself, attain; ὀρεγ-μα, ὀρεξι-ς a stretch; ὀρυιᾶ a clasp, a grasp.

Lat.: *reg-o*, *ê-rig-o*, *por-rig-o*, *rogu-s*, *rec-tu-s*. *rex*.

Goth.: rak̥jan *rak-jan* to stretch, reach; raihts *raiht-s* straight, right.

Ags.: ꝥæcan to reach; riht right.

An allied concept is that of ऋत *ṛta* the right, the orderly, the true; from √ऋ *r* to go, to strive, to fix. Thus we read (Rgv. x, 133, 6):—

ऋतम्य नः पथा नय अति विश्वानि दुःश्रिता.

Ṛtasja nah patā naja ati viśvāni duḥ-itā.

‘Lead us (O Indra) on the right path over all evils’.

Varuna, Mitra and Arjamaṇ are described as *ṛtaspr̥śaḥ* upholding the Right, and the gods generally are said to delight in *Ṛta* and to hate *Anṛta* (Rgv. v. 67. 4; vi. 52. 10; vii. 66. 13):—

ते हि सत्याः ऋतःस्पृशः ऋतःश्रुतः जनेःश्रुते ।

Tē hi satyāḥ ṛta-spr̥śaḥ ṛta-śr̥utāḥ janē-śr̥utē.

विश्वे देवाः ऋतःश्रुतः ऋतःभिः

Viśvê devāḥ Ṛta-śr̥utāḥ Ṛta-bhiḥ

दृवनःश्रुतः जुषतां युज्यं पयः ॥ १० ॥

havana-śr̥utāḥ j̥uṣatām j̥uḡjyam pajah

ऋतःश्रुतः ऋतःश्रुतः ऋतःश्रुतः

घोरामः अनृतःश्रुतः ।

Ṛta-śr̥utāḥ Ṛta-śr̥utāḥ Ṛta-śr̥utāḥ

g̥ôrāsaḥ Anṛta-śr̥utāḥ.

In Vasiṣṭa’s hymn to Varuṇa *anṛta* is used in the sense of ‘all evil’.

स्वप्नः च न इत् अनृतस्य प्रश्रुता ॥ ६ ॥

Śvapnaḥ cha it Anṛtasja pra-śr̥utā.

‘Even sleep does not remove all evil’. vii. 86. 6.

Herr Geldner translates: ‘Sogar der Traum verschliesst sich nicht dem Unrecht’.

In the Avesta we find 𐬀𐬵𐬭𐬀, which is the old Bactrian form of ऋत, used in the sense of Cosmic Order, of κόσμος as opposed to χάος; 𐬀𐬵𐬭𐬀𐬀𐬵𐬭𐬀 ‘belonging to the holy, well-ordered Creation’ = ऋतवान्.

√ VAS to dwell, abide.

√ AK to writhe.

Skt.: वस् to dwell; वसु *vasu* riches; वासु *vâs-tu* house; वास्तव्यम् *vâ-stavya-s* οἰκείος.

अक् tortuose ire;
अक् *ak-a* sin, affliction.

Sd.: वाञ्छ to abide; वाञ्छन् *vaññ* beautiful, good, noble; वाञ्छन् *va-ññ* goodness, excellence.

अक् *aku* base, bad.

OP.: वाहुक *Vahuka*.

Pv.: वह *vêh* good.

Pers.: باه *bah* good.

अक् *ak* evil.

Gk.: φαῦς *faṣ*. ἄστυ (for *ῥάστυ*) City; ἀστέιος *astéios* civic; ἀστός *astós* citizen.

Goth.: visan *vis-an* to be (*vas*, *vêsum*, *visans*); *ga-visan* to abide; *vists* essence, nature; *vis* stillness. *Gôth ist unsis her visan* 'it is good for us to be here.'

Ays.: peṭan *ves-an* to be.

Icl.: vcrā.

Mhy.: Wesen, war.

Eng.: Was.

Skt.: *vasu*, *vasjas*, *vasiṣṭa* = *Sd.:* *vaññ*, *vaññāñ*, *vahista*.

As an ethical expression *vaññ* is most commonly used in connexion with the two *Amēsa spentas*—*Aša* the most noble and *Mano* the good. *Aša vahista*, *Vôhu Manaññ*. Opposed to the latter is *Akem Manô* Bad Mind, the arch-demon; *Akistem Manô* the Worst Mind, *Agra Mainjus* himself.

The radical antithesis is thus conceived as Rest V Motion. Goodness is that which abides, Evil is full of a tortuous, snake-like activity.

We may take a strophe from the 30th Hā of the Jasma, which forms part of the Gâtâ Ahunavaiti, as the best textual illustration:—

այգևաւ .սպէցաւ .սրբաւ .լլայարեւաւ .բայբայ .սառ .հաւ
 .բաւ .փրանեալացաւ .սրբապրան .սրբապրան .բաւ .սրբապրան
 .սառապրան .սառ .փրանեալացաւ .սրբապրան .սրբապրան .սրբապրան
 . . . փրանեալացաւ .հաւ

*Aḍ tâ Mainjê paourujê jâ jemâ kâfîâ asrâtem ma-
 nahikâ vakahikâ skjao'anôî hî rahjê akemkâ ajaoškâ
 hudâogjê eres vîsjâtâ nôid duşdâogjê.*

‘These two heavenly beings, the twins, were the first to be heard, namely, the Noble and the Base in thought, word and work. Of these rightly chose the wise, not so the unwise!’

‘Violation of the categorical imperative’ is perhaps the truest rendering of the Sanskrit **हिंसा** *himsâ* from the root **हिम्** *hims*, primarily to kill, injure; then to violate, offend. It is action contrary to **धर्म**, whereby the moral sense is injured. On the other hand, **अहिंसा** *ahimsâ* is the perfection of **धर्म**. As with the metaphysical antithesis between *Brahman* and *Samsâra*, between phaenomena and the Thing-in-itself, so here in immediate connexion we have the ethical contrast between denial and affirmation.

अहिंसा परमो धर्मः अहिंसा परमा गतिः ।

अहिंसा परमा प्रीतिम् त्वहिंसा परमं पदम् ॥

‘Harmlessness or the-denial-of-the-Will-to-life is the highest Duty, the most excellent way, the supreme Joy, the noblest thought!’

Or as we have it in the beautiful language of the B’agavad-Gîtâ:—

समं सर्वेषु भूतेषु तिष्ठन्तं परमेश्वरं ।

विनश्यत्स्वविनश्यन्तं यः पश्यति स पश्यति ॥ २० ॥

समं पश्यन् हि सर्वत्र समवस्थितमेश्वर ।

न हिनस्त्यात्मनात्मानं ततो याति परां गतिं ॥ २८ ॥

In all things dwells the Lord supreme,
Undying, when they cease to be.
Whoso can look beyond the dream
And know Him—he indeed can see:—
The Self within he cannot wrong,
But treads the Path serene and strong!

A characteristic thought of good and evil is that of the gay and the grave, the bright and the blurred. In the well-known Indian maxim: अवश्यम् एव भोक्तव्यं कृतं कर्म शुभाशुभम् 'The fruit of every action good or bad is of necessity to be eaten'; we have the compound *śub'âśub'a* from *√śub* to shine, be gay, and a *privative*.

In *अतिक्रम*, from *√kram* to step, and *ati* beyond, we have the familiar view expressed in *παράβασις* and *transgressio*, more particularly as the overstepping or going beyond a law. 'Peccare', says Cicero 'est tanquam transilire lineas', but for the full significance of the conception we must listen to St. Paul:—

Ὅς ἐν νόμῳ καυχᾶσαι, διὰ τῆς παραβάσεως τοῦ νόμου τὸν Θεὸν ἀτιμάζεις;

Qui in lege gloriaris, per legis transgressionem Deum ignominia afficis?

Rom. ii. 23.

Καὶ Ἀδὰμ οὐκ ἠπατήθη· ἡ δὲ γυνὴ ἀπατηθεῖσα, ἐν παραβάσει γέγονε·

Adam non est seductus; mulier autem seducta, in transgressionem fuit.

1 Tim. ii. 14.

But sin is not only the transgressing of a law or line; it is sometimes the non-observance of a law—*ἀνομία*, *παρὰνομία*. The Stoics defined sin as νόμου ἀπατόρευμα,

and St. Augustine well said that it was 'factum vel dictum vel concupitum aliquid contra aeternam legem.'

Καὶ τότε ἀποκαλυφθήσεται ὁ ἄνομος, ὃν ὁ Κύριος ἀνα-
λώσει τῷ πνεύματι τοῦ στόματος αὐτοῦ, καὶ καταργήσῃ τῇ
ἐπιφανείᾳ τῆς παρουσίας αὐτοῦ. 2 Thess. ii. 8.

By ὁ ἄνομος St. Paul here means ὁ ἄνθρωπος τῆς
ἁμαρτίας, ὁ υἱὸς τῆς ἀπωλείας.

Παράπτωμα sin as 'falling away' is not found in clas-
sical Greek, but is familiar to us in the writings of
St. Paul. Its Sanskrit equivalent पातक (Pat. पेट) is used
in the sense of crime both in the B'agavad-Gītā and the
Hitōpadēśa.

Καὶ ὑμεῖς, ὄντας νεκροὺς τοῖς παραπτώμασι καὶ ταῖς
ἁμαρτίαις. Ephes. ii. 1.

Καὶ παραπεσόντας, πάλιν ἀνακαινίζειν εἰς μετάνοιαν,
ἀνασταυροῦντας ἑαυτοῖς τὸν Υἱὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ παραδειγ-
ματίζοντας. Heb. vi. 6.

यद्यप्येते न पश्यन्ति लीभिपहतचेतसः ।

कुलक्षयकृतं दीपं मित्रद्वीहे च पातकं ॥ ३८ ॥

B'g. i. 38.

'Should we not resolve to forego so sinful a deed, we,
who hold the murder of relatives to be sin?'

In the New Testament, where ethical terms have the
deepest significance, we find, moreover, the principle of evil
conceived as disobedience to a voice, παρακοή; ignorance
of what one ought to have known, ἀγνόημα; a diminution
of what should have been rendered in full measure, ἥττημα;
as discord, πλημμέλεια; and as the missing of a mark or
aim, the failing to attain the true end and scope of our
life, ἁμαρτία.

Ὡςπερ γὰρ διὰ τῆς παρακοῆς τοῦ ἐνὸς ἀνθρώπου ἁμαρ-
τωλοὶ κατεστάθησαν οἱ πολλοί· οὕτω καὶ διὰ τῆς ὑπακοῆς
τοῦ ἐνὸς δίκαιοι κατασταθήσονται οἱ πολλοί. Rom. v. 19.

Εἰς δὲ τὴν δευτέραν ἅπαξ τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ μόνος ὁ ἀρχιερεὺς, οὐ χωρὶς αἵματος, ὃ προσφέρει ὑπὲρ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τῶν τοῦ λαοῦ ἀγνοημάτων.

Heb. ix. 7.

Οὐδεὶς ἐκὼν κακός says Plato, and it may well be asked whether all forms of wrong do not more or less partake of the nature of an ἀγνόημα. On the above passage Trench aptly observes:—

“The ἀγνοήματα, or ‘errors’ of the people, for which the High Priest offered sacrifice on the great day of atonement, were not wilful transgressions, ‘presumptuous sins’ (Ps. xix. 13), ‘peccata proaeretica’, committed against conscience and with a high hand against God; those who committed such would be cut off from the congregation; there was no provision made in the Levitical constitution for the forgiveness of such (Num. xv. 30, 31); but sins growing out of the weakness of the flesh, out of an imperfect insight into God’s law, out of heedlessness and lack of due circumspection (Lev. v. 15—17; Num. xv. 22—29), and afterwards looked back on with shame and regret.”

Ἡττημα is the Latin ‘delictum’, the German *Fehler*, the coming short of Duty, a fault. Thus St. Paul says:—

Ἦδη μὲν οὖν ὅλως ἡττημα ὑμῖν ἐστιν, ὅτι κρίματα ἔχετε μεθ’ ἑαυτῶν. Διατί οὐχὶ μᾶλλον ἀδικεῖσθε; διατί οὐχὶ μᾶλλον ἀποστερεῖσθε.

1 Cor. vi. 7.

Πλημμέλεια, from πλὴν and μέλος, is evil as Discord, a singing out of Tune, opposed to ἐμμέλεια, the right modulation of the voice to the music. It is often found in the Septuagint.

‘Disproportioned sin
Jarred against nature’s chime, and with harsh din
Broke the fair music that all creatures made
To their great Lord.’

But by far the most significant view of sin to be found in the New Testament is that expressed in the word *ἁμαρτία*, namely, the missing of a mark, the failing to attain the true scope and goal of our lives. It is the word of the master and of his beloved disciple.

Τίς ἐξ ὑμῶν ἐλέγχει με περὶ ἁμαρτίας;

That is to say: 'Who can show that I have failed of the Divine, that I have missed the true Mark?'

Εἰ τὰ ἔργα μὴ ἐποίησα ἐν αὐτοῖς, ἃ οὐδεὶς ἄλλος ἐποίησεν, ἁμαρτίαν οὐκ εἶχουσιν·

The Jews did wrong (*ἁμαρτία*) because they failed to see in Christ the Revelation of the Father, the *πῶρ* and the Λόγος of God. And we too sin when we are content with anything less than the secret of Jesus!

Righteousness, on the other hand, is expressed by *δσιότης*, *δικαιοσύνη*, *ἀγιότης* and *ἀγνεία*.

δσιότης corresponds to the Latin *sanctitas*: it is the divine constitution of the κόσμος, the everlasting ordinance of right. In classical Greek it is generally applied to piety toward the gods and dutifulness to parents; in the Septuagint *δσιος* is used as the rendering of *דִּשָּׁה* the man who loves God; the saint. Plato says: Καὶ μὴν περὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τὰ προσήκοντα πράττων, δίκαι' ἂν πράττοι, περὶ δὲ θεοὺς ὅσια (Gorg. 507b). Here *δσιος* is the pious man. *δίκαιος* is he who is faithful in his obligations to his fellowmen. But in another dialogue Plato regards *δικαιοσύνη* or τὸ δίκαιον as the sum total of all virtue: τοῦτο τοίνυν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ μέρος τοῦ δικαίου εἶναι εὐσεβές τε καὶ ὅσιον, τὸ περὶ τὴν τῶν θεῶν θεραπείαν· τὸ δὲ περὶ τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὸ λοιπὸν εἶναι τοῦ δικαίου μέρος (Euthyphro 12e).

According to its etymology *δίκη*, *δικαιοσύνη* is that which can be pointed at, so, firstly, established practice, consolidated custom, law.

√DIK to point out.

Skt.: √दिक् दिशामि *dis-â-mi* I show, direct; दिशा direction.

Gk.: √δικ· δείκ-νυ-μι I point, show; δείξι-ς notice; δείγμα something shown; δίκ-η Right; δίκ-αιος, δικ-αιосύνη.

Lat.: √dic. dico; causi-dic-u-s; in-dico; judex, dicis causa.

Goth.: √tīh. teih-an, táiht. taihum, taihans; to show, announce.

Ger.: √zig. zeig-e I point.

ἀριότης and ἀρνεία are both from the root ἄρ meaning primarily to set apart, worship.

√JAG.

Skt.: √यज् यजामि *jaḡ-â-mi* I sacrifice, worship; यगम् *jaḡ-am* sacrifice; यज्यम् *jaḡjyas* = ἅγιος adorable.

Gk.: √ἄγ· ἄζ-ο-μαι I stand in awe of; ἅγ-ιο-ς holy; ἅγ-νό-ς pure; ἁγίζω I consecrate; ἅγ-ος sacrifice.

Skt.: √जग् to sacrifice, praise; जगता *jas-ata* adorable.

Δικαιοσύνη γὰρ θεοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ ἀποκαλύπτεται ἐκ πίστεως εἰς πίστιν, καθὼς γέγραπται· ὁ δὲ δίκαιος ἐκ πίστεως ζήσεται.

Rom. i. 17.

Καὶ τῷ ἁγγέλῳ τῆς ἐν Φιλαδελφείᾳ ἐκκλησίας γράψον· τὰδε λέγει ὁ ἅγιος, ὁ ἀληθινὸς, ὁ ἔχων τὴν κλεῖδα τοῦ Δαυεὶδ, ὁ ἀνοίγων, καὶ οὐδεὶς κλείει, καὶ κλείει, καὶ οὐδεὶς ἀνοίγει·

Rev. iii. 7.

Μηδεὶς σου τῆς νεότητος καταφρονεῖτω, ἀλλὰ τύπος γίνου τῶν πιστῶν ἐν λόγῳ, ἐν ἀναστροφῇ, ἐν ἀγάπῃ, ἐν πίστει, ἐν ἀρνεΐᾳ.

1 Tim. iv. 12.

Lastly, we have the well-known contrast between the good of its kind—ἀγαθός and the bad of its kind—κακός. Ἀγαθός is from the root *ǵād* meaning to stand, be firm; the thought of goodness being that of *stability*, whilst κακός from *√kak* to be unsteady, to vacillate, gives us the idea of badness as *instability*. From *√ǵād* come also the familiar Teutonic forms gôd, kuot, good, gut.¹

Amongst the Romans this contrast was expressed by bonus V malus, the bright and the black, light and darkness. The earlier form of bonus was duonus from the root div (dju) which has given us deus, dies, Diana p. 31). Just as bi-du-u-m stands for bi-div-u-m so du-o-nus stands for div-o-nus, which at once reminds us of divinus, and in truth the good is never far from the divine. Malus, on the other hand, is connected with a mournful group of words, as may be seen from the following list:—

√MAL to be dirty.

Skt.: मलम् *mal-a-s* dirt, filth; मलिनम् *mal-ina-s* black;
मलिष्टम् *mal-iṣṭa-s* very foul, very wicked; मलाक्रा
mal-ākṛā a lewd woman.

Gk.: μέλας black; μελαίν-ω I blacken; μολύν-ω I pollute.

Lat.: mal-u-s, mal-itia, mali-gnu-s, male-ficu-s.

Goth.: mail.

Ohg.: meil a spot, blemish.

Lit.: mól-i-s mud; mól-yna-s blue.

Lett.: mel-s black.

Peculiarly instructive are the words *Evil* and *Sin*. The former is from *√vab*, the latter from *√as*. Already we have seen sin as the 'throttler' (अहंस्) and the 'writher' (آيك) and now we have to know it as 'that which is woven'

¹ See p. 20.

and 'that which is bound'; actively also as 'weaver' and 'binder' (evil: peccatum).

√VAB' to weave.

Skt.: वम् in ऊनवाभम् ūna-vāb'-as wool-weaver = spider.

Gk.: ὕφ· ὕφ-άω and ὕφ-αίνω I weave. θεμέλια Φοῖβος ὕφαίνει Phoebe lays (*lit.* weaves) the foundation. ὕφ-ή woof.

Goth.: 𐍂𐍄𐍂𐍅 malus; 𐍂𐍄𐍂𐍅𐍂𐍅𐍄𐍄 malefactor; 𐍂𐍄𐍂𐍅𐍂𐍅𐍄𐍄𐍂𐍅𐍄𐍄 𐍂𐍄𐍂𐍅𐍂𐍅𐍄𐍄𐍂𐍅𐍄𐍄 𐍂𐍄𐍂𐍅𐍂𐍅𐍄𐍄𐍂𐍅𐍄𐍄 𐍂𐍄𐍂𐍅𐍂𐍅𐍄𐍄𐍂𐍅𐍄𐍄 maledicere.

Ags.: ýfel malus; etc.

Tô lang is tô recenne, hû ic þam leód-sceaðan

Yfla gehvylces hond-leán forgeald.

Beón. 2094-5.

Mhg.: Üb-el malus; Übeltäter malefactor.

Eng.: Ev-il malus; evildoer malefactor.

Erlöse uns von dem Übel.

Deliver us from Evil.

As regards *peccatum* opinions differ as to its derivation. Pott, for instance, fixed upon the root *pik*, which has given us पिशुनम् traitor, treacherous; Lithuanian *pik-tas* bad; *pjĭk-ti* to be angry; *peĭk-ti* to despise, scold; Greek πικ-ρός, πευκεδανός, πευκάλιμος bitter, sharp; but, inasmuch as √*pik* seems fundamentally to mean 'to sting' or 'stab', it hardly fits peccare. On the whole I am inclined to believe that *pak* is the root, giving us 'binding' as the primary view of Sin to the Romance peoples.

√PAK' to bind.

Skt.: पाशम् pāś-as trap, halter; पाशयामि pāśa-jâ-mi I bind; पञ्चम् jat, solid; पशुम् paś-us cattle.

Sd.: ωωδ *paś* to bind.

Gk.: παγ· πήγ-νυ-μι (ἐ-πάγ-ην) I make fast, confirm;
πήγ-μα pedestal; πηγ-ός fast, strong; πάγ-ος,
πάγ-νη rime, frost; πάγ-η trap; πάσσ-αλος =
πακ-ја-λος plug.

Lat.: pac-i-sc-or; pâx; pac-i-o; pâ-lus; pang-o; pec-c-are;
pec-c-atu-m; pig-nus; pec-u.

Goth.: fah-an to catch; fulla-fah-jan ικανὸν ποιεῖν; fagr-s
εὔθετος; faili-u property.

Ohg.: fuog-a, gafnogi aptus; gafag-jan to satisfy; fah de-
partment; fih-u cattle.

Mhg.: fang-en; Fach; füg-en; Fug-e; füg-lich; Vieh.

OPr.: pek-u cattle, property.

Boh.: pás girdle; pás-mo thread, yarn. *Eng.*: fing-er.

The order of conceptual evolution seems to be: to bind fast, to catch, to freeze.

From the Ṛgveda itself we know that both sin and punishment are spoken of as fetters or cords. Thus we read:—

‘O Sôma, Rudra, all the medicines that ye have, put into our bodies. Whatever guilt cleaves to us which we have brought upon ourselves, take away, and set us free! Ye bearers of the pointed spear and sharp lance, O Sôma-Rudra, show gracious favor; deliver us from the fetters (pâśād) of Varuṇa and take us into thy friendly protection!’

Ṛgv. 6. 74.

This thought of sin is thus thoroughly Aryan, and is present not only to the linguistic consciousness of the Romance nations, but has been handed on to the Welsh as *pechod*.

Latin: peccatum.

Welsh: pechod.

French: péché.

Spanish: pecco, peccado.

Portuguese: peca.

Italian: pecca.

Provençal: peca.

Perhaps the most difficult to determine is the word *sin* itself. Already we have seen how often evil has been conceived as Not-Being, but here it seems at first sight as though sin had been conceived as Being, if we are right in deriving it from *√as*, which has given us the Gothic *sun-ja* truth. being. The real difficulty is the vowel in Latin. where. instead of son-s we should have expected sen-s (pre-sen-s, ab-sen-s).

Ags.: seôn-an to bring a sacrifice, purify; syn sin.

To gebetenne ealle mine sinna

To atone for all my sins.

L. Can. Edg. Conf. 9.

ON.: son piaculum. expiation; synd quod expiandum est; synia negare.

Danish }
Swedish } synd sin
Icelandic }

Gothic: sann expiation.

Dutch: zonde sin.

Mhy.: Sünde sin; sühm-en to expiate.

Irish: sain to change.

Galic: sain-e discord.

Norse: onde evil.

Latin: son-s guilt; in-son-s guiltless.

If this is a case of polarity we might well be tempted to compare:—

Gk.: σάο-ς, σόο-ς, σῶο-ς, σῶς whole; σῶ-κο-ς powerful; σαώω, σώ-ζ-ω I heal. save; σω-τήρ saviour; ἄ-σω-το-ς unsaved.

<i>Lat.:</i>	sâ-nu-s	whole.
<i>Ohg.:</i>	ga-sunt	well.
<i>Ags.:</i>	sund	healthy.
<i>Eng.:</i>	sound.	

Now it is quite possible that all these words come from *vas*, not so much, however, in its secondary sense of Being as rather in its primary meaning of Breathing (skt.: *as-u-s* breath of life; *âs* mouth; lat. *ôs*).

vas to breathe.

Skt.: *वअस् अस्मि as-mi* am; *अस्ति is*; *सत् sat* being, good; *स्वस्तिम् sv-as-ti-s* well-being; *सु su* = *eu* well; *असुरम् asu-ra-s* living; *असुस् as-u-s* breath of life.

Gk.: *ἰέε· εἰ-μί = ἐσμι*; 3. S. *ἐσ-τί*; *εὖ-εσ-τώ* well-being; *ἐσ-θ-λό-ς* excellent; *ἐ-ὖ-ς* good.

Sd.: *अहम् ah-mi* am; *अस्ति as-ti* is.

Lith.: *es-mi* am; *es-ti* is; *es-a-ba* essence; *es-ni-s* substantial.

Eccls.: *jes-mi* am; *jes-ti* is.

Lat.: (e) *s-u-m* am; *es-t* is.

Osc.: *es-uf* estate.

Goth.: *i-m* am; *is-t* is; *sun-i-s* true; *sun-ja* truth.

Eng.: *a-m, is*.

On.: *sunm-r* true.

The order of conceptual evolution seems to be: α) breath β) life γ) being δ) reality ε) truth ζ) goodness.

If the word *sin* really comes from this root there can, I think, be little doubt that it is the primary sense of 'breathing', 'mouth', for 'out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh'.

It is, however, possible that 'sin' and its cognates come directly from σίν-ος a mischief, a plague; σίν-ο-μαι I plunder, spoil; σίν-της ravenous.

There remain a few ethical concepts, mostly savage, the etymology of which I am unable to give:—

<i>Kâfir:</i>	enkohlakalu	evil.		
	şono	trespass.		
<i>Şulu:</i>	ekwon	evil.		
	şono	trespass.		
<i>Sesuto:</i>	beñ	evil.		
	melatu	trespass.		
<i>Bari:</i>	torónjak	sin.		
	nárók	evils.		
<i>Temne:</i>	trabeitra	sin.		
	trạlaş	evil.		
<i>Oki:</i>	akaw	sin.		
	bone	evil.		
<i>Kamilroi:</i>	kagil	bad.	<i>Musuk:</i> dâr	bad.
	muřu	good.	pidém	good.
<i>Macquarie:</i>	jarakai	evil.	<i>Kamir:</i> gíg	bad.
	jirijiri	sacred.	bin	debitum.
<i>Odul:</i>	omok	good.	kas	good.
<i>Kukken:</i>	nimelkin	good.		
<i>Aleutic:</i>	iğamanak	good.		
<i>Encounter Bay:</i>	brûp	bad.		
	nañkur	good.		
<i>Adelaide:</i>	muijo	good.		
<i>West-Australian:</i>	gul	bad.		
	gwab	good.		
<i>Ostjak:</i>	boğat }	right	(= b'agavat, from √b'ag²)	
<i>Kottish:</i>	pagai }			
<i>Kippewê:</i>	neşũ	good.		

CHAPTER IV.

THE CONCEPT OF LOVE.

Having applied the search-light of language to the grave issues of Right and Wrong, Good and Evil, Sanctity and Sin, turn we now to the beautiful thought of Love. Treating the words of each language separately we shall obtain a picture of the individual nation's thought. A comparison of the pictures so won will bring out national characteristics and reveal the nature of that holy state which has been truly described as the greatest thing in the world. Hebrew shall represent the early Semites, Sanskrit and Persian the Āryas, Greek and Latin cultured European antiquity, Gothic the Teutonic world, and Russian the aspirations and inspirations of the Slavs¹.

I. SEMITIC.

The cultured European of to-day may perhaps find it hard to realise a naive antiquity, a sceptical present can only with difficulty enter into the emotional life of a devout past, to which the Supernatural was a reality more vital than anything physical. To the Jew of the ancient East Love was not what it is to the Gentile of the modern West. The different kinds of love which are possible between members of the human race the Hebrew distinguished as concrete and abstract, as active and inactive. Whilst the former was analysed according to the mood

¹ In his Linguistic essays my friend Dr. Abel has on this subject an excellent chapter, to which as regards the Hebrew conception I am much indebted.

and motives from which it springs. the latter was considered to be the same in all cases. So long as love was denoted as mere feeling, one word seemed to him enough for all the various relations between man and man in which it can manifest itself. But where the benevolent purposes which accompany love and the delightful results were emphasized, he became conscious of the manifold gradations of the feeling in strength and motive and felt the need of several words, the synonymity of which was quite peculiar to him. If, on the one hand, this view represents the simple relations of early times in which less was thought of the good intention than of the good deed, yet, on the other, we must remember that the latter springs from love, nay, that it is indeed love itself. Hence the application of the concept in all its various Hebrew colors to Jahvêh himself and the tracing of all earthly love to its divine Source.

אהב

י^אAHAB· to breathe quickly, to love.

Hebr.: אהב he loved; אהב loving, a friend, lover; אהבה love, delight.

Sam.: אבה amavit.

Ar.: هب concitatus est, anhelavit: احب amiable, most lovely; احبا friends; احباب favorites; حب الوطن Amor patriae.

لله هكذا احب الله العالم

‘For God so loved the world.’

אהבה לאלה העולם.

The history of this Hebrew word forms, as Prof. Abel truly says, a sacred chapter in the history of humanity. Like ἀγάπη, its equivalent among the Greeks. Ahav is love as pure feeling, embracing not only the love between man and woman but also between parents and children, relations

and friends, in fact, all men generally. Metaphorically also love to things, inclination to certain actions, when its idea dwindles to liking. It expresses an inner attachment without the cause becoming apparent, and has a tendency, this point being left undecided, to let one think rather of the impulse of a warm heart than of a weighed and settled esteem. Between man and woman it is both passion and conjugal affection. As passion Ahav is capable of the highest poetic elaboration, as in the Song of Solomon, where it is the 'banner held over the beloved' and where all nature is invoked to adequately express its sweetness. From the earliest times, too, it has represented that devotion which gladly serves the beloved object and finds nothing too hard, no trouble too great for a purpose so dear. We are told, for instance, that Jacob served seven years for Rachel, and that they seemed to him but a few days for the Ahav he had to her.

וַיַּעֲבֹד יַעֲקֹב בְּרָחֵל שְׁבַע שָׁנִים וַיְהִי כְּעֵינָיו כִּימִים אַחָדִים
בְּאַהֲבָתוֹ אֹתָהּ

Nay, it even denotes that glowing passion which is found only in that ideal sphere where love is lord of all.

אִם־יִתֵּן אִישׁ אֶת־כָּל־הֹוֶן בֵּיתוֹ בְּאַהֲבָהָ בָּזוּ יָבוֹז לּוֹ

'If a man would give all the substance of his house for Love, it would utterly be contemned.'

Taken broadly it embraces not only the pitiful tenderness of God toward man and man's devotion to God, but also a world-wide charity.

כָּאַהֲבַת יְהוָה אֶת־בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל

'As God loved the children of Israel.'

וְאַהֲבָתָ אֶת יְהוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ בְּכָל־לִבְּךָ וּבְכָל־נַפְשְׁךָ וּבְכָל־מְאֹדְךָ

'And thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, with all thy soul and with all thy strength.'

וְעַל כָּל־פְּשָׁעִים תִּכְסֶּה אֲהָבָה

'Love covers all sins.'

At different periods of Semitic history these three views of Ahav have underlain Jewish thought, nor do they shut out the idea of Jahvêh as an avenging Judge. It is just because God loves, that He punishes or purifies His people. And if the Highest can forgive and even love the man who has sinned against Him, it behoves all men to pardon and esteem one another. Hence אהב represents the bond of universal brotherhood. Thus we read in Leviticus as a commandment of the Eternal: 'Thou shalt not avenge nor bear any grudge against the children of thy people, but thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself: I am the Lord.'

לֹא־תִקֶּם וְלֹא־תִטּוֹר אֶת־בְּנֵי עַמְּךָ וְאֶהְבָּתָּ לְרֵעֶךָ כְּמִוֶּךָ אֲנִי יְהוָה

From the conception of charity as applying to the various members of the Semitic family Ahav rises to the thought of all mankind.

כִּי יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵיכֶם הוּא אֱלֹהֵי הָאֱלֹהִים וְאֲדֹנֵי הָאֲדֹנִים הָאֵל הַגָּדֹל הַגִּבּוֹר וְהַנּוֹרָא אֲשֶׁר לֹא־יִשָּׂא פָנִים וְלֹא יִקַּח שָׁחַד: עֲשֵׂה מִשְׁפָּט וְתוֹם וְאִלְמָנָה וְאֶהָב גֵּר לְתֵת לוֹ לֶחֶם וְשִׁמְלָה: וְאֶהְבָּתֶם אֶת־הַגֵּר כִּי־גֵרִים הָיִיתֶם בְּאֶרֶץ מִצְרַיִם.

'For the Lord your God, he is God of gods and Lord of lords, the great God, the mighty, and the terrible, who regardeth not persons nor taketh reward. He doth execute the judgment of the fatherless and widow, and loveth the stranger in giving him food and raiment. Love ye therefore the stranger: for ye were strangers in the land of Egypt.'

Passing on to the thought of active love we find in חסד a noble combination of love and grace. It is a grace arising from goodwill, a disposition which gladly does good because it looks upon the active love, which underlies beneficence, as the beautiful prerogative of the Mighty One. Thus Isaiah says (liv, 10):—

כִּי הִהָרִים יְמוּשׁוּ וְהַגְּבָעוֹת תִּמוּטְיָנָה וְחִסְדֵּי מַאֲתָדָה לֹא־יִמוּשׁוּ וּבְרִית שְׁלוֹמִי לֹא תִמוּט אֲמַר מִרְחֻמֶּךָ יְהוָה:

‘For the mountains may depart, and the hills may be removed; but my kindness (*Kesed*) shall not depart from thee, neither shall the covenant of my peace be removed, saith He that hath mercy (*Rakam*) on thee, the Eternal.’

The fundamental meaning of the root (*kāsad*) seems to be *painful emotion*.

Hebr.: חֶסֶד Ar.: حَسَد Syr.: مَحَبَّة

And this is perhaps why it primarily expresses a vouchsafing or condescending grace, pity.

וַיְהִי יְהוָה אֲתִּיּוֹסָף וַיֵּם אֵלָיו חֶסֶד

‘But the Lord was with Joseph and shewed kindness unto him.’

But it is not solely love of superiors for inferiors; not infrequently the idea of condescension steps into the background and we find *Kesed* expressing brotherly love and even conjugal affection.

וַיֹּאמֶר דָּוִד אֶעֱשֶׂה חֶסֶד וְעִם־חֲנָן בְּיָנִיחַט בְּאִשְׁרִי עֲשֶׂה אֲבִיו
עִמָּדִי חֶסֶד

‘And David said: I will shew kindness unto Kānun the son of Nākāś, as his father shewed kindness unto me.’

וְאַרְשֻׁתִּיךָ לִי בְצֹדֵק וּבְמִשְׁפָּט וּבְחֶסֶד וּבְרַחֲמִים

‘Yea, I will betroth thee unto me in righteousness, in judgment, in loving-kindness and in mercies.’

In Genesis xxi, 23 we find it used as love of one’s country, patriotism; and in Nehemiah xiii, 14 as piety or love of God.

From the friendly grace of *Kesed* we pass to the loving pity, the mercy of *Rakam*.

רַחֵם רַחֵם

‘to be soft, tender.’

To the Psalmist *Kesed* is more than mere grace, *Rakam* more than sympathy. Thus ciii, 8:—

רַחֵם וְחַנּוּן יְהוָה אֶרְךְ אַפָּיִם וְרַב־חֶסֶד

'The Lord is merciful and gracious, slow to anger and plenteous in loving kindness.'

In רַחֵם we have an exquisite tenderness, that delicate solicitude which not only an earthly father feels for his children but which the All-Father entertains for those who fear Him.

בְּרַחֵם אָב עַל-בָּנָיִם רַחֵם יְהוָה עַל-יִרְאַיוֹ

Nay, it expresses that annihilation or abandonment of self in God which was the burden of Israel's sweetest songs:—

אֶרְחַמֶּנָּה יְהוָה חֲסִידִי

Whilst Kesed is kindness manifested toward rich and poor, whole and sick, happy and miserable, without distinction, rakam represents pity for the poor, compassion with the needy and the suffering. And it is the same in Arabic where الله is described as الرحمان arrakmān the Compassionate, الرحيم arrakīm the Merciful.

عليه الرحمة والغفران والرضوان

'May he have mercy and pardon and the blessing of God!'

A modification of Kesed is Kên or Kânan, the primary meaning of which seems to be 'to utter a gurgling sound,' 'to groan.'

כֵּן, חֵן, חֲנּוּן

In the Old Testament it is often used in the sense of that kindly feeling which a master has for his pupil, a senior for a junior, and which a son may warmly entertain for his father. Where we should say: 'if it please you,' the Hebrew used to say: 'if I have found kên in thine eyes.' Thus Jacob at the end of his days says to his son Joseph: 'If I have found חֵן in thine eyes, put thy hand under my thigh, and shew me חֶסֶד and faithfulness!' And indeed, where the relations between man and his Maker are close,

the same feeling is expressed. In Exodus xxxiii, 17, we read:—

‘The Lord spake unto Moses: what thou hast said, I will do. For thou hast found grace (kên) in mine eyes, and I know thee by name!’

But perhaps its best and most sacred meaning is ‘a father’s love for his little ones.’ (Job xix, 17.)

רוחי זרה לאשתי ומנוחי לבני בטני

‘My breath is strange to my wife, and my cherishing to the children of my body.’

By far the most interesting feature of the Hebrew question is the bright and beautiful expansion of the Jewish אהב into the Christian ἀγάπη, the full meaning of which is given us by St. Paul in the 13th Chapter of his first Letter to the Corinthians, and by St. John in his epistles.

II. ARYAN.

Of early Aryan ideas of the supreme emotion perhaps the most striking characteristic is spontaneity. The most general thought is that of the heart bending toward the world at large, a kindly, genial benevolence. This, at all events, seems to be the fundamental meaning of काम, though in later literature it came to be specialised as the Indian Cupid.

√*KAM* to bend.

Skt.: कम् कामस् *kâmas* love, affirmation of the will to Life.
कान्त *kânta* lover; कान्ति *kânti* beauty; कामम् *kâmam*
freely. Kâmôpahatakittânga amore afflictum
animum et corpus habens.

Irish: caemh love, desire; caomhach friend; caomhaim I save,
protect. *Roumanian*: chamor love.

Latin: câ-rus (= cam-rus) dear; câ-ri-tas love.

And this concept, as the affirmation of the will to Life, is found in one of the most interesting of the R̥g-vēda mantras, which long ago excited the enthusiasm of Prof. Max Müller in his History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature. The Sūkta, which is known as the Creation-Hymn, opens with a lofty description of the primaeval Chaos—no light, no sound; no day, no night; a yawning Abyss of empty, dark space, without death and without immortality.

‘The One alone breathed calmly, self-contained’.

From this serene self-consciousness of the primal Brahman in the profound chaotic gloom arose, by reason of the genial heat evolved, Kâmas, the earliest seed of mind, which poets, pondering in their hearts, have found to be the source of being from not-being.

कामः । तत् । अग्रे । सं । अवर्तत । अधि ।
 मनसः । रेतः । प्रथमं । यत् । आसत्ति ।
 सतः । ब्रधं । असति । निः । अविदन् ।
 हृदि । प्रति । इदं । कवयः । मनीषा ॥ ४ ॥

Expressed in the philosophical phraseology of Schopenhauer’s school it is: Out of the Will (Tad) arose, through the turning thereof (Tapas), first Kâmas, affirmation, and this became the first germ of mind, the only principle of the visibility of affirmation. From this first principle rose the whole realm of Being, its flames being cast over all nature.

Then we come to a thought of friendship which, though always implying a surface-attachment, is by no means to be considered the ideal of love. Affection as ‘oiliness’ seems to be pre-eminently Aryan, स्नेह *snēha* and मित्वम् *mitratvam* coming each from a root meaning ‘to be fat’, ‘oily’, namely, स्निह् *snih* and मिद *mid*. They are found especially in the Hitôpadêśas, a book of moral instruction and popular legend, generally supposed to have been written by Viṣṇuśarma for the benefit of certain Indian princes.

Thus, in the first Book we read how, for a long time, a Deer and a Crow live in great Snêha in a forest of Bahâr.

तस्यां चिरान् महता स्नेहेन मृगकाकौ निवसतः

Tasjâm kîrân mahatâ snêhêna mṛgakâkâu nivasatah.

The Deer, frisky and fat, roaming about at his pleasure, is seen by a certain Jackal. Having eyed him, the Jackal reflects: 'Ah! how shall I feast on this delicate flesh?'

In the same way मैत्री *mâitrî* and मित्रत्वम् *mîtrātvaṁ* are used of that lively friendliness amongst animals of the lower order which may, perhaps, not improperly be described as brute love. Continuing the above story, for instance, we find that the jackal seeks to effect his purpose by addressing the deer as Mitra (*√mîd*) and then by describing himself as a poor lonely creature without a Mitra (friend) and without a band'u (relation), K'sudrabudd'i of the forest!

अत्रारण्ये मित्रबन्धुहीनो मृतवद्
एकाकी निवसामि

'Here, in the forest, as one dead, I dwell alone, without kinsman and without a friend!'

The word बन्धु *band'u* brings us at once to another view of love, that, namely, of those strong ties of blood and kinship which unite various members of the same family, clan, tribe or nation; for, *√band'* means *to bind*. A *band'u* is one who is *bound* to another in the first instance by family-feeling, afterwards, no doubt, by other and purely ideal considerations. The opening of the *B'agavad-Gîta* deals largely with the relations of the parties involved, and from that work we may quote the following:

आचार्याः पितरः पुत्रास्तथैव च पितामहाः ।
मातुलाः श्वशुराः पौत्राः श्यालाः
संवन्धिनस्तथा ॥ ३४ ॥

'Teachers, fathers, sons also, and progenitors; Uncles, sisters, nephews, brothers-in-law and near relatives (*sam-band'inas* 'those-who-are-bound-to-one').

In प्रीति *Prīti* and प्रेम्ण *Prēman* we have love as *Erlilation*, a lofty joy which takes possession of the soul and rushes in tumult to the beloved object.

✓PRI^â to be overjoyed at, love.

Skt.: प्रीणामि *prī-ṇā-mi* I delight in; प्रियम् *prī-ja-s* dear, beloved; प्रीति *prī-ti*, प्रेमन *prē-man* love, joy.

Sd.: 𐎧𐎠𐎧𐎠 *fi-ri* to love, praise; 𐎧𐎠𐎧𐎠𐎧𐎠 *fi-ri-ta* love, benevolence.

Gk.: πρᾶ-ος, πρᾶϋ-ς soft; πρᾶ-ό-της softness; πρᾶϋ-ν-ω.

Russ.: Пріятель *prí-ja-tel* friend.

Eccs.: *pri-ja-ti* to provide; *pri-ja-telu* friend.

Lith.: *prė-telius* friend. *Russ.:* Прія́знь *prī-ja-sn* friendship.

Goth.: *fri-jôn* to love; *frijond-s* friend; *fri-a-thra* love.

Ohg.: *fra-o* glad; *fri-unt* amicus; *fri-da* pax.

Mhg.: *fro-h* glad; Freund φίλος; *Fri-e-de* peace.

Eng.: friend amicus. *Irish:* frith service. *Welsh:* priawd spouse.

Prijatva : πρώτης :: friathva : Friede.

Kroat.: *pri-jat-nost* loveliness. *Pol.:* *przy-jem-ność* loveliness.

<i>Kroat.:</i>	<i>pri-ja-telj</i>	} friend	<i>pri-atan</i>	} friendly.
<i>Pol.:</i>	<i>przy-ja-tiel</i>		<i>przy-ja-źny</i>	
<i>Boh.:</i>	<i>přítel</i>		<i>přítel-ský</i>	

Boh.: pří-jem-ný amiable

Dan.: fre-nde } amicus
Ags.: fre-ond }
Flem.: vriend }

Goth.: *fri-j-ei* freedom; *frei-s* free; *fri-thus* peace

Eng.: free; freedom; fro-lic.

In the second Fargard of the Vendidad we find the word *frīta* applied to Spēnta Ārmaiti, the genius of the earth, in the sense of 'beloved'. Jima steps forward toward the luminous space southwards, to meet the sun, and he

respects, is the most interesting concept with which we have to deal. Already we have seen that true friendship implies freedom, and now, not only shall we find this, but also the great truth enunciated by St. Paul and mirrored in his matchless Spectrum of Love, namely, that love *hopeth* all things, *beliereth* all things. The root *lub* has given us *lib-ertas* freedom; *lub-ô* love; *lub-ains* hope; *ga-laub-ains* faith.

VLUB' to yearn.

Skt.: *√लुम् lub' लोभस् lôb'-a-s* cupidity, yearning; *लुब्ध lub-d'a* greedy; *लुभ्यामि lub'-jâ-mi* I yearn, desire.

Gk.: *√λιφ· λίψ* desire; *λίπ-τ-ο-μαι* I long for.

Lat.: *lub-et; lib-et; lib-î-do; lib-er; Libentîna; lib-er-tas.*

Russ.: *любѡвъ ljub-or* love; *любѡтъ ljub-iti* to be fond of.

Kro.: *ljub-ac* amor; *ljub-egan* amiable.

Boh.: *lib-eg-nost* loveliness.

Eccles.: *ljub-i-ti φιλεῖν; liub-y ἀγάπη; ljub-imi* sponte.

Lith.: *liub-y-ti* to take pleasure in; *liub-jaus* rather.

Goth.: *liub-an* to love; *lub-an* to hope; *laub-jan* to believe; *liub-s* dear; *liuba-leiks* lovely; *lub-ô* love; *lub-ains* hope; *ga-laub-eins* faith; *lib-âins* life.

Ohg.: *môt-lub-a* affectus; *lop* praise; *lop-ôn* to praise; *lep-an* ζωή.

Ag.: *luf-e ἀγάπη; lif' ζωή; lif-frea* Life-Lord, God.

Mhg.: *Lieb-en; Lieb-e; lob-en* to praise; *Leb-en.*

Eng.: *lov-e; lief; be-lief; lif-e.*

In love we have freedom, hope, faith, praise, nay, life itself. No poet has expressed this exquisite feeling with greater delicacy than Tennyson. Maud's lover speaks of his love to

'Her whose gentle will has changed my fate
And made my life a perfumed altar-flame.'

Peter the Great is described as having worked for Russia with such *Lubov*:—

Въ этомъ сила и будущность Россіи, для которой такъ неустанно, съ такою лубовію работаль Петръ Великій.

‘Herein lie the power and the future of Russia, for which Peter the Great worked so incessantly, and with such love’.

In no language has this root been so prolific as in Russian where, besides *lubor*, we have *lub-esni* to be loved on account of really amiable qualities recognised not only by the feelings but by the judgment; *lub-imi* to be loved from choice; *lub-oi* loved as a matter of taste; *lub* dear from natural inclination; *lub-im* and *lub-imez* the dear husband; *lub-ornik* the erotic amateur; *r-lub-kivi* one in love; *lub-itel* lover of the fine arts.

In Latin we see two streams of thought; that in which love turns to lust (*libîdo*); and that whereby a lofty, disciplined passion leads to freedom (*libertas*).

A libidinosâ sententiâ certum et definitum jus religionum eos deterret.

Liber sum, et nullius dominationi parens.

The corresponding word in Persian is عشق, which is at once *lub-ô* and *lib-ains*, Liebe and Leben, love and life. In the sweet song of Umar K’ajjâm:—

سر دفتر عالم معانی عشق است
سر بیت قصیدی جوانی عشق است
ای ان که خبر ندارد از عالم عشق
ان نکتا ببیند ان که زنده گانی عشق است

‘The heading of the Volume of the Spirit-World is Love!
The first verse of the lyrics of youth is Love!
O ye who know not of the realm of Love,
Know this alone, that Life is Love!’

This is the Persian word *par excellence* and is a thoroughly Aryan view of the subject, the root being *is* to yearn.

Skt.: √इष इष *iṣ-ta* dilectus; इषि *iṣ-ti* desire; इष्मन् *Iṣ-ma-s* Love-god; *ekā-ā-mi* = *ais-sk-ā-mi*.

Sd.: عى *iṣ* to wish, earnestly seek; عى *iṣ-ti* longing.

Gk.: √ιc to wish; ιό-τη-ς wish, will; ι-μερο-ς for ισ-μερο-ς longing.

Lat.: *aes-timare*.

Goth.: *is-an* to long for; *fīa-isan* to tempt.

Passing on to the people of Hellas we meet with the well-known and weighty words ἀραπᾶν and φιλεῖν. Now these two words stand to each other in much the same relation as *diligere* and *amare*, but the Greek expression which most nearly corresponds to लोभस् and in later literature to कामस् and عشق is ἔρως, from √ap to strive after, long for. It is not only the passion of the youth for the maiden, but is used by Plato to express that yearning for the unseen yet ever-present Beauty which surrounds us all, and will one day be revealed to every purged soul.

Just as the Indian Rsis found Kâmas to be the moving principle of Creation, so in the theogony of the Greeks Ἔρος holds a foremost place. In the beautiful words of Hesiod:—

ἦδ' Ἔρος, ὃς κάλλιστος ἐν ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσι, λυσιμελής
πάντων τε θεῶν, πάντων τ' ἀνθρώπων δάμναται ἐν στήθεσσι
νόον, καὶ ἐπίφρονα βουλήν.

Anakreon says:—

Ὅ δὲ καὶ θεῶν δυνάστης·
Ὅ δὲ καὶ βροτοὺς δαμάζει.

Most of all in the organ-voice of the Chorus in Sophokles' *Antigone* and in the *Hippolytos* of Euripides:—

Ερως ἀνίκατε μάχαν,
 "Ερως, ὃς ἐν κτήμασι πίπτεις,
 ὃς ἐν μαλακαῖς παρειαῖς
 νεάνιδος ἐννυχεύεις·
 φοιτᾷς δ' ὑπερπόντιος, ἔν τ'
 ἀγρονόμοις αὐλαῖς·
 καὶ σ' οὐτ' ἀθανάτων φύξιμος οὐδεὶς
 οὔθ' ἡμερίων ἐπ' ἀν-
 θρώπων· ὁ δ' ἔχων, μέμνηεν.

Ant. 777—785.

Ερως "Ερως, ὁ κατ' ὁμμάτων
 στάζεις πόθον, εἰσάγων γλυκεῖαν
 ψυχαῖς χάριν οὗς ἐπιστρατεύσῃ,
 μὴ μοί ποτε σὺν κακῇ φανείης
 μηδ' ἄρρυθμος ἔλθοις.
 οὔτε γὰρ πυρός οὐτ'
 ἄστρων ὑπέρτερον βέλος,
 οἷον τὸ τὰς Ἀφροδίτας
 ἦησιν ἐκ χερῶν
 "Ερως ὁ Διὸς παῖς.

Hipp. 525—534.

Amongst the Romans, too, we find Ovid saying of *Amor: regnat et in dominos jus habet ille Deos*, which might well be paraphrased in the words of the 'Last Minstrel':—

Love rules the court, the camp, the grove,
 And men below and saints above:
 For love is heaven, and heaven is love!

Between the Greek ἀγαπᾶν and φιλεῖν and the Latin *diligere* and *amare* the parallelism is so close that it will be best to consider them together.

Both ἀγαπᾶν and *diligere* express an attachment resulting from choice and a deliberate judgment that the object is really worthy of regard, whilst φιλεῖν and *amare*, without necessarily-implying an unreasoning attachment, give utterance to an instinctive feeling, an impulse of passion, as is amply manifest not only in the literature of Greece and Rome but in the New Testament itself. As regards the Latin words we cannot do better than refer

to Cicero's letters. Writing to one friend concerning another, the great orator says: 'Ut scires illum a me non *diligi* solum, verum etiam *amari*' (Ep. Fam. xiii. 47); and with regard to Clodius' feeling for him: 'L. Clodius valde me *diligit*, vel, ut ἐμφατικώτερον dicam, valde me *amat*'. (Ad Brut. 1). Dion Cassius tells us that, addressing the Roman people over the body of Caesar, Antonius said: ἐφιλήσατε αὐτὸν ὡς πατέρα, καὶ ἡγαπήσατε ὡς εὐεργέτην.

But it is in reading the New Testament that we most fully realise the distinction, as was long ago shown by Dean Trench. Whilst we are often bidden ἀγαπᾶν τὸν Θεόν (Matt. xxii. 37; Luke x. 27; 1 Cor. viii. 3) and good men are said to do so (Rom. viii. 28; 1 Pet. i. 8; 1 John iv. 21), it is nowhere urged that man should φιλεῖν τὸν Θεόν. Of the Father we read that He both ἀγαπᾷ (John iii. 35) and φιλεῖ (v. 20) τὸν Υἱόν. And in this connexion we cannot forget the touching scene, described in the 21st Chapter of St. John's Gospel. The risen Master thrice asks the penitent disciple: 'Lovest thou me?' and to each enquiry Peter answers: φιλῶ σε, expressing a warm, personal affection, but when the question is put it is only the third time that our Lord uses this word, ἀγαπᾷς με, *respectful affection* giving place to φιλεῖς με, *personal attachment*.

The Latin *Caritas* seems to hold an intermediate position: a man may have *caritas* for his fellow-man, he may also have it for his country and his country's past.

Ex ea caritate quae est inter natos et parentes. quae dirimi nisi detestabili scelere non potest.

Cic. Am. 8, 27.

Oblitaeque ingenitae erga patriam caritatis, dummodo virum honoratum videret, consilium migrandi ab Tarquiniiis cepit.

Liv. 1. 34, 5.

In the same way Amor, from primarily meaning sexual passion:

Persuasit nox, amor, vinum, adolescentia—
Humanum 'st.

Ter. Ad. 3. 4. 471.

has become transformed by the great Christian poet of the Middle Age into the supreme cosmic emotion:

L'Amor che muove il Sole e l'altre stelle.

But of all the words for love in any language there is none so sacred as the Greek ἀγάπη. No classical writer goes beyond φιλία, φιλαδελφία or φιланθρωπία. It is Christianity alone which has created this noble conception, this glorious expansion of the Hebrew אהבה, this love which

‘delightedly believes
Divinities, being itself divine’.

Of this beautiful Christian thought St. Paul has given us an exquisite analysis in the 13th Chapter of his first Epistle to the Corinthians:—

Ἡ ἀγάπη μακροθυμεῖ, χρηστεύεται· ἡ ἀγάπη οὐ ζηλοῖ· ἡ ἀγάπη οὐ περπερεύεται, οὐ φυσιοῦται, οὐκ ἀσχημονεῖ, οὐ ζητεῖ τὰ ἑαυτῆς, οὐ παροξύνεται, οὐ λογίζεται τὸ κακὸν, οὐ χαίρει ἐπὶ τῇ ἀδικίᾳ, συγχαίρει δὲ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ· πάντα στέγει, πάντα πιστεύει, πάντα ἐλπίζει, πάντα ὑπομένει. ἡ ἀγάπη οὐδέποτε ἐκπίπτει.

Νυνὶ δὲ μένει πίστις, ἐλπίς, ἀγάπη, τὰ τρία ταῦτα· μείζων δὲ τούτων ἡ ἀγάπη.

Here we have vastly more than a transition from Amor, through caritas, to dilectio. Ἔρωσ represents amor and φιλία fairly corresponds to caritas, but ἀγάπη goes far beyond any dilectio. St. Paul has shown us that it has at least nine ingredients, namely, patience, kindness,

generosity, humility, courtesy, unselfishness, good temper, guilelessness and sincerity. Nay, though prophecies fail and tongues cease, though knowledge vanish and the very world itself pass away—Love abides!

‘For life, with all it yields of joy and woe
And hope and fear,
Is just our chance o’ the prize of learning love,—
How love might be, hath been indeed, and is’.

CHAPTER V.

THE MORAL SENSE.

In conclusion let us see how the inductive survey of human views of good and evil bears upon the great question of the existence, nature and function of what is known as conscience, divine reason, moral sense or categorical imperative.

Assuredly the most important enquiry respecting this faculty is whether it is really intuitive, that is to say, an instinct, or nothing but a power of appreciation and distinction wholly derived from experience. The consensus of opinion in the past has accepted it as the innate principle to which all laws and moral maxims are addressed. As far back as the 4th century B. C. we find a Chinese philosopher exclaiming: 'In man there is a sense of right and wrong'; that he loses it, arises from the fact that it is daily injured and its beauty destroyed, just as trees are hewn down by axes. During a period of repose conscience again comes to the front, but, since it is always hurt, the human being is not far removed from the lower animals. At the same time it must not be supposed that man has never had a moral sense, for that were wholly-contrary to his nature!'² But not only do the ancients, notably the Roman philosophers who distinguish between the *honestum* and the *utile*, take the transcendental side of the question: we have the witness of words themselves pointing in the same direction. For instance, to the linguistic consciousness

¹ 良心

² Mañ-zü (373—289 B. C.) In the first instance the expression 良心 'innate principle' is used, in the second 情 Zin 'conscientious sensibility.'

of Europe the moral sense is knowledge or consciousness of the individual soul with the Over-Soul, of man with God (Ἰνδ. συν-εἰδησις; сѡбѣтѣ; svjest; sumnienie; svedōmī; con-scientia; Mith-vissei; Gewissen; in-wyt).

It is quite true that there are words of ethical import implying a long course of evolution, such as ἥθος, Sitte, Mores, Pflicht, but we have only to look into the history of these words to see that, as soon as they assume an ethical meaning they primarily apply not to the individual but to the nation, if not to the race. They represent, in fact, the collective, as distinguished from the individual, conscience.

Ἰνδ. 'to do'.

Skt.: स्वधा *sva-d'â* own doing, custom, character. A law unto oneself or to one's own people.

„ इंद्र स्वधां अनु द्वि नः ब्रूथ

For, Indra, according to thy wont, thou art ours!

Rgv. i. 165. 5.

„ स्वधात *sva-d'âta* the Self-Determined (see p. 24).

Gk.: ἥθος (= ἡθικός) custom; ἡθικός-ος trusty, dear. εἰ-ωθ-α am wont, ἐθ-ίζ-ω accustom myself.

Goth.: sians *sid-u-s* custom; *sidôn* to practise.

Ohg.: sit-u ἥθος.

Mhg.: Sitte custom, etiquette; Sitt-lich-keit morality.

Latin: Sodâ-lis a consort.

„ Mômes manners, conduct, morals; from Môs a custom.

German: Pflicht duty, from pflegen to be accustomed to, cultivate, practise.

The analysis of such ethical terminology would seem to support the views of Mr. Herbert Spencer. 'I believe.'

he says, 'that the experiences of utility organized and consolidated through all past generations of the human race, have been producing corresponding modifications, which, by continued transmission and accumulation, have become in us certain faculties of moral intuition—certain emotions responding to right and wrong conduct, which have no apparent basis in the individual experiences of utility.'

But we cannot go very deeply into the discussion whether, independently of experience, we have any really intuitive appreciation or perception of right and wrong without becoming aware that it is, after all, only a special case of the general metaphysical question whether we have *any* ideas *à priori* or transcendental, wholly underived from experience.

Now, the two theories known as idealist and sensuist, formal and material, are as old as philosophy itself. Alike in India and Greece we find the sages holding, on the one hand, that mind is a reflex of matter, thought a secretion of the brain; and, on the other, that mind makes nature, that intelligence involves principles which, as the conditions of its activity, cannot be the result of its operation. In other words, the *à priori* theory maintains that, in all mental phaenomena there is an element given not *to* but *by* the mind, having, in fact, a *previous* and *necessary* existence, whilst the *à posteriori* view regards the intellectual element as explicable on principles within the empirical range.

According to Aristotle the moral maxims of which ethical science consists are οὐτ' ἄρα φύσει, οὔτε παρὰ φύσιν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ φύσιν. Though they are not intuitive they are in accordance with nature by reason of the ἐπιτηδειότης or natural adaptation to them which man possesses. This comes very near to the recognition of a moral sense; in fact, Aristotle would probably agree with Cicero when he says: *Natura dedit homini quosdam igniculos*

et semina virtutum, quæ sunt earum quasi principia et fundamenta. And when Seneca observed: *sanabilibus aegrotamus malis, nosque in rectum genitos natura, si sanari velimus, adjuvat*, there can be no doubt that he was of the same opinion. And this is true of some who once thought otherwise. Dr. Cabanis, for instance, who, in the early part of his career, wrote: 'les sciences morales devaient rentrer dans le domaine de la physique, pour n'être plus qu'une branche de l'histoire naturelle de l'homme.' in later life renounced such materialism and became a fervent idealist. Even Darwin, who considers the social instincts the prime principle of man's moral constitution, tells us that, he fully subscribes 'to the judgment of those writers who maintain that of all the differences between man and the lower animals, the moral sense or conscience is by far the most important.'

Perhaps the most powerful thinker of modern times who has written on this subject is Immanuel Kant. The learned author of the Critique of Pure Reason declares that the faculty which he characterizes as *der kategorische Imperativ*, lies wholly beyond the sphere of ordinary logic; is, in fact, a transcendental psychological truth admitting neither proof nor disproof. From the existence of this absolute tendency which controls the motives of actions Kant infers the reality of ethical freedom. Freedom is the *ratio essendi* of the moral law, but the moral law is the *ratio cognoscendi* of freedom. The indeterminateness of the Will as Noumenon is postulated by the Law which we find in us dictating unconditionally how we are to act. And this law must be connected with the idea of the possibility of its fulfilment. 'Du kannst, denn du sollst,' says the voice within; not 'du sollst, denn du kannst'; because the sense of duty is there wholly independently of our power. It is the law which man as noumenon gives to man as phaenomenon. As St. Paul puts it: 'I delight in

the law of God according to the inner man'. And of this truth comparative philology gives startling confirmation. At the outset of our examination of ethical concepts we found *sin* looked upon as 'disobedience to a Voice' (παρά-κοή), whilst *righteousness* was 'hearkening to the inward monitor' (p. 54). 'If any man will follow me, let him deny himself' expresses the entire content of an Imperative which is no longer hypothetical but categorical. Hence the soul is not so much *knowing* as *willing*. In determining moral worth it is not intellect, but *deeds*, as the manifestation of the quality of a man's *will* that we take into account. Thus the thought of duty must ever form the basis of all true practical philosophy.

Two further most important inferences Kant draws, namely: the existence of God, because there can be no law without a Lawgiver; and the fact of a future life, because, were there no perpetuation of consciousness beyond the grave, the tendency would be gratuitous.

But if proof of the existence of a moral sense be needed, we have the most satisfactory evidence in its universality and uniformity which have, I think, been fully shown in the course of our enquiry. It is quite true that, at various times and in different places, we find different estimates of right and wrong, but the discrepancies are accidental and caused by external circumstances. We have only to look a little below the surface to find certain leading principles of agreement exerting an influence over every variety and condition of human nature with a power and uniformity analogous to those of the most obvious of the physical instincts.'

We have seen, for instance, how not only Hindûs and Hebrews but Chinese and Egyptians, differing as they do in language, culture and modes of thought, yet wholly agree in conceiving Right as Being, Wrong as Not-Being. This is very significant. Not only does it seem to prove

the existence of an ethical intuition as distinguished from a faculty gradually acquired by experience, but it shows that Augustine's view of evil is that which mankind instinctively adopts. Essentially sin is privative, is absolute *malitia*, which, if unchecked, would go to the extinction of all being, nay, of God himself. 'There is no doubt', says the late Dr. Duncan, 'that all sin designs deicide. All sin is directed against universal being. It is primarily against God, inferentially against all being. It seeks to slay Being at the root.'

Again, we have found that the thought of evil as *transgression* or *trespass* is well-nigh universal. The implication is obvious. The various races of mankind have instinctively felt that in doing wrong they were *going beyond a Law*. That law was looked upon as the emanation of the will of a Superior or Superiors having authority, there can surely be no doubt. Though we may describe the reign of physical law as a modern discovery, the great truth arrived at by Kant on philosophical grounds, namely, the universality of the moral law and the necessity of a Lawgiver, our investigation has shown to have been instinctively recognised from the dawn of humanity. Nor is this result affected by the fact that, amongst various races we find different estimates of right and wrong, in some cases even amounting to ethical polarity. In our own Aryan idioms we have the curious instance of the same moral term meaning both good and bad, better and worse:—

<i>Latin:</i>	mal-us 'bad'; mel-ior, 'better.'
<i>English:</i>	bad malus; bet-ter (= bad-ter) melior. (<i>Sanskrit:</i> bad-ra 'good').
<i>Russian:</i>	Блaгiи 'good and bad.'
"	Дoбpo " "
"	Хopoшъ 'good' }
<i>Little Russian:</i>	Гiрш 'bad' }
<i>Polish:</i>	gorsze 'worse' }

} *gar* to shine.

<i>German:</i>	schlicht 'straight, upright'; schlecht 'bad.'
<i>Chinese:</i>	良 'good'; 良 'bad.'
<i>Sanskrit:</i>	भद्र bād-ra 'good'; <i>English:</i> bad.
"	वर vara 'good' { <i>Gothic:</i> vair-s <i>Icelandic:</i> ver <i>Danish:</i> vaerre <i>English:</i> worse.

But no modern student of the phaenomena of consciousness can overlook the fact that, the geological conception of the mental world so strongly advocated by the evolutionist, by offering a new interpretation of all à priori forms of thought, greatly affects the question before us. Before the rise of the new doctrine our ideas of Duty and of the Deity were either included in the à priori category or were supposed to have been arrived at in the course of individual experience. According to the principle of Evolution, on the other hand, they are the 'accumulated lesson of actual experience unconsciously whispered on to each new descendant by its line of progenitors.' The real difficulty lies in distinguishing the bequeathed part of the infant's mental furniture from its own subsequent acquisitions. None has stated this more clearly than Prof. Sully. 'According to this hypothesis', he says, 'a man's experiences and habits, while they distinctly modify his own cerebral structure and mental capacity, tend also to modify those of his offspring. Hence it is fairly certain that if these processes of hereditary transmission have been going on through countless generations of the human race, every infant now born into the world receives along with its primitive nervous organization a very decided and powerful moral bent, whether it be as a predisposition to certain modes of conception, or as an instinctive force of emotional susceptibility in particular directions. Not only so, but if we suppose man to have been gradually evolved from less

highly organized species, it becomes highly probable that influences which can be seen to have acted on whole species, man included, have left behind them a yet deeper impress in the innate mental structure of a nineteenth century boy or girl.'

In his *Descent of Man* our great biologist Mr. Darwin has made an elaborate attempt to interpret the brute mind and to derive man's ethical feelings from the instincts of lower orders of being. He tells us that, when the degree of its sociability and of its intelligence qualifies it to experience the recurrence of images of past actions, and a feeling of dissatisfaction at the recollection of an unsatisfied instinct, an animal suffers remorse. And, indeed, his view of conscientious sensibility is such that, he does not hesitate to maintain that, if mankind were brought up under the same conditions as the hive-bees, sisters would feel it to be a sacred duty to slay their brothers, and mothers to make away with their prolific daughters.

Now it must be confessed that, this is a somewhat strange view of the moral sentiment. In the first place, we are left in the dark as to how a mere memory of an ungratified instinct becomes suddenly transformed into the voice of a Socratic δαίμόνιον which imperatively points out 'that it would have been better to have followed one impulse rather than the other.' In the second, if one is not disposed to believe that a superior bee would solve the population problem in a less drastic way, there is certainly no reason for supposing that human beings in a state of sanity would not do so. Unless we can find, after a wide psychological induction, based on the observation of many races, that men in crowded cities or under specially-uncomfortable circumstances have resorted to such measures *from a sense of duty*, we must decline to entertain any such opinion of the human conscience. Then, who is to say that the superior persistence of an instinct gives a

consciousness of obligation? When the swallow abandons her young in order to migrate, is it at the high call of duty? The difficulties of trying to enter into the feelings which a dog, a swallow, or a horse experiences under the drawings of two opposite impulses are indeed immense. Of one thing, however, we may be quite sure, namely, that a sense of wrong in no way accompanies the regret which we ourselves feel at the omission to seize a passing pleasure or at the recollection of an unsatisfied longing. Nor is this all. There are surely few students of anthropology who would deny that 'the first rudimentary sense of duty presents itself in that peculiar variety of fear which accompanies a recognition of superior will and power in another.' It is thus more than likely that an intelligent elephant, horse, or dog, which is capable of apprehending the manifestations of lofty volition lurking behind its master's words, feels something akin to man's sentiment of obligation. But when we are told of a troop of baboons (*Cercopithecus griseo-viridis*) that, after passing through a thorny brake each stretches himself at full length along the branch of a tree whilst his neighbor 'conscientiously' extracts from his fur every thorn and burr, we cannot but think it highly conjectural to suppose that such an impulse of mutual service really amounts to an act of conscience.

Thus, as regards the lower animals, the truth would seem to be that, *under domestication and in constant contact with man*, a moral sentiment may be acquired, but that there is no really-instinctive appreciation of duty.

As regards man, on the other hand, we have found that, even in a state of nature, in which condition according to Hobbes no moral element exists, there is an undoubted intuition of right and wrong. Darwin himself gives us the account of three Patagonians who preferred being shot, one after the other, to betraying their comrades. That

the distinction between virtue and vice is intrinsic or essential is further shown by the general use of the word *ought*, *doit*, *soll*, and of such impersonals as *ὀφείλει* and *oportet*, clearly indicating some universal idea of duty apart from, though perhaps coinciding with utility. Nor can this idea of duty be expressed in any language relating to a consideration of consequences. 'Duty!' exclaims Kant, 'wondrous thought, that workest neither by fond insinuation, flattery, nor by any threat, but merely by holding up thy naked law in the soul, and so extorting for thyself always reverence, if not always obedience; before whom all appetites are dumb, however secretly they rebel—whence thy original?'¹

How truly does the poet say:—

'He that ever following her commands,
On with toil of heart and knees and hands,
Through the long gorge to the far light has won
His path upward, and prevailed,
Shall find the toppling crags of Duty scaled
Are close upon the shining table-lands
To which our God Himself is moon and sun!'

The fact is, wherever we find man we find him with face upturned to Heaven, his eyes upon the stars, looking for the sudden outshining of transcendental idea. As soon as ever he becomes conscious of self he is aware of Deity. This is the truth underlying not only the European words for Conscience already noticed, but such remote expressions as Malay *راس هات*, Arabic *ضمير*, and Hebrew *נִשְׁמָה*, which, from primarily-signifying the breath-of life breathed into man whereby he became a living soul (Gen. ii. 7), came to mean 'a lamp of the Everlasting, searching all the inner chambers of the body' (Prov. xx. 27). Nor should we forget the Chinese *良心* and *情*, where in each case it is the *heart* or *will* rather than the *head* that is taken into

¹ Kritik der praktischen Vernunft (S. 105).

account: and the Hyperborean *Nātawa*, from *naitea* 'that which is on high'; a conception of the categorical imperative whereby *das sittliche Gesetz* rises to *dem gestirnten Himmel*.

Perhaps no better analogy could be found than that between the moral sense and an eye for color or an ear for sound. As certain musically-gifted people come into the world enabled to appreciate and delight in the simultaneity and succession of certain musical sounds, without knowledge of the laws of harmony and counterpoint, so, though altogether ignorant of moral maxims, mankind is born with an intuitive appreciation of right and wrong in various degrees of sensitiveness. It is certainly possible that, this exquisite sense, together with the faculty of speech has been gradually evolved in countless ages from lower forms of life. What we hold is that, in man alone it is intuitive. Plato, Plotinos and Paul express themselves differently, but, in this matter, the truth to which they give utterance is the same; a truth made amply apparent by an analysis of language.

The light of the Logos thrown upon the consciousness of man makes manifest the two great and abiding facts: God and Conscience; giving us all the sublime assurance that, though that image may be blurred and sometimes altogether lost, the true likeness of the human is that of the divine! Αὐτὸ τὸ πνεῦμα συμμαρτυρεῖ τῷ πνεύματι ἡμῶν, ὅτι ἐσμὲν τέκνα Θεοῦ. And this is the sacred secret of Duty,

Nor know we anything so fair
As is the smile upon thy face!



APPENDIX.



IDEOLOGICAL INDICES.

- | | |
|---------------------|-----------------------------|
| 1. Genitive + noun | α) Object + subject + verb |
| 2. Noun + genitive | β) Object + verb + subject |
| 3. Adjective + noun | γ) Verb + object + subject |
| 4. Noun + adjective | δ) Verb + subject + object |
| 5. Object + verb | ε) Subject + object + verb |
| 6. Verb + object | ζ) Subject + verb + object. |
| 7. Verb + subject | |
| 8. Subject + verb. | |

I. <i>Natural</i>	¹ gen + n,	n	⁴ + adj,	⁵ o + v,	⁸ s + v.
II. <i>Hybrid</i>	¹ gen + n.	n	⁴ + adj,	⁶ v + o,	⁸ s + v.
III. <i>Indirect</i>	¹ gen + n.	adj	³ + n.	⁵ o + v,	⁸ s + v.
IV. <i>Hybrid</i>	¹ gen + n.	adj	³ + n,	⁵ o + v,	⁷ v + s.
V. <i>Hybrid</i>	¹ gen + n.	adj	³ + n.	⁶ v + o,	⁸ s + v.
VI. <i>Hybrid</i>	² n + gen,	n	⁴ + adj,	⁶ v + o,	⁸ s + v.
VII. <i>Direct</i>	² n + gen,	n	⁴ + adj,	⁶ v + o,	⁷ v + s.

In the transmission of Language the old word-order is often disturbed by later substitution of races, but with a

regularity which enables us to formulate the following laws of ideological evolution:—


1. Wherever a language spoken by immigrant tribes is brought into contact with an idiom of different ideology spoken by a settled population, and mingles with it, the power of preserving its sentence-arrangement is greater with the less civilised.

2. When, of two languages spoken by two populations at different stages of civilisation, there is imposition and not supersession, the position of the genitive and adjective which usually prevails, is that proper to the more civilised idiom, often with the addition of an affix.

3. Under the same conditions the position of the verb, as to its subject and object, which has the greater chance of prevailing, is that of the less cultured language, pronouns &c., being often added.

4. The phaenomena of incorporative pronouns relating to subject or object are found wherever a language of an indirect standard comes under the modifying influence of another language of a direct standard.

ANTHROPOLOGICAL CLASSIFICATION.



CLASSIFICATION OF LANGUAGE.

a) GENEALOGICAL CLASSIFICATION.

- | | |
|-----------------------|----------------------------------|
| I. Hottentots. | 1. Speech of the K'oi'oi. |
| | 2. Languages of the Bushmen. |
| II. Papuans. | Idioms of the Papua-stems. |
| III. African Negroes. | 21 different speech-stems. |
| | 1. Mande idioms. |
| | 2. Wolof language. |
| | 3. Felup idioms. |
| | 4—11. isolated languages. |
| | 12. Bornu idioms |
| | 13. Kru " |
| | 14. Ewe " |
| | 15. Ibo " |
| | 16—17. isolated idioms |
| | 18. Musgu " |
| | 19—20. isolated " |
| | 21. Nile " |
| IV. Kâfirs. | Bantu languages. |
| V. Australians. | Australian and Tasmanian idioms. |
| VI. Hyperboreans. | 1. Jukagir |
| | 2. Korjak. Kukkish. |
| | 3. Kamkadal. Speech of the Ainu. |
| | 4. Jenissei-Ostjak and Kottish. |
| | 5. Eskimo languages. |
| | 6. Aleutic. |
| VII. Americans. | 26 Stems. |
| | 1. Kenai languages. |
| | 2. At'apaska " |
| | 3. Algonkin " |
| | 4. Irokese. |
| | 5. Dakota. |
| | 6. Pani. |

Americans.

7. Appalach.
8. Languages of the tribes of the
N.W. Coast.
9. Oregon idioms.
10. Californian „
11. Juma „
12. Isolated idioms of Sonora and
Texas.
13. Idioms of the aborigines of
Mexico.
14. Aşteḱ-Sonorik languages.
15. Maja „
16. Isolated idioms of Middle
America and the Antilles.
17. Carabee; Arowak.
18. Tupi-Guarani.
19. Andes-idioms.
20. Araukan.
21. Abiponese.
22. Languages of the Puelche.
23. „ „ Teluelhet.
24. „ „ Pešäräh.
25. Kibka.
26. Kwikua.

VIII. Malays.

IX. Mongols.

Malayo-Polynesian languages.

1. Ural-Altaic idioms.
2. Sumirian and Akkadian.
3. Japanese.
4. Korean.
5. Monosyllabic languages.
 - α) Tibetan. Himāla tongues.
 - β) Burmese. Lohita „
 - γ) Siamese.
 - δ) Annamite.
 - ε) Chinese.

- | | |
|------------------|--|
| Mongols. | 7) Isolated languages of the
Indo-Chinese Peninsula. |
| X. Dravidas. | 1. Munda languages.
2. Dravida „
3. Singhalese. |
| XI. Nubas. | 1. Fulah tongue.
2. Nuba languages.
3. Languages of the Wa-Kwafi
and Masai stems. |
| XII. Midlanders. | 1. Basque.
2. Caucasian languages.
3. Hamito-Semitic „
4. Âryan „ |

β) MORPHOLOGICAL CLASSIFICATION.

- | | |
|-------------------------|---|
| A. Inorganic Languages. | { I. Idioms without grammatical
structure (Chinese, for in-
stance).
II. Languages with affixes (all
idioms of polysyllabic build
excepting the Indo-European).
III. Flexion-Languages (the Aryan). |
| B. Organic Languages. | { α) Synthetic (the ancient),
β) Analytic languages (the
modern Indo-European
tongues). |
| 1. Normal | Flexional languages, or state
tongues. |
| 2. Intranormal | Isolating and agglutinative, or fa-
mily 'nomad'. |
| 3. Transnormal | Incorporative tongues. |


SCHEME I.

BASED ON GENDER AND CONSANGUINITY.

External Characteristics.	Internal Characteristics.					Abstract	
	Heterologous		Concrete			Digeneous	Trigeneous
	1	2	3	1	2		
I. Monosyllabic	Korean, Transgangaetic, Kiranti and Tibetan tongues.	Chinese	Egyptian	..
II. Incorporating	American tongues and Basque tongues.	Algonkin
III. Euphonic	Mandengo, Yoruba.
IV. Alliterative	Kongo, Angola.
V. Agglutinating	Polynesian and Australian idioms.	Narrinjeri	..	Malay tongues.	Mongol idiom.	Japanese, Gaudian and Dravidian, Finnish and Turkish.	..
VI. Agglutinating Inflectional	Hindustani, Bengali, Singhalese.
VII. Dissyllabic Inflectional	Semitic tongues.	..
VIII. Inflectional Synthetic	Sanskrit, Prakrit, Greek and Latin.
IX. Inflectional anaflexed.	German, English, etc. etc.

SCHEME II.

SYSTEM OF LANGUAGES AS THE EVOLUTION OF THE SPEECH-IDEA.



SCHEME I.

CLASSIFICATION OF THE VARIOUS KINDS

OF

WRITING.

A. Idea-writing	{ 1. By pictures	{ (α) pure	In North America and Siberia, etc.
	{ 2. By figures	{ (β) mixed with 2, 3	Mexico.
B. Sound-writing	{ 3. By pictures	knotted cords	Peru.
	{ 4. By figures	(only mixed)	—
C. Alphabetic-writing		(mixed with 2)	China (Wordwriting).
	{ 5. Syllable-script	{ (α) By pictures only mixed	—
		{ (β) By figures or signs	Japan.
		{ a. By pictures (mixed with 1, 2, 5α) .	Egypt.
		{ b. By signs (mixed with 5β)	The Cuneiform and Indian scripts.
	{ 6. Letter-script	{ α) with defective vowels . . .	The Semitic in Asia.
		{ β) with complete vowels . . .	The European Semitic.

SCHEME II.

I. Thought-Script:—

- | | |
|---------------------|--|
| A) Script-Painting. | (Thought as a whole). Script-painting of the North American Indians. |
| B) Picture-Script. | (Thought in its constituents). Writing of the Mexicans, and at the basis of the Chinese and the Egyptian script. |

II. Sound-Script:—

- | | |
|----------------------------|---|
| A) Word-Script. | (Substitution of the picture of an idea for another, coinciding with the former in sound). Script of the Chinese and ancient Egyptians. |
| B) Syllable-Script. | Japanese writing and Semitic Cuneiform. |
| C) Syllable-letter-Script. | (Writing in which a definite sign can denote neither a syllable nor a single sound, but both). Writing of the Semitic nations. |
| D) Letter-Script. | (Writing in which a definite sign denotes a definite sound). Persian Cuneiform. Egyptian, Indian, Greeco-Roman Script. |

PHONOLOGICAL CLASSIFICATION.

I. VOWELS.

		a		
i				u
		a		
	e	ö	o	
i		ü		u
		â		
	ê	ö	ô	
î		ü		û
		ä		
	e	ö	o	
i		u		u
		ã		
	ẽ	ö	õ	
ĩ		ü		ñ etc.

II. CONSONANTS.

A) EXPIRATAE.

	Explosives	Fricatives	Tremblants	Liquids	Resonants
Faucals	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{back} \\ \text{fore} \end{array} \right.$	h' c			
Gutturals	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{back} \\ \text{fore} \end{array} \right.$	h h' > ɣ ɣ'	r'	l'	n
Palatals	k k' (k)	k' k' s s'	ɣ'		ɳ
Linguals	z z'				
Palato-Dentals	t t' ɕ ɕ'	j		l	n'
Dentals	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{alveol.} \\ \text{cacum.} \\ \text{dors.} \\ \text{dent.} \end{array} \right.$	ɕ ɕ' s s' r		l	ɳ
Labio-Dentals	t̥ t̥'	s s'			n
Labials	p p'	f v			m

GENEALOGICAL CLASSIFICATION

OF THE CONCEPTION OF DEITY.

A. *Hottentot Race*:—

1. K'oikoi	2. Sān
!K'ûb	Zuni- Goam
Lord	Red Morning.

B. *Pupûa Race*:—

1. Môtu	2. Mâfôr
Dirava	Hari
Spirit	Bright One (cognomen of Viṣṇu).

C. *African Negro Race*:—

1. Mande	2. Tenne	3. Hausa
Ngêwô	Kâru	Obaŋgiŋi
	Old-One	House Father
4. Kanuri	5. Ewe	6. Joruba
Kémâ-ndê	Mawu	Olodumare
Lord-of-us	Striker	One-who-has-a-name
7. Okî	8. Akrà	9. Tédâ
Onjankôpon	Njohmo	Kénuô
Heaven	Heaven	Our Master
10. Sonfai	11. Ibo	12. Bari
Jer-koi	Kuku	Nun
Our Lord	Seeker	The All-Depth
13. Dinka	14. Mâba	15. Musuk
Dendi	Kâlak	Alan
That-Great	Great One	(a form of Allâh?)
16. Lógoné	17. Wándalâ	18. Bisâri
Mâl-uâ	Dadâ-mia	Ankwane
Our Master	Our Father	

- | | | |
|-------------------------------------|---------------------|------------------------------|
| 19. Fernando Po
Rup ⁱ | 20. Serer
Rôg | 21. Nupe
Sôko
Seeker |
| 22. Basa
Grêpô | 23. Grebo
Njesoa | 24. Bullom
Foi
Beyond. |

D. Kafir Race:—

- | | | |
|--|--|---|
| 1. Kâfir
Utik ^{so}
Red Morning | 2. Sulu
Munkulunkulu
Old-Old-One | 3. Swahili
Muungu
Old-Old-One |
| 4. Sekwâna
Mor ^{imo}
Ancestral Spirit | 5. Sesuto
Molimo
Ancestral Spirit | 6. Inhambane
Muluungulu
Old-Old-One |
| 7. Ki-Hjan
Muluungu
Old-Old-One | 8. Ki-Kamba
Muluungu
Old-Old-One | 9. Kinika
Muluungu
Old-Old-One |
| 10. Makua
Mulugo
Old-Old-One | 11. Otji-Herero
o Mukuru
Old-Old-One | 12. Maravi
Nsimmo
Spirit |
| 13. Sena
Musimo
Spirit | 14. Kwellimane
Musimo
Spirit | 15. Benga
Anjambi
Spirit |
| 16. Mpoñwe
Anjambia
Spirit | 17. Ki-Swahili
Mlungu
Old-Old-One | 18. Sofala
Murungu
Old-Old-One |
| 19. Tette
Moruungo
Old-Old-One | 20. Ki-Pokomo
Muungo
Old-Old-One | 21. Isubu
Obasi
The Father |
| 22. Kongo
Nsambianpungu
Old Spirit | 23. Angola
o Nsambi
Spirit | 24. Kiteke
Nsaño-rupuo
Spirit above |

25. Fulde
Gô¹mam

26. Andaman
Pû¹luga
Good Spirit.

E. Anstralian Race:—

1. Kamilaroi
Baia¹me
Crea¹tor

2. Turrubul
Mum¹bâl
Thun¹der.

F. Hyperborean Race:—

1. Odul
Kô¹il

2. Eskimo
Gud¹lib

3. Greenlandish
Tor¹ngarsuk
Great Spirit

4. Aniu
Kam¹ui
Spi¹rit

5. Aleutic
Agô¹guk

6. Labrador
Gud¹e
(a form of God).

G. 1. Timê
Ke¹sâmanedu
Great Spirit

2. Krî
Ma¹nito
Spi¹rit

3. Lemni-Lennape
Kittan¹itowit
Great-Living-Spirit

4. Ogîbwa
Vi¹sêmanito
Great Spirit

5. Mikmak
Ni¹kskam

6. Malisît
Nu¹kskam

7. Algonkin
Kud¹uagni
Fra¹mer

8. Kôkta
Ô¹ki
Lo¹fty-One

9. Iroquois
Tarô¹nhiawagon
Sky-Holder

10. Dakota
Waka¹ntanka
Great Spirit

11. Tklinkit
A¹sakun

12. Mexican
Teot¹l

13. Otomi
Ok¹kâ

14. Tukud'
Vittukukank¹jo

15. Goakira
Marci¹wa

- | | | |
|--|---|----------------------------------|
| 16. Tupi
Tupan
Thunderer | 17. Kiriri
Tupan
Thunder | 18. Kikito
Tupas
Thunderer |
| 19. Kili-dehu
Pillan
Thunderer | 20. Astek
Huizilo Pokthi
'Humming Bird,
left'. | 21. Gwarani
Tamoi |
| 22. Inka
Pakakamak
World Creator | 23. Kvikuan
Pakakamakka
World Creator | 24. Kapaneki
Nomboni |
| | 25. Köggaba
Kalguašiša | |

H. Malay Race:—

- | | | |
|--|---|----------------------------|
| 1. Lifu
Akōtesi and
Haše | 2. Aneitjumesē
Atua
Core-of-Humanity. | 3. Samoan
Atua |
| 4. Tongan
Otua | 5. Maori
Atua | 6. Tahitian
Atua |
| 7. Rarotongan
Atua | 8. Marquesan
Atua | 9. Nju
Atua |
| 10. Hawaii
Akua | 11. Rotuman
Oitu
Core-of-Humanity. | 12. Faté
Leatu |
| 13. Malagasi
Andria-Manitra and Šanahari
Noble-Sweet Creator | | 14. Malay
Tūhan
Lord |
| 15. Balinese
Widi | 16. Batta
Debata
The Bright One | 17. Djak
Tapa |
| 18. Maré
Makaše | 19. Jaiān
K'on | 20. Figi
Kalū |

- | | | |
|-------------------|---------------------|------------------------|
| 21. Viti
Kalou | 22. Ngumesc
Supé | 23. Saibai
Angadan. |
|-------------------|---------------------|------------------------|

I. Mongol Race:—

- | | | |
|--|--|--|
| 1. Akkadian
Dingir
Heaven | 2. Mongolian
Tengri
Heaven | 3. Turkish
Tangri
Heaven |
| 4. Jakut
Tangara
Heaven | 5. Manku
Abka-i Egen
Heaven's Lord | 6. Hun
Tang-li
Heaven |
| 7. Chinese
Tjän
Heaven | 8. Korean
TKien
Heaven | 9. Japanese
Kami
Spirit |
| 10. Tibetan
Lha and Mkog
Lord Best | 11. Burmese
Burâ
Lord | 12. Siamese
Brâ
Lord |
| 13. K'assi
U-Blei
Lord | 14. Kamšadal
Billukai
Heaven | 15. Finnish
Jumala
Thunder-place
(Heaven) |
| 16. Esthonian
Jummal
Heaven | 17. Kéremissian
Juma
Thunder | 18. Lapp
Jubmel
Heaven |
| 19. Jurak
Num
Thunder | 20. Ostjak
Tôrim
Earth | 21. Wogul
Tôrîm
Earth |
| 22. Kúvas
Tóra
Earth | 23. Magyar
Isten
Object-of worship | 24. Mordvinian
Paz
Lord |

- | | | |
|------------------|------------------|-------------------------------|
| 25. Kal'muk | 26. Lep'ka | 27. Samoyede |
| Tar ⁱ | Ram ^u | Jilibeam ⁱ baertje |
| Earth | | Protector-of-the-Living |
28. Karassin
Ilz^a
Great Uncle.

K. Drâvîḍa Race:—

- | | |
|----------|---------------------|
| 1. Kol | } Sîn-Zoña Sun-God. |
| 2. Munda | |
| 3. Oraon | |
- | | | |
|-------------|--------------|------------|
| 4. Sant'âli | 5. Tamil | 6. Tulu |
| Kando | Kadraveguran | Kadavular |
| Moon | Omnipotent | Omnipotent |
- | | | |
|------------|---------------|---------------------|
| 7. Gond | 8. Urija | 9. Râgmahâli |
| Tari-Pennu | Bura-Pennu | Gosanjit' |
| Star-Woman | Lord and Lady | Leader-of-the-Flock |

L. Nûba Race:—

- | | | | |
|---------|-----------|----------|--------------|
| 1. Nubi | 2. Fulde | 3. Mahas | 4. Dongolâwi |
| Nôr | Gomirâdo | Nôr | Arti |
| Lord | Folk-Lord | Lord | Knower. |

M. Midlanders:—

- | | |
|----------------|----------------|
| 1. Basque | 2. Avaric |
| Jainkoa | Zov and Betšed |
| Lord celestial | Heaven Wealth |
- | | | |
|-------------|---------------|--------------|
| 3. Georgian | 4. Mingrelian | 5. Swanetian |
| Gmerti | Goronti | Germet |
| | Self-Existent | |
- | | | |
|------------|-------------|---------|
| 6. Lesgish | 7. Abkâsian | 8. Udic |
| Tangri | Anka | Zû |
| Heaven | Mother | Heaven |

9. T'uś
Dāl
Giver

10. Kēkenziś
Dēlē
Giver.

N. Hamito-Semitic Race:—

- | | | |
|---|------------------------------------|--|
| 1. Bogos
Ġār
Heaven | 2. Galla
Wākâ-jo
Potter | 3. Kabyle
Rebbi
Master |
| 4. Egyptian
Nuter
Destroyer | 5. Koptic
Nūte
Destroyer | 6. Hebrew
El
Force |
| 7. Aramaean
Alāhā
Fear | 8. Assyrian
An and Ilu
Force | 9. Syro-Chaldaic
I-I
Self-Existent |
| 10. Phaenician
Alilat
Fear | 11. Karšun
Allah
Fear | 12. Arabic
Allah
Fear |
| 13. Bilin
Adarâ
Lord | 14. Kamir
Adarâ
Lord | 15. Kara
Jadarâ
Lord |
| 16. Æthiopic
Egşlabehêr
Land-Lord | 17. Amharic
Amāk
King | 18. Tigré
Egşlabehêr
Land-Lord. |

O. Aryan Race:—

- | | | |
|-----------------------------------|----------------------------|--------------------------------|
| 1. Sanskrit
Dēva
Bright One | 2. Sand
Ahura
Spirit | 3. Pāli
Jēbba
Bright One |
| 4. Bengāli
I'wor
Ruler | 5. Assami
Mānrah | 6. Pārbuti
Ġsvāra
Ruler |

- | | | |
|---|--|------------------------------------|
| 7. Mondari
Paramêśvarâ
High Ruler | 8. Gurmukî
Paramêśura
High Ruler | 9. Marât'i
Dêvânê
Bright One |
| 10. Sinhali
Dêvijô
Bright One | 11. Multani
Israhai
Ruler | 12. Hindi
Îśvaranê
Ruler |
| 13. Kait'i
Isaya
Ruler | 14. Sangiri
Ruata | 15. Old-Baktrian
Kad'âta |
| 16. Pahlavi
K'utât | 17. Parsi-Guġarati
K'ôdâo | |

Self-Existent

- | | | | |
|----------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|-------------------|
| 18. Persian
K'udâ | 19. Kaśmiri
K'udân | 20. Sind'i
K'udâ | 21. Urdu
K'udâ |
|----------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|-------------------|

Self-Existent

- | | | |
|---------------------|--------------------------------|----------------------|
| 22. Dâkani
K'ûda | 23. Mussulman-Bengâli
K'ôdâ | 24. Kurdish
K'ôdê |
|---------------------|--------------------------------|----------------------|

Self-Existent

- | | | |
|-------------------|----------------------|---------------------------------------|
| 25. Paštu
Kudê | 26. Osseti
Xyuyay | 27. Armenian
Asdouaz
He-is-here |
|-------------------|----------------------|---------------------------------------|

Self-Existent

- | | | |
|---------------------------------|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| 28. Welsh
Duw
Bright One | 29. Armoric
Douë
Bright One | 30. Irish
Dia
Bright One |
| 31. Gaelic
Dia
Bright One | 32. Manx
Gî
Bright One | 33. Umbrian
Aesar
Ruler |
| 34. Latin
Deus | 35. French
Dieu | 36. Vaudois
Dion |
| | | 37. Italian
Iddio |

Bright One

38. Piedmontese 39. Romanese 40. Roumanian
 Iddio Des and Des Dummeden
 Bright One Ruler and Bright One

41. Catalan 42. Spanish 43. Portuguese 44. Provençal
 Deu Dios Des Dieu
 Bright One

45. Gypsy 46. Tosk 47. Geg
 Dewel Perutia Perendia
 Bright One High Bright One

48. Greek
 Θεοs
 He-to-whom-prayer-is-made.

49. Old Slav 50. Russian 51. Bulgarian
 Bogo Bogo Bogo

52. Servian 53. Slovenian
 Bogo Bogo

Dispenser of Wealth

54. Slovak 55. Polish 56. Wendish
 Boho Bogo Bohg

57. Kroatian 58. Bohemian
 Bogo Buh

Dispenser of Wealth

59. Lettish 60. Lithuanian 61. Samogitian
 Deews Diews Diewas

Bright One

62. Icelandic 63. Swedish 64. Norsk 65. Gothic
 Gud Gud Gud Gud

Self-Existent

66. Old High German	67. Nether-German	68. Anglosaxon
K ¹ ot	Go ¹ d	Go ¹ d

Self-Existent

69. Frisian	70. Flemish	71. Dutch	72. English
Go ¹ d	Go ¹ d	Go ¹ d	Go ¹ d

Self-Existent





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